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Executive Summary 
 
Container Security has steadily increased in importance since 2001 and today is one of the most 
controversial trade-related issues. This is because maritime transportation is the most efficient 
and cost-effective method of transporting goods throughout the world (pp. 5 – 7). Today 
approximately 90 percent of the world’s goods are moved by means of maritime containers. The 
challenge of securing the supply chain against terrorist attacks is to strike an effective balance 
trade facilitation and security (pp. 13, 63 – 64).  
 
The aim of the investigation is to establish whether the Container Security Initiative achieves this 
balance by examining whether it complies with the legal requirements contained in the 
agreements of the World Trade Organization (pp. 9 – 11).  The WTO is the most important trade 
organization in the world and safeguards the interests of its members to participate in 
international trade. All members are bound by the obligations arising under its agreements 
according to the international legal principle of pacta sunt servanda (pp. 112 – 114).  
 
The first part of the investigation provides an overview of the various measures protecting the 
supply chain at national, international and supranational levels (pp. 23 – 57). It finds that the 
conflicting approaches to supply chain security run the risk of burdening traders with a 
proliferation of overlapping and incompatible security measures (pp. 57 – 60). The second 
section then defines and ascertains the nature of the Container Security Initiative (pp. 61 – 93) 
and describes its administration (93 – 104). It finds that the CSI is fundamentally unilateral in 
nature insofar as it does not recognize the maritime security standards of other nations and 
primarily aims to protect the borders of the United States rather than ensure international peace 
and security (pp. 104 – 111).  
 
The third section deals with the question whether the CSI complies with the WTO agreements 
and to this end adopts a three-step approach (p. 115). First, the framework conditions are 
examined including the procedures for raising a complaint, the burden of proof, standard of 
review as well as relevant jurisprudence; second, the relevant agreements are examined and 
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infringements identified; finally, possible justifications for a breach of the relevant agreement(s) 
are examined.  
 
The final section of the dissertation concerns Article XXI of the GATT, the so-called “national 
security exception” (p. 220). This provision constitutes a general exception to the obligations 
under the GATT and justifies measures which infringe the general obligations of the agreement. 
In other words, the CSI would comply with WTO if it is justifiable on the basis of this provision. 
However, the fact that there has never been a decision of the GATT or WTO concerning the 
interpretation of this provision, its subjective and objective wording as well as the great political 
sensitivity which surrounds the issue of national security means that this question cannot be 
easily answered – as shown by the very different views expressed in the literature on this 
provision (pp. 248 – 255). 
 
The examination of Article XXI therefore adopts a modified version of the structure used by the 
Panels and Appellate Body in relation to Article XX (pp. 296 – 333): 
 
1) Preliminary investigation: Does the measure fall within the scope of Article XXI(b) (i) – 
(iii)? 
2) Necessity of the measure: a) is the measure “necessary” to protect “its essential security 
interests? b) is the measure effective? and c) is the measure the least trade restrictive 
measure available? 
3) Has the United States exercised its right to invoke Article XXI reasonably? 
 
The findings of the investigation are as follows. The question whether the CSI falls within the 
scope of Article XXI is a moot point. The terms contained in these provisions are to be 
interpreted in line with the “evolutionary interpretation” (pp. 297, 299) namely their 
contemporary meaning as defined in international agreement. As far as sub-paragraph (b) (i) is 
concerned, the CSI is primarily aimed at finding a “dirty bomb” rather than a nuclear weapon in a 
container. Technically, such a device does not fall within the scope of the term “fissionable 
materials”, because it is a by-product of the fission process (pp. 266 – 267, 297). Moreover, it 
generally recognized that terrorists are highly unlikely to possess the technological know-how or 
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means to transport a nuclear device in a container.  The CSI is also unlikely to fall within the 
scope of Article XXI (b) (iii) because the threat of international terrorism does not amount to a 
state of war or an emergency in international relations (pp. 301 – 304). The term “war” is 
interpreted according to Article 51 of the UN Charter and traditionally has been given a 
restrictive meaning in the sense that it is limited to state actors. Although commentators have 
called for the term to be re-evaluated following 9/11, the traditional notion of war still applies. It 
is not the role of the evolutionary interpretation to shape international law but to reflect its current 
usage (p. 300). Likewise, international terrorism does not amount to an “emergency in 
international relations.” Although port facilities are classified as critical infrastructure in the 
United States, the attacks carried out by terrorists within the maritime domain have hitherto been 
small-scale, sporadic and primitive, using traditional explosives (pp. 303 – 304). The limited 
technical capabilities of terrorists also casts doubt on whether there really is a terrorist threat in 
relation to maritime transportation (pp. 308 – 310) 
 
The next section of the enquiry concerns the necessity of the CSI (pp. 310 ff.). This question is 
also difficult to answer with certainty mainly because the effectiveness of the CSI has been called 
into question by oversight bodies in the United States such as the General Accounting Office and 
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. On the other hand, the SAFE Port Act 2006 has 
attempted to rectify some of these shortcomings (pp. 322 – 324).  
 
The CSI does not appear to be the least trade restrictive measure available: considering that it 
affects a global resource, the United States should offer membership of the measure to all 
countries and closely base its requirements on the international standards of the Revised Kyoto 
Convention and the Framework of Standards (pp. 327 – 328). In addition, the recent 100 percent 
scanning amendment contained in Section 1701 of the IRCA 2007 sweeps away the risk 
assessment strategy upon which the CSI is based. This is likely to be considered disproportionate 
considering that the risk of maritime terrorism is uncertain at best (pp. 330). 
 
The final stage of the test subjects the CSI to the abus des droit doctrine, similar to that found in 
Article XX (pp. 328 ff.). In fact, the investigation uses the chapeau of the latter provision as a 
basis for this investigation, concentrating on evidence of arbitrary discrimination and disguised 
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restrictions on trade. However, the concept of abus des droit does not need to be limited to these 
two instances and further evidence of potential abuses is also examined (pp. 331 - 333.).  
 
In conclusion, the investigation finds that the CSI may infringe general obligations of the GATT 
and is unlikely to be justifiable under Article XXI (pp. 334 ff.). This rather unexpected result 
underlines the need for both the complainant and the United States to collect as much evidence as 
possible supporting their claims. In addition, the United States should not automatically invoke 
Article XXI as a response to a complaint because it can present strong arguments against an 
infringement of the general obligations (pp. 216 – 217, 218). On the other hand, Article XXI is 
far more restrictive in scope than past disputes involving this provision suggest (pp. 294 – 295). 
Like Article XX it is a conditional and limited exception to the GATT obligations and its 
interpretation is the preserve of the Dispute Settlement Body, not the member states themselves. 
Considering that this body is “quasi judicial” in nature and that the World Trade Organization is 
nowadays a “rules-based” institution (pp. 113 – 114), Article XXI is likely to be narrowly 
interpreted not because of policy reasons (à la the Panel in US – Tuna I and II) but because of the 
legal nature of its provisions.  
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 “[F]or our frontline inspectors, border control remains the enforcement equivalent of trying to 
catch minnows at the base of Niagara Falls.” 
 
Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable1 
 
 
Consult before you legislate 
Negotiate before you litigate 
Compensate before you retaliate 
and comply – at any rate 
 
     Pascal Lamy, “Hymn to Compliance” 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Maritime transportation is the most efficient, cost-effective and reliable means of transporting 
goods over long distances.2 The four oceans – the Atlantic, Arctic, Indian and Pacific – together 
“represent the Earth’s greatest defining geographic feature.”3 For thousands of years, the shipping 
industry has brought nations together in trading relationships and has developed its practices 
according to the needs of commerce.4 Today, it is the preferred means of transporting goods long 
distances and represents an extremely important service sector. The popularity of maritime 
transportation is due to “containerization” which refers to the practice of ‘stuffing’ goods into a 
steel container which are then stacked on a ship for transportation.5 It was introduced in the 1950s 
and led to a huge growth in maritime transportation services. The advantages of containerization 
over traditional methods of handling cargo were explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. 
Longshoremen (1980): 
 
                                                  
1
 STEPHEN FLYNN, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE, p. 2.  
2
 See Hans Binnendijk, Leigh C. Caraher et al, The Virtual Border: Countering Seaborne Container Terrorism, 
Defense Horizons, August 2002, p.2. 
3
 THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, September 2005, p.1.  
4
 William Tetley, Maritime Transportation in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, Vol. XII, p. 3 
5
 Further information and references on containerization can be found under 
< http://www.worldshipping.org/ind.html >. 
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"The use of containers is substantially more economical than traditional methods of handling 
ocean-borne cargo. Because cargo does not have to be handled and repacked as it moves from 
the warehouse by truck to the dock, into the vessel, then from the vessel to the dock and by truck 
or rail to its destination, the costs of handling are significantly reduced. Expenses of separate 
export packaging, storage, losses from pilferage and breakage, and costs of insurance and 
processing cargo documents may also be decreased. Perhaps most significantly, a container ship 
can be loaded or unloaded in a fraction of the time required for a conventional ship. As a result, 
the unprofitable in-port time of each ship is reduced, and a smaller number of ships are needed 
to carry a given volume of cargo.”6 
 
Soon after its introduction in the 1950s,7 containerized intermodal transport quickly grew in 
popularity to become the major method of transporting goods from one country to another. The 
efficiency offered by this form of transportation has reduced transportation costs as a barrier to 
trade and led to a tremendous increase in freight traffic driven by the growth in electronic 
commerce.
8
  
 
Nowadays, the American economy is heavily reliant on the maritime transportation system 
(MTS) as the following statement by the U.S. government makes clear:9 
 
“The MTS makes it possible for goods from other countries to be delivered to our front door step. 
It enables the U.S. to project military presence across the globe, creates jobs that support local 
economies, and provides a source of recreation for all Americans. Fundamentally, the Nation’s 
economic and military security is closely linked to the health and functionality of the MTS.”10 
                                                  
6
 U.S. Supreme Court, NLRB v Longshoremen, 447 U.S. 490 (1980),  per Mr. Justice Marshall at section (A), second 
paragraph. 
7
 Malcolm McLean, Pioneer of Container Ships, The Economist 2 June 2001, Issue 1.  “I had to wait most of the day 
to deliver the bales, sitting there in my truck, watching stevedores load other cargo. […] The thought occurred to me, 
as I waited around that day, that it would be easier to lift my trailer up and, without any of its contents being touched, 
put it on the ship.” (emphasis added). Therefore, the concept of a container is that the contents do not have to be 
interfered with. 
8
 MARITIME COMMERCE SECURITY PLAN, p. 2; INDIRA CARR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 3RD EDITION, p. 103.  
9
 See Section 101 (2) Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002, Pub. L. 107-295, 107th Congress, 25 November 
2002 [S. 1214] [hereinafter MTSA 2002]. 
10
 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM: SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, OCTOBER 2005 [hereinafter MARITIME SECURITY 
RECOMMENDATIONS], Foreward, p. i.  
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Maritime transportation therefore represents critical infrastructure for all trading nations.11 
Despite this, security at seaports has traditionally been low and the open nature of ports, 
weaknesses in container documentation12 and low inspections of containers entering the US13 
have combined to make seaports a major locus of federal crime; containers have also been used 
to smuggle of narcotics and contraband into the United States.14 In the years following 
containerization, U.S. Customs – the primary border enforcement agency of the United States – 
became overwhelmed by the increased volume of cargo entering U.S. ports15 and after 9/11 
policy-makers believed that the complete absence of security at harbours made a terrorist attack 
on a major U.S. seaport inevitable.16 Historical events also show that global trade carries risks as 
well as benefits. For example, it has been claimed that 9/11 “imposed the most unwelcome 
transformation of international commerce since the Middle Ages, when westbound maritime 
trade brought the Black Plague from Asia to Europe.”17 The comparison is apposite because 
experts believe that maritime transportation also offers an effective conduit for terrorism.  
 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) acted on expert 
advice that terrorists could place an explosive device in a container destined for an airport or 
harbour in the United States and detonated upon arrival.18 The statistics of 9/11 had already 
revealed the destructive power and catastrophic effects of a terrorist attack on a critical economic 
                                                  
11
 See Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 (22 May 1998); CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (98 – 675): JOHN D. 
MOTEFF, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES: A PRIMER, 13 AUGUST 1998, (“The nation's health, wealth, and security rely 
on the supply and distribution of certain goods and services. The array of physical assets, processes and 
organizations across which these goods and services move are called critical infrastructures.”), page unavailable 
online. 
12
 See Hearing Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, Cargo Containers: The Next 
Terrorist Target?, 108th Congress, 1st Sess., 20 March 2003 [hereinafter S. Hrg. 108–55], p. 6. 
13
 Id., Section 101 (8). 
14
 Id., Section 101 (6). See REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY COMMISSION ON CRIME AND SECURITY IN U.S. SEAPORTS, 
2000, esp. Chapters 4 and 5. See also DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY, MARITIME 
TRANSPORT COMMITTEE, OECD, SECURITY IN MARITIME TRANSPORT: RISK FACTORS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT, JULY 
2003 [hereinafter OECD Report 2003], p. 9 at paras. 24 – 26; S. Hrg. 108–55, pp. 4ff.  
15
 See Hearing Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, Weak Links: Assessing the 
Vulnerability of U.S. Ports and Whether the Government is Adequately Structured to Guard Them, 107th Congress 1st 
Session 6 December 2001 [hereinafter S - Hrg. 107-309], p. 131  (testimony of Argent Acosta). 
16
 S. Hrg. 108–55, (testimony of Stephan E. Flynn), p. 25. See also Section 101 (14) MTSA 2002.  
17
 Leslie Woolf, Global Terrorism Three Years Later, Customs Today, September 2004  
18
 See UNITED STATES SENATE PERMANENT SUB-COMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND 
SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS: AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS TO SECURE THE GLOBAL SUPPLY 
CHAIN, PREPARED BY THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY STAFF OF THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
INVESTIGATIONS, 2006, (hereinafter ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS), pp. 3 – 5; concerning the variety of threats in the 
maritime domain see also THE NATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY, pp. 4 – 6.   
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structure. Such an event at a major U.S. seaport would effectively shut down container shipping 
and paralyze the world economy.19 Faced with this threat, the U.S. government took pre-emptive, 
unilateral action to secure maritime container transportation.20  
 
CBP announced the introduction of the Container Security Initiative on 20 January 200221 as a 
means of securing the container transportation of goods. The primary aim of the measure is to 
“protect the global trading system and the trade lanes between CSI ports and the U.S.”22 To 
achieve this, CBP stations teams of U.S. Customs officials at key foreign ports of its major 
overseas trading partners on the basis of bilateral agreements in order to screen high-risk 
containers before they depart for the United States. Thereby, the CSI practically pushes U.S. 
borders outwards23 and implements U.S. security standards overseas.24 In the United States, the 
Container Security Initiative forms an integral part of Homeland Security and represents a crucial 
issue in domestic politics. This was shown by the 2004 presidential campaign, when Senator 
Kerry and President Bush both agreed on the threat that nuclear terrorism posed to the United 
States.25 The need to secure maritime transportation against terrorists is also recognized by major 
international organizations including the G8, World Customs Organization and the World 
Shipping Council.26 
 
                                                  
19
 ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, id. 
20
 Jessica Romero, Prevention of Maritime Terrorism: The Container Security Initiative, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 597 at 597 
(describing the CSI as an “an excellent illustration of contemporary evolving preventative legal strategies in the 
international arena”). 
21
 See Robert C. Bonner, Speech before the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Washington, D.C., 
17 January 2002 [hereinafter U.S. Customs Commissioner, Speech of 17 January 2002]. 
22
 Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, CSI FACT SHEET, p.1.  
23
 Concerning the concept of “pushing the borders outwards” see Seventh public hearing of the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 26 January 2004 (testimony of Robert C. Bonner, U.S. Commissioner 
for Customs) [hereinafter U.S. Customs Commissioner, Testimony of 26 January 2004]. 
24
 See DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SECURE SEAS, OPEN BORDERS: KEEPING OUR WATERS SAFE, SECURE 
AND OPEN FOR BUSINESS, 21 June, 2004 [hereinafter “SECURE SEAS, OPEN BORDERS”].  
25
 Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, The Container Security Initiative and the Customs Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism: Securing the Global Supply Chain or Trojan Horse? 109th Congress, 1st Sess., 26 May 2005. 
[hereinafter S. Hrg. 109-186], p. 2. Cf. FINAL REPORT OF THE 9-11 COMMISSION, p. 341 (“Bin Laden, al Qaeda, or 
even terrorism was not an important topic in the 2000 presidential campaign. Congress and the media called little 
attention to it”).  
26
 See G8, The Co-operative G8 Action on Transport Security, 26 June 2002; WCO, Resolution of the Customs and 
Co-operation Council on Security and Facilitation of The International Supply Chain, June 2002; WCO, Resolution 
of the Customs and Co-operation Council on Global Security and Facilitation of The International Supply Chain, 
June 2004; European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, Directorate G, Maritime Transport 
and Intermodality, Consultation Paper, Freight Transport Security, 23 December 2003. 
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Thesis and Method of Investigation 
 
The aim of this study is to examine the substance and administration of the Container Security 
Initiative in order to identify aspects of the measure which could conflict with the provisions of 
the WTO agreements. The investigation also considers whether, in the event that a violation 
complaint is upheld, it would be possible to justify the Container Security Initiative on the basis 
of the national security exception.  
 
The United States has introduced the Container Security Initiative for reasons of national security 
in order to ensure the security of its supply chain with its major trading partners.27 The fact that 
the CSI seeks to regulate the supply chain together with the growing importance of supply chain 
security in general, means that WTO member states must be able to anticipate any potential 
conflicts between their security measures and WTO law at the planning stage and formulate their 
provision accordingly. It must be emphasized at the outset that member states are under a legal 
obligation to comply with the provisions of the WTO agreements. There is still a need for 
research into the legal implications of security measures such as the Container Security 
Initiative,28 which are highly complex and affect many areas of international law. This 
investigation aims to use the available evidence to highlight the legal effects of the Container 
Security Initiative on World Trade Law.  
 
With the creation and further tightening of trade security regimes at national and international 
level, there is an increasing danger that international trade could be adversely affected in the “war 
against terrorism.” In fact, the WTO Secretariat has already stated that security measures should 
not represent a disguised form of protectionism.29 This particular danger resulting from increased 
security measures should also be considered against the general fact that, despite the progressive 
                                                  
27
 THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 2002, p.8, which identifies cargo 
containers as a major initiative in relation to border and transportation security.  
28
 See Marjorie Florestal, Terror on the High Seas: The Trade and Development Implications of U.S. National 
Security Measures, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 385 at fn.1, describing this area of research as a “once obscure subject.”  
29
 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEW: UNITED STATES, 2004, (WT/TPR/S/126) [hereinafter 
WTO TRADE POLICY REVIEW 2004], p. 8 at para. 9 (“In the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks, security 
considerations have become an essential component of trade and investment policy. Significant changes to U.S. trade 
practices have been implemented to ensure the nation’s security. […] It is important that the new U.S. security-
related policies and practices do not become unnecessary trade or investment barriers”).  
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liberalization of global trade achieved by the GATT and WTO since 1947, there is still a 
temptation for member states to circumvent their obligations under the WTO agreements by 
means of non-tariff barriers to trade in order to protect their economies against foreign 
competition. This dissertation argues that Article XXI of the GATT represents a conditional and 
limited exception to the general obligations and, as such, provides an effective means of 
preventing states from using national security measures as disguised forms of protectionism.  
 
The dissertation is divided into five sections starting with the background to the Container 
Security Initiative and ending with an assessment of whether the measure complies with the 
national security exception(s) of the relevant agreement(s). Section A provides an overview of 
the various security measures which have been introduced since 9/11 in order to combat maritime 
terrorism. The Container Security Initiative is described within the context of these measures in 
order to make the reader aware of the fact that the measure under discussion forms only one of a 
number of security initiatives at national, supranational and international level. Section B 
examines the substance, implementation and administration of the 24 Hour Rule and the 
Container Security Initiative. Although the two measures are technically separate, the 24 Hour 
Rule is examined as part of the CSI because it forms the precondition for the measure’s 
implementation at foreign seaports.30 Other subjects of investigation include the bilateral 
agreements and benefits of CSI participation.  
 
Section C tackles the question of whether the Container Security Initiative contravenes the 
various WTO Agreements. It starts by outlining in general terms the potential trade effects of the 
Container Security Initiative and then examines the measure against the GATS, GATT and TBT 
Agreement using a uniform structure. Considering the fact that the effects of the Container 
Security on trade have still not been precisely quantified, the examination aims to highlight 
potential conflicts between the Container Security Initiative and the WTO Agreement. Section D 
examines the hypothetical situation that the Panel upholds a violation complaint against the 
Container Security Initiative. The purpose of this section is to examine whether the Container 
                                                  
30
 Concerning the relationship between the 24 Hour Rule and the CSI see UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, CONTAINER SECURITY: EXPANSION OF KEY CUSTOMS PROGRAMS 
WILL REQUIRE GREATER ATTENTION TO CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS, GAO-03-770, July 2003 [hereinafter GAO-03-
770], pp. 21 - 22 and Annex II p. 49, point 8.  
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Security Initiative can be justified under the national security exceptions found in the covered 
agreements. As with Section C, the major part of the examination concerns the GATT 
(particularly Article XXI) and it concludes with an assessment of whether the CSI complies with 
WTO law. 
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A. Maritime Security Measures Following 9/11 
 
The destruction of the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 by Al Qaeda terrorists exposed 
“the soft underbelly of globalization.”31 Although the headquarters of Al Qaeda were in 
Afghanistan,32 the terrorist cell responsible was easily able to exploit global transportation and 
communications networks to carry out their atrocity in the United States. If globalization had 
created the image of a world without borders, 9/11 highlighted the need to increase border 
security in order to protect the freedoms offered by globalization.  
 
In the aftermath of 9/11, cross-border transportation security became a priority mission for the 
U.S. Government as it took steps to protect the American homeland against further terrorist 
attacks by strengthening border controls. Although some anti-terrorist measures introduced by the 
Bush administration have met with fierce criticism in the United States, those relating to maritime 
security have received a large measure of bipartisan support.33 Other states too, recognizing the 
vulnerability of container shipping, introduced their own measures to protect the global supply 
chain. The need to secure maritime shipping environment was also recognized by international 
and regional organizations including the International Maritime Organization, the World Customs 
Organization and European Union.34 These national, regional and multilateral security regimes 
sometimes differ in significant respects thereby running the risk of creating a patchwork-quilt of 
security standards which ship-owners, operators and masters of vessels must comply with. The 
following section examines this development by providing an overview of the security measures 
which have been adopted by the U.S. government, international organizations and the European 
Union in order to combat the terrorist threat.35  
                                                  
31
 FLYNN, p. 7. 
32
 For an overview of the origins of Al Qaida see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
Third public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Statement of Marc 
Sageman), 9 July 2003.  
33
 See e.g. Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 
The Future of Port Security: The Greenlane Maritime Cargo Security Act, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, 5 April 2006 
(hereinafter S. Hrg 109 – 877), pp.1 and 12; see also ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, p.1. See also votes on passage of 
the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act 2006 Pub. L. 109 – 347, 109th Congress (2nd Session) 30 
September 2006 [H.R. 4954] [hereinafter SAFE Port Act 2006], available under 
< http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-4954 >.  
34
 Supra n. 26.  
35
 An overview is also provided by Owen Bishop, A Secure Package? Maritime Cargo Container Security After 
9/11, 29 TRANSP. L. J. 313; Robert G. Clyne, Terrorism and Port/Cargo Security: Developments and Implications for 
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1. Implementation Strategies  
 
Considering that the level of security in the maritime domain has traditionally been low, 
governments should aim to implement security measures with as little disruption to the supply 
chain as possible. Customs authorities must respect the needs of globalized trade and the rights of 
stakeholders involved in the supply chain. Considering that inefficient customs procedures 
constitute a significant barrier to trade, security measures should also reflect principles of the 
modernized customs environment including transparency and predictability, risk management 
and customs simplification.36  
 
The Container Security Initiative combines concepts of unilateralism, bilateralism and 
multilateralism. It is a unilateral measure designed to protect the United States against terrorist 
attacks by increasing security standards of seaports in foreign territories. The CBP has 
implemented the CSI using bilateral agreements entered into with national customs 
administrations in respect of selected seaports. At the same time, the U.S. Customs 
Commissioner expressed his intention to ‘internationalize’ the security standards contained in the 
CSI by means of the Framework of Standards, a multilateral agreement administered by the 
WCO.37 The following examines these three approaches to supply-chain security.  
 
1.1. Unilateral Security Measures  
 
There is no official definition of unilateral measures38 but the term generally refers to measures 
which a state takes independently of the international community with the aim of protecting its 
own interests. The ability of states to take unilateral measures largely depends on whether they 
have the economic or military leverage to enforce them. They are generally disapproved of by the 
international community which, since 1945, has been characterized by multilateral agreement 
                                                                                                                                                                
Marine Cargo Recoveries, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1183; Constantine G. Papavizas, and Lawrence I. Kiern, 2001 – 2002 
U.S. Maritime Legislative Developments, 34 J. MAR. L. & COM. 451; Thomas J. Schoenbaum and Jessica C. 
Langston, An All Hands Evolution: Port Security in the Wake of September 11th, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1333.  
36
 See Kunio Mikuriya, Legal Framework for Customs Operations and Enforcement Issues, in CUSTOMS 
MODERNIZATION HANDBOOK, pp. 51 – 66 (Luc De Wulf and Jose Sokol, eds., 2005).  
37
 See Robert C. Bonner, Remarks to the Customs World London Summit 2004 London, England, 21 September 2004 
[hereinafter, U.S. Customs Commissioner, Remarks of 21 September 2004]. 
38
 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 4, 2000, p. 1018. 
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(i.e. states take action through the relevant international organizations).39 Unilateral measures are 
controversial because they place the interests of one state above those of other (often weaker) 
states. In the 1980s, for example, the United States introduced unilateral measures to protect 
dolphins and sea turtles. Failure to comply with these measures led to the imposition of trade 
embargoes which were intended to force the offending state to change its environmental policies 
in line with U.S. demands. Although designed to protect the environment the measures also 
restricted developing countries’ access to U.S. markets and thereby caused economic hardship to 
their citizens.40   
 
Such a situation creates the suspicion that a state which has sufficient political and economic 
power to enforce unilateral measures could abuse its power to force trade or political concessions 
from other member states.41 Failure to comply with the unilateral measures of an economically 
powerful state could lead to positive sanctions in the form of trade embargoes which can have 
devastating effects on the target country, as the following statement makes clear:  
 
“In addition to imposing immediate hardship on the people of the target nation, [security] … 
sanctions tend to retard the nation’s future economic and social development. Future trade will 
be lost as traditional customers seek out more stable sources of supply. Advances in such areas 
as housing, health care, and education will be interrupted as money-flows and political stability 
wane and the infrastructure necessary to attract foreign investment deteriorates. As is often the 
case, such effects will not be limited to the target of the sanction but will be felt collaterally 
throughout the region.”42 
 
On the other hand, international law does recognize the right of states to take unilateral measures 
under certain circumstances, notwithstanding their obligations under international agreements. In 
fact, international treaties often contain escape clauses allowing states to take action to protect 
                                                  
39
 See e.g. preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, which refers inter alia to employing international 
machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples. 
40
 See infra n. 64 and (on the effects of such measures) pp. 152 ff., 169 ff. 
41
 See James R. Arnold, The Oilseeds Dispute and the Validity of Unilateralism in a Multilateral Context, 30 STAN. J. 
INT’L L., 187, p. 214. 
42
 See Wesley A. Cann Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the WTO Security Exception: 
Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a New Balance Between Sovereignty and 
Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT’L LAW 413, p. 427. 
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vital interests.43 For example, the WTO agreements recognize environmental and security 
interests as general exceptions to the contractual obligations of its members. National security, in 
particular, represents powerful exception for unilateral measures. Under the GATT and GATS, 
this exception is formulated in partially subjective terms that grant member states a wide (albeit 
not unlimited) discretion to adopt measures they consider necessary to protect their national 
security interests.44  Especially nowadays, in the shadow of 9/11, the public expects their 
government to take precautionary measures to protect them against terrorism.45 The political 
importance of national security measures means that rulings from the Panel or Appellate Body 
which limit this right could result in accusations of judicial activism46 and would be difficult to 
reconcile with the principle in dubio mitius.47 Moreover, Resolution 1373 issued by the UN 
Security Council shortly after 9/11 recognizes the legitimacy of unilateral measures which seek to 
protect national security.48 
 
Therefore, although unilateral measures represent the exception rather than the rule in the 
international community, the right to such measures in extremis is nevertheless expressly 
recognized by international law. Particularly with regard to national security, it can be very 
difficult to challenge the legitimacy of such an important national interest, particularly counter-
terrorist measures in the aftermath of 9/11. On the other hand, the practical difficulties of 
implementing unilateral measures at global level and the controversy which they give rise to 
challenge their long-term sustainability.  
 
 
 
 
                                                  
43
 See Dapo Akande and Sope Williams, Security Issues: What Role for the WTO? VIRGINIA J. INT’L L. p. 366-367.   
44
 See Raj Bhala, Fighting Bad Guys with International Trade Law, 31 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 1, p. 16, who refers to 
Article XXI as an “all-embracing exception to GATT obligations.”  
45
 See Robert E. Baldwin, The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Interpreting the Perspectives of Economists and 
Political Scientists, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY, pp. 157 – 63 (Robert C. Feneestra et al. eds.). 
46
 See infra pp. 246 ff. 
47
 See infra p. 240. 
48
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, 
on 28 September 2001 [hereinafter “S/RES/1373”]. 
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1.2. Bilateral Agreements 
 
Bilateral agreements are concluded between two states and cover a wide range of subjects, 
especially those not yet regulated by multilateral agreement.49 They can take a number of 
different forms although states sometimes prefer informal and non-binding agreements in order to 
reach a quick agreement. Trade is often the motivating factor in concluding bilateral trade 
agreements50 although law enforcement can also be important. Bilateral agreements often offer 
trade benefits in return for co-operation (e.g. the Declaration of Principles).51  
 
As a general rule, a state’s jurisdiction is limited to its sovereign territory and criminals attempt to 
evade prosecution by moving from one state to another.52 Therefore, law enforcement agencies 
often enter into agreements with their foreign counterparts in order to combat transnational crime. 
For example, the United States’ Coast Guard has entered into so-called ‘Bilateral Maritime 
Counter-Drug and Immigration Interdiction Agreements’ with Latin American53 and Caribbean 
states, with the aim of combating drug smuggling and illegal immigration.54 Their main purpose 
is to prevent vessels from exploiting the freedom of the high seas to escape law enforcement. 
Informal bilateral agreements, such as the Declaration of Principles used by CBP to implement 
the CSI, also provide for flexibility and efficiency by by-passing the normal cumbersome 
procedures relating to inter-state co-operation.55 Another form of bilateral agreement used by the 
United States to combat transnational crime is a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) which 
aims “to improve the effectiveness of judicial assistance and to regularize and facilitate its 
                                                  
49
 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Synopsis of ‘Systemic’ Issues Related 
to Regional Trade Agreements: Note by the Secretariat, WT/REG/W/37 (2 March 2000). 
50
 Well-known examples of regional trade agreements include the North Atlantic Free Trade Association (NAFTA); 
Mercursor and ASEAN. 
51
 For an overview of the bilateral approach adopted by CBP see Ashley Roach, Container and Port Security: A 
Bilateral Perspective, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW, pp. 343 ff.  
52
 See generally, Charles Clifton Leacock, The Internationalization of Crime, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 263.  
53
 According to the U.S. Department of State, the United States has concluded bilateral maritime co-operation 
agreements with all of the Central American governments except El Salvador. See Hearing And Briefing Before The 
Subcommittee On The Western Hemisphere Of The Committee On International Relations House Of 
Representatives, 109th Congress, 1st Session (testimony of Jonathan Farrar), 9 November 2005, p. 11. 
54
 See Joseph E. Kramek, Bilateral Maritime Counter-Drug and Immigrant Interdiction Agreements: Is This the 
World of the Future? 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 121, pp. 133 ff.  
55
 See Romero, p. 601. 
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procedures.”56 The United States has entered into more than sixty such bilateral agreements with 
other states and the European Union.57  
 
There are at least three objections to bilateral agreements. First, they can contravene the non-
discrimination principle of WTO law by granting contractual parties preferential trade conditions. 
Second, the proliferation of bilateral agreements whose contents reflect the conditions in the 
contracting parties can lead to a patchwork quilt of standards. Third, bilateral agreements such as 
the Declarations of Principles do not ensure global coverage because they limited to the major 
trading partners of the United States. On the other hand, there are counter-arguments. For 
example, any discriminatory effect of bilateral trading agreements can be compensated by their 
liberalizing effect on trade; the diversity of bilateral agreements can be mitigated by adopting 
model bilateral agreements such as that provided by the WCO in relation to customs co-
operation. Finally, the proliferation of bilateral agreements on the same subject can contribute to 
the attainment of multilateral agreement58  
 
1.3. Multilateral Framework 
 
Multilateralism is the dominant method of global governance and means that states take decisions 
in agreement with other states through international organizations which regulate different 
aspects of inter-state relations. Multilateralism aims to prevent political conflicts arising between 
states owing to protectionism and unilateral measures. This aim most clearly motivates the 
United Nations, which was created in an effort “to save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”59 Since 1945, 
multilateral governance has expanded to other areas, most notably customs and world trade. The 
creation of the Customs Co-operation Council in 1954 created a forum for the multilateral 
regulation of customs matters.60 The signing in 1947 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
                                                  
56
 According to the U.S. Department of State Website, Mutual Legal Assistance (MLAT) and Other Agreements 
< http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_690.html >; see also Leacock, pp. 273 – 274.  
57
 Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance between the European Union and the United States of America, 19 July 
2003, O.J., L 181/34. 
58
 Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case for Bilateral Agreements, 22 Cornell Int’l L.J. 1, pp. 21 – 22. 
59
 Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations.  
60
 The Customs Co-operation Council is the official name of the World Customs Organization 
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Trade heralded the creation of a multilateral trading environment.61 Nowadays, one speaks of an 
international community of states which decides issues of common importance within 
international fora. Multilateralism depends on the willingness of states to respect their obligations 
under international agreements and the development of international law.62  
 
Although international organizations such as the United Nations and World Trade Organization 
permit states to take unilateral measures under exceptional circumstances, its members must 
nevertheless attempt to take measures on the basis of multilateral negotiations where the 
measures in question affect a global resource.63  
 
There is a fear that unilateral measures could lead to the fragmentation of the legal regimes 
established by international organizations and cause trade disputes.64 At the same time, 
multilateral agreement is not always possible or effective owing to the practical difficulties in 
negotiations involving numerous states at different stages of economic development. It is 
therefore crucially important that multilateral organizations have effective decision-making 
procedures. For example, they must be able to take decisions reasonably quickly in order to 
respond to changing circumstances. In addition, the voting procedures and rights of participation 
must be seen as fair in order to ensure the continued support of all states. The World Trade 
Organization experiences difficulties in these respects owing to the size of its membership,65 the 
                                                  
61
 More recently, in 2002, the International Criminal Court was created with jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and related matters. 
62
 E.g., the United Nations aims to “establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising 
from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.” In 1947, the General Assembly of the United 
Nations established the International Law Commission in order to promote the progressive development of 
international law and its codification. See Arts. 1 (1), 13 and 15 of the Statute of the International Law Commission.  
63
 According to the Appellate Body, the use of unilateral trade measures aimed at protecting the environment is only 
acceptable if accompanied by multilateral efforts directed towards the same goal. See Report of the Appellate Body, 
United States – Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998 
[hereinafter Appellate Body, US – Shrimp], paras. 166 – 167. The importance of multilateralism to the WTO is also 
suggested in the preamble to the WTO Agreement, which states that members are resolved “to develop an integrated, 
more viable and durable multilateral trading system.” Moreover, it states that members are “Determined to preserve 
the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading system.” Members are also under 
an obligation to reach multilateral agreement. 
64
 See Report of the Panel, United States — Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R - 39S/155, circulated on 
3 September 1991 (not adopted) [hereinafter US – Tuna I], para. 5.27; see also Report of the Panel, United States – 
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, 15 May 1998 (adopted 6 November 1998), 
[hereinafter Panel, US – Shrimp], paras, 7.44 – 7.45. 
65
 The World Trade Organization currently has 151 members. 
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different blocs of members, which each have differing and sometimes conflicting interests66 and 
the length of time required to reach an agreement.67 Such difficulties may compromise the ability 
of international organizations to respond quickly and effectively to pressing issues such as 
security measures in international trade.   
 
In addition to these procedural difficulties there are some subject areas which do not lend 
themselves to multilateral agreement.68 As stated above, national security is one area which can 
be exempt from the obligations imposed by international treaties. Article XXI of the GATT, for 
example, allows a member state to take unilateral measures “it considers necessary to protect its 
essential security interests.” Measures relating to national security are inherently unsuited to 
multilateral negotiations: only the government has the power to introduce such measures and it 
does so acting on top secret information provided by its security services.  
 
Despite problems in achieving consensus, multilateral agreement is desirable if it can be 
achieved. Measures agreed by the members of an international organization can be implemented 
according to uniform standards and implemented under the auspices of the organization. Thereby, 
the needs of developing countries and LDCs in the implementation process can also be taken into 
account. Last but not least, the organization can make the adoption of such measures a 
precondition for the accession of new member states.  
 
 
                                                  
66
 Developing countries outnumber developed countries. The World Trade Organization does not define the term 
“developing countries” but approximately one third of the WTO membership falls under the category of “least 
developed” countries. The United Nations does not define “developing country” either. In international trade 
statistics the Southern African Customs Union is considered a developed area: see United Nations. Standard country 
or Area Codes for Statistical Use. Series M, No. 49, Rev. 4 (United Nations publication, Sales No. M.98.XVII.9). 
67
 Examples include the continuing lack of agreement on subjecting maritime transportation services to GATS 
disciplines. Negotiations have been held since 1994 without success. The United Nations has not been able to reach 
agreement on a universal definition of terrorism although it has defined terrorist actions. See e.g. Resolution adopted 
by the General Assembly, 49th Session, 49/62 on 9 December 1994 Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism 
[hereinafter A/RES/49/60, 17 February 1995], Annex I, paras.1 – 3. See also the recent Resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly 60th Session on 8 September 2006 60/288, The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy [hereinafter A/RES/60/288, 20 September 2006], preamble, p.2. 
68
 Increasing trade liberalization has given rise to a number of non-trade-related issues (e.g. the environment, labour 
laws and human rights) which has caused disputes between developing and industrialized countries, as illustrated by 
the Seattle and Cancun Ministerial Conferences. See infra, p. 245. 
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1.4. Advantages and Disadvantages of Unilateral and Multilateral Approaches 
 
The main advantage of the unilateral approach lies in the fact that the state has total control over 
the security standards it considers necessary to protect its national security and can formulate its 
strategy accordingly.69 This reflects the close connection between national security and 
sovereignty: states have an inherent right to protect their continued existence.70 With regard to 
maritime security, the U.S. government has stated: 
 
“The United States recognizes the inherent right of every nation, including our own, to defend 
itself, to protect its legitimate national interests, and to prevent unlawful exploitation of the 
maritime domain.”71 
 
National security measures are invariably mandatory in nature, enshrined by primary legislation 
and enforced by (sometimes draconian) trade measures. Recent examples of security measures in 
the United States include the SAFE Port Act 2006 and H.R. 1 Implementing the 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.72 When adopting security measures the government 
can also expect cross-party and popular support: after all, international terrorism strikes at the 
stability of government and the citizens of the state.73 However, it is important that such 
legislation also be transparent, reflect international standards and allow sufficient flexibility.74 
                                                  
69
 The Container Security Initiative is a direct response to a thesis of a leading U.S. security expert which 
demonstrates how terrorists may smuggle fissionable materials into the United States to create a WMD. Concerning 
this thesis see FLYNN, pp. 18 ff.. However, the actual threat level presented by this thesis is disputed. See e.g. 
ECMT/OECD REPORT 2005, pp., 36 – 44. 
70
 Hannes L. Schloemann and Stefan Ohlhoff, “Constitutionalization” and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National 
Security as an Issue of Competence, A. J. Int’l L. Vol. 93, 424, p. 426; Michael J. Hahn, Vital Interests and the Law 
of GATT: An Analysis of GATT’s Security Exception, 12 Mich. J. Int'l. L. 558, pp. 562 – 563; THE NATIONAL 
STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, pp. 20 
71
 THE INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND COORDINATION STRATEGY, p. 4.  
72
 In particular, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act 1996, Pub. L. 104 – 114, 104th 
Congress, [H.R. 927] is referred to within the context of Article XXI GATT. Reference is also made to the general 
embargo on trade applied against Nicaragua by the United States by virtue of Executive Order on 1 May 1985 as well 
as the trade sanctions applied against Argentina for non-economic reasons by the EEC owing to the Falklands 
conflict. See GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, p. 600.  
73
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Being home to “the world’s premier marketplace”75 and the world’s only superpower, the United 
States is in a position to enforce its unilateral customs controls through effective sanctions. 
Through the CSI, CBP seeks co-operation from strategically important states and uses its trading 
power over those states in a “carrot and stick approach” in order to conclude security 
agreements.76 In fact, Section 1701 of the Act Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission 2007 (amending Section 232 of the SAFE Port Act 2006) goes even further and 
effectively makes the very existence of trade relations with the United States dependent on the 
implementation of U.S. security standards (from 2012).77 On the other hand, there are also 
disadvantages with unilateral measures. Such leverage over its trading partners makes unilateral 
security measures a viable option for the United States but they are hardly a realistic option for 
economically weaker states. Where unilateral measures protect vital interests such as national 
security, there is little likelihood of compromise, particularly where the implementing state has 
superior trade power.78 This creates the conditions for trade wars with other states as well as 
disputes with supranational and international organizations.79 This leads to another problem, 
namely that unilateral measures could conflict with the principle of pacta sunt servanda, 
according to which partner states must comply with their obligations under regional and 
international trade agreements.80 This could deprive weaker states of their rights under trade 
agreements and the resultant damage to their economy could actually fuel the conditions for 
terrorism.81 The non-reciprocity of security measures could also cause other states to introduce 
their own security requirements in retaliation82 and the proliferation of incompatible unilateral 
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measures could represent considerable barriers to trade.83 In this context it is important to note 
that UN Resolution 1456 obliges states to respect their international obligations when 
implementing security measures.84 Another significant disadvantage of the unilateral approach is 
that the implementing state has no way of knowing for certain if its measures are effective in 
preventing the perceived threat of terrorism. In dealing with the threat the member state in 
question will rely wholly on the intelligence provided by its security services. However, this 
assessment is usually classified and not open to scrutiny by the legislature or international 
organizations.85 The risk of the ineffectiveness of unilateral measures is particularly acute in the 
case of the CSI considering that it is the first measure which attempts to secure maritime 
transportation against a shadowy, non-state actor (Al Qaeda).86 
 
Multilateral measures are developed by international organizations which view security as a 
global public good and aim to improve the security of all their members.87 Their main aim is to 
create uniform, albeit voluntary standards which can be adopted by all members taking account 
of their economic development. In particular, a body such as the World Customs Organization 
can ensure that LDCs and DCs are not excluded from security standards by coupling their 
implementation with necessary capacity building.88 International organizations also formulate 
measures within the framework of the treaty obligations binding their members as well as 
international legal principles.89 As a result, multilateral security measures can (in theory at least), 
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lead to a more consistent security regime than the patchwork quilt of bilateral agreements with 
selected trading partners used to implement unilateral security measures (such as the CSI). On the 
other hand, the multilateral approach also entails considerable disadvantages. Perhaps most the 
most significant of these is the fact that the adoption of security measures at international 
organizations depends on consensus. Accordingly, it may take a long time before the organization 
achieves the necessary consensus and, in the battle for acceptance, the security measure may end 
up as representing the lowest common denominator and amount to no more than a weak 
supplement to the more stringent national measures. In addition, the security measures of 
international organizations (e.g. the WCO’s Framework of Standards) are often voluntary and it 
is difficult to monitor compliance.90  
 
2. Security Measures at National Level 
 
In the United States, economic security has long been linked to national security and seaports and 
container terminals are regarded as critical infrastructure owing to their economic significance.91 
Following 9/11, the United States government, acting through the Departments of State and 
Homeland Security introduced a raft of measures in response to the threat of maritime 
terrorism.92 Such measures have given rise to controversy because they potentially restrict access 
to US markets and respond to a threat which is impossible to identify or predict precisely.  
 
2.1. The Maritime Transportation Security Policy of the United States  
 
The security policy of the United States with regard to the maritime domain was established by 
Presidential Directive NSPD41/HSPD 13, which was issued on 24 December 2004.  The aim of 
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the Directive is to establish “U.S. policy, guidelines, and implementation actions to enhance U.S. 
national security and homeland security by protecting U.S. maritime interests.”93 The strategy 
primarily aims to protect the United States but it also recognizes the fact that securing the 
maritime domain is a global issue. It states that maritime security policies “are most effective 
when the strategic importance of international trade [is] … considered appropriately.94 The fact 
that the international supply chain spans several jurisdictions means that, in practice, the United 
States will only be able to protect its national interests by co-operating with other states. The 
coordination of international efforts and international outreach therefore forms an important part 
of U.S. maritime security policy.95 
 
As a result of Presidential Directive NSPD41/HSPD13, the Department of Defence and 
Homeland Security developed the National Strategy for Maritime Security which was published 
in December 2005, almost three years after the Container Security Initiative was introduced.96 
The Directive also mandated eight interrelated supporting plans which deal with different aspects 
of maritime security and are guided by the security principles in the National Strategy.97 The 
“vision for maritime transportation system security” is stated thus: 
 
“A systems-oriented security regime built upon layers of protection and defense-in-depth that 
effectively mitigates critical system security risks, whilst preserving the functionality and 
efficiency of the MTS. Understanding the most effective security risk management strategies 
involves co-operation and participation of both domestic and international stakeholders acting at 
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strategic points in the system, the U.S. seeks to improve security through a co-operative and 
cohesive effort involving all stakeholders.”98 
 
The National Strategy for Maritime Security maps out the threat, interests at risk and means of 
protection. It claims that threat exists in the possibility that terrorists could exploit 
telecommunications and international commercial logistics to cause damage to global, political 
and economic security. The strategy identifies three groups of potential perpetrators (nation-
states, terrorists and transnational criminals and pirates)99 and has three overarching aims: to 
preserve the freedom of the seas;100 to facilitate and defend commerce101 and to facilitate the 
movement of desirable goods and people across U.S. borders, while screening out dangerous 
people and material. In order to achieve the last aim, goods and people should be screened before 
arriving at the physical borders of the United States.102 The attainment of these overarching aims 
dictates the following objectives:  
 
• Prevent Terrorist Attacks and Criminal or Hostile Acts103  
• Protect Maritime-Related Population Centres and Critical Infrastructures104  
• Minimize Damage and Expedite Recovery105  
• Safeguard the Ocean and Its Resources106  
 
The fact that the international supply chain is a global resource means that the maritime security 
strategy displays extraterritorial characteristics. For example, in order to safeguard the ocean and 
its resources, the United States declares that “[t]he vulnerability is not just within U.S. territorial 
seas and internal waters.”107 Therefore, it intends to patrol its exclusive economic zone and high 
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seas areas of national interest. This is potentially controversial because under international law no 
nation can claim jurisdiction over the high seas.108 
 
The United States has acknowledged that the international supply chain is a resource shared by 
all states by declaring its intention to pursue its security initiatives diplomatically through 
international organizations such as the International Maritime Organization, the World Customs 
Organization, and International Standards Organization.109 Where appropriate, these initiatives 
are to build upon existing efforts, including the Container Security Initiative.110 For example, the 
Department of State is to implement standardized international security and World Customs 
Organization frameworks for customs practices and standards to ensure that goods and people 
entering a country do not pose a threat.111 In particular, the United States will offer maritime and 
port security assistance, training, and consultation in order to enhance the maritime security 
capabilities of other key nations.112  
 
In addition to partnerships with other states, the strategy also requires the government and private 
sector to co-operate in improving maritime security and presents the Container Security Initiative 
and 24 Hour Rule as primary examples of such a partnership.113 Operating in conjunction, these 
security initiatives aim to screen and inspect goods before they reach U.S. ports. However, in 
order to ensure the security of the entire supply chain, cargo must be loaded in containers at 
secure facilities and the integrity of the container maintained to its final destination.114 To achieve 
this, individual companies must embed security measures into their commercial practices as well.  
 
In the event of a terrorist attack, the United States “should not default to an automatic shutdown 
of the marine transportation system”115 but instead aim to “disengage selectively only designated 
portions” and adopt “a prudent and measured response” on the basis of “an assessment of the 
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specific incident, including available intelligence.”116 In this connection, reference is made to 
“closures of selected commercial nodes within the marine transportation system, as well as 
effective efforts to redirect the affected modes of commerce.”117  
 
The Maritime Security Strategy also reflects fundamental security concepts stated in other 
security strategies issued by the U.S. Government following 9/11,118 namely pre-emptive 
defence, international co-operation and unilateralism. The concept of pre-emptive defence is also 
found in the National Security Strategy of the United States (September 2002) and the National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism (February 2003). This form of defence aims to identify and 
destroy the threat before it reaches U.S. borders.119 The National Security Strategy for the United 
States and the National Security Strategy for Homeland Security (July 2002) also stress the need 
for international co-operation. In particular, the former strategy declares that all nations have a 
responsibility to prevent acts of terrorism.120  The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (December 2002), states that the United States will actively employ diplomatic 
approaches in bilateral and multilateral settings in pursuit of non-proliferation goals.”121 Despite 
the need for international co-operation, the United States is also prepared to pursue unilateral 
defence measures. The National Security Strategy of the United States is based “on a distinctly 
American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests.”122 In 
order to defend the nation, the United States is prepared to act unilaterally.123 Similarly, in the 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that the United States “will not hesitate to act 
alone to exercise our right to self-defense.”124   
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Overall, the National Strategy for Maritime Security “represents a multi-layered approach and 
includes increased maritime domain awareness as well as enhanced prevention, protection and 
recovery capabilities.”125 It also forms one component of an overall national strategy to combat 
terrorism. According to the GAO, the various national strategies “show cohesion in that they are 
organized in a hierarchy, share common themes and cross-reference each other.”126 On the other 
hand, they tend to describe the terrorist threat only briefly or in general terms.127 In addition, the 
GAO found that “most strategies lack detailed performance goals and measures to monitor and 
evaluate the success of combating terrorism programs.”128  
 
2.1.1  The Container Security Initiative 
 
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) was publicly announced on January 20, 2002 by U.S. 
Customs129 and was based on the “In-transit Container Security Initiative” which existed between 
Canada and the United States prior to 9/11.130  The CSI was a response to the lack of security in 
container transportation: following 9/11, security experts believed that terrorists could place a 
nuclear or radiological bomb in a container destined for an airport or harbour in the United States 
and detonated upon arrival.131 Such an event would effectively shut down container shipping and 
paralyze the world economy.132 The CSI enables teams of U.S. Customs officials to be stationed 
at key ports overseas in order to screen high-risk containers before they depart for the United 
States.133 It aims to enlarge America’s zone of security by pushing U.S. borders outwards,134 
thereby ensuring that foreign harbours satisfy U.S. security standards.135 The measure originally 
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consisted of non-regulatory (bilateral agreements) and regulatory components (24 Hour Rule). 
However, since the passage of the SAFE Port Act 2006, major concepts of the CSI are now 
largely regulated by statute. The CSI takes its place alongside the numerous security measures 
introduced by governments since 2001.136 
 
2.1.2. The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 
 
This initiative was proposed on 27 November 2001 by U.S. Customs and was formally 
announced on 16 April 2002 by the U.S. Commissioner for Customs.137 According to the 
Customs and Border Protection Bureau, “C-TPAT builds on the best practices of CBP/industry 
partnerships to strengthen supply chain security, encourage co-operative relationships and to 
better concentrate CBP resources on areas of greatest risk.”138 It is a voluntary partnership 
between CBP and importers and participation is open to U.S. and selected foreign companies.139 
Applicants must demonstrate their commitment to C-TPAT by signing agreements in which they 
undertake to establish security practices in all phases of their operations which are approved by 
CBP.140  
 
The C-TPAT offers the government and private sector reciprocal benefits. The government 
benefits from the fact that all participating businesses undertake to establish security practices in 
all phases of their operations which are approved by CBP.141 This serves to remove from the 
inspection process legitimate commerce that presents no security risk. In return for satisfying the 
requirements, companies will be certified by CBP as C-TPAT members, thereby qualifying them 
for expedited processing at U.S. borders. This will create a system of clearance which processes 
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goods faster, more efficiently and at less cost to business.142 The C-TPAT applies to each sector 
of the supply chain and all modes of transportation. Its security requirements are tailored to suit 
the mode of transportation in question. It is not solely designed for large companies – the benefits 
may also be attractive for small or medium-sized companies.  
 
The C-TPAT is an important security measure because it recognizes that responsibility for supply 
chain security primarily lies with the private sector.143 Unlike the CSI, which only improves 
security at select foreign seaports of departure, a customs – business partnership has the potential 
to improve security at the point of origin (i.e. where the goods are packed for shipment).144 It is 
not a new concept: a customs – business partnership to secure supply chain security was 
pioneered by the United States in the Sea Carrier Initiative in 1984 and the Business Anti-
Smuggling Coalition (BASC) of 1996.145 It also resembles pre-shipment inspection. However, 
the C-TPAT is more ambitious than previous partnerships because it seeks to assure the integrity 
of every cargo shipment bound for the U.S. – from the point of foreign manufacture to the U.S. 
border. It has proved a popular concept in many countries and is also reflected in the WCO’s 
Framework of Standards. According to CBP, the current membership includes over 86 of the top 
100 United States importers by containerized cargo volume and represents over 40% of all the 
imports by dollar value into this country and over 96% of all the United States bound maritime 
container carrier traffic.146 
 
2.1.3. The Secure Freight Initiative 
 
The Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) was launched on 7 December 2006 by the Department of 
Homeland Security and Department of Energy.147 The initiative builds upon existing port security 
measures by enhancing the federal government’s ability to scan containers for nuclear and 
radiological materials overseas and to better assess the risk of inbound containers. The 
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programme was mandated by Section 231 of the SAFE Port Act 2006148 and is the result of a 
review of the Department’s programmes, policies, operations and structure.149 It is supported by 
the World Shipping Council.150  
 
According to Section 231(b), equipment for the new security initiative will have to meet a certain 
technical standard and will be provided by either (1) the Department of Homeland Security and 
the Department of Energy or (2) in co-operation with the private sector or, when possible, host 
governments. The aims of the initiative are laid down in Section 231(c), which provides for inter 
alia the scanning of all containers destined for the United States loaded in partner ports;151 the 
electronic transmission of images and information to appropriate United States Government 
personnel for evaluation and analysis and an automated notification of questionable or high-risk 
cargo as a trigger for further inspection by appropriately trained personnel.152 Full scale 
implementation of the pilot system is due to commence one year after the enactment of the SAFE 
Port Act.153 No less than 180 days thereafter the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security is to submit a report to congress on the effectiveness of the initiative.154 The 
implementation of the programme will begin in early 2007.  
 
The programme displays similarities to the Container Security Initiative. However, there are two 
major differences. Unlike the Container Security Initiative, the SFI will not rely solely on cargo 
manifest information to target high-risk cargo, but use additional advance cargo shipment 
information from a number of sources.155 This information will be compiled by privately-
operated “fusion Centres.” This initiative offers an important advantage over the CSI by 
providing a more complete and accurate picture of what cargo is being bought and sold, by 
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whom, and from where.156 Second, the SFI requires United States-bound containers before 
departure to pass through a radiation detection machine and an X-ray device, a combination 
intended to find bomb-making materials that have intentionally been shielded. However, 
according to Section 1701 of the Act Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission 2007, such scanning will apply to all containerized shipments destined for the 
United States by 2012 (so-called “100 per cent scanning”).  
 
2.1.4. The Megaport Initiative 
 
This initiative is administered by the Office of the Second Line of Defense (SLD) within the 
Department of Energy. The aim of the Megaports Initiative is to enhance security at major 
seaports by installing radiation detection equipment in order to prevent the smuggling of nuclear 
and radioactive material by containers.157  Such material could be used to construct a weapon of 
mass destruction which could be used against the United States. Although the Megaports 
Initiative is separate from the CSI, it complements the fourth component of that measure. Like 
the CSI, it takes the form of a co-operation between the Department of Energy and the host 
country’s government. In effect, the two countries share the costs of the security equipment: the 
DOE provides the equipment which is to be used and the foreign port facilitates the installation 
and operational staff. Unlike the fourth component of the CSI, the Megaports Initiative involves 
commercially available, off-the-shelf equipment. The Megaports Initiative currently has three 
members: the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands, the port of Antwerp in Belgium and the port 
of Piraeus in Greece.  
 
2.1.5. Operation Safe Commerce 
 
Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) was created in August 2001 and was originally intended to 
secure the supply chain against narcotics smuggling.158 According to its mission, OSC aims to 
enhance border and international transportation security without impeding free trade and 
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international commerce.159 OSC is a coalition of private business, ports, local, state and federal 
representatives. It is headed by an Executive Steering Committee which is co-chaired by the 
Department of Transport and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. The measure 
identifies weaknesses in the supply chain and tests new cargo handling techniques and 
technology which can be used to secure the supply chain.160 Operation Safe Commerce 
complements the CSI and C-TPAT but penetrates the supply chain further than either because 
container handling and technology solutions affect all private and public sector stakeholders in 
the supply chain.161 It currently involves the three largest container ports in the United States 
which have been provided with grants by the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Transportation Security Agency to fund security projects.162 
 
2.1.6. The Proliferation Security Initiative 
 
This measure was introduced by President Bush on 31 May 2003 and is based on the National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction which was published in December 2002. The 
PSI is an interdiction strategy in relation to state or non-state actors of proliferation concern.163 
Such actors are those countries or entities which PSI participants believe should be subject to 
interdiction activities owing to their involvement in proliferation. It is a response to the growing 
market in weapons of mass destruction and related materials. Traffickers today are using 
increasingly aggressive and sophisticated methods to traffic WMD. This problem has been 
recognized by the United Nations164 whose Security Resolution 1540 corresponds to the aims of 
the PSI.165 The initiative consists of states which are concerned to ensure the non-proliferation of 
WMD and are willing and able to stop the flow of such materials as they are transported by sea, 
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air or land. The programme is overseen by the Department of Homeland Security with the 
support of the U.S. Coast Guard and, like the CSI, is based on bilateral agreements with other 
states. There are currently agreements with Panama, Liberia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands 
and Croatia. Negotiations are being carried out with Greece, Belize and Cyprus. In 2003, 
participants of the initiative agreed to the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles.166  
 
2.1.7. The Smart Box Initiative 
 
This initiative was started in 2004 by the CBP and five C-TPAT participants. The currently used 
“fifty cent seal” is an indicative mechanical seal (i.e. is only designed to indicate interference). 
However, they can be easily replaced and are insufficient to ensure the integrity of the 
container.167 The aim of this initiative is to develop a smart box which will prevent containers 
being opened by unauthorized persons en route to the port of destination. As a result, it aims to 
secure the container itself rather than the surrounding maritime environment. Research Centres 
around developing a container security device (CSD) which will record tampering and eventually 
replace the currently used ISO Standard mechanical security seal.168 Arguably, this initiative is 
the only one which offers verifiable “cradle to the grave” security. 
 
2.2. Legislative Instruments Relating to the CSI 
 
Immediately after 9/11 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1373 under its 
Chapter VII powers. Article 2(b) obliged states to take the necessary steps to prevent the 
commission of terrorist acts. States were given a 90-day period in which to implement the 
provisions of the Resolution and a Committee of the Security Council was established, in order to 
monitor compliance. As a result of this Resolution, state legislatures acted quickly to improve 
their regulatory counter-terrorist regimes. In line with the obligation imposed by UN Resolution 
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1373, Congress passed a number of statutes which aimed to secure U.S. borders against further 
terrorist atrocities. The legislative basis for the Container Security Initiative is provided by the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002 (“MTSA”) which amended the Trade Act 2002. 
Generally speaking, the function of both Acts is to embed security practices and vulnerability 
reduction efforts into commercial practices.169 The Trade Act 2002, Homeland Security Act 2002 
and U.S. PATRIOT Act 2002, also served to facilitate the implementation of the CSI by creating 
the necessary conditions and infrastructure for effective counter-terrorist measures. The recent 
Security and Accountability for Every Port Act 2006 (“SAFE Port Act 2006”), codifies the 
Container Security Initiative. The following section provides an overview of applicable legal 
instruments as well as legislative developments relating to the CSI. 
 
2.2.1. Homeland Security Act 2002  
 
One of the first steps that the U.S. government took in response to 9/11 was a fundamental 
reorganization of executive agencies in order to improve its anti-terrorist capabilities. This was 
achieved by the Homeland Security Act 2002,170 described at the time as representing the “most 
extensive reorganization of the federal government since Harry Truman signed the National 
Security Act.”171 Section 101 of the Act creates the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), an 
executive branch of the U.S. government. This department was established on 24 January 2003 
and its primary mission is to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States, reduce America's 
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage of, and help in recovery from, terrorist 
attacks that do occur.172 Section 402 identifies agencies and functions relevant to border and 
transportation security that are to be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. 
Overall, the Department houses over twenty federal agencies including the United States 
Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service, the Coast Guard, and the Transportation Security Administration. Subsuming 
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all the agencies with border security tasks under one department with overall responsibility for 
security aims to improve the flow of information and co-operation between them.173  
 
2.2.2. US PATRIOT Act 2002  
 
The US PATRIOT Act 2002174 was passed as a direct response to Resolution 1373 and is 
described in its preamble as “[a]n Act to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and 
around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes.”175 
Section 801 outlaws terrorist attacks and other actions of violence against mass transportation 
systems. Accordingly, it is a crime to wreck, derail, burn or disable mass transit; place a 
biological agent or destructive device on mass transit recklessly or with the intent to endanger or 
to place the same in or near a mass transit facility knowing a conveyance is likely to be 
disabled.176 Section 1016 (e) of the Act also defines the term “critical infrastructure”, which 
would appear to include physical networks such as the maritime transportation system.177 
Terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against mass transportation systems are punishable by 
a fine or imprisonment.178  
 
 
 
                                                  
173
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2.2.3. The Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002 
 
The Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002179 (MTSA) was the first piece of legislation 
dealing with maritime counter-terrorism and aims to protect ports and waterways in the United 
States from a terrorist attack without adversely affecting the flow of legitimate commerce. 
Section 102 of the Act implements the security requirements of SOLAS amendments and the 
ISPS Code issued by the International Maritime Organization.180 Its provisions impose broad 
security requirements on the private sector and establish a comprehensive national antiterrorism 
system, integrating federal, state, local and private law enforcement agencies overseeing the 
security of the international borders at America's seaports.181 Under this Act, the Coast Guard is 
primarily responsible for ensuring the security of ports and vessels in the United States.182 
However, there is also an extraterritorial dimension to this legislation. Section 108 (a) (1) (B) of 
the Act provides for the assessment of anti-terrorist provisions at foreign seaports from which 
foreign vessels depart on a voyage to the United States. In addition, sub-paragraph (C) authorizes 
the Secretary to assess the security arrangements of any other port he considers a risk to 
international maritime commerce. If the Secretary deems the anti-terrorist measures of the foreign 
port to be inadequate, he can deny vessels from that port entry to the United States.183 Violations 
of the Act lead to severe monetary sanctions.184 Another important function of the MTSA was to 
amend the Trade Act of 1930 to permit U.S. Customs to require the advance submission of 
electronic information.185 Certain provisions of the MTSA were recently amended by the SAFE 
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Port Act 2006. As a rule, the owner of a vessel or facility is now required to be a U.S. citizen.186 
The Act also reflects the need to co-operate with the private sector in securing the maritime 
facilities.187 
 
2.2.4. The Trade Act 2002  
 
The effective prevention of terrorism requires the co-operation of the private sector. This is 
reflected in Chapter 4 of the Trade Act 2002188 which contains a number of anti-terrorism 
provisions. Section 343 (a) directs the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations, within 
one year of enactment of the Act, providing for the transmission to the Customs Service, now the 
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), of electronic cargo information prior to 
importation into or exportation from the United States. The regulations can require information 
which the Secretary believes is reasonably necessary to ensure aviation, maritime and surface 
transportation safety and security pursuant to those laws enforced and administered by the 
Customs Service.189 Additionally, the statute sets parameters which the Secretary must adhere to 
when developing and promulgating the regulations; requires him to balance the needs of trade 
and security and to consider differences in the various modes of transportation.190 The existence 
of competitive relationships among parties on whom requirements to provide particular 
information will be imposed are to be considered.191 Customs also has to recognize the 
competitive importance for the confidentiality of information as well as the differences between 
modes of transportation.192 Section 341 (a) of the Trade Act also increases the immunity of 
Customs officers from civil actions when conducting searches.193  
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2.2.5. The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act 2006  
 
By 2006, political interest in the security measures introduced by the CBP had greatly increased 
and Senators introduced legislation to improve their effectiveness. Political support for codifying 
the CSI and C-TPAT was reinforced owing to the acquisition by DP World of rights to run 
terminal operations at six US ports in 2006.194 Accordingly, a bill for the Greenlane Maritime 
Cargo Security Act (S. 2008), was submitted to Congress following a high-profile hearing on 
maritime security measures in May 2005.195 Its aim was to improve cargo security and regulate 
container security standards and procedures of the Container Security Initiative, the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism and “greenlane” clearance of maritime container cargo.196 
This bill was superseded by the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act 2006 which 
retained many of its provisions. 
 
The so-called “SAFE Port Act” 2006 was passed on 14 March 2006 with strong bi-partisan 
support in the Congress. It specifically addresses maritime terrorism and aims to enhance security 
at U.S. ports, prevent threats from reaching the United States and track and protect containers en 
route to the United States.197 The Act addresses weaknesses in maritime security identified by the 
Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigations (PSI)198 namely the failure to examine high-risk 
containers and container systems.199 It increases the transparency of the CSI by requiring the 
publication of a strategic plan200 and minimum security standards201 and also defines terms 
commonly used in relation to maritime security.202 The Act also responds to the issue of costs 
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which was raised at a congressional hearing on the CSI and accompanying report.203 The Act 
requires the stationing of personnel to be assessed with a view to conducting CSI targeting 
domestically.204  
 
Title II of the Act deals with the security of the international supply chain, which is defined in 
Section 2 (10) as “the end-to-end process for shipping goods to or from the United States.”205 
Section 205 codifies the most important (and controversial aspects) of the Container Security 
Initiative. For example, Section 202 (a) requires the Secretary of the DHS to develop protocols 
for the resumption of trade which trade has been suspended owing to a transportation security 
incident. Preference will be given to vessels entering 1) from an approved foreign (CSI) port; 2) 
vessels operated by C-TPAT participants and 3) carrying Greenlane (3rd tier CTPAT) cargo.206 
Section 205 (j) expressly states that cargo from CSI ports will be deemed as representing a lesser 
risk than cargo from non-CSI ports and Section 202 (c) (1) authorizes the Customs Commissioner 
to give priority to cargo entering a port of entry directly from a foreign seaport designated under 
the Container Security Initiative.207 Section 201 (a) requires the Secretary of the DHS to 
formulate a strategic plan for maritime transportation security and lists related requirements in 
Section 201 (b) (1) – (11). This complements existing plans relating to maritime transportation 
security208 and must take into account the impact of supply chain security requirements on small 
and medium-sized companies. This is complemented by Section 201(c) which requires the 
Secretary to consult with major stakeholders involved in the security of containers moving 
through the international supply chain.209  
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2.2.6. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 2007  
 
The importance of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 2007 
(IRCA) lies in Section 1701 which amends Section 232 of the SAFE Port Act 2007 to provide for 
100 per cent scanning of all container cargo entering the United States.210 The proposal of 100 
per cent is not new and was actually raised at a Senate hearing soon after the introduction of the 
CSI.211 Following the enactment of the SAFE Port Act 2006 a number of amendments were 
tabled mandating 100 per cent inspections by senators who regarded the CSI as offering 
inadequate protection against high-risk containers. H.R. 4899 (the so-called “Sale Only if Scan” 
Act) required foreign ports participating in the Container Security Initiative to scan (as opposed 
to screen) all containers shipped to the United States for nuclear and radiological weapons before 
loading.212 Failure to scan the cargo would have led to the suspension of trade in container cargo 
with that nation, which effectively made membership of the CSI a liability. The information 
collected from the scanning would be recorded and used to enhance the ATS system. However, 
the amendment was narrowly defeated.213 On 12 September 2006 the so-called “Schumer 
Amendment” 4930 was offered which also provided for the 100 percent scanning of containers 
entering the United States214 but it was killed by a table to motion. Another amendment was 
Senate Amendment 4999 offered on 13 September 2006: to improve the Security of Cargo 
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Containers Destined for the United States.215 This would have amended Section 126 of the SAFE 
Port Act to provide for the creation of a plan for 100 percent scanning of cargo containers. The 
plan would have provided for specific annual benchmarks of containers destined for the US 
which are scanned at foreign harbours as well as penalties for those harbours which did not 
correspond to the benchmarking, including the loss of access to United States ports and fines. 
However, this amendment was not approved in the Senate by a vote.  
 
On 14 March 2006, S. 2410 (Foreign Investment Transparency and Security Act of 2006)216 was 
introduced.  Section 3 (a) (2) of the bill proposed amending the SAFE Port Act 2006 to the effect 
that it should be the goal of the United States to scan 100 percent of containers. The bill did not 
became law but in the 110th Congress, H.R. 1 Implementing the Recommendations of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (IRCA 2007) was enacted.217 
Section 1701 of the IRCA 2007 effectively reinvokes the aim of H.R. 4899 amendment to permit 
container cargo to enter the United States only if it has been subject to scanning. This provision is 
planned to take effect by 1 July 2012 (Section 1701 (b) (2) (A)).  
 
3. Security Measures at International Level  
 
The Container Security Initiative was the first measure designed to secure maritime cargo 
containers against terrorist attack. The measure is unilateral insofar as it aims to protect the 
borders of the United States but is implemented in co-operation with other states on the basis of 
bilateral agreements. After its introduction, a number of organizations also issued measures 
designed to secure maritime transportation.218 As a result, the United Nations, World Customs 
Organization, the European Union, G8, the International Maritime Organization and the World 
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Shipping Council have all taken steps to combat maritime terrorism. Some of these measures 
reflect the strategy employed by the CSI (most notably the WCO’s Framework of Standards).219 
The proliferation of agreements and resolutions relating to anti-terrorism complement the rule of 
customary international law that states are obliged to co-operate in order to combat terrorism.220 
 
Prior to 9/11, there was no international regime to prevent acts of terrorism involving maritime 
transportation. For example, existing security conventions such as the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea 
Convention (SOLAS) were directed towards the safety of those on board vessels and bilateral 
agreements with other states concerning co-operation in maritime matters dealt with drug 
smuggling and illegal immigration. The lack of a global maritime security regime reflected the 
absence of agreement on combating international terrorism generally. In some respects, this still 
applies: despite the universal condemnation of international terrorism, the Security Council has 
been unable to produce a definition of terrorism221 owing to a lack of consensus within the 
international community on what constitutes terrorism.”222 The Security Council regards the lack 
of a universal definition as a major obstacle in combating terrorism223 and has attempted to 
resolve this issue. For example, after 9/11 it attempted to strengthen anti-terrorist measures by 
issuing Resolution 1373 (2001) which obliged all states to take steps to combat terrorism.224 In 
addition, it established the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism in 
October 2001 to work on a Draft Comprehensive Convention which would define “international 
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terrorism” in way which is acceptable to all nations. However, a general definition of terrorism 
has so far proved elusive.  
 
This unsettled situation also applies to the weapons used by terrorists. International law does not 
provide a universal definition of “Weapons of Mass Destruction”225 despite the fact that 
“weapons of mass destruction” (“WMD”) is a term routinely used in discussions on international 
terrorism.226 It is commonly described as an umbrella term which refers to three different 
materials in the construction of weapons: nuclear, biological and chemical agents.227 The 
possession and use of each weapon is regulated in international law by separate conventions.  
 
The weapons capability of international terrorists (and thereby the risk they present to target 
nations) is also unclear. Although they have hitherto used conventional weapons in carrying out 
their acts of terror, there is a constant fear that terrorists could gain possession of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction in the near future.228 Although the likelihood of terrorists using these particular 
weapons is believed to be remote owing to difficulties in constructing the weapons and 
detonation,229 it is also acknowledged that it is not beyond the technical competence of terrorists 
to construct a radiological or “dirty” bomb, consisting of conventional explosives surrounded by 
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 The term “weapon of mass destruction” (WMD) is defined in 18 U.S. Code §2332 a (c); cf. Alan Reynolds, Hazy 
WMD Definition, WASHINGTON TIMES, 2 February 2003.  
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radioactive material.230 A recent report by the National Defense University deemed an ocean 
container as ideally suited to delivering a WMD.231 
 
3.1. International Organizations 
 
There are many international organizations which deal with issues related to the maritime 
domain.232 The most important organization for customs matters is the World Customs 
Organization whose membership accounts for 99 % of all customs administrations. According to 
its mission statement, the WCO aims “to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of Member 
Customs administrations, thereby assisting them to contribute successfully to national 
development goals, particularly in the areas of trade facilitation, revenue collection, community 
protection and national security.”233 This organization issued the Framework of Standards for 
supply chain security measures in 2005. On the other hand, customs procedures are also of 
importance to trade organizations because they can obstruct the efficient importation of goods. 
The UNCTAD and the OECD have both issued significant studies on the effects of the CSI on 
supply chain practices.234 The most important trade organization is the World Trade Organization 
which has 151 members, although it has not as yet made any contribution to security issues in the 
maritime domain. Stakeholders in the maritime industry are represented by a considerable 
number of international organizations: in particular, the International Maritime Organization has 
played a leading role in maritime security through the issue of the ISPS Code in 2002. The World 
Shipping Council has also played an important role in evaluating the practical effect of these 
measures, notably with regard to the 24 Hour Rule and 100 Percent Scanning measures adopted 
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234
 See ECMT/OECD REPORT 2005; UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT CONTAINER 
SECURITY: MAJOR INITIATIVES AND RELATED INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS (UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2004/1), 
[hereinafter UNCTAD REPORT 2003].  
  
 
46 
by the CBP.235 The following provides a brief overview of the most important measures adopted 
by international organizations in response to the threat of terrorism. 
 
3.1.1 United Nations’ Resolutions  
 
The Resolutions of the United Nations issued by the Security Council under its Chapter VII 
powers oblige states to combat terrorism. The Resolutions lay down the aims to be achieved with 
respect to counter-terrorism whilst leaving the actual implementation to the Members themselves. 
However, Members must thereby respect their obligations under international law.  
 
In its Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001,236 the Security Council of the United Nations 
requires all states to take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist by providing 
early warning to other states by exchange of information and other means.237 States are to “afford 
one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations” and 
“prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls.”238 In 
addition, the Security Council calls upon all states to “exchange information … and co-operate on 
administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist acts.”239 The Resolution 
also establishes the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). This Resolution is 
significant because it imposes a binding obligation on states to take steps to prevent the 
commission of terrorist acts. 
 
Resolution 1456 of the Security Council issued on 20 January 2003 reiterates the obligation on 
states to assist each other to the maximum possible extent wherever they occur.240 It also 
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 See Comments of the World Shipping Council Before the United States Customs Service In the Matter of 
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recognizes that there is a serious risk that WMD could fall into the hands of terrorists and obliges 
states to take urgent action to prevent and suppress all active and passive support to terrorism, 
and, in particular, comply fully with all relevant resolutions of the Security Council.241 In 
addition, the CTC should have regard to international best practices when monitoring the 
implementation of Resolution 1373.242 According to paragraph 6, states must also ensure that any 
measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law. 
International organizations should also collaborate to enhance the effectiveness of their actions 
against terrorism.243 
 
The U.N. Security Council has also passed a number of resolutions which deal with various 
issues related to terrorism. For example, Resolution 1540 obliges states to prevent the 
proliferation of WMD244 and Security Resolution 1624 of 14 September 2005 calls upon all 
States to co-operate, inter alia, to strengthen the security of their international borders.245 
 
3.1.2. Co-operative G8 Action on Transport Security   
 
The Co-operative G8 Action on Transport Security represents an agreement of the members to 
promote greater transportation security in all modes.246 The member states have agreed to 
develop an improved global container security regime, implement common standards for 
electronic customs reporting and to require advance electronic information pertaining to 
containers. The two aims of the Co-operative Action are greater security and trade facilitation. 
Concerning container security, the G8 aims to co-operate with international organizations “to 
develop and implement an improved global container regime.” The group aims to implement 
common standards for electronic customs reporting including in non-G8 countries within the 
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WCO. It also requires advance electronic information pertaining to containers as easily as 
possible in the trade chain. G8 experts will promote policy conference and coordination in all 
relevant international organizations in partnership with industry.  
 
3.1.3. International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 
 
The International Maritime Organization forms part of the United Nations and is responsible for 
the safety of life at sea and environmental protection. Following 9/11, it also adopted a resolution 
calling for the enhancement of measures and procedures to prevent acts of maritime terrorism in 
relation to ships and port facilities.247 In December 2002, the IMO amended the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea with the express aim of safeguarding “the worldwide 
supply chain against any breach resulting from terrorist attacks against ships, ports, offshore 
terminals or other facilities.”248 It was believed that this convention “offered the speediest means 
of ensuring the necessary security measures entered into force and given effect quickly.249 The 
amendments were effected by two resolutions and incorporated into Article XI of the 
Convention, which now deals with safety (XI-1) security (XI-2).250 Resolution 2 of the 
diplomatic conference incorporates the International Ship and Port Facility Code (ISPS Code) 
into Chapter XI-2 (“Special Measures to Enhance Container Security”).251  
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 International Maritime Organization, Assembly Resolution A.924(22), Review of measures and procedures to 
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The ISPS entered into force on 1 July 2004 and represents a direct response to 9/11.252 Its 
preamble states that it is to “form the international framework through which ships and port 
facilities can co-operate to detect and deter acts which threaten security in the maritime transport 
sector.”253 The ISPS is the result of consultations with member states, inter-governmental 
organizations and non-governmental organizations held under the auspices of the IMO’s 
Maritime Safety Committee.254 The provisions of the Code require security plans and enhanced 
security measures for ships engaged in international commerce and port facilities. Owing to the 
fact that the ISPS Code does not directly regulate land facilities, container security falls outside 
its scope. However, the security of land-based facilities has been regulated by the Framework of 
Standards 2005 issued by the WCO and the Code of Practice on Security in Ports 2003 issued by 
the ILO/IMO.255  
 
3.1.4. The WCO Framework of Standards 
 
The World Customs Organization (WCO) also responded to the terrorist attacks in New York by 
its “Resolution of the Customs and Co-operation Council on Security and Facilitation of The 
International Supply Chain.”256 This Resolution reflects the need to pursue improvements in 
supply chain security at international level and adopts basic aspects of the Container Security 
Initiative such as the twin aims of trade facilitation and supply chain security; co-operation 
between the public and private sectors as well as customs administrations, the advance 
transmission of customs data and the importance of risk management and risk assessment 
techniques. The WCO resolves to develop guidelines by June 2003 to assist members in 
developing a legal basis to enable the advance electronic transmission of customs data. In 
addition, guidelines should also be developed for co-operative arrangements between members 
and private industry. The Resolution pays particular regard to the needs of developing countries 
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which will need assistance – both in financial and technical terms – in order to implement risk 
management and risk assessment techniques. 
 
The WCO’s “Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade” provides a 
multilateral set of standards for container security.257 The Framework consists of four 
components: harmonization of advance electronic cargo information requirements on shipments; 
adoption by members of a consistent risk management approach to address security threats; 
outbound inspection of high-risk containers and cargo, preferably using no-intrusive detection 
equipment upon request; definition of the benefits that Customs will provide to businesses that 
meet minimal supply chain security standards and best practices.258 The Framework creates 
harmonized standards in relation to benefits, technology, communication and facilitation and 
encourages the recognition of other standards.259 It is based on two pillars: customs – to – 
customs networks and customs – to – business partnerships which consist of consolidated 
standards. The C2C pillar provides for co-operation between customs authorities in order to 
inspect cargo before it arrives at the destination port. It achieves this by providing for the use of 
advance electronic information to identify high-risk containers or cargo. The C2B pillar aims to 
create an international system for identifying private businesses that offer a high degree of 
security.260   
 
The Framework does not specifically concentrate on combating terrorism but aims to secure the 
international trade supply chain against terrorism and other forms of transnational crime. It 
recognizes that some customs administrations will need assistance in implementing the standards 
and makes capacity-building a precondition of implementing the security standards.261 The 
Container Security Initiative will continue to exist alongside the multilateral framework of 
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standards: the relationship between the two measures was described by the President of the 
World Shipping Council as follows:  
 
“This framework will be useful, but it is at a fairly high policy level and will be implemented on a 
voluntary basis by interested governments. Consequently, U.S. and foreign customs authorities 
must also create a network of bilateral co-operative relationships to share information and to 
enhance trade security.”262 
 
Therefore the Framework of Standards simply represents a voluntary code of standards and does 
not prevent states from pursuing their own security regimes. At the same time, it could be argued 
that it has a certain amount of persuasive force because it represents international best practices. 
 
3.1.5. The SUA Convention 1988 
 
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
was developed in response to piracy and terrorist hijacking of the Achilles Lauro.263 The 
Convention resulted from proposals by some states that the IMO draw up an international 
convention providing for a comprehensive suppression of unlawful acts committed against the 
safety of maritime navigation.264 Such a convention would solve the problem of prosecuting 
unlawful acts against vessels.  
 
The operative provisions of the Convention do not make any reference to terrorism possibly 
because inclusion of the term could have given rise to controversy about its definition.265 
However, the preamble refers to “the world-wide escalation of terrorism in all its forms.” It also 
refers to Resolution 40/61 of the General Assembly of the United Nations by which the UN 
invited the IMO to “study the problem terrorism aboard or against ships with a view to making 
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recommendations on appropriate measures.” The Convention deems certain acts committed on 
board or against ships to be unlawful and declares those who perpetrate them to be international 
outlaws, liable to arrest, extradition and trial.266 Although the Convention does not provide a 
single definition of what constitutes an unlawful act, Article 3 provides a closed list of seven acts 
which may be considered unlawful for the purpose of the Convention, some of which clearly 
relate to terrorist activities.267 In order for such acts to be considered “unlawful acts” pursuant to 
the Convention, two requirements in Section 3 (1) must be satisfied. Accordingly, the act must be 
unlawful per se and the necessary intention must be present. Clearly, if a ship is carrying 
hazardous materials without first having obtained the necessary documentation or permission, it 
could satisfy the requirement of unlawfulness but it would not satisfy the intention 
requirement.268  
 
Following 9/11, the Legal Committee of the IMO has been considering amendments to the SUA 
Convention and its Protocol in order to take into account the increased threat of international 
terrorism. These revisions mainly concern extending the list of unlawful acts and allowing law 
enforcement officials to board ships on the high seas. For example, the list of offences in Article 
3 is planned to be expanded to include “using against or on a ship or discharging from a ship any 
explosive, radioactive material or biological, chemical or nuclear weapon in a manner that causes 
or is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage.” Another important, albeit controversial, 
revision grants law enforcement officials of one flag state to board the vessel of another if it 
suspects the vessel or a person on board that vessel of carrying terrorist materials.  
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3.1.6. Other Instruments Relevant to Maritime Security  
 
A number of instruments adopted by international organizations prior to 9/11 also contain 
provisions relating to security. In particular, they could provide a means of improving security 
standards with regard to the construction of containers and mutual assistance between customs 
administrations.  
 
The Customs Convention on Containers signed in 1972269 regulates the transparency of 
containers for inspection purposes as well as methods of sealing in order to prevent outside 
interference during transit. It also provides for the mutual recognition of containers.  It is the 
major international agreement on containers today and its definition of a container is referred to 
in Section 2(5) of the SAFE Port Act 2006.  
 
The 1972 Convention has two main objectives: (1) the temporary importation of containers and 
(2) the approval of containers for transport under customs seal. An annex to the Convention 
contains the regulations on technical conditions270 which also relate to security standards. For 
example, Article 1 of Annex 4 lays down the basic principles governing the granting of approval 
for the international transport of goods under customs seal. Sub-paragraphs (a) – (d) ensure the 
transparency of containers for inspection purposes. Containers should be constructed and 
equipped in such a manner that no goods may be removed for or introduced into the sealed part 
of the container unnoticed. According to sub-paragraph (b), they must facilitate inspection by 
allowing customs seals to be affixed to them. Sub-paragraph (c) provides that they must not 
contain any concealed places where goods may be hidden. In addition, all spaces capable of 
holding goods must be readily available for customs inspections. Article 2 relates to the security 
of containers by requiring containers to be constructed in such a way as to prevent outside 
interference. According to Article 2 (1) (a), the parts of the container (e.g. sides, floor, roof etc.) 
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must be assembled in such a way that any alteration or removal of a part will leave visible traces. 
The Convention provides for a procedure to amend the Convention in accordance with new 
technical specifications. By means of such provisions, the 1972 Container Convention has the 
potential to offer a multilateral basis for modifying the design of containers to accommodate 
smart container technology.271  
 
The Convention on the Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters 2003 
(Johannesburg Convention 2003)272 provides the legal framework for the exchange of 
information and provision of assistance in order to ensure the proper application of customs laws 
and to prevent, investigate and combat customs offences. The preamble to the Convention refers 
to the need to protect society and ensure the security of the international trade supply chain. It 
acknowledges the importance of risk management to balancing compliance and facilitation and 
emphasizes that it must be based on the international exchange of information. Article 2 (1) 
provides that mutual assistance in customs matters serves three purposes: 1) the proper 
application of customs law; 2) the prevention, investigation and combating of cargo offences and 
3) ensuring the security of the international trade and supply chain.  
 
According to Article 2 (2), mutual assistance shall be implemented by a Contracting Party 
according to its laws and regulations within the limits of its customs administration’s legal 
powers and available resources. In particular, the Johannesburg Convention recognizes that crime 
nowadays transcends geographical borders and seeks to prevent offenders frustrating law 
enforcement by crossing borders. Articles 19 – 23 allow the officials of the Contracting Parties to 
continue pursuit, surveillance etc. in the territory of another Contracting Party. Article 5 deals 
with information for the application and enforcement of customs law. Accordingly, customs 
administrations are to exchange, either on request or on their own initiative, any information to 
assist in the proper application of customs law and to conduct risk assessments to prevent and 
detect customs offences.  
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Chapter VII refers to the use, confidentiality and protection of information. Article 24 imposes 
conditions on the exchange of information. As a rule, information shall only be used for the 
purpose of administrative assistance and by the customs administration or for the purpose for 
which it was intended. This agreement provides a comprehensive framework for the conclusion 
of bilateral agreements between customs administrations concerning mutual assistance in 
customs matters. However, the Convention has yet to enter into force.273 
 
Bilateral agreements are the preferred form of co-operation between customs administrations 
because their contents are to be tailored to the needs of each customs administration. The purpose 
of the WCO’s Model Bilateral Agreement 1996 is to enable states to achieve the maximum 
uniformity possible in their bilateral agreements and it also reflects the provisions of the 
Johannesburg Convention. Changes to the text should only be made where their specific 
circumstances require. Article 2(1) limits the administrative assistance to “the proper application 
of customs law” and Article 2(2) provides that all assistance under this Agreement by either 
contracting party shall be performed in accordance with its national legal and administrative 
provisions and within the limits of its Custom’s Administrations’ competence and available 
resources.” Like the earlier agreement, Article 6 requires the state in need of assistance to 
“request” assistance from the other customs administration. Article 16 respects sovereignty 
concerns by providing that a customs administration can refuse requests for assistance on grounds 
of national security or sovereignty. Article 13 limits physical co-operation in another customs 
administration’s territory to the inspection of documents at the offices of the customs 
administration of the requested administration.  
 
The efficiency of customs administrations is very important for the flow of trade. The 
International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures 
(as amended) 2000 (“Revised Kyoto Convention (“RKC”)),274 responds to the demands of 
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modern international trade by simplifying and modernizing customs procedures and practices.275 
The Convention supersedes the original Kyoto Convention, which dates from 1974. The RKC 
consists of chapters, a General Annex and Specific Annexes.276 The provisions in the General 
Annex are mandatory and all signatories must accept them without reservation. However states 
can choose which provisions they wish to apply in the Specific Annexes.277 The General Annex 
and accompanying guidelines are particularly important for the following investigation because 
they contain core principles for all procedures and practices to be uniformly applied by customs 
administrations. Owing to the fact that the Convention was concluded just before 9/11, supply 
chain security is not treated as a separate chapter, although the stated aim of the Convention is to 
improve customs controls278 and to this end it stipulates the use of automated systems, risk 
management techniques and pre-arrival information.279 The provisions also improve trade 
facilitation by improving the transparency and predictability of customs procedures by requiring 
easy access to customs rules and regulations and providing a system of appeals in customs 
matters. These principles are also found in Articles V, VIII and X GATT. The Convention is 
updated by means of a Management Committee which meets annually and recommends updates 
to the Convention.280 The Kyoto Convention entered into force on 3 February 2006 and there are 
currently 53 Contracting Parties. The United States signed the Convention on 6 December 2005. 
Reference is made to the Convention throughout this investigation in order to clarify customs 
terminology and practices.   
 
3.2. The European Union  
 
The European Community has been developing measures to improve supply chain security since 
9/11. These efforts were given additional urgency by the Madrid bombing of 2003. The European 
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 See Preamble to the RKC. For an overview of this convention see Mikuriya, pp. 53 – 58. 
276
 For an explanation of the structure, see RKC, Guidelines to the General Annex, Ch. 1, para. 2.  
277
 Article 12 (1) – (2) and 13 (1) – (3) RKC.  
278
 Id. (“The objective of this Convention is not only to meet the needs of the trading community to facilitate the 
movements of goods but also to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of compliance with Customs law and 
Customs control”). 
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 See e.g. RKC, General Annex, Ch. 6, para. 6 describing risk management (referring to standards 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5).  
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which has acceded to the RKC will be better placed to implement the Framework of Standards. Updates to the RKC 
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Commission seeks to balance security and trade facilitation by means of the “Authorized 
Economic Operator” (“AEO”) certificate281 which status grants economic participants expedited 
customs clearance subject to certain conditions being satisfied. There are three types of AEO 
certification.282 The “AEO Certificate – Customs” is designed for economic operators wishing to 
benefit from simplifications provided for under the customs rules (typically exporters trading 
with countries outside the EU). The “AEO – Security and Safety” is designed for economic 
operators wishing to benefit from reduced border controls when goods enter or leave the customs 
territory of the Community. Economic operators wishing to benefit from both customs 
simplifications and security facilitation may choose the combined Certificate “AEO – Customs / 
Security and Safety.” The procedure for issuing AEO Certificates is instituted by an application 
of the economic operator for granting AEO status. The applicant is required283 to provide a 
central point for access to all information needed by the customs authorities, including access to 
main accounts, customs records and documentation, workflow–documentation and other records 
which provide evidence for compliance with the requirements for granting the status. In addition, 
applicants are also required, to the extent possible, to submit the necessary data by electronic 
means to the customs authorities. There are two important differences between the EU and US 
security measures: first, the EU measures provide for mutual recognition of security standards 
and, second, the US measures require more extensive data elements for risk assessment.284 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The investigation has provided a brief overview of the various security initiatives taken at 
national, international and supranational level to secure the supply chain. Thereby, two major 
issues have emerged. On the one hand, trade can no longer be pursued in isolation but must be 
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 Regulation (EC) 648/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 April 2005 amending Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code contains an amendment to the Customs 
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balanced with national security interests. Second, the question arises as to what approach is best 
suited to secure the supply chain – an international asset which is of great economic importance 
to individual states. The following summarizes the findings of the investigation. 
 
1. Governments must strike a balance between free trade and security. They must also pay 
due regard to capacity-building 
Prior to 9/11, the most important policy consideration in maritime transportation generally was 
trade facilitation. This was recognized by a number of international conventions, including the 
Revised Kyoto Convention and others dealing with specific modes of transportation.285 As a 
result of 9/11 greater emphasis was placed on law enforcement which required customs to greatly 
increase the security of the international supply chain whilst facilitating trade. This objective 
reflects the fact that the supply chain is an asset of critical importance to the security interests of a 
nation as well as to the commercial relationships of the international community.286 These two 
aims are by no means mutually exclusive287 but can only be successfully balanced if security 
measures are effective and are implemented “with the minimum essential impact on commercial 
and trade-flow costs and operations.”288 Effective security measures are also based on modern 
customs infrastructure which not all countries have in place. Therefore, capacity building must be 
a fundamental pre-condition of supply chain security. 289 
 
2. Unilateral and multilateral security measures offer advantages and disadvantages 
The examination has shown that measures combating maritime terrorism can be divided into two 
approaches: a unilateral approach which concentrates on protecting national borders using 
measure formulated by national security experts (e.g. the CSI) and a multilateral approach which 
regards security as a common good desired by all states and which incorporates international best 
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 See e.g. Convention on the International Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets, 1975 [hereinafter TIR 
Convention 1975]; Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965. 
286
 For an examination of the approach of the US to combating the threat presented by Weapons of Mass Destruction 
as a response to the weaknesses of traditional approaches, see THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COMMISSION, 
FINAL REPORT, WEAPONS OF TERROR: FREEING THE WORLD OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ARMS, 
STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN, 1 JUNE 2006, [hereinafter WMD COMMISSION FINAL REPORT] pp. 54 ff.. 
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 Writers have argued that customs controls and trade facilitation are by no means mutually exclusive. In fact, 
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Customs in Cargo Security, in CUSTOMS MODERNIZATION HANDBOOK, (Luc de Wulf and José B. Sokol eds.), pp. 
265 – 266.  
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 THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, p. 20. 
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 See e.g. the Framework of Standards, supra pp. 49 - 51. This theme is examined further at infra pp. 149 - 155 ff. 
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practices (e.g. the Framework of Standards).290  These two approaches display distinct advantages 
and disadvantages in securing the supply chain.  
 
3. Unilateral and multilateral approaches to security are not mutually exclusive 
Both the maritime domain and supply chain security are public goods and, as such, all nations of 
the world have an obligation to contribute to their security and, by the same token, the right to 
benefit from them.291 Effective security may therefore require a mixture of the three approaches: 
states seek to protect their own borders by devising measures that place particular emphasis on 
their vital interests but which are based on international standards and best practices. They can 
then seek to implement these agreements by entering into bilateral agreements with the relevant 
states.292 Such an approach offers one way of striking a balance between the many issues at stake 
in implementing pre-emptive measures to protect maritime transportation security, namely 
national security, the global maritime domain, state sovereignty as well as a state’s obligations 
under international agreements.  
 
4. Cost is a major factor when implementing security measures 
A common problem of security measures, regardless of whether they are unilateral, bilateral or 
multilateral in nature is cost. There are few options available in securing seaports and cargo 
containers and, as a rule, the measures proposed to secure the supply chain require states to create 
the necessary infrastructure to facilitate information exchange and acquire expensive NII 
equipment to scan containers. This aspect was realized by the U.S. government and international 
organizations soon after the introduction of security measures.293 This aspect is of particular 
concern to developing countries and demands effective capacity building.294  
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 This resembles the approach taken by the United States to environmental measures. See e.g. Panel, US – Tuna I, 
paras. 527 – 528; Florestal, pp. 397 – 398.  
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 Cf. NATIONAL SECURITY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, p. 2. 
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 Both the ISPS CODE and the Framework of Standards recognize that implementation of their provisions depends 
on co-operation between states. See Preamble to the ISPS CODE, para. 8 and standards 7.5, 9, 11 of the Framework of 
Standards.    
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additional burden on certain Contracting Governments.” See also S/RES/1377, recognizing that many States will 
require assistance in implementing all the requirements of S/RES/1373. See also S/RES/1624, para. 6 (b).  
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 See U.N. Resolution 1631 (2005), adopted by the Security Council at its 5282nd meeting, on 17 October 2005 
[hereinafter S/RES/1631], para. 6; see also the Framework of Standards, p.8 at para. 1.6, p. 27 at para. 6.8. 
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5. The proliferation of anti-terrorist measures could result in competing standards of 
supply-chain security 
The foregoing has shown that states and international organizations approach the problem of 
security with different aims, priorities and decision-making structures. The scope and standards 
of security measures introduced by the United States and international organizations therefore 
may not correlate in terms of subjects, strategy and standards.295 In practical terms, this means 
that proliferation of security measures can lead to overlaps, duplication of requirements and 
conflicts at national and global level.296 Moreover, U.S. measures to improve supply chain 
security often depend on the co-operation of other states for their effectiveness. Trading partners 
of the United States could therefore find themselves involved in co-operative ventures with 
different U.S. border agencies which each pursue overlapping and competing security 
measures.297 As one commentator points out, involving multiple government organizations in 
border security could result in “ineffective and inefficient border procedures and corruption.”298 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
295
 See e.g. Section 204 (c) of the SAFE Port Act 2006. Although this provision encourages the establishment and 
promotion of international standards for container security, it does not explain the relationship that exists between the 
CSI and such international standards. A brief overview of all current U.S. security initiatives is provided in the 
INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND COORDINATION STRATEGY, APPENDIX B, pp. 1 ff.    
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 For example, the Secure Freight Initiative shares many of the objectives of CSI and the question arises as to its 
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seaports are already members of the CSI. In addition the U.S. Commissioner of Customs has stated that the SFI is the 
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for Strategic and International Studies, 11 July 2007 [hereinafter “CBP Commissioner, Remarks, 11 July 2007”]. 
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strategy of the United States. See also Eric Lipton, U.S. to Expand Cargo Scans to Detect Nuclear Material, NEW 
YORK TIMES, 8 December 2006; see ECSA ANNUAL REPORT 2003 – 2004, p. 19.  
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 For example Operation Safe Commerce, the Secure Freight Initiative, the Megaports Initiative, Operation Port 
Shield all require co-operation with foreign governments. See e.g. GAO-03-297T, p. 14 (concerning Operation Safe 
Commerce).  
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B. The Container Security Initiative 
 
1. Substance of the Measure 
 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, U.S. Customs became aware that terrorists could hide a 
radiological bomb in a container primed for detonation upon arrival at a U.S. seaport. Although it 
is generally impossible to precisely quantify the terrorist threat to the Maritime Domain, this 
particular scenario was directly supported by the following evidence:299 
 
• The factually-based explanation of how terrorists could exploit security weaknesses of the 
Maritime Domain to smuggle WMD into the United State by a U.S. security expert;300  
• An Italian newspaper report of an Egyptian national concealed in a container;301 
• A “port security war game” carried out by independent consultants.302 
 
The persuasive force of this evidence was increased by the economic devastation of 9/11303 as 
well as the Madrid and London bombings304 which provided further evidence of how terrorists 
target public transport in order to cause maximum carnage in built-up areas as a means of 
terrorizing civilians.305 Seaports represent gateways to U.S. markets and incorporate 
transportation hubs which offer direct access to United States highway and rail networks. 
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 For an overview of the evidence see ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS. See also S. Hrg. 108–55, pp. 4 – 5.  
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 See FLYNN, pp. 17 - 29. 
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 MARC GERENCSER ET AL, BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, PORT SECURITY WAR GAME: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SUPPLY 
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Therefore, if terrorists concealed a bomb in a container, they would be easily able to load it onto 
a truck or railway carriage and transport it to a major city centre for detonation.306  
 
If seaports are a gateway to national markets then customs acts as a gatekeeper.307 However, 
owing to the fact that, traditionally, security has not played a major role in the Maritime Domain, 
the question arises as to how U.S. Customs should introduce security measures into an 
environment characterized by efficient commercial practices. As already suggested, this is a 
source of great controversy but, according to the United States, any measures must take into 
account the following aspects: 
 
“To support the accelerating growth of global commerce and security concerns, security 
measures must: (1) be aligned and embedded with supply chain information flows and business 
processes; (2) keep pace with supply chain developments; (3) optimize the use of existing 
databases; and (4) be implemented with the minimum essential impact on commercial and trade-
flow costs and operations. This will require new and enhanced partnerships, as well as cost- and 
burden-sharing between the private and public sectors.”308 
 
CBP’s answer to the challenge of supply chain security is the Container Security Initiative. It was 
introduced by U.S. Customs in 2002 and represents a unilateral security measure designed to 
protect the borders of the United States. The CSI was originally non-regulatory in form,309 but 
recently has been codified into law by the SAFE Port Act. Although this Act regulates important 
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 FLYNN,  pp. 17 – 29; See INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND COORDINATION STRATEGY, APPENDIX A, p. 2 (“WMD 
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aspects of the CSI, it only provides a very general definition of the measure itself in Section 205 
(a):310  
 
“[A] program […] to identify and examine or search maritime containers that pose a security 
risk before loading such containers in a foreign port for shipment to the United States, either 
directly or through a foreign port.” 
 
The Act does not provide any information on the aims or objectives of the measure, the 
participating seaports, specific contents of the Declarations of Principles or cost-sharing 
arrangements. In order to find this information one must still refer to numerous official 
documents issued by government agencies and institutions. For example, DHS and CBP have 
issued the National Maritime Transportation Security Strategy and the CSI Strategic Plan 
respectively which provide information on the aims and objectives. Reports by the Congressional 
Research provide background information on security measures and responsible agencies and the 
Government Accountability Office has issued a number of reports which critically assess the CSI 
practical aspects of the CSI. Speeches by the U.S. Customs Commissioner also explain its 
function and operation and the views of policy-makers have been recorded at numerous 
congressional hearings on the CSI.311 Reports by international organizations such as UNCTAD, 
OECD, the World Bank and the World Shipping Organization are also important sources of 
information on the practical effects of the measure on international trade. 
 
The Container Security Initiative is an umbrella term which refers to four security measures. 
Taken together they create a layered security system. It is based on the premise that it is 
impractical to carry out 100 percent inspection of all container cargo entering the United States. 
Experience after 9/11 showed that intensifying inspections of cargo led to increased wait times at 
the border and that physically inspecting every container entering the United States would impose 
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 Section 205 of the SAFE Port Act 2006 refers to the Container Security Initiative as “a program […]  to identify 
and examine or search maritime containers that pose a security risk before loading such containers in a foreign port 
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 U.S. Customs has provided a definition of the Container Security Initiative on its official website 
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supplemented by a CSI FACT SHEET which is periodically updated. The bilateral agreements are broadly worded and 
refer to general principles underlying the co-operation rather than specific guidelines concerning the CSI’s 
implementation. See infra pp. 80 ff. 
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an unacceptable burden on the American economy.312 Therefore, CBP adopted risk management 
techniques in an attempt to strike the necessary balance between trade and security. This 
technique presumes that the majority of U.S. imports are legitimate and concentrates the 
(admittedly very limited) investigatory resources of CBP on the small proportion of containers 
which could be used by terrorists to carry out an attack. According to one commentator, “[t]he 
concept is not to develop the perfect system, but rather to raise the obstacles to carrying out a 
successful attack beyond the will or ability of terrorists to surmount them.”313 Accordingly, the 
CSI identifies the small number of cargo containers that pose a high risk for terrorism and scans 
or physically examines them at the foreign port before they are shipped to the United States.314 
The following description of the four components is taken from the CSI Strategic Plan:315 
 
• Identify high risk containers;  
• Pre-screening and evaluate containers before they are shipped;  
• Use technology to pre-screen high risk containers  
• Use smarter, tamper-evident containers.316  
 
In this respect, the CSI strategic plan follows the description of the CSI in speeches by the former 
U.S. Customs Commissioner, Robert C. Bonner.317 The first three components are geared 
towards the single objective of preventing WMD being smuggled into the United States. The 
implementation of the CSI necessitates further measures, notably the 24 Hour Rule and the 
conclusion of so-called “Declarations of Principles.” The former provides CSI teams at partner 
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seaports with the necessary information to carry out inspections.318 Therefore, the effectiveness 
of the CSI largely depends on this component.319 Similarly, the Declarations of Principles enables 
the CBP to examine high-risk containers in foreign as opposed to U.S. harbours and therefore 
form a precondition for preventing (as opposed to merely discovering) the importation of WMD 
into the United States.320 The following examination regards the first three components of the 
CSI as interlocking components of the same strategy: removing one component would render the 
overall aim of the strategy inutile. On the other hand, the fourth component – smart and secure 
containers – is relatively undeveloped and therefore will only be dealt with briefly.321  
 
The CSI is arguably the most ambitious maritime security measure of the U.S. government to 
date because it seeks to secure the three main components of the maritime transportation system, 
namely ports and port facilities, vessels and infrastructure.322 In particular, it is concerned with 
securing cargo before it enters the Maritime Domain.323 This means that the CSI is an 
extraterritorial security measure to the extent that CBP carries out border inspections in foreign 
territory (i.e. the last port of lading). By “pushing back the borders”, U.S. customs has the 
opportunity to assess the security of containers before they are loaded on vessels for transport to 
the United States.324  
 
1.1. Use of Terminology in the Container Security Initiative  
 
At this preliminary stage of the investigation it is important to briefly consider terminology 
relevant to the CSI. Although the SAFE Port Act 2006 provides some definitions of relevant 
terms, these are not exhaustive325 and reference must be had to other pieces of legislation 
(especially the MTSA 2002) as well as official documents (e.g. issued by the GAO, CRS and 
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CBP). First of all, there are three important terms which relate to the framework of maritime 
security measures. They include: 
 
“Maritime Domain” this is the subject of security measures and is formulated broadly by 
the U.S. government. It means “all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, 
or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related 
activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.” It is 
important to note that this definition includes the global commons (i.e. the “high seas”) 
and objects subject to national jurisdiction. Seeking to regulate such objects depends on 
the agreement of other states. Within the maritime domain, the CSI primarily deals with 
“component security” because each of its security measures aims to ensure the security of 
individual physical components of the Maritime Domain, (i.e. primarily containers but 
also vessels and seaports).326  
 
“International Supply Chain” according to Section 2 of the SAFE Port Act 2006 this 
term refers to the “end-to-end process for shipping goods to or from the United States 
beginning at the point of origin (including manufacturer, supplier, or vendor) through a 
point of distribution to the destination. This is the subject of Title II of the SAFE Port Act, 
which includes the Container Security Initiative. The global nature of the international 
supply chain means that US security measures are extraterritorial in nature insofar as CBP 
regulates objects outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.327 
 
The level of threat plays a crucial role in justifying the introduction and severity of 
security measures regulating container cargo destined for the United States.328 The 
“Maritime Security (MARSEC) Level” refers to “the level set to reflect the prevailing 
threat environment to the marine elements of the national transportation system, including 
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ports, vessels, facilities, and critical assets and infrastructure located on or adjacent to 
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S..”329  
 
Finally, the event which the CSI attempts to prevent is a “transportation security 
incident” which is defined in the MTSA 2002. This term refers to a security incident 
resulting in a significant loss of life, environmental damage, transportation system 
disruption, or economic disruption in a particular area.330 This term should also be viewed 
in conjunction with an “Incident of National Significance”, which refers to the scale of the 
incident. This term refers to “high-impact events that require an extensive and well-
coordinated multi-agency response to save lives, minimize damage, and provide the basis 
for long-term community and economic recovery”. 331 A TSI declared by the Secretary to 
be an INS is referred to as a “national TSI.”332 
 
Another important aspect of terminology deals with the activities of CSI teams at foreign 
seaports. Specific terms which refer to individual assets such as “container”, “container security 
device”, and “radiation detection equipment” will be examined in the relevant section. However, 
at this point it is worth considering more general terms which refer to the type of controls applied 
to cargo containers. According to Section 2 of the SAFE Port Act 2006 the terms, “screening”, 
“scanning” and “inspections” are defined as follows.  
 
• Inspections: the comprehensive process used by the United States Customs and Border 
Protection to assess goods entering the United States to appraise them for duty purposes, 
to detect the presence of restricted or prohibited items, and to ensure compliance with all 
applicable laws. The process may include screening, conducting an examination, or 
conducting a search.333 
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• Scan: utilizing non-intrusive imaging equipment, radiation detection equipment, or both, 
to capture data, including images of a container.334 
 
• Screening: A visual or automated review of information about goods, including manifest 
or entry documentation accompanying a shipment being imported into the United States, 
to determine the presence of mis-declared, restricted, or prohibited items and assess the 
level of threat posed by such cargo.335  
 
The use of the terms “pre-screening”, “inspections” “screening” and “scanning” can give rise to 
confusion. When the CSI was introduced the U.S. Customs Commissioner referred to the general 
strategy of “pushing the borders outwards” by the term “pre-screening.”336  This is also reflected 
in the CSI Strategic Plan. By contrast, the SAFE Port Act does not use the term “pre-screening” 
at all but instead uses the term “inspections” to refer to the general process of carrying out an 
assessment of US imports. However, the definition provided refers to the assessment of “goods 
entering the United States” (emphasis added) which would appear to exclude the extraterritorial 
control activities performed by CSI teams at foreign seaports. Also, the Section 2 of the SAFE 
Port Act defines the terms “screening” and “scanning” as two distinct procedures. This is 
supported by Section 232 which clearly differentiates between the “screening of cargo 
containers” and the “scanning of high-risk containers” as well as Section 1701 of the Act 
Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission which amends Section 232 of the 
SAFE Port Act to provide for 100 per cent scanning as opposed to 100 per cent screening.337 
That said, Section 2 (12) of the latter Act refers to the utilization of NII equipment, radiation 
detection equipment “or both” and, under the “scanning of high risk containers”, Section 232 (a) 
(2) refers to a scan or a search. This clearly contradicts Section 1701 of the 9/11 Implementing 
Act, which defines scanning as a two-stage procedure, i.e. using “non-intrusive imaging 
equipment and radiation detection equipment.” The CSI Strategic Plan, by contrast, omits almost 
all reference to the term “scanning” and, in the single instance where it does use this term, it 
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 Section 2 (12).  
335
 Section 2 (13). 
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 See U.S. Customs Commissioner, Statement of 19 February 2002. According to this definition, “pre-screening” 
refers to act of examining cargo prior to departure to the United States and includes the stationing of CSI teams, as 
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simply refers to the use of “radiation detection devices.”338 A Report by the Permanent Sub-
Committee of Investigations which led to the passage of the SAFE Port Act adds to the confusion 
by referring to this two-stage procedure by the term “screening” and not “scanning.”339  
 
Another important point to note is that only the term “pre-screening” is specific to the CSI insofar 
as it refers to screening taking place in a foreign seaport. The terms “screening” and “scanning” 
in the SAFE Port Act are location-neutral and therefore can also refer to screening and scanning 
carried out at U.S. seaports.340 
 
Problems with terminology can also result from the use of commercial terms within a security 
context. A good example of this was CBP’s proposed use of the term “shipper” in 19 CFR 4.7., 
which it defined as meaning “the owner and exporter of the cargo.”341  The definition of this term 
was clearly influenced by security considerations. By defining “shipper” in this way, CBP was 
attempting to get information about the source of the cargo (i.e., the foreign entity that last owned 
the cargo prior to export).342 However, this definition did not reflect the normal meaning of the 
term “shipper” as used on commercial documentation and, according to the World Shipping 
Council, thereby ran the risk of disrupting the legal relationship between contractual parties.343 
CBP itself recognized the problems caused by this and suspended its interpretation of the term 
“shipper” in June 2004. 
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 See CSI STRATEGIC PLAN, p.17 (this is also the only instance where the term “scan” is used).  
339
 See ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, p. 34 ff. In this context, the authors use the term “screening” to refer to 
establishing the contents of a container by means of x-ray equipment. According to Section 2 of the SAFE Port Act, 
however, this falls under the term “scanning”. In addition, the report uses “inspection” and “examination” 
synonymously whereas “inspection” refers to the process of establishing the contents of a container by means of 
examinations and other methods.   
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the context of pre-screening (i.e. at foreign seaports). 
341
 See Comments of the World Shipping Council Before the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection in the Matter 
of Required Advanced Electronic Presentation of Cargo Information, (Docket Number: RIN 1515-AD33), 22 August 
2003, pp. 4 ff. 
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1.2. Identification of High-Risk Containers 
 
The sheer quantity of containers entering the United States every day means that customs 
administrations can only carry out a limited number of inspections, generally estimated to be 2 
per cent of incoming containers per year.344 In the aftermath of 9/11 U.S. Customs found that it 
was not possible to analyze more than 20 per cent of the cargo entering the United States.345 
Moreover, increased physical inspection of containers restricted trade and proved “economically 
intolerable.”346 In view of this experience, U.S. Customs has attempted to balance trade 
facilitation and security controls by using risk management techniques in order to target 
containers which represent a high-risk of terrorist interference. Risk assessment is recognized in 
international conventions347 and an increasing number of customs administrations throughout the 
world.348 It also forms the basis of the pre-emptive defence strategy “pushing the borders 
outwards” by allowing customs administrations to assess the risk of cargo shipments before they 
reach the arrival port.349  
 
                                                  
344
 See K. Lamar Walters, Industry on Alert: Legal and Economic Ramifications of the Homeland Security Act on 
Maritime Commerce, 30 TUL. MAR. L.J. 311, p. 329. 
345
 In addition, such intensity of inspections would be impossible to sustain indefinitely, especially considering the 
range of tasks that Customs must perform. Concerning other enforcement activities of Customs post 9/11 see Robert 
C. Bonner, Statement before the Hearing on U.S. Customs FY 2003 Budget Request House Appropriations 
Committee Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Services, and General Government, 27 February 2002 [hereinafter 
U.S. Customs Commissioner, Statement of 27 February 2002]. See also ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, at p. 17, 
which cites “mission fatigue” as the first reason for the low level of inspections.  
346
 See James M. Loy and Robert G. Ross, Global Trade: America’s Achilles’ Heel, DEFENSE HORIZONS NO. 7, 
February p. 5; see also Robert C. Bonner, Remarks to the Trade Support Network, 9 October 2002 [hereinafter U.S. 
Customs Commissioner, Remarks of 9 October 2002] (“[I]nspecting every container would be wasteful and make no 
sense, because most containers pose no security risk.”). 
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 See e.g. Standards 6.3. and 6.4. of the RKC. See also RKC, General Annex, Guidelines on Customs Control, 
Chapter 6, p. 8, para. 4 defines “risk analysis” as “[t]he systematic use of available information to determine how 
often defined risks may occur and the magnitude of their likely consequences.” It also defines “risk assessment” as 
“[t]he systematic determination of risk management priorities by evaluating and comparing the level of risk against 
pre-determined standards, target risk levels or other criteria.” Other conventions include the Framework of 
Standards, Standard 4.2., which defines “risk-management” as “the systematic application of management 
procedures and practices which provide Customs with the necessary information to address movements or 
consignments which present a risk”; see also Columbus Ministerial Declaration on Trade Efficiency, App., Section 
B. para. 5. The necessity of advance information to prevent terrorist acts is also recognized in S/RES/1373, para. 
2 (b).  
348
 See WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2007, p. 45, table 9.2. (“Risk – based inspections: the most popular reform 
in 2005/06”). 
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 Cf. THE NATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY, pp. 8 – 9; THE NATIONAL PLAN TO ACHIEVE MARITIME 
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The first component of the Container Security Initiative aims to calculate the risk-rating of 
shipments entering the United States. It consists of two elements: the legal basis for advance 
notification of container cargo and its technical implementation. The first element refers to the 
so-called “24 Hour Rule”, which requires the advance collection and evaluation of information 
on containerized and break-bulk maritime cargo destined for or transiting through United States’ 
seaports. It is mandatory on all importers and enforced by severe financial penalties. As such, it 
has potentially wide-ranging effects on international trade.350 The technical implementation of 
this component is accomplished by the Automated Commercial Environment, which is the data 
system utilized by the National Targeting Centre to sort through the information collected and 
identify high-risk containers. The following examines these two instruments in greater detail.  
 
1.2.1. The 24 Hour Rule 
 
The 24 Hour Rule was introduced in February 2002 during trials at the port of Rotterdam in 
response to U.S. Customs officials’ request for more information on consignments destined for 
the United States. 351 As stated above, the introduction of the 24 Hour Rule was mandated by 
Section 343 (a) of the Trade Act 2002 which provides for the advance submission electronic 
cargo information. In order to implement the 24 Hour Rule, CBP amended Section 4.7 of CFR 
Title 19, Part 4 which deals with “vessels in foreign and domestic trades.”352 U.S Customs 
informed the maritime industry of its security plans by publishing notices of its proposed rule-
making in the Federal Register.353 These notices detailed its intention to amend the Customs 
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 See WSC, Comments of 9 September 2002, p. 5. 
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 The 24 Hour Rule applies to all forms of cargo is either brought into or sent from the United States by any mode 
of commercial transportation (sea, air, rail or truck). See Fed. Reg. Vol. 68 No. 234, p. 68140. This section 
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the 24 Hour Rule. Thereby, the GAO clearly portrays the 24 Hour Rule as a pre-condition and not only a component 
of the CSI. See GAO-03-770, p. 18. 
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 Accordingly, Section 4.7 now provides for inter alia the advance filing of cargo declaration. This provision 
regulates the subject, source of information and addressees of the rule; the method of transmission; third party 
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 By its notice of proposed rule-making of 8 August 2002, the U.S. Customs Service declared its intention to issue 
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Regulations to require the advance electronic transmission of information pertaining to cargo 
prior to its being brought into, or sent from the United States by all modes of commercial 
transport.354  
 
The 24 Hour Rule itself is contained in Section 4.7 (b) (2) and applies to vessel-operating and 
non-vessel-operating common carriers. The subject of the regulation is primarily containerized 
cargo which is either destined for or being shipped through United States’ harbours. It requires 
that the incoming carrier provide CBP, in respect of every vessel arriving in the US and required 
to make entry, with the CBP-approved electronic equivalent of the vessel’s cargo declaration 24 
hours before the cargo is laden aboard the vessel at the foreign port. The time frame of 24 hours 
enables high-risk containers to be identified and inspected at the foreign harbour without 
disrupting shipment of containers to the United States. The National Targeting Centre analyses 
the information received on the container and identifies high-risk shipments which are to be 
subject to scanning or physical inspection at the foreign harbour by issuing a “no-load order”. 
CSI teams at the harbour then request the host customs authorities to carry out an inspection of 
the high risk container during the down time while the container is waiting to be loaded onto the 
vessel.355  
 
There are three different types of cargo which are affected by the rule: container cargo, bulk and 
break-bulk cargo. Whereas container cargo is fully subject to the 24 Hour Rule, special provision 
is made for the other two classes. The carriers of bulk and break-bulk cargo are exempt from the 
requirement that they file the cargo declaration with US customs 24 hours before such cargo is 
laden aboard the vessel at the foreign port.356 Instead, carriers of break or break-bulk cargo must 
present their cargo declarations to customs either 24 hours before they arrive in the US (if they 
                                                                                                                                                                
authority owing to the urgency of the situation. Congress supported U.S. Customs by amending Section 343(a) of the 
Trade Act 2002 by means of Section 108 of the MTSA: Cf. Notice of proposed rule-making in Fed. Reg. 23 July 
2003, Vol. 68, No. 141, p. 43574, which refers to the amended Section 343(a) of the Trade Act 2002. For further 
information see Papavizas and Kiern, pp. 457 – 458.  
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 The first notice was issued on 8 August 2002 whilst the U.S. Customs was still under the Department of the 
Treasury and acting on reliance of its existing powers under USC 19 1431 (d). There then followed a period of 
consultation as required by the then applicable Section 343(a) of the Trade Act 2002. However, when the final rule 
was issued on 5 December, U.S. Customs had become the Customs and Border Protection Bureau and was 
responsible to the Department of Homeland Security. The statutory authority relied on was Section 343(a) of the 
Trade Act 2002 as amended. The rule became effective as from 5 January 2004. 
355
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are participants of the AMS programme), or upon arrival if they are non-automated carriers. 
Significantly, “Freight Remaining on Board” (FROB) is also subject to the 24 Hour Rule. This is 
cargo which is carried on a vessel and destined for a foreign port after the vessel has discharged 
other cargo at U.S. ports. According to the CBP, such cargo could pose a cargo safety or security 
risk to the same extent as other cargo that arrives in the United States.357  
 
The required data elements on the inward manifest are listed in Section 4.7a. The aim of the rule 
is to establish the contents of the container as precisely as possible. According to data element 
(vii), generic descriptions such as “FAK”, “general cargo” and “STC” are not acceptable. 
Providing information in this way will constitute an infringement pursuant to Section 4.7a (f). 
According to sub-paragraph (4), the cargo declaration must state information additional to that 
provided on the cargo manifest. The data elements required are numerous but they can be divided 
into four classes: 
 
• identity of cargo: (v), (vii), (xii), (xiii) 
• identity of parties: (ii), (iii), (viii), (ix), (x) 
• route taken: (i), (vi), (xi) 
• schedule of the consignment: (iv), (vi), (xv), (xvi) 
 
CBP is engaged on broadening the required data elements for its risk assessment of containers. 358  
This is mandated by Section 203(b) of the SAFE Port Act, which orders the Secretary (acting 
through the Commissioner), to require “the electronic transmission to the Department of 
additional date elements for improved high-risk targeting, including appropriate elements of entry 
data … to be provided as advanced information with respect to cargo destined for importation 
into the United States prior to the loading of such cargo on vessels at foreign ports”.359 The 
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additional data elements are intended to produce more effective and more vigorous cargo risk 
assessments.360  
 
Considering that the 24 Hour Rule is crucial for obtaining targeting information361 it is important 
that the parties responsible comply with its requirements. Section 4.7(e) CFR Title 19, Part 4 
imposes substantial civil penalties on a master of a vessel or NVOCC for failing to provide 
manifest information; transmitting forged, altered or false information or failing to submit 
information on time. Concerning the masters of vessels, civil penalties are to be assessed 
pursuant to 19 USC 1436. NVOCCs will be liable to pay liquidated damages as provided in 
Section 113.64(c) in addition to any other applicable penalties.362 
 
One of the parameters contained in Section 343 (a) of the Trade Act 2002 is that regulations 
should only apply to that party most likely to have direct knowledge of the information in 
question. This so-called “direct knowledge requirement” has proved especially controversial 
because, when producing the cargo manifest, the carrier is reliant on third parties to provide 
accurate information. Questions of liability arise when information provided turns out to be 
inaccurate. Industry representatives have argued that it would therefore be unfair to punish 
presenting parties who have no means of verifying the information provided.363  The solution 
adopted by CBP is contained in Section 4.7 (b) (2) (iii), where the party electronically presenting 
to CBP the required information receives the information from another party, CBP will take into 
                                                                                                                                                                
Petition of the World Shipping Council, the National Transportation League, the  National Customs Brokers and 
Forwarders Association of America, Inc. and the Retail Industry Leaders Association for Reconsideration of the 
Final Rule before the DHS CP, RIN 1651-AA49: Required Advance Electronic  Presentation of Cargo Information’ 
(RIN 1651-AA49).  
360
 The additional data elements (“10+2”) must also be provided 24 hours prior to the loading of the vessel and will 
be linked to the existing 24 Hour Rule data collected in the AMS. According to CBP, the new data elements are 
aimed at further identifying the entities involved in the supply chain, their locations as well as a corroborating and 
potentially more precise description of the commodities being shipped to the United States. Therefore, the new data 
elements include the name and address of the manufacturer, seller, consolidator and buyer as well as the country of 
origin of the goods and the container stuffing location. In addition to the ten data elements relating to the movement 
of goods, the CBP also requires the ocean carrier to provide a vessel stow plan and container status messages. In 
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consideration how the presenting party acquired such information and whether and how the 
presenting party is able to verify this information. Where the presenting party cannot verify the 
information, CBP will permit the party to electronically present the information on the basis of 
what the party reasonably believes to be true.  
 
1.2.2. Data Processing and Risk Assessment 
 
The Container Security Initiative is based on risk assessment which is facilitated by an effective 
system of data processing. The Trade Act 2002 effectively makes an electronic customs 
environment mandatory because it does not contain any exceptions or waivers to the automation 
requirement for data.  Vessel carriers which continue to present paper Inward Cargo Declarations 
to CBP will be denied permission to unload their cargo by the Port Director.364 The automation 
requirement is essential to the Container Security Initiative because it facilitates the efficient 
screening of cargo containers. However, this concept of a paperless environment is not a new 
concept in U.S. Customs: the effectiveness of sharing information through electronic means had 
already been recognized by the NAFTA Implementation Act 1993.365 This Act defined the term 
“electronic transmission” as “the transfer of data or information through an authorized electronic 
data interchange system […].”366   
 
The technical implementation of the 24 Hour Rule depends on the customs administration having 
the necessary infrastructure to collect and assess information.367 In this respect, it is important to 
note that the term “electronic data entry” does not just verify commercial information (e.g. 
customs classification and evaluation) but also determines compliance with customs law 
generally.368 CBP currently uses the Automated Commercial System (ACS) in order to track, 
control, and process all commercial goods imported into the United States. However, this system 
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has long been recognized to be outdated and inadequate to meet the needs of commerce.369 U.S. 
Customs planned to satisfy the requirements of the NAFTA Implementation Act 1993 by 
introducing the Automated Commercial Environment.370 Although initial attempts to implement 
this new system were started in 1994, the implementation process has proved difficult and is still 
ongoing.371 The ACE aims to facilitate the movement of legitimate trade through more effective 
trade account management372 and strengthen border security by identifying import and export 
transactions that could pose a threat to the United States.373  
 
CBP employs risk assessment techniques in order to sort through the cargo information including 
the manifest information, entry data and intelligence inputs and assess the risk rating of the cargo. 
It carries out this task by means of the Automated Targeting System (ATS).374 This system 
measures electronic cargo information on individual shipments against collection of hundreds of 
weighted rules based on a model shipment profile.375 The risk level of the container is assessed 
on the basis of any resultant anomalies. The higher the score, the more attention the shipment will 
require.376 The results of the ATS assessment are reviewed by the Manifest Review Unit (MRU). 
This consists of customs inspectors who review indicators of suspicious shipments (so-called 
“red flags”). If a container is considered to be high-risk, then a “no-load” order will be issued to 
the ocean carrier. This means that the container must not be loaded onto the vessel but taken 
away for scanning or physical examination.377 
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The ATS represents the foundation of the Container Security Initiative and therefore its 
effectiveness is a key factor in identifying high-risk cargo containers, a fact recognized by the 
World Shipping Council in 2002.378 However, an investigation into the effectiveness of the CSI 
by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in 2005 found that containers bound for the 
United States were not being screened effectively.379 The Automated Targeting System used for 
evaluating the risk-rating of the container was based on limited and potentially inaccurate 
information owing to its reliance on the cargo manifest as a source of data.380  
 
1.3. Pre-Screening Containers at the Port of Departure 
 
As stated above, the term “pre-screening” is used by CBP in a general sense to refer to the 
concept of “pushing the borders outwards.” According to this strategy, CSI teams are stationed at 
foreign seaports in order to ascertain the contents of containers destined for the United States. 
The strategy is of vital importance in balancing the dual role of ensuring border security and 
facilitating commercial entry381 because it allows high-risk containers to be examined during 
down-time at the foreign seaport (thereby avoiding any delay in the transportation of the 
container) and prior to their shipment to the United States (thereby eliminating the detonation of a 
radiological bomb at a U.S. seaport). This is also one of the most controversial aspects of the CSI 
because CBP uses its trade power to coerce foreign governments into participating in the CSI. It 
also reflects the unilateral nature of the CSI because “pushing out the borders” primarily protects 
U.S. security interests by shifting the risk of the detonation of a terrorist bomb from U.S. seaports 
to the port of departure.  
 
The concept of pushing the borders outwards is clearly a revolutionary concept in customs.382 
Prior to 9/11, the tasks of border protection agencies were generally limited to the territory or 
coastal waters of the United States. For example, according to the border search doctrine, U.S. 
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Customs only had jurisdiction to inspect people and cargo entering the United States.383 In 
addition, the U.S. Coast Guard only had authority to board and inspect suspicious vessels within 
the coastal waters of the U.S.).384 However, this was clearly inadequate to prevent WMD from 
being smuggled into U.S. seaports.385 Owing to the perceived threat of a radiological bomb being 
hidden in a container, primed for detonation at a U.S. seaport, CBP therefore decided to transfer 
border inspection activities to foreign seaports.  
 
This strategy is potentially difficult to implement because under international law, a country 
cannot extend its jurisdiction over the territory of another state without first obtaining its 
consent.386 Obtaining consent to jurisdictional extension is necessary “for purposes of 
international comity and diplomatic courtesy”387 and it also respects the principles of sovereignty 
and the rule of law.388 It is now a requirement of the SAFE Port Act 2006.389 The United States 
Customs Service has entered into bilateral agreements with selected customs administrations 
which provide for U.S. Customs officers to be stationed at foreign seaports in order to observe 
inspections of high-risk cargo destined for the United States. The agreements have been 
designated “Declarations of Principles” and signed by the U.S. Commissioner of Customs.390  
 
Before a customs administration can become a member of the CSI, it must satisfy a number of 
criteria which are laid down unilaterally by the CBP with the approval of the Director of the 
Department of Homeland Security:391  
 
                                                  
383
 See infra p. 101. 
384
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• Seaport must have regular, direct, and substantial container traffic to ports in the United 
States. 
• Customs must be able to inspect cargo originating, transiting, exiting, or being 
transshipped through a country. 
• Non-intrusive inspection (NII) equipment (gamma or X-ray) and radiation detection 
equipment must be available for use at or near the potential CSI port. 
 
In addition to these mandatory criteria, potential CSI ports must also agree to: 
 
• Establish an automated risk management system. 
• Share critical data, intelligence, and risk management information with U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) 
• Conduct a thorough port assessment and commit to resolving port infrastructure 
vulnerabilities. 
• Maintain integrity programmes, and identify and combat breaches in integrity. 
 
Some of these criteria for membership have been codified in the SAFE Port Act.392 The 
membership procedure runs as follows: CBP dispatches an assessment team to the seaport in 
order to ensure that it satisfies the security criteria, whereupon it invites the customs authority to 
join the CSI programme.393 The next step is the negotiation of a “Declaration of Principles” 
between the two customs administrations. Generally speaking, this stage has not proved difficult 
for CBP because the agreements do not confer any powers on the CSI teams and therefore do not 
interfere with the sovereign powers of the host customs authorities.  That said, the EC 
Commission did object to CBP concluding agreements with individual EC member states.394 This 
was solved by the creation of a pan-European Agreement395 that implements the Container 
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Security Initiative in all EC member states by means of a single multilateral agreement under the 
auspices of the European Commission and United States.396 Once the bilateral agreement has 
been signed, CBP designates the seaport a “CSI port.” 397  
 
The expansion of the CSI has been divided into three stages.398 In Phase I, the CBP targeted the 
major trading partners of the United States – primarily the ten “megaports”, which account for 
the vast majority of US imports. Phase II of the CSI saw the initiative being expanded to seaports 
which were of strategic importance, including medium-income developing countries.399 At the 
end of 2007 there were fifty-eight participating ports which account for approximately 90 percent 
of containers entering the United States.400 The third phase of expansion (which has not been 
officially announced) may see the initiative being expanded to more developing countries.401  
 
1.3.1. The Declaration of Principles 
 
Notwithstanding the unilateral nature of the CSI, the U.S. government has expressly stated that its 
security measures must be implemented in co-operation with other states.402 In this respect, the 
Declarations of Principles are crucial to the pre-emptive defence strategy pursued by the CSI.403 
Such customs – to – customs partnerships reflect the principles of international conventions such 
as the Revised Kyoto Convention, which requires customs administrations to co-operate with 
each other “and seek to conclude mutual administrative assistance to enhance customs 
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control.”404 Customs administrations have traditionally preferred a customs-to-customs approach 
to co-operation because it permits the bilateral agreement to be tailored to meet the specific legal 
and political conditions in the contracting parties.405 The Johannesburg Convention provides the 
necessary framework for concluding such agreements and is potentially an important instrument 
in combating terrorism and transnational crime.406  
 
The parties to the Declarations of Principles (DoPs) are the customs administrations of the United 
States and foreign state in question. An examination of the DoPs reveals a number of shared 
characteristics. The agreements are formulated in broad terms and follow the same structure. 
They are divided into a preamble and operative provisions. The Preamble to the Declarations 
performs four important functions. First, it identifies the subject of co-operation as “intensifying 
the exchange of information and best practices between the two customs authorities”; second, it 
confirms the qualification of the port for CSI status by referring to the volume of trade between 
the port in question and the ports of the United States; third, it places the agreement within a 
global context by reference to the resolutions or discussions with international organizations. 
Finally, it provides the reasons for the agreements, namely the need to “deter, prevent and 
interdict” any terrorist attempt to disrupt global trade or exploit commercial shipping.  
 
The operative provisions also adopt a similar structure and are divided into six paragraphs four of 
which refer to the customs co-operation:  
 
• aim of co-operation. This paragraph consists of three elements: a) to intensify customs 
co-operation; b) on a reciprocal basis and c) within the framework of the existing 
Customs Mutual Agreement;  
• scope of the co-operation. The second paragraph details the activities which are to be the 
subject of the co-operative agreement. These specifically refer to elements of the 
                                                  
404
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Container Security Initiative, i.e. the sharing of information, the pre-screening of 
containers and the stationing of U.S. Customs officers at the port in question.  
• jurisdictional conditions to which U.S. Customs officers are subjected. Generally, the 
agreements provide that they will work under the authority of the U.S. Ambassador in the 
country concerned and in accordance with the guidelines set down by the host customs 
administration.  
• implementation of co-operation. This paragraph requires the contracting parties to 
consult closely on the implementation of the CSI at the port concerned, in order to ensure 
the effectiveness and mutual benefit of the Customs co-operation.  
 
The final two paragraphs concern the validity of the agreement. As a rule, the agreements require 
a notice of termination to be given in writing three months in advance. In addition, the agreement 
will cease to have effect once the European Agreement comes into force.407   
 
Overall the DoPs are quite limited in scope and do not confer any powers on U.S. customs 
officers stationed in the foreign seaport. This appears to be borne out by practical experience with 
reports of host customs authorities declining requests to inspect containers designated high risk 
by the NTC.408 Substantively, there is little in the Declarations that reflects the Model Agreement 
on Bilateral Agreements 1996. There is evidence that the lack of substance in these agreements 
adversely affects the effectiveness of the CSI.409  
 
CBP maintains that the Declarations of Principles are informal and voluntary agreements. 
Legally, the agreements appear to be non-binding for a number of reasons.410 The CBP has stated 
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that its intention was to enter into an informal agreement in order to avoid the constitutional 
formalities associated with formal agreements and the lengthy negotiations involved in the 
agreement of detailed provisions.411  The agreements have also been concluded as between the 
Customs service of the United States and the customs administrations of its trading partners. 
Therefore, they constitute agency-to-agency agreements as opposed to government-to-
government agreements.412 Also, Article II, Section 2, clause 2 of the United States’ Constitution 
requires international agreements to be entered into “by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate.”413 Finally, non-binding agreements often use the term “Declaration” and merely state the 
shared aspiration of the parties.414 On the other hand, despite the fact that the DoPs are not legally 
binding, the SAFE Port Act arguably places these agreements on a more formal footing and 
emphasizes the need to harmonize safety standards at foreign ports.415 
 
The CBP has described the agreements as voluntary and mandatory but this may not be the case 
in practice.416 There is an inherent conflict between the need for security and the needs of 
commerce and, in order to persuade governments to agree to CSI, the CBP has granted 
participating seaports commercial incentives in the form of expedited clearance at U.S. 
seaports.417 Although the actual value of this benefit is uncertain, CSI participation is regarded by 
seaports as a seal of approval which ensures efficient customs clearance by CBP, particularly in 
the event of a TSI.418 As a result, there is significant commercial (i.e. from seaports and 
importers) and political pressure (from domestic political parties and the U.S. government) on 
customs administrations to sign the Declaration of Principles.419 Refusal to do so could lead to 
                                                                                                                                                                
< http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh10.htm >; Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. 
Treaty Interpretation, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 431, p. 434. 
411
 See Romero, pp. 600 – 601. 
412
 For an overview see generally Robert E. Dalton, National Treaty Law and Practice: United States, in NATIONAL 
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: ( Monroe Leigh, et al. eds. 2005), Washington DC: American Society of International 
Law, 1999 
413
 Without being submitted to the Senate for advice and consent a treaty may be valid under international law but as 
far as the United States is concerned, it does not form part of the “Supreme Law of the Land” and is not binding on 
the U.S. Courts.  
414
 See United Nations Treaty Reference Guide, p. 5 (“Declarations”). 
415
 Supra n. 201. 
416
 See pp. 77 ff. 
417
 See FLYNN, supra n. 76. 
418
 See e.g. Section 202 of the SAFE Port Act 2006, which states that the Customs Commissioner may give 
preference to cargo entering a port of entry from a CSI seaport.  
419
 See Irvin Lim Fang Jau, Not Yet All Aboard … But Already All at Sea Over the Container Security Initiative, 
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore (November 2002), p. 12. 
  
 
84 
economic reprisals in the form of increased inspection of cargo coming from their major seaports 
(i.e. “redlane” clearance).420 Delay represents a considerable non-barrier to trade421 and the risk 
of increased inspections at U.S. seaports is likely to discourage shippers from using non-CSI 
ports. Considering that maritime transportation services play a “pivotal role in modern trade 
oriented economies”,422 and that the “cost of international (maritime) transportation services are 
an important determinant of a country’s export competitiveness”,423 such customs treatment 
could cause substantial economic damage on a country’s GDP. The passage of the SAFE Port 
Act 2006 also tends to reduce the voluntary character of the bilateral agreements by e.g. requiring 
CBP to increase security standards within a fixed time limit.424  
 
The CBP has often referred to the reciprocal nature of the agreements and points to the presence 
of Canadian and Japanese customs officials at their own ports as evidence of this. Reciprocity is a 
norm of international law and forms the basis for all international agreements.425 In practice, it is 
also an important means by which the United States ensures support for the CSI from its trade 
partners in inspecting containers bound for U.S. seaports.426 However (in theory at least), full 
reciprocity appears unworkable because it could lead to numerous customs administrations being 
stationed at one U.S. seaport.427 Considering that the U.S. imports far more than it exports as well 
as the extremely high cost of stationing CSI teams, reciprocity is unlikely to be exercised by all 
CSI partner administrations.428  
 
 
                                                  
420
 FLYNN, supra n. 76.  
421
 See Shashi Kumar and Jan Hoffmann, Globalisation: The Maritime Nexus, in Costas Th. Grammenos (ed), The 
Handbook of Maritime Economics and Business, LLP, London 2002, p. 43. 
422
 BENJAMIN PARAMESWARAN, THE LIBERALIZATION OF MARITIME TRANSPORT SERVICES WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO THE WTO/GATS FRAMEWORK, (International Max Planck Research School for Maritime Affairs at 
the University of Hamburg), p. 47. 
423
 Id., p. 52. 
424
 Section 204 and 205 SAFE Port Act 2006. 
425
 See Arnold, (supra n. 41), p. 211. However, CBP does not recognize other security measures as equal to the CSI. 
426
 FLYNN, p. 96. 
427
 See also Gregory W. Bowman, Thinking Outside the Border: Homeland Security and the Forward Deployment of 
the U.S. Border, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 189, pp. 205 – 206. Arguably, reciprocity reflects the origins of the CSI in the In-
transit Container Security programme with the Canadian customs authorities. See Robert C. Bonner, Statement 
before the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Homeland Security, 13 May 2003.  
428
 Concerning the costs of the CSI, see S. Hrg. 109-186, p. 6; ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, p. 21. 
  
 
85 
1.3.2. Stationing of U.S. Customs Officers at Foreign Seaports 
 
Following the signing of the Declarations of Principles, CBP deploys “CSI teams” consisting of 
four customs officers to the foreign seaport.429 Their role is to ensure that cargo shipments which 
have been deemed “high-risk” by the NTC are scanned or physically inspected by the host 
customs authority in order to detect WMD or radiological weapons smuggled in containers before 
they are loaded on a vessel destined for the United States.430 This aspect of the CSI forms part of 
the pre-screening component and the presence of U.S. customs officers at foreign seaports is 
central to the concept of “pushing the borders outwards.” The effectiveness of CSI largely hinges 
on this component because once the container has been loaded onto the vessel there is no way of 
examining it prior to arrival at the U.S. harbour.431 
 
According to the Government Accountability Office, CSI teams consist of special agents, 
targeters and intelligence analysts.432 They perform the following functions:433 
 
• Team leader: the immediate supervisor for all CSI team members and coordinates with 
host-government counterparts in daily operations; 
• Intelligence analysts: gathers information to support targeters; 
• Targeters: target shipments and refer high-risk shipments to host government officials for 
investigation; 
• Special agents: coordinate all investigative activity connected to CSI and liaise with U.S. 
embassy attachés.  
 
The stationing of CSI teams is strategically important because it serves to enforce CBP’s 
unilateral security measures. Theoretically at least, CSI teams ensure that all high-risk containers 
are inspected using CBP-approved NII equipment prior to their departure for U.S. seaports.434 
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CBP also claims that their presence also acts as a deterrent to terrorists435 and that interaction 
with foreign customs officials enhances co-operation and intelligence sharing.436 
 
In the United States, CBP is the premier law enforcement agency with powers exceeding even 
those of the FBI and CIA.437  In practice, however, CSI teams do not exercise the same powers at 
the participating seaports of foreign states. Members of the CSI team are non-uniformed 
representatives of the CBP and do have any powers of enforcement at the host seaport to enforce 
no-load orders, or demand the scanning and examination of high-risk containers.438 In order to 
carry out inspections, CSI teams must refer the container in question to the foreign officials who 
then decide whether to scan or examine the container in question.439 According to CBP, its 
officers are permitted to observe the inspections and document the results. However, the host 
customs authority may decide to deny an inspection in which case the CSI team must mark the 
container for inspection on arrival at the U.S. port.440 This lack of enforcement power is reflected 
in CBP’s own explanation of how a no-load order functions: 
 
“The power behind the 24-hour rule derives from the Commissioner Bonner's legal authority to 
deny a permit to unlade cargo at a U.S. port. If the manifest information […] doesn’t add up, 
CBP notifies the carrier that a container will not be given a permit to unlade in the U.S. If the 
carrier cannot unlade, he will not bother to load the container onto the ship. So if there is a 
security risk with that container or its cargo, it remains in the foreign port.”441 
 
In other words, the carrier’s decision to comply with a no-load order is dictated by the powers 
that CBP officers exercise on their home territory. This clearly shows that the enforcement 
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powers of CBP remain rooted in the territory of the United States.442 As noted by oversight 
bodies, the lack of enforcement powers of CSI teams means there is nothing that CBP can do to 
prevent a foreign seaport from permitting a ship to load its high-risk cargo and depart for the 
United States (which often happens in practice), thereby leaving U.S. seaports open to the threat 
of high-risk containers.443 In reality therefore, the security offered by CSI teams at the seaport of 
departure is significantly less than the term “pushing out the border” tends to suggest. 
 
The pre-screening of containers at the seaport of departure is crucial to the balance between 
ensuring security and balancing trade. This is because containers considered high-risk can be 
examined during the “dwell-time” at the CSI port which avoids causing delays to the transit of 
the container.444 Security is ensured by using advanced x-ray equipment to scan high-risk 
containers. On the other hand, trade facilitation is ensured by granting containers from CSI ports 
expedited clearance at U.S. seaports.445 
 
1.4. Use of Technology to Scan High-Risk Containers 
 
Strictly speaking, this aspect of the CSI also forms part of the pre-screening component because, 
like the stationing of CSI teams, scanning technology is a means of accomplishing the screening 
of containers prior to their shipment to the United States. However, this is treated as a separate 
component by CBP and is also regulated in a separate section in the SAFE Port Act.446 This 
aspect is not specific to the concept of “pushing the borders outwards” because the MTSA 2002 
and SAFE Port Act 2006 also requires U.S. authorities to deploy scanning equipment at U.S. 
seaports.  
 
Section 2 of the SAFE Port Act defines “radiation technology equipment” as “any technology 
that is capable of detecting or identifying nuclear and radiological material or nuclear and 
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radiological explosive devices.” Although WMD also includes chemical and biological weapons, 
equipment for detecting these classes of WMD does not yet exist.447  It should also be noted that 
scanning equipment is not limited to detecting weapons but can also be used to detect smuggled 
goods in general (e.g. cigarettes).448 This may enhance the attractiveness of such inspection 
equipment for host customs authorities. 
 
Radiation technology equipment is to be employed in a range of equipment, including mobile, 
truck and seaport container x-ray systems.449 It forms part of the port superstructure (fixed and 
mobile equipment).450 In theory, because NII equipment enables CSI teams to find out what is in 
the container without actually opening it, inspections can be carried out rapidly. The inspections 
are carried out within the period of “down-time” at the foreign harbour which can last up to seven 
days. In this way, high-risk containers can be inspected without disrupting its transportation. 
Physical examinations, on the other hand, take far longer and are only to be carried out in 
exceptional cases.451 In practice, however, the use of technology to scan high-risk containers can 
be problematic because the effectiveness of NII equipment can be compromised by the reliability 
of the equipment, high costs of running it and the layout of the port. In addition, it has so far 
proved impossible to penetrate containers transporting trash or rugs.452  
 
Host seaports bear the cost of acquiring, operating and maintaining NII equipment, which can be 
considerable. Such equipment is very expensive with the relevant equipment running into the 
millions of dollars. They must also bear the related costs of inspections, disposal of any WMD 
discovered as well as false alarms. The installation of equipment can also require the replanning 
of harbour operations owing to space and location considerations.453 More specifically, the costs 
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of inspection equipment are reported to be borne by seaport authorities,454 although the exact 
cost-sharing arrangement may also depend on the organizational mode of the seaport.455 The lack 
of funding for security measures at U.S. seaports raises the suspicion that the CSI is simply a 
means of shifting the cost of security measures to its trading partners. As matters presently stand, 
the security measures at CSI ports often significantly surpass those at U.S. ports.456 
 
Until recently, Section 232(b) of the SAFE Port provided for 100 per cent scanning of high-risk 
containers. Therefore, if a container is deemed by the ATS to be high-risk, it had to be scanned or 
searched before leaving a United States seaport facility.457 However, some senators found the 
existing scanning processes for maritime containers to be insufficient, especially since the 
findings of the Report by the Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigations had suggested that 
scanning technology was now sufficiently advanced to permit 100 percent scanning of containers 
destined for the United States.458 The model for 100 percent screening of containers was provided 
by Hong Kong harbour which employs the Integrated Container Inspection System (ICIS).459 
According to the PSI, such a scan did not impede the flow of commerce and the equipment used 
was equivalent to or exceeded equipment used in the U.S.460 The PSI found that if this system 
was widely implemented, it could allow for 100 percent of all containers to be screened upon 
arrival at any port. At the request of the Hong Kong Container Terminal Operators Association, 
DHS examined the possibility of linking this concept to the CSI. It was also argued that the 
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implementation of ICIS might yield considerable cost savings to CBP because the majority of 
targeting and analysis of images could take place remotely, thus reducing the substantial costs of 
stationing CBP personnel abroad under the CSI programme.461 On 3 August, the IRCA 2007 
entered into force. Section 1701 of this Act mandates the 100 per cent scanning of all containers 
(i.e. not just high-risk containers) destined for the United States at the port of departure by 2012.  
 
1.5. Use of Smarter, Tamper-Evident Containers 
 
This component of the CSI differs from the others insofar as it attempts to improve the integrity 
of containers themselves rather than the environment through which they move.462 Section 2 of 
the SAFE Port Act defines “container” by reference to the same term in the Containers 
Convention 1972. This is defined in Article II (1) of the Convention as “an article of transport 
equipment (a) of a permanent character and accordingly strong enough to be suitable for repeated 
use; (b) specially designed to facilitate the transport of goods, by one or more modes of transport, 
without intermediate reloading […].”  
 
Since its invention in the 1950s the container has undergone few technical changes. It remains 
little more than a steel box fastened by a “fifty cent tag.” As a result, it is easy for criminals to 
open containers without leaving any visible traces. Clearly, a container which could record all 
openings or diversions from the planned route or which could only be opened by authorized 
persons would provide a considerable standard of security throughout the supply chain. Although 
smart containers are still undergoing development, they are viewed by CBP as representing the 
single most important component of the CSI. This was underlined by the U.S. Commissioner for 
Customs:  
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“The best factory and loading dock security at the point of stuffing of a container, the best CBP 
targeting, and the best CSI inspections are part of the solution, but after all that has been done, a 
terrorist must not be able to open a container en route and stuff a bomb in it, or weapon of mass 
destruction (WMD).”463 
 
Smart containers must be securely sealed and tamper-evident.464 Therefore, research has 
concentrated on improving seals and developing an electronic container security device. In order 
to qualify as a “smart container”, the container must use specific, heavy-duty seals approved by 
the ISO.465 The container security device is a plastic box containing sensor circuitry which snaps 
into the hinge of the container. This device records the times a container is opened and the 
information stored is downloaded by a “reader” which is small enough to be integrated into a 
mobile phone.466 As the research advances and produces containers or container seals capable of 
mass production, the CBP will incorporate them into its requirements for C-TPAT or the 
Container Security Initiative.467 Importers will be required to use smart containers or secure seals 
or risk having their containers being classified as “high-risk.” According to the U.S. 
Commissioner for Customs “[i]f the containers entering our ports are not suitably sealed with at 
least an ISO certified high-security mechanical seal, we simply cannot view them as ‘low 
risk’.”468 Shippers who use the smart containers will be rewarded with expedited clearance in the 
forms of a “green lane.”469 Therefore, the development of a patented smart container represents a 
potentially lucrative field of research for companies. The implementation of smart containers 
could be achieved by means of Articles IX and X of the 1972 Convention, which lay down 
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procedures for amending the convention and annexes.470 The importance of container seals is also 
recognized by the RKC, which establishes minimum standards for customs seals.471 
 
1.6. Benefits of CSI Participation 
 
CBP rewards the private sector for investing in inspection equipment and liaising with its officers 
in the inspection of containers by granting expedited or green lane clearance for containers from 
the seaport. In the words of one security expert, the aim of this is “[t]o have the incentives for 
action trump the incentives for inaction.”472 In the event of a terrorist attack, use of a CSI port 
guarantees foreign exporters undelayed access to U.S. markets and, according to CBP, constitutes 
an economic advantage.473 This represents an important advantage for seaports over their 
competitors insofar as the former can attract greater business from importers anxious to ensure 
the reliability of their supplies.474 The U.S. Commissioner for Customs has described this benefit 
as follows: 
 
“If U.S. and host-government’s customs officials have cleared a shipment at the port of export, it 
will get expedited processing and release upon arriving in the United States. This gets importers’ 
goods to American markets more quickly […].”475 
 
The rapid expansion of CSI suggests that this benefit has encouraged seaports to participate in the 
CSI.476 The rationale is that expenditure on acquiring inspection equipment and liaising with CBP 
is more than compensated by the added custom that the seaport will obtain from importers eager 
for their goods to obtain expedited clearance.  
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Although the benefit of expedited clearance for containers at U.S. seaports potentially represents 
a significant competitive advantage (especially considering “just-in-time” delivery practices),477 
it is uncertain how expedited clearance translates into trade figures or whether CSI seaports are 
actually seeing an increase in custom which justify the costs of acquiring, operating, maintaining 
and upgrading inspection equipment (which can be considerable). It should also be observed that 
expedited or “green lane” clearance for imports is also contingent on the satisfaction of other 
requirements. According to the U.S. Commissioner for Customs, a shipment will receive “green 
lane” treatment if it comes from a: 
 
• foreign vendor that meets C-TPAT security standards at the point of loading or stuffing, 
or a C-TPAT importer that has assured its foreign vendors meet C-TPAT security 
standards at point of stuffing, and 
• uses a C-TPAT smart container, 
• is shipped through a CSI port, and 
• carried on board a C-TPAT carrier's vessel, 
• for delivery to a C-TPAT importer.478 
 
This gives the impression that shipping goods to the United States from a CSI port, in itself, will 
not necessarily guarantee expedited clearance by CBP. Considering that C-TPAT is primarily 
designed for U.S. companies, it also appears that full expedited clearance will only be available 
to U.S. importers. On the other hand, it has also been reported that cargo from CSI ports is 
automatically subject to less scrutiny by CBP officers at major U.S. ports.479 
 
2. Administration  
 
Prior to 9/11, several government agencies were responsible for the security of containerized 
transportation480 and they carried out border inspections in relation to immigration, customs and 
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animal and plant health. Investigations into 9/11 revealed that the number of agencies involved in 
international trade hampered the implementation of an effective security policy.481 The scattered 
organization of border control hindered the effective exchange of information and formulation of 
a border security policy, with each government agency pursuing its own strategy482 and even 
engaging in interagency “turf fights.”483 The events of 9/11 therefore led to an extensive 
reorganization of government departments.484 With the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security, border agencies were integrated into a single department which had overall 
responsibility for national security. In addition, the Homeland Security Act 2002 implemented 
the concept of “One Face at the Border.” The United States now has a unified inspections 
operation at borders; one inspector is charged with examining people, plants, goods and cargo 
upon entry to the country. This policy now means that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
inspectors are essentially interchangeable and responsible for all primary inspections.485 As a 
result of this momentous re-organization, the administration of the Container Security Initiative 
involves the following bodies: 
 
2.1. The Department of Homeland Security 
 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created by Executive Order on 8 October 
2001,486 in order to develop and co-ordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national 
strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks.487 The Order was placed on 
statutory footing by the Homeland Security Act of 2002488 and the DHS became operational on 1 
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March 2003. It is the first single government agency to be responsible for border management 
and transportation security.489   
 
Section 101 (a) of the HSA 2002 establishes a Department of Homeland Security, as an executive 
department of the United States. The Department of Homeland Security is headed by a Secretary 
who is appointed by the President (Section 102). The primary mission of the DHS forms a 
comprehensive counter-terrorist strategy, embracing prevention, protection, response and 
recovery and is laid down in Section 101 (b): 
 
• prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 
• reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and 
• minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur 
within the United States. 
 
A major goal of the Department of Homeland Security is to enhance the protection of critical 
infrastructure and key resources, which includes the nation’s shipping routes.490 It is exclusively 
focused on counter-terrorism and this anti-terrorist focus is also reflected in the missions of sub-
ordinate agencies which are responsible for border and transportation security. At the same time, 
Section 101 (f) requires the DHS to ensure that the overall security of the United States is not 
diminished by efforts, activities and programmes aimed at securing the homeland. Therefore, it 
must strike a balance between improving security and facilitating legitimate travel and trade.  
 
Concerning maritime security, the Department of Homeland Security has the task of 
implementing the National Strategy for Maritime Security 2005.491 It carries out comprehensive 
vulnerability assessments of strategic facilities and coordinates security research and 
development.492 It also analyses the threat of terrorism and co-ordinates anti-terrorist strategy 
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within the executive branch. In this respect, the Secretary is required to appoint a Special 
Assistant to the Secretary who inter alia must work with federal entities, academia and the 
private sector in developing innovative approaches to address homeland security challenges (Sec 
102 (f) (5)).  
 
The Department acts as a co-ordinating body for the diverse government departments responsible 
for national security493 and administers a number of security measures through several 
agencies.494 It requires co-operation at all levels of government to ensure that critical information 
is shared effectively between the diverse government departments.495 Accordingly, the Secretary 
has the authority to enter into agreements with other executive agencies, co-ordinate policy with 
non-federal entities with regard to homeland security and issue regulations (Section 102 (c) and 
(e)).   
 
2.2. The Directorate of Border and Transportation Security 
 
The Directorate of Border and Transportation Security is located within the DHS and is 
responsible for border security. The Directorate consolidates a number of border security 
agencies including the CBP and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Section 
401 HSA 2002 appoints an Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security to head the 
Directorate of Border and Transportation Security and Section 402 (1) – (8) defines his 
responsibilities. It states that the Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Border and 
Transportation Security is responsible for (1) preventing the entry of terrorists and the 
instruments of terrorism into the United States; (2) securing the borders, territorial waters ports, 
terminals, waterways, and air, land, and sea transportation systems of the United States, including 
                                                  
493
 The DHS is to carry out its coordination function through the Office of State and Local Coordination: see Section 
102 (c) of the Homeland Security Act. 
494
 Section 101 (b) (2) of the Homeland Security Act declares that the primary responsibility for investigating and 
prosecuting terrorism does not lie with the Department but in the relevant Federal, State and local law enforcement 
agencies. However, entities transferred to the Department (e.g. CBP) may have jurisdiction where provided by law. 
Security programmes administered by the DHS include US-VISIT, NEXUS and SENTRI, FAST lanes and fast and 
secure visas. For an overview of the efforts of the Department of Homeland Security to secure U.S. transportation 
systems, see Tom Ridge, Secretary of U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Statement before the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 9 April 2003; see also U.S. Customs Commissioner, 
Testimony of 26 January 2004. 
495
 Information sharing is facilitated by the Homeland Security Information Network which aims to improve the flow 
of threat information to state, local and private sector partners. 
  
 
97 
managing and co-ordinating those functions transferred to the Department at ports of entry. 
Section 402 (6) requires the Directorate to administer the customs laws of the United States 
which relate to border security. In particular, Section 402 (8) requires the Under-Secretary to 
ensure the speedy, orderly, and efficient flow of lawful traffic and commerce in carrying out 
these responsibilities. The new Directorate improves the coordination of measures to safeguard 
transportation systems and secure the border by consolidating the agencies responsible for border, 
coastline, and transportation security. The Directorate is divided into two bureaus: the Bureau for 
Customs and Border Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  
 
2.3. U.S. Customs and Border Protection Bureau (CBP) 
 
According to the Revised Kyoto Convention (RKC), customs services perform three functions: to 
enforce the law, collect duties and taxes and provide prompt clearance of goods and ensuring 
compliance. Maritime security has also formed a traditional task of the U.S. customs 
administration.496 Research has shown that customs procedures have a significant impact on the 
movement of persons and goods in international trade497 and customs administrations have 
attempted to streamline their procedures in response to the growth in international trade.498 
Although 9/11 served to shift the focus to security, the aim of the CSI was (and still is) to strike a 
balance between trade security and facilitation by using risk assessment techniques. In this 
respect, it reflects the RKC and Framework of Standards. 
 
According to Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution, Congress has the 
broad power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations.” This power is necessary to prevent 
smuggling and prohibited articles from entering the United States borders. The responsibility to 
carry out this role has traditionally been exercised by the United States Customs Service which 
was created by statute in 1790. In order to prevent illegal goods entering the United States and to 
                                                  
496
 See DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, MARITIME COMMERCE SECURITY PLAN, OCTOBER 2005 p. 2. 
497
 See RKC, General Annex, Chapter 1, Guidelines on General Principles, p.3, para.1.  
498
 The growth in international trade has been driven by electronic commerce, see Columbus Ministerial Declaration 
on Trade Efficiency, paras. 6 and 7.  
  
 
98 
assess customs duties and tariffs it has statutory powers to inspect goods imported into the United 
States.499 
 
On 1 March 2003, the United States Customs Service was renamed “The United States Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection (BCBP).”500 The change of name and accompanying re-
organization reflected the fact that U.S. Customs was “thrust onto the frontlines of … [the] war 
on terrorism.”501 Today, CBP exists as a government agency under the supervision of the Border 
and Transportation Security Directorate within the Department of Homeland Security.502 Section 
403 HSA 2002 transfers to the Secretary of Homeland Security the functions, personnel, assets 
and liabilities of (1) the U.S. Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury including the 
functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto.  
 
The primary mission of CBP is to protect America against further terrorist attacks and is the 
agency responsible for maritime cargo security.503 However, it must also perform traditional law 
enforcement tasks of U.S. Customs as well, including illegal drug and contraband interdiction, 
regulating trade, protecting intellectual property rights by seizing counterfeit goods and 
investigating money laundering and financial crimes.504 In accordance with the Trade Act 2002, 
CBP must also balance the interests of trade and security by facilitating the entry of legitimate 
trade. Therefore it performs a dual role: protecting both the border and commercial operations. 
Since 9/11, the “One face at the Border” policy has assigned the responsibility for managing, 
controlling and securing U.S. borders to CBP alone. The agency has the power to issue 
regulations concerning border entry and formulates its policy in conjunction with the U.S. 
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Administration, Congress, the business community and the public.505 It also shares the task of 
implementing maritime security measures with the U.S. Coast Guard, which is responsible for the 
waterborne movement of cargo and security at port facilities.506 
 
Like all other law enforcement bodies, the jurisdiction of the U.S. Customs Service is limited to 
the borders of the United States.507 This presents a problem in pursuing a pre-emptive counter-
terrorism strategy which requires customs to inspect container cargo before they arrive at the U.S. 
port of destination. However, despite their limitations, the Declarations of Principles have 
enabled CBP to overcome this territorial limitation to a large extent. This is a revolutionary 
development in mutual assistance which has traditionally permitted the presence of customs 
officers on foreign territory under limited circumstances (e.g. to continue surveillance or pursuit 
of offenders).508 By contrast, the DoPs permit liaison between customs administrations for an 
unlimited period of time and within relatively undefined parameters.509 
 
The United States customs service has a wide range of powers to enforce customs law and 
regulations. A “customs officer” is defined under 19 U.S.C. 1401 as “any officer of the United 
States Customs Service or any commissioned warrant or petty officer of the Coast Guard” or any 
other person duly authorized to perform any duties of a customs officer. The basic provision 
regulating their powers is 19 U.S.C. 482, which authorizes customs officers to search vehicles 
and persons both within and without their respective districts. The subject of customs inspections 
are invariably goods or vessels entering or leaving the country.  
 
The sole authority to examine cargo is contained in U.S. Code 1434. This provision grants U.S. 
Customs (now CBP) the power to regulate the entry of vessels into the United States. Section 
1461 requires all merchandise and baggage imported or brought in from any contiguous country 
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to be unladen in the presence of and inspected by a customs officer at the first port of entry at 
which the same shall arrive. According to Section 1467, whenever a vessel from a foreign port 
arrives at a port or place in the United States, the appropriate customs officer for such port or 
place of arrival may “cause inspection, examination and search to be made of the persons, 
baggage and merchandise discharged or unladen from such a vessel.” Section 1499 requires the 
customs service to inspect a “sufficient number of shipments” and examine a “sufficient number 
of entries” to ensure compliance with the laws enforced by the customs service. 19 U.S.C. § 1581 
(a)510 grants a general authorization for performing border searches511 in respect of persons and 
things.512 Customs may carry out the searches without cause513 at points of embarkation514 and 
importation.515  
 
Customs officers also have a number of enforcement powers. According to 19 USC Section 
1589a, they may 1) carry a firearm; 2) execute and serve a warrant, subpoena or summons or any 
other process issued under the authority of the United States, and 3) make an arrest without a 
warrant for any offence against the United States. The power of arrest includes any offence 
committed within the officer’s presence or to a felony cognizable under the laws of the U.S. 
which are committed outside the officer’s presence, provided that he has reasonable grounds to 
believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a felony.  
 
The statutory powers of customs officers are limited to the territory of the United States. 
However, within its jurisdiction, U.S. Customs enjoys a privileged constitutional position and 
have broad powers to carry out their law enforcement activities. In United States v. Ickes,516 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals interpreted §1581 “against the backdrop of an ‘impressive historical 
pedigree of the Government’s power and interest’ at the border.” The Court noted that this 
backdrop had traditionally persuaded courts to interpret the provision “in an expansive manner.” 
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Although the Fourth Amendment guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures as 
a fundamental right,517 the Courts have granted Customs officers a special constitutional position 
by means of the “border search doctrine.” Accordingly, in United States v. Ramsey, the court held 
that border searches without probable cause and without a warrant are nevertheless reasonable 
pursuant to the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.518 In United States v. Thirty-seven 
Photographs the U.S. Supreme Court held that a port of entry is not a traveller’s home.”519 The 
Court observed that inspections of luggage was a characteristic function of Customs officers and 
described it as “an old practice and is intimately associated with excluding illegal articles from 
the country.”520  
 
According to case law, border inspections are not subject to the constraints imposed by the 
Fourth Amendment for three reasons. First, border searches are carried out in order for the United 
States to protect itself against unwanted imports or entrants and must therefore be effective for 
this purpose. Second, a port of entry has a different legal status from other places within the 
country. A person can only claim his full constitutional rights once he has entered the country 
lawfully.521 Finally, there is a public interest in ensuring that narcotics and other threats to public 
health and security are prevented from entering the country. The courts must satisfy this public 
interest. These broad powers are justified in the interests of self-protection. The fact that U.S. 
Customs is now a lead government agency in ensuring national security is likely to reinforce the 
already broad powers granted to customs officials in the execution of their duties. This was 
expressly stated by the U.S. Court of Appeals in the recent case United States v. Ickes.522 Section 
341 (a) of the Trade Act 2002 is also important in this respect because the provision increases the 
immunity of Customs officers from civil liability when conducting a search provided that they 
performed the search in good faith and used reasonable means while effectuating such search.523 
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As a result of this amendment customs officials no longer have to show “reasonable cause to 
suspect there is merchandise which was imported contrary to law” before conducting a search.524  
 
The U.S. Commissioner for Customs heads the CBP and is responsible for developing strategies, 
including the Container Security Initiative. He is appointed by the President with the advice and 
the consent of the Senate.525 He reports directly to the Secretary for Homeland Security who, in 
turn, is directly answerable to the President of the United States. The powers of the U.S. Customs 
Commissioner are largely determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security. According to 
Section 102 (a) (3), the functions of all officers, employees and organizational units of the 
Department are vested in the Secretary. The Secretary has the authority to delegate any of his 
functions to any officer, employee or organizational unit of the Department.526 The Secretary’s 
functions includes the authority to enter into “co-operative agreements” as may be necessary to 
carry out his statutory responsibilities.527 The U.S. Commissioner for Customs is responsible for 
the implementation of the Container Security Initiative.528 
 
Complaints against Customs policy and decisions are dealt with by the Office of Trade 
Relations.529 The financing of security measures is crucial to the effectiveness of security 
measures and CBP must take into account the recommendations of the Government 
Accountability Office together with the Committee of Ways and Means when formulating policy. 
Appeals against the decisions of CBP are made to the Office of Trade Relations. In addition, the 
Court of International Trade has jurisdiction to hear appeals and protests against the agency’s 
acts. 
 
                                                  
524
 On the legal implications of this amendment see Nathanial Saylor, The Untouchables: Protections from Liability 
for Border Searches Conducted by U.S. Customs in Light of the Passage of the Good Faith Defense in 19 U.S.C. 
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 Section 411 (b) of the Homeland Security Act.  
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 Id. Section 102 (b) (2). 
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 See S. Hrg. 109-186, p. 2 (“Under the leadership of Commissioner Bonner, CBP aggressively implemented these 
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 Replacing the Office of Trade Ombudsman, see Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, news release U.S. 
Customs Establishes New Office of Trade Relations, Appoints Director, 7 January 2002.  
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2.4. The National Targeting Centre (NTC) 
 
The Customs and Border Protection National Targeting Centre was formerly known as the Office 
of Border Security.530 It was created in October 2001 and forms part of CBP’s Office of Field 
Operations. The priority mission of the NTC is to provide tactical targeting and analytical 
research support for anti-terrorism efforts using the Automated Targeting System (ATS). The 
Centre also liaises with other border security agencies including: U.S. Coast Guard, Immigration 
& Customs Enforcement, Federal Air Marshals, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transportation 
Security Administration, Department of Energy.531 In particular, the NTC also supports the FDA 
in its administration of the Bio-terrorism Act. The staff of the NTC includes representatives from 
all CBP disciplines as well as liaison staff from the intelligence community. According to the 
U.S. CBP, the NTC also supports other CBP field elements, “including Container Security 
Initiative personnel stationed in countries throughout the world, with additional research assets 
for passenger and cargo examinations.”532  
 
2.5. Government Accountability Office 
 
The mission of the Government Accountability Office is to “support the Congress in meeting its 
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability 
of the federal government for the benefit of the American people.”533  In fulfilling its mission, the 
GAO “examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programmes and activities; and 
provides analyses, options, and other assistance to help the Congress make effective oversight, 
policy, and funding decisions.”534 In particular, the “GAO’s work includes financial audits, 
programme reviews and evaluations, policy analyses, legal opinions and analyses, and 
                                                  
530
 Joint Hearing Before The Subcommittee On Crime, Terrorism, And Homeland Security Of The Committee On 
The Judiciary And The Subcommittee On Intelligence And Counterterrorism Of The Select Committee On 
Homeland Security House Of Representatives, Progress In Consolidating Terrorist Watchlists — The Terrorist 
Screening Centre (TSC), 108th Congress (2nd Session), 25 March 2004. (Statement by Charles Bartoldus), p. 15.  
531
 See Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s National Targeting 
Centre, 7 September 2004.  
532
 See Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, National Targeting Centre Keeps Terrorism at Bay, CUSTOMS 
AND BORDER PROTECTION TODAY, March 2005.  
533
 GAO REPORT, GAO STRATEGIC PLAN 2004-2009, 1 March 2004 
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investigations.”535 It plays a leading role in the oversight of homeland security measures and 
continually monitors “the progress of the department and other critical parts of the federal 
government in becoming effective structures for meeting national needs.”536 With regard to the 
Container Security Initiative and related security measures, the GAO has issued a number of 
reports which provide valuable insight into their practical effectiveness. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The Container Security Initiative therefore builds on existing initiatives in terms of co-operation 
with the private sector as well as the infrastructure used to process information and its 
organization. The introduction of the Container Security Initiative could be considered as a 
programme “aimed at continuously modernizing Customs procedures and practices”, referred to 
in the Revised Kyoto Convention.537 The CBP did not approach the need for container security 
purely from a law enforcement perspective but sought (to some extent) to balance it with the 
needs of trade facilitation, as required by statute538 (i.e. by means of risk management). The 
administration of the measure has been improved since its introduction owing to the 
investigations of oversight bodies and the enactment of the SAFE PORT ACT 2006 clarifies the 
definitions and lays down standards which must be achieved within fixed time limits. Finally, 
although the measure appears based on a hypothetical “nightmare” scenario, its pre-emptive 
strategy nevertheless corresponds to WMD anti-proliferation efforts at international level.539 The 
findings may be summarized as follows: 
 
1. 9/11 made border security the primary mission of the US customs authority  
Customs not only facilitates trade but also enforces the fiscal obligations of importers as well as 
restrictions and prohibitions on movements of people and goods. The importance of these two 
activities is recognized by international customs conventions540 although prior to 9/11 the focus 
                                                  
535
 Id. 
536
 Id.  
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 See Preamble to Appendix I of the RKC. 
538
 See e.g. Section 343 (a) (3) Trade Act 2002. 
539
 See e.g. Resolution 1450, adopted by the Security Council at its 4667th meeting, on 13 December 2002 
[hereinafter S/Res/1450 (2002)]. 
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 See e.g. RKC, General Annex, Chapter 6, Guidelines on Customs Control, p. 6, para. 3; see also Article 5, TIR 
Convention. 
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was firmly on trade facilitation. This event served not only to shift the focus of CBP to border 
security but also to extend the law enforcement activities of border authorities to anti-terrorist 
activities. According to the WCO’s Framework of Standards (FoS) customs administrations have 
a crucial role to play in counter-terrorism: 
 
“As government organizations that control and administer the international movement of goods, 
Customs administrations are in a unique position to provide increased security to the global 
supply chain and to contribute to socio-economic development through revenue collection and 
trade facilitation.”541  
 
It is notable that this statement places security next to the traditional tasks of customs. There is a 
danger that customs could choke off trade through excessive security regulations and the added 
focus on security could cause it to neglect its other (traditional) which society are also important 
for society. This need to balance facilitation and compliance is a challenge which pre-dates 
9/11542 and, in fact, the CSI reflects many concepts derived from customs modernization efforts 
such as electronic data exchange, adoption of risk assessment measures and a reorganization of 
customs administrations.  
 
2. The Container Security Initiative is not novel but builds on earlier strategies  
The strategy of the Container Security Initiative echoes the aims of earlier policies developed by 
U.S. Customs, particularly those incorporated into the NAFTA Implementation Act 1993.543 
During the 1980s the Customs Service recognized that it was failing to perform its dual roles of 
trade facilitation and law enforcement properly544 and undertook modernization measures in 
recognition of the challenges presented by globalization. On the one hand, it required greater 
efficiency to cope with increased trade. On the other, it required increased law enforcement to 
                                                  
541
 See Introduction to the Framework of Standards, p. 6, para. 1.1.  
542
 See e.g. Preamble to the RKC, “Noting that the significant benefits of facilitation of international trade may be 
achieved without compromising appropriate standards of Customs control.” 
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 Most notably, the National Customs Automation Programme and informed compliance, see Section 631 and 637, 
Title VI of the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057. The 
Act entered into force on 8 December 1993. See Message from the Commissioner, Revised Kyoto Convention, 
General Annex, Chapter 6 (Guidelines on Customs Control), pp. 46 – 110.  
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 See The National Partnership for Reinventing Government, People, Processes and Partnerships: Customs in, 
Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less, Status Report September 1994. This report provides an 
overview of the agency's plans for comprehensive change. 
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combat cargo crime.545 U.S. Customs sought to meet these challenges by moving away from the 
traditional adversarial approach of customs law enforcement to acting in partnership with the 
private sector in order to ensure compliance (so-called “informed compliance). In addition, the 
completion of customs formalities could be speeded up by the electronic submission of data.546 
The partnership between customs and the private sector and the electronic submission of 
information formed the subjects of the NAFTA Implementation Act 1993. The Act required 
Customs to provide importers with all the information necessary to ensure compliance with their 
legal obligations547 and shifted the legal responsibility for ensuring customs compliance onto 
importers.548 It also replaced transaction-by-transaction processing with account-based 
processing.549 These developments proved mutually beneficial to the public and private sector 
and improved customs law enforcement. This public – private partnership also extended to law 
enforcement activities: in 1994 U.S. Customs announced the initiative “People, Processes and 
Partnerships”550 and the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC) was also created in 1996 as 
a business-led alliance supported by the U.S. Customs Service with the aims of combating 
narcotics smuggling via commercial trade. This programme enabled customs to cut off 
contraband at its source in foreign ports.551 Other industry partnership programmes include the 
Carrier Initiative Programme (CIP, established in 1984) and the Americas Counter Smuggling 
                                                  
545
 Cf. Preamble to the RKC, “Noting that the significant benefits of facilitation of international trade may be 
achieved without compromising appropriate standards of Customs control.” 
546
 See Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Everything Changed 1989 – 2003, U.S. Customs Today, February 
2003.  
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 Section 625 (e) NAFTA Implementation Act 1993 (19 U.S.C. 1625 (e)). 
548
 Ibid,. Section 637 (a) (19 USC Section 1484 (a) (1) (B)) the "importer of record" must, using reasonable care, file 
with the Customs Service "the declared value, classification and rate of duty applicable to the merchandise, and other 
such documentation [...]." The importer must therefore provide customs with all pertinent information on a shipment 
and properly classify the goods. 
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 Ibid., Section 615 (U.S.C. 1509 (b)): U.S. customs uses audits to test an importer's compliance with his statutory 
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 FLYNN, p. 14. 
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 “The Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition, or BASC, and the Carrier Initiative have proven that we can team 
together to prevent the use of legitimate trade by drug trafficking organizations. We are drawing on that experience, 
and those models, to strengthen our defenses against the use of the legitimate trading system by international terrorist 
organizations.” See Robert C. Bonner, Speech to the Trade Support Network (TSN), Washington, D.C., 22 January 
2002. 
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Initiative (ACSI, established in February 1998).552 The CSI therefore appears as the latest in a 
long line of security-related initiatives developed by U.S. Customs. 
 
In this context, it is worth mentioning that risk management also reflects a global development as 
Customs administrations throughout the world are employing risk management techniques in 
order to identify high risk shipments and target their resources efficiently.553 The WCO has been 
involved in creating a global framework for risk assessment through the Revised Kyoto 
Convention and more recently by the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global 
Trade.554 The Kyoto Convention recognized that simplification and harmonization can be 
accomplished by adopting modern techniques such as risk management controls and the 
application of information technology.555  
 
3. Effective supply-chain security depends on partnership between customs authorities and 
the private sector 
As far as the CSI is concerned, partnership with the private sector in order to obtain advance 
information on cargo shipments and inspect high-risk cargo is essential because “it owns and 
operates the vast majority of the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources.”556 The 
incentive of expedited clearance to encourage private sector investment in security equipment at 
seaports resembles a quid pro quo arrangement familiar from e.g. concession contracts.557 Also, 
the strategy of CBP in targeting CSI on the small number of seaports with the highest trade 
volumes (so-called megaports) is similar to the approach taken by customs administrations in 
external audit.558  
                                                  
552
 Details on CBP’s industry partnership programmes can be found under 
< http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/partnerships/ >. 
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 See Standard 4 of the Framework of Standards, Annex 1, para. 4.2 defines risk assessment as “the systematic 
application of management procedures and practices which provide Customs with the necessary information to 
address movements or consignments which present a risk.”  
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wide range of tasks. See RKC: General Annex, Chapter 6, Guidelines on Customs Control, pp. 10 ff.  
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4. Electronic data transmission is essential to the CSI but is resource-intensive and difficult 
to implement 
Concerning electronic data transmission, the NAFTA Implementation Act 1993 also required the 
Secretary to establish a National Customs Automation Programme.559 This system aimed to 
facilitate the movement of trade through more effective trade account management as well as 
reducing the data reporting burden on the trading community.560 The benefits of electronic data 
transmission in accelerating and simplifying customs formalities have also been recognized by 
international conventions.561  At the same time, the experience of CBP with the ACE shows that 
information technology can be expensive to implement and it also requires the necessary skilled 
staff to operate and maintain it. IT systems can therefore prove a double-edged sword and it is 
significant that the Revised Kyoto Convention only permits its use “where it is cost-effective and 
efficient for the Customs and the trade” and requires customs administrations to use the “relevant 
internationally accepted standards.”562 As far as the United States is concerned the CSI has 
provided CBP with added motivation to implement the ACE563 because any technical problems in 
IT systems are likely to seriously compromise border security measures, including the CSI. It 
must also be recognized that an IT system is only as good as the information it processes. In this 
respect, the cargo manifest which CBP uses to assess the risk of containers is a commercial 
document and it has been said that it does not provide the necessary information for security 
purposes.564  
 
5. The CSI is essential a unilateral measure but has encouraged multilateral security 
agreements 
Another problem which arises with the CSI is that it is an uncompromisingly unilateral nature, 
which could conflict with the obligations of the United States under international law. Although 
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 Section 411 (a) NAFTA Implementation Act 1993 (19 USC § 1411), defined as “an automated and electronic 
system for processing commercial importations.” 
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the subject of the measure is the international supply chain565 it is important to recognize that the 
CSI is designed for the singular purpose of protecting U.S. seaports against terrorist attack. This 
unilateralism is clearly expressed by the National Security Strategy for the United States of 
America: 
 
“The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that 
reflects the union of our values and our national interests.”566 
 
The essence of the unilateral nature of the CSI is its refusal to recognize the security measures of 
its trading partners as sufficient to protect U.S. security interests. Accordingly, CBP believes that 
it is justified in subjecting container cargo to increased scrutiny by the mere fact that the seaports 
from which they depart for the United States are not members of CSI. The CBP has implemented 
the CSI by means of bilateral agreement with foreign customs administrations. However, 
although the criteria for joining the CSI appear objective, CBP does not offer membership to all 
states.  
 
On the other hand, there are also indications that this unilateral measure could one day be 
superseded by a multilateral security regime. The United States has been able to use its immense 
trade leverage567 to expand the CSI quickly among its major trading partners in accordance with 
its own security standards.568  Almost six years after its introduction, the Container Security 
Initiative involves 58 seaports in 35 countries. According to commentators, bilateral agreement 
can be used as a means of reaching multilateral agreement.569 Therefore, it was significant that 
the CBP decided to “internationalize” the measure by means of multilateral agreement. In June 
2006, the Framework of Standards was issued by the WCO. It represents the first multilateral 
agreement specifically directed towards securing the international supply chain570 and reflects 
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many of the concepts used in the Container Security Initiative. Although this measure is 
voluntary and does not affect the continued existence of the CSI, it does lay the basis for a 
multilateral regime on supply chain security in the future. 
 
6. The SAFE Port Act 2006 partially codifies the CSI. However, its provisions are 
inadequate in a number of respects 
Concerning the administration of the measure, the Container Security Initiative has changed from 
being a non-regulatory measure to one which is regulated by statute (i.e. the SAFE Port Act 
2006). The absence of statutory regulation seriously affected transparency because, in order to 
define the Container Security Initiative, reference had to be made to a range of sources including 
primary and secondary legislation,571 frequently asked questions, speeches, press releases and 
bilateral agreements. This gave rise to difficulties in ascertaining the requirements of the 
measure, its strategy, definition of individual components as well as its future development.  
Owing to its complexity it is important that the CSI reflects the principle of transparency. 
Although its four components are interrelated, they are also linked to the initiatives of other 
government agencies and, to a certain extent, are developing at their own pace.572 The CSI also 
shows that the introduction of security measures necessitates legal change in a number of 
different areas (e.g. advanced submission of data, data protection, penalties, appeals, liability, 
statutory definitions, time limits etc.) and requires the amendment of existing legislation. In 
addition, those affected by the CSI may also be importers situated in foreign countries which 
transit their goods through the United States and who may not be fully aware of the CSI’s 
requirements and implications.  
 
The most important piece of legislation relating to the CSI is the SAFE Port Act 2006 which 
provides a framework for its implementation, administration and monitoring. It requires the 
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 The Trade Act 2002 and Homeland Security Act 2002 provide for the advance declaration of cargo information. 
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submission of annual reports documenting operations at different CSI seaports, collation of 
statistics and presentation of budget requirements. It also provides for technical implementation 
and compatibility with national and international security measures. This is very important 
considering the increasing number of national security programmes573 and the WCO’s 
Framework of Standards. On the other hand, the Act also contains some vague provisions that 
could create uncertainty in the maritime industry insofar as they provide for more onerous 
security standards and initiatives.574 In addition, the Act fails to provide for separate appeals 
procedure for importers or transit shippers affected by the CSI. This is significant because non-
compliance could result in considerable economic loss for US importers or transit shippers owing 
to physical inspections of containers or heavy statutory penalties.575 A separate, transparent 
procedure for lodging complaints and appeals against the decisions of the CBP which relate to 
security measures is therefore needed in order to ensure that complaints are dealt with efficiently 
and objectively and to clarify the interpretation of the relevant statutory requirements. This too 
would ensure the transparency of procedures, due process and accountability – especially with 
regard to foreign shippers. 
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C. Compliance with WTO Law 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The World Trade Organization was founded on 1 January 1995 as a successor to the trade regime 
based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which had been created in 1947. 
It is an international organization with legal personality.576 The Preamble to the WTO 
agreement577 declares the primary and overarching aims of the WTO to be the increase of 
prosperity in the form of living standards and full employment.578 These principles play an 
important role in the interpretation of the covered agreements, although the fact that there is no 
hierarchy among them has made it difficult for the Panel to strike a balance between them which 
has proved universally acceptable, especially in environmental cases. In fact, the WTO 
Agreement is an umbrella instrument for a number of different agreements which relate to major 
aspects of world trade including goods, services and intellectual property.579 It administers these 
agreements within a common institutional framework580 and ensures that the members adhere to 
the fundamental principles of non-discrimination and national treatment.581 There are currently 
151 members ranging from least developed, developing and developed countries.582 This diverse 
membership means that it is increasingly difficult to reach agreement on certain issues owing to 
competing goals and priorities. Nevertheless, since its creation in 1947, the GATT/WTO has 
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 Article VIII of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. The WTO has been repeatedly 
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played a crucial role in the intensification of globalization.583 In particular, it has made great 
progress in liberalizing trade for the benefit of its member states by reducing tariffs (the 
traditional means of protectionism) to negligible levels and has also provided a forum for 
negotiations among its members concerning their multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with 
under the agreements.584 The creation of the WTO as a result of the Uruguay Round extended 
trade negotiations into new areas such as services and intellectual property, although there has not 
been the liberalization in certain services (e.g. maritime transportation services) that was 
originally hoped for.  With the Doha Development Agenda the WTO has made the reduction of 
poverty in developing countries a priority issue and the broad aim of assisting and promoting the 
interests of developing countries can be found in the WTO Agreement and covered agreements.  
 
Although the WTO is described as a trade organization, issues such as the environment, labour 
conditions, human rights and now security (so-called “non-trade related issues”) are becoming 
increasingly important and it is difficult to define the limits to the scope of the WTO with 
certainty.585 As one commentator states, “[t]here are no logical or inherent limits to trade 
regulation, and it remains a matter of political expedience and negotiations, rather than theory 
and legal classifications, to define the scope of WTO law.”586  
 
The United States is also a member of the World Trade Organization and must comply with its 
obligations under the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 1994 in accordance 
with the principle of pacta sunt servanda.587 This principle is expressed in Article 26 of the 
VCLT, which states, “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
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performed by them in good faith.”588 Accordingly, governments must not take any measures that 
could frustrate the aims and objectives of the WTO Agreement and covered agreements.589 
Furthermore, they are obliged to exercise their rights in accordance with the abus des droit 
doctrine, which derives from the duty of good faith. U.N. Security Resolution 1456 also obliges 
states to “ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations 
under international law.”590 
 
Under exceptional circumstances, members are relieved from their obligations under the WTO 
agreements. As mentioned above, the WTO agreements contain an exception to the general 
obligations of the agreement for member states’ unilateral measures relating to security. This 
security exception is fundamentally important to the Container Security Initiative, because it 
allows states to any measures they consider necessary to protect their essential security interests. 
This so-called “national security exception” is also found in a number of other covered 
agreements (e.g. the GATT, GATS and TBT Agreement) and has proved very controversial.  
 
1.1. Scope of Investigation 
 
Considering that the Container Security Initiative has the potential to restrict trade in goods and 
services,591 the aim of the investigation is to determine whether the Container Security Initiative 
infringes the following covered agreements: the GATS, GATT, the Agreement on Pre-Shipment 
Inspection and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. The latter agreement, in particular, 
is very important nowadays concerning the prevalence of non-tariff barriers to trade.  
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1.2. Methodology 
 
The following examines selected provisions of each agreement in three stages. The first stage 
introduces the agreement and describes its aims. The second stage describes the scope of the 
agreement, its requirements as well as the way that the Panel and Appellate Body have 
interpreted its terms (especially in light of contemporary circumstances and the limitation 
contained in Article 3:2 DSU). The third section examines whether the Container Security 
Initiative complies with the provision in question and the final section summarizes the findings.  
 
2. Trade Effects of the Container Security Initiative 
 
The Container Security Initiative is a security measure which attempts to balance the needs of the 
public and trade.592 This corresponds to statutory requirements593 as well as The National 
Strategy for Maritime Security, which requires that security measures “be implemented with the 
minimum essential impact on commercial and trade-flow costs and operations.”594 At the same 
time, the United States has stated that it “recognizes the potential for trade disruption and has 
taken every possible step to ensure that legitimate trade is not disrupted.”595  
 
On the other hand, there was always a risk that the introduction of the CSI into an industry where 
security has traditionally played a relatively minor role could adversely affect existing practices 
to some extent.596 In particular, commentators argue that the CSI has the potential to adversely 
affect trade in services and trade in goods.597 The WTO Secretariat and WTO members have also 
expressed concern that the CSI may restrict trade.598 Owing to the fact that the CSI addresses the 
seaports of its major trading partners, it mainly affects trade in maritime transportation services. 
                                                  
592
 Concerning the character of the CSI see generally Math Noortmann, The U.S. Container Security Initiative: A 
Maritime Transport Security Measure or an (Inter)National Public Security Measure?, 10 IUS GENTIUM, 139.  
593
 Section 101 (13) (A) of the MTSA 2002; Section 343 (a) (3) of the Trade Act 2002. 
594
 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, p. 20, pt. 4  
595
 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEW – UNITED STATES, MINUTES OF MEETING, 
ADDENDUM, 22 NOVEMBER 2004 (WT/WTPR/M/126/Add.3), p. 37.  
596
 Security measures require improvements to infrastructure in order to facilitate the advance electronic submission 
of cargo information. In addition, the physical inspection of containers must also be accommodated by seaports 
which generally do not have much space. Concerning the challenges of implementation see generally GAO-03-297T, 
pp. 2 (concerning layout of ports); 12 – 19 (concerning administrative issues). 
597
 See e.g. Lee, pp. 136 et seq.  
598
 WTO TRADE POLICY REVIEW: UNITED STATES 2004, supra n. 29.   
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However, despite the fact that the CSI only appears to regulate seaports and containers, it may be 
possible for the complainant to prove that it produces a de facto restrictive effect on trade in 
goods by establishing a causal relationship between the CSI and the restriction.599  
 
The following sections examine the parties affected by the CSI and the trade effects of the 
measure in relation to services and goods. The latter section is particularly important because it 
explains the reasons why these agreements are relevant before their individual provisions are 
examined. The following section presents a general overview of trade effects whereas the 
examination of the individual agreements concentrates on trade effects specifically relevant to 
individual provisions.  
 
2.1. Trade in Services 
 
Maritime transportation services are crucial to world trade and form one of the world’s most 
important services markets.600 The introduction of containerization led to a rapid expansion in 
seaport services with the result that today approximately 90 percent of international trade is 
transported by means of container vessels.601 Such figures suggest that maritime transportation is 
the driving force behind globalization. 
 
Competition in maritime transport services is intense with ports around the world expanding 
terminal capacity, modernizing their infrastructure and identifying new service markets in order 
to stay ahead of the competition. It is a global industry with seaports providing a range of 
services including infrastructure provision, berthing services, cargo handling, consignees and 
ancillary services.602 Seaports perform an important strategic role as regional transshipment hubs 
and also encourage agglomeration: according to one study “firms’ location decisions are based on 
                                                  
599
 See Report of the Panel, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished 
Leather, WT/DS155/R, 19 December 2000 (adopted on 16 February 2001), [hereinafter Panel, Argentina – Bovine 
Hides]. 
600
 See J. Michael Taylor, Evaluating the Continuing GATS Negotiations Concerning International Maritime 
Transportation Services, 27 Tul. Mar. L.J. 129, pp. 149 – 150; PAREMESWARAN, pp. 7 et seq. (on the general 
importance of trade in services) and pp. 23 et seq. (on the importance of maritime transport services in particular). 
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 See e.g. PAREMESWARAN, pp. 23 – 27; WTO, COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES, MARITIME TRANSPORT SERVICE, 
BACKGROUND NOTE BY THE WTO SECRETARIAT, (S/C/W/62), 16 November 1998, pp. 3 – 6 and (S/CSS/W/106), 4 
October 2001, pp. 4 – 5; Haveman et al, p. 1.; Flynn, p. 84; Kumar and Hoffmann, pp. 36 – 38.   
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 See Trujillo and Nombela, p. 10, box. 2.  
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price considerations and on ease of access to markets.”603 At the same time, seaports are fragile 
installations with their operations being compromised by limited space (leading to bottlenecks), 
and they are highly vulnerable to natural disasters (e.g. hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis), strikes 
by union workers and the constant demand for lower transport costs (e.g. introduction of new 
practices and new shipping routes).604  
 
Unfortunately, the market for maritime transportation services is also restrictive and many states 
have traditionally used a variety of measures to protect domestic service providers against foreign 
competition.605 9/11 led to an increase of security in maritime transportation services, thereby 
“forever altering maritime operations around the world.”606 Security measures such as the CSI 
may represent a new breed of non-tariff barrier to trade in services607 and could interfere with or 
distort supply and demand in the international maritime transport services market.608  
 
The CSI affects trade in seaport services because it distorts the competitive relationship between 
seaports owing to the grant of expedited clearance CSI shipments (“greenlane”) and increased 
inspections for non-CSI shipments (“redlane”). The former provides an incentive for seaports to 
participate in the CSI which is non-market driven609 and designed to increase the competitiveness 
of the seaport.610 As a result, CSI ports can provide a more attractive service than non-CSI ports. 
By contrast, the absence of a bilateral agreement allowing the stationing of CSI teams means that 
suspicious cargo from non-CSI ports cannot be inspected prior to export to the United States. As 
a result, any scanning or physical inspection can only be carried out at a less opportune stage in 
the supply chain, i.e. at the U.S. seaport or while the ship is still at sea. Increased inspections at 
U.S. seaports could delay customs clearance, thereby increasing transit costs and leading to the 
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 J. VERNON HENDERSON ET AL, GEOGRAPHY AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH WORKING 
PAPER 2456 pp. 2 – 6.  
604
 The limitations of seaports are recognized to a certain extent in Section 232 (b) (4) (c) of the SAFE Port Act 2006 
(as amended by Section 1701 of the IRCA 2007). 
605
 See PARAMESWARAN, p. 45. 
606
 Lucienne Carasso, Bulow Charter Party Consequences of Maritime Security Initiatives: Potential Disputes and 
Responsive Clauses, 37 J. MAR. L. & COM. 79, p. 79.  
607
 PARAMESWARAN (at p. 50), defines a barrier to trade in maritime services as “barriers that limit maritime service 
providers from accessing, entering or operating in a market or consumers from freely choosing the transport services 
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 One important example of how security measures can restrict the freedom to provide seaport services is the Dubai 
Ports World controversy: see infra pp. 332 – 333. 
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 Lee, pp. 132 et seq. 
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 See FLYNN, supra n. 76. 
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dissatisfaction of customers.611 There is evidence that CBP is deliberately attempting to create a 
two-tier system of trade.612 
 
Considering the highly competitive nature of the maritime transport industry it is difficult to see 
how non-CSI ports will survive in the new system of trade envisaged by CBP which effectively 
relegates them to secondary status.613 Research by the OECD has also shows that shippers are 
unlikely to use the services of ports which are at risk of terrorist attacks.614 Owing to the fact that 
costs play a decisive role in shippers’ choice of markets, non-CSI ports are likely to see a drop in 
demand for their services as shippers switch to CSI ports in order to avoid discriminatory 
treatment at U.S. seaports.615 The diversion of cargo to larger CSI megaports will result in less 
demand for services offered by non-CSI ports which may even lead to their closure. In this 
respect, the ports likely to suffer most are large local and regional ports which offer direct routes 
to the United States.616 In particular, the development of regional transshipment ports could be 
affected by the lack of CSI status.617 Considering that seaports attract agglomeration, the loss of 
business owing to lack of CSI status is likely to have a knock-on effect in the surrounding area, 
with manufacturers moving to CSI ports in other countries. 
 
Participation in the CSI therefore has profound economic ramifications for seaports: according to 
one commentator, the promise of expedited clearance has been the major factor in the rapid 
expansion of the CSI.618 This can be shown by the initial reaction of European Commission to the 
expansion of the CSI at European seaports.619 It argued that expedited clearance could distort the 
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 See PARAMESWARAN, p. 64.  
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 See U.S. Commissioner, Remarks of 30 October 2003. 
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 See Nicholas Hughes Allen, The Container Security Initiative Costs, Implications and Relevance to Developing 
Countries, PUBLIC ADMIN. DEV. 26, 439 – 447 (2006), pp. 441 – 445. UNCTAD REPORT 2003, p. 21 at para. 56. 
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 OECD REPORT 2003, p. 26.  
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 See Allen, p. 444. 
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 See comments of European officials in Gregory Crouch, U.S. Port Security Plan Irks Europeans, NEW YORK 
TIMES, 6 November 2002 (Reporter). According to this report, “For instance, once a cargo container has cleared 
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competitive relations between seaports within the European Community by diverting trade flows 
to CSI ports and threatened to commence infringement proceedings against EU member states 
which had concluded bilateral agreements with the CBP.620 In literature, there is also general 
agreement CSI could adversely effect competitive conditions between seaports, especially in 
relation to developing countries.621  
 
2.2. Trade in Goods 
 
Increasing port security can also have an indirect affect on the trade in goods because the 
importation of products into foreign countries depends on cost-effective and reliable 
transportation, efficient seaport operations and customs procedures. According to one writer, 
trade is affected by a wide range of factors including formal trade barriers such as tariffs as well 
as numerous transport-related aspects, including port privatization.622 For example, employing 
non-union labour can lead to the introduction of more efficient work practices, some of which 
can increase port productivity by up to 30 percent.623  
 
Maritime transport is of particular importance to trade in goods624 because it offers a low cost and 
predictable means of transport which has provided the foundation for highly sensitive modern 
business practices such as low inventories and just-in-time deliveries.625 Any disruption to the 
supply chain caused by over-zealous security measures will quickly be felt by the end consumer:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                
the United States. But cargo leaving a French port like Marseille, which is not a party to such agreements, can expect 
to face potential delays when it reaches American shores.”  
620
 See statement of Frits Bolkestein in Press Release, 18 March 2003 (IP/03/399), “The security concerns of both the 
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 Kumar and Hoffmann, pp. 41 – 42.  
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STORY: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON ENHANCING FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION, p. 3 (“The Journal of Commerce 
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“When transportation system performance decreases, freight-related businesses and their 
customers are affected in two ways. First, freight assets become less productive. Second, more 
freight transportation must be consumed to meet the needs of a thriving and expanding economy. 
Thus, when freight transportation under-performs, the economy pays the price.”626 
 
The most popular means of transporting goods is by sea and many of the largest trading nations 
are heavily reliant on maritime transport. For example, the United States is the world’s largest 
importer of goods with its total imports for 2006 amounting to $ 1.86 billion dollars.627 Each 
year, 18.5 million seaborne containers enter United States ports,628 which account for 
approximately 49% of waterborne imports of goods.629 The right of WTO members to access 
U.S. markets using seaborne containers is therefore of crucial importance for the GDP of its 
trading partners.630  
 
Any delay caused by security measures will translate into transport costs which play a crucial role 
in influencing a shipper’s choice of market.631 In this respect, the following statement by the 
former U.S. Customs Commissioner will obviously has implications for the importation of goods 
into the United States. 
 
“Finally, being in the “green lane” will have true economic meaning because inspections at CSI 
ports, U.S. seaports, and all U.S. ports of entry have increased, and they will continue to 
increase, based on risk management principles and targeting based on risk assessment. […] 
                                                  
626
 Id., p. 5.  
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 US CENSUS BUREAU, US INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES, ANNUAL REVISION FOR 2006, 8 June 
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March 2006, p. 4, fig.1.  
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What will that mean for shipments not in the “green lane”? More inspections, more delays, and 
more expenses at the ports.”632 
 
There are 360 seaports in the United States and their infrastructure, unloading capabilities and 
cargo handling capabilities vary greatly.633 Accordingly, some seaports will cope with added 
inspections better than others. Increasing inspections at US seaports could therefore interfere with 
market access for the exporters of WTO member states634 who are not able to ship containers 
from CSI ports: increased inspections, delays and expenses at US ports represent considerable 
trade barriers whose adverse effects on access to many of the world’s largest markets should not 
be underestimated. 
 
2.3. Parties Affected by the Container Security Initiative  
 
Despite the fact that the WTO Agreement is designed to directly improve the rights of traders 
(i.e. in the sense of encouraging the import and export of goods and provision of services),635 the 
right to bring a complaint under WTO law is limited to states only.636 The only action which 
export industries adversely affected by a state’s trading regulations can take is to petition their 
government to initiate a complaint before the WTO. Although the effects of the CSI are likely to 
be felt primarily by US importers637 it can also affect the following foreign entities:638 
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1. Foreign seaports: the seaports and terminal operators which largely bear the costs of 
implementing security measures according to U.S. security standards.639 Costs include the 
acquisition, operation and maintenance of non-intrusive security equipment. However, 
just as importantly, the seaport must also satisfy the necessary logistical demands that the 
scanning of high-risk containers entails.  
 
2. Maritime carriers: defined by CBP as “the party having operational control of the 
vessel”, carriers are responsible for complying with the information requirements 
contained in the 24 Hour Rule. Infringements of this rule can lead to substantial 
penalties.640 It has also been reported that the requirements of the 24 Hour Rule and CSI 
have also affected the way vessel operators do business.641  
 
3. Port users: seaports and customs authorities may seek to recoup the costs for compliance 
with the US security standards from port users by means of a security-related user fee. 
Such fees could be imposed on all port users generally or only on port users who are 
shipping cargo to the United States. This latter category includes the US importer as well 
as transit cargo, which will pass through a US seaport en route to its final destination.  
 
4. Foreign exporters: US exporters ship goods to the United States. Their main concern is 
transport costs, which are reflected in the price of the goods. By increasing costs of transit 
and the risks of delay, the new security regulations increase the price of foreign goods, 
making them less attractive to US consumers. This could lead exporters to seek 
alternative markets for their goods.  
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2.4. Complaints by Private Parties 
 
The WTO Agreements were concluded by sovereign nations and therefore only member states 
have the necessary standing to bring complaints under the Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
According to the Appellate Body in U.S. – Shrimp, the dispute settlement proceedings are not 
available to “individuals or private organizations.”642 member states therefore bring complaints 
on behalf of their economic participants643 and have established procedures which enable the 
private sector to notify the government of the trade restrictive practices of other member states.644 
Private sector complainants bear the burden of proof when bringing a complaint to the competent 
national authorities. Governments will also take into account legal, commercial and political 
factors when deciding whether to initiate dispute settlement proceedings.645  
 
The EU is a major user of the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure646 and Council Regulation 
(EC) No 3286/94 establishes the procedure for lodging a complaint under the Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (and other international treaties) by the European 
Communities (hereinafter “Trade Barriers Regulation”).647 Private parties are crucial to bringing 
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a complaint because the Commission cannot commence a complaint independently of the opinion 
of member states.648 According to one commentator: 
 
“Private parties are the real guardians of the international trade agreements that the EU signs 
with third countries. They are the ones with the vested interests, and hence they are the most 
vigilant in highlighting the transgressions of third countries.”649 
 
The following examines the requirements that an EU exporter must satisfy before the European 
Commission will consider initiating a complaint before the WTO. Any complaint against the CSI 
will be directed against the United States itself: the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection is a 
government agency and its acts are directly attributable to the United States government.650 
 
The Preamble to this piece of secondary legislation states that its aim is “to provide a legal 
mechanism under Community law which would be fully transparent, and would ensure that the 
decision to invoke the Community's rights under international trade rules is taken on the basis of 
accurate factual information and legal analysis.” The grounds for lodging a complaint lie in 
“obstacles to trade” or “adverse trade effects.” The former is defined in Article 2 as “any trade 
practice adopted or maintained by a third country in respect of which international trade rules 
establish a right of action.” “Adverse trade effects” are defined are “those which an obstacle to 
trade causes or threatens to cause, in respect of a product or service, to Community enterprises on 
the market of any third country, and which have a material impact on the economy of the 
Community or of a region of the Community, or on a sector of economic activity therein.” 
However, this is qualified to the effect that “the fact that the complainant suffers from such 
adverse effects shall not be considered sufficient to justify, on its own, that the Community 
institutions proceed with any action.”  
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Article 3 provides that “any natural or legal person, or any association not having legal 
personality, acting on behalf of a Community industry which considers that it has suffered injury 
as a result of obstacles to trade that have an effect on the market of the Community may lodge a 
written complaint.” Sub-paragraph 2 requires the complainant to provide sufficient evidence of 
the existence of the obstacles to trade and of the injury resulting therefrom. In particular, 
evidence of adverse trade effects must be given on the basis of the illustrative list of factors 
indicated in Article 10, which deals with evidentiary requirements. According to Article 10(1), 
regard may be had to three factors: (a) the volume of community imports or exports, (b) the 
prices of the Community industry’s competitors and (c) the consequent impact on the Community 
industry.  As far as the territorial scope of the examination is concerned, paragraph 4 does not 
refer to adverse effects on individual countries but “on the economy of the Community or of a 
region of the Community, or on a sector of economic activity therein.” Article 4 also provides 
that adverse may arise inter alia “in situations in which trade flows concerning a product or 
service are prevented, impeded or diverted as a result of any obstacle to trade.” 
 
The TBR extends to all the covered agreements of the WTO and permits violation and non-
violation complaints.651 Article (2) (1) also requires complaints to be directed towards practices 
which are maintained or adopted by the government.652 Complaints can be made by industry 
representatives (Article 3 (1)) or individual companies (Article 4 (1)), although the latter’s right is 
restricted to “obstacles to trade that have an effect on the market of a third country.”653 
Concerning the burden of proof, a complaint under the Trade Barriers Directive of the European 
Union does not depend on the challenged measure actually causing damage: according to Article 
2 (3) an injury can consist in the threat of material injury in respect of a product or service. 
However, according to Article 2 (4) the fact that the complainant suffers from adverse effects will 
not by itself justify Community institutions to proceed with any action. Rather, the complainant 
must show that “it is necessary in the interest of the Community” for the Commission to take 
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action.654 Individual companies must therefore show that their injury has “a material impact on 
the economy of the Community or of a region of the Community, or on a sector of economic 
activity therein.”655 If this requirement is satisfied, the Commission will instigate an examination 
in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article 5.656  
 
Following the consultation of the Advisory Committee, if the Commission decides that there is 
sufficient evidence to justify initiating an examination procedure for the purpose of considering 
the legal and factual issues involved and that this is in the interest of the Community it will 
commence an examination in accordance with Article 8 of the Regulation. According to Article 8 
(1) (a), the Commission must announce the initiation of an examination procedure in the Official 
Journal of the European Communities.657 The examination procedure will be terminated if there 
is insufficient evidence (Article 11(1)) or if the country concerned takes measures which remove 
the source of the complaint (Article 11(2)).658 However, considering the comments of the Panel 
in Argentina – Bovine Hides, concerning the proof provided by the European Communities in 
support of its allegation of cartel between Argentinean tanners, satisfaction of the TBR procedure 
does not necessarily mean that the EC will satisfy the burden of proof imposed by WTO 
jurisprudence.659 
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support the claim that the alleged adverse effects have a material impact as defined in art. 2(4) of the Regulation. See 
para. 6. of the Notice. 
658
 For an example of the latter case, see Commission Decision of 20 December 1995 (96/40/EC) suspending the 
proceedings under Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 on trade barriers, concerning piracy of Community sound 
recordings in Thailand and its effects on Community trade in sound recordings. (O.J. L 011 , 16/01/1996 p. 7 – 8). 
659
 Panel, Argentina – Bovine Hides, para. 11.52 (“The evidence before us is quite thin. We have a newspaper article 
and opinion piece, a press release from the frigoríficos and a statement by a member of the Congreso de la Nación. 
Such evidence would certainly not support a case in a domestic court”). Concerning the burden of proof see the 
Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses, 
WT/DS33/AB/R, 25 April 1997 (adopted on 23 May 1997), p. 14. The results of the EU’s examination procedure are 
contained in the Report to the Committee Established under Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 (Trade 
Barriers Regulation) I.E.3/JVE D(97). See also European Commission, Decision of 23 October 1998 (98/618/EC) 
under the provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 concerning measures maintained by the Republic of 
Argentina on the export of bovine hides and the import of finished leather (O.J. L295/46). 
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2.5. Complaints by Member States 
 
This stage of the investigation concerns a violation complaint against the CSI and so the 
following will provide a brief overview the rules, procedures and practice of the Dispute 
Settlement Body. The WTO was conceived as a “rules-based organization” equipped with a 
“quasi-judicial” dispute settlement body (DSB), which plays a crucial role in enforcing the 
covered agreements and ensuring harmonious relations among a diverse membership.660 The 
Panel and Appellate Body view the covered agreements as legally binding (i.e. “rule-based” 
approach) and their rulings reflect the legal requirements contained in the agreements. This is 
reflected in Article 6.2 DSU, which states that the covered agreements provide the legal basis for 
requesting the establishment of a Panel and also form the starting point of any dispute settlement 
proceedings.661 The procedure for dispute settlement is regulated by the Uruguay Round 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),662 which 
forms part of the multilateral agreements under the WTO and is binding on all members.663 
 
The dispute settlement procedure itself is established in Article 3.7 DSU. In cases of dispute, the 
party filing the complaint will first request the member state concerned to enter into consultations 
within 30 days. If no settlement has been reached after 60 days, the complaining party may 
approach the DSB and request the establishment of a Panel to find the Container Security 
Initiative (“CSI”) violates various provisions of the GATT 1994 and is not justified by Article 
XXI (i.e. a so-called “violation complaint”).664 The DSU aims to ensure the full and effective 
investigation of disputes by the Panels. Article 7.1 provides for standard terms of reference, 
which stipulates that a Panel must examine a matter referred to it by parties to a dispute. Article 
                                                  
660
 The Ministerial Declaration of 20 September 1986 contained an express mandate to improve the dispute 
settlement procedure. See WTO/GATT Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round (Declaration of 20 December 
1986), lines 69-70 (“In order to ensure prompt and effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all contracting 
parties, negotiations shall aim to improve and strengthen the rules and the procedures of the dispute settlement 
process, while recognizing the contribution that would be made by more effective and enforceable GATT rules and 
disciplines”).  
661
 See MITSUO MATSHUSHITA ET AL, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE AND POLICY, OXFORD 
2004, pp. 54 – 55.  
662
 Introduced by the Uruguay Round. It allows WTO Members to base their claims on any of the multilateral trade 
agreements included in the Annexes to the Agreement establishing the WTO 
663
 The DSU was signed in 1994 and now forms part of the covered agreements. 
664
 Violation complaints are aimed at the withdrawal of measures alleged to have been adopted by another member in 
breach of the GATT. See WAINCYMER, pp. 91 – 92.  
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7.2 DSU imposes a positive duty on panels to “address the relevant provisions in any covered 
agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute.” In addition, Article 17.12 DSU 
requires the Appellate Body to “address each of the issues raised on appeal.”665 If the Panel finds 
for the complainant it will recommend that the United States take all necessary steps to bring the 
CSI into conformity with its obligations under the General Agreement.666 The Panel report will 
be adopted unless all member states decide to the contrary. 
 
Considering that countries affected by the Container Security Initiative may include developing 
countries, Article 3.12 DSU is also relevant. It provides that where a developing country member 
brings a complaint against a developed country member, the latter can invoke the provisions of 
the Decisions of 5 April 1966.667 According to paragraph 1 of this instrument, if consultations 
between a less-developed contracting party and a developed contracting party in regard to any 
matter falling under paragraph 1 of Article XXIII do not lead to a satisfactory settlement, the less-
developed contracting party complaining of the measures may refer the matter to the Director-
General who, acting in an ex officio capacity, will use his good offices with a view to facilitating 
a solution. 
 
3. The General Agreement on Trade in Services 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was created in response to the growth of 
trade in services.668 The GATS entered into force in 1995 and is a framework agreement that 
provides for the liberalization of international trade. It has 8 annexes dealing with individual 
service sectors.669  
                                                  
665
 See Lorand Bartels, The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism, 53 ICLQ 861, at p. 
876 (quoting James Bacchus). 
666
 Accordingly, there is no retroactive remedy. See Frieder Roessler, The Responsibilities of a WTO Member Found 
to Have Violated WTO Law, in Yasuhei Taniguchi et al (eds.), THE WTO IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Cambridge 2007, pp. 141 et seq.  
667
 GATT, Decision of 5 April 1966 on Procedures under Article XXIII GATT (BISD 14S/18) 
668
 It is estimated that trade in services accounts for approximately one-quarter of international trade. The GATS was 
signed on 15 April and entered into force on 1 January 1995.  
669
 For an overview of the GATS, see VAN DEN BOSSCHE, pp. 50 – 1 et seq.  
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The structure of the GATS reflects a different approach to liberalization than that adopted by the 
GATT. Parts II and III of the GATS refer to general obligations and specific commitments 
respectively. States which have agreed to subject their service sectors to GATS disciplines enter 
the service sector in question in the so-called ‘positive list’. This means that a state undertakes no 
commitment to liberalize any sector unless it is listed in its Schedule.670 Any commitments listed 
in the Schedule must be applied in accordance with general obligations, i.e. most-favoured nation 
treatment and transparency. Therefore, the first step is to ascertain whether the agreement applies 
to the services sector in question.  
 
3.2. Maritime Transportation Services under the GATS 
 
Maritime transportation services fall within the scope of the GATS and are divided into three 
pillars.671 The first pillar concerns international transportation services which includes passenger 
and freight international transportation. The second pillar concerns auxiliary services including 
cargo handling, storage and warehouse, customs clearance, container station and depot, maritime 
agency and freight services. The final pillar of maritime services relate to the access and use of 
port facilities. This group includes towage and tug assistance, port captain services, navigation 
aids, communications, berth and berthing services. The Container Security Initiative affects the 
third pillar of maritime transportation services, namely access to and use of port facilities.672  
 
The question arises as to whether maritime transportation services in the United States are subject 
to the disciplines in the GATS. During the Uruguay Round, negotiations were held concerning 
the liberalization of maritime transport services under the auspices of the Negotiating Group on 
Maritime Transportation Services (NGMTS).673 However, they were never completed owing to 
the reservations of some states that the principles of MFN national treatment could not be applied 
                                                  
670
 The positive list approach is therefore the opposite of that taken by NAFTA, where all items that are not 
specifically identified are automatically liberalized. See WTO LAW pp. 810 and 821. 
671
 According to the Maritime Model Schedule of 15 April 1996. See World Trade Organization, Council for Trade 
in Services, Maritime Transport Services, Background Note by the Secretariat (S/C/W/62), 16 November 1998, pp. 
10 – 18.  
672
 See PARAMESWARAN, pp. 341 – 343. 
673
 Established by the Decision on Negotiations on Maritime Transport Services, WTO Doc. No. LT/UR/D-5/5 
(April 15 1994) [hereinafter NGMTS Decision 1994], para. 2. 
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to transport services.674 Moreover, the United States refused to submit an offer, believing that 
those submitted by other countries simply preserved the status quo. According to the United 
States, they did not meet the aims of the negotiations, namely to liberalize create assurances of 
open markets and non-discriminatory treatment for shipping companies and related commercial 
operations.675 In addition, there was political pressure in the United States not to include maritime 
transportation services in the GATS discussions, as shown by the 1989 Concurrent Resolution on 
maritime transportation services.676  
 
Despite the opposition of the United States, the importance of maritime transportation services 
was such that attempts to incorporate this area of services into the GATS continued beyond the 
Uruguay Round as regulated by the Decision on Negotiations on Maritime Transportation 
Services 1994 which stated that negotiations were to be completed by June 1996.677 It also 
created a Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services (NGMTS) to oversee the 
negotiations. However, owing to the lack of progress, the Council for Trade in Services adopted 
the Decision on Maritime Transportation Services on 28 June 1996, which suspended 
negotiations until the 2000 round of negotiations.678 Paragraph 4 of the Decision declares that the 
Decision is not to apply to any specific commitment on maritime transportation services, which is 
inscribed in a member’s schedule.679 The MFN principle will only generally apply once the 
current negotiations have been concluded. Paragraph 7 of the Decision requires Members not to 
apply any measures affecting trade in maritime transport services except with a view to 
                                                  
674
 Concerning maritime services, the UNCTAD Liner Conferences and application of cabotage is incompatible with 
basic MFN. See Mary E. Footer & Carol George, The General Agreement on Trade and Services, in THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION, LEGAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS, p. 813. For an overview of the negotiations see 
Taylor pp. 158 – 169.  
675
 World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meeting of 24 May 
1996, S/NGMTS/12, P3 (3 June 1996). Id. p. 166. 
676
 Concurrent Resolution to recognize the uniqueness of and express strong support for the maritime policy of the 
United States, and to urge the President in the strongest possible terms to ensure that the United States does not 
propose maritime transportation services for inclusion in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade discussions 
and that any proposal that would consider maritime transportation as an area for negotiation is actively opposed by 
the United States. 101st Congress, August 4th (legislative day January 3rd), 1989, S. CON. RES. 
63.< http://140.147.249.9/cgi-bin/query/z?c101:S.CON.RES.63: >.   
677
 As declared by the NGMTS Decision 1994.  
678
 See Council for Trade in Services, Decision on Maritime Transport Services, 28 June 1996 (S/L/24 dated 3 July), 
at paragraph 1. 
679
 The commitments of most countries are limited to providing non-discriminatory access to and use of port 
facilities and onward transportation including stevedoring and terminal services. 
  
 
131 
maintaining or improving the freedom of provision of maritime transport services. The text of 
this decision was incorporated into Annex 1 of the GATS.  
 
Negotiations on maritime transport services started again in 2000, based on the 1996 conditional 
offers or improved offers. However, progress was slow. Although member states issued a joint 
statement in 2003680 this only led to a limited number of quality offers being tabled.681 To date, 
the United States has not submitted any offers in relation to maritime transportation services in 
the Doha Round.682 This reflects a general reluctance among member states to liberalize the third 
pillar of maritime transport services. Under the law of the sea, ports are under sovereign state 
control and the access to and use of port facilities is controlled by the government. For example, 
the U.S. government applies port access restrictions based on national security restrictions683 as 
well as “state port control” (PSC) regimes.684 
 
3.3. The ‘Standstill Commitment’ 
 
Paragraph 7 of the Decision on Maritime Transportation Services 1996 states that “participants 
shall not apply any measure affecting trade in maritime transportation services except in response 
to measures applied by other countries and with a view to maintaining or improving the freedom 
of provision of maritime transport services, nor in such a manner as would improve their 
negotiating position and leverage.”685 The fact that this provision has been included in Annex 3 
                                                  
680
 World Trade Organization, Joint Statement on the Negotiations on Maritime Transport Services, March 2003 
(TN/S/W/11). 
681
 See World Trade Organization, Joint Statement on the Importance of Commitments on Maritime Transport 
Services, 25 February 2005 (JOB(05)/22). The statement urges members to “reassess their current positions and to 
contribute to the negotiations by tabling high quality and meaningful initial and revised offers.” 
682
 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO INVESTMENT AND TRADE 2006, p. 17 (“[T]he U.S. has 
not included any maritime services-related commitments within even its most recent Doha WTO Round services 
offer of May 2005”). 
683
 For example, vessels from Cuba, Iran, Iraq and North Korea are prohibited from entering U.S. ports. See World 
Trade Organization, Communication from the United States of America, Response to Questionnaire on Maritime 
Transportation Services S/NGMTS/W/2/Add. 11.  
684
 According to PSC, governments can order the inspection of foreign ships at its ports to ensure that the condition 
of the ship complies with international regulations. In particular, states have the right to arrest and detain substandard 
ships for safety reasons. PSC regimes serve to protect the marine environment, in particular from pollution by oil. 
The Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control aims to eliminate the operation of sub-standard 
ships through a harmonized system of port state control: see 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PARIS MOU. States are 
wary of any agreement that might encroach on the port state control principle. See Taylor, p. 175. 
685
 See NGMTS Decision 1994.  
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of the GATS as well as its designation as “the standstill commitment”686 suggests that it has some 
degree of legal force.687 On the other hand, commentators regard the standstill commitment as 
amounting to nothing more than a political agreement and therefore “not legally binding in the 
sense of the WTO dispute settlement system.”688 This question reflects the controversy 
surrounding the legal status of assurances made during negotiations.689  
 
The legal status of the “peace-clause” or “standstill commitment” was considered by the 
European Commission in its investigation into whether Chile was preventing fishermen from 
Community states from entering its markets (so-called “Swordfish Dispute”) owing to the 
provisions of a national law protecting swordfish:  
 
“Following the 1996 Ministerial decision, all WTO Members, including Chile, are committed to 
a standstill obligation. In other words, Chile cannot make access to its market more difficult than 
was the situation in June 1996.”690 
 
In the event, the Commission did pursue this line of enquiry. It held that, as the law had been 
introduced by Chile in 1990, the standstill commitment had no relevance to the case.691   
 
                                                  
686
 See e.g. UNCTAD, NEGOTIATIONS ON TRANSPORT AND LOGISTICS SERVICES: ISSUES TO CONSIDER, 
UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2005/3, 2006, p. 1; PARAMESWARAN, p. 286.  
687
 See e.g. INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, THE GATS: A HANDBOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION 
MEMBER BARS FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THE TERMS USED IN THE GATS, published by the International Bar 
Association, p. 19. According to paragraph 8, the NGMTS is responsible for the surveillance of this commitment. 
688
 See PARAMESWARAN, p. 286; Edwin Vermulst and Bart Driessen, Commercial Defence Actions and Other 
International Trade Developments in the European Community, No. XL 1 January 1996 – 30 June 1996, EJIL, Vol. 
7, No. 4 1996 at A., who state “This standstill commitment […] is merely a political principle without legally 
binding force.”  
689
 For example, the wording of paragraph 7 resembles paragraph C of the Punta del Este Declaration (which 
provides for standstill and rollback). During the Uruguay Round, the United States interpreted these provisions to be 
nothing more than political agreements and therefore non-binding. However, this interpretation was flatly rejected by 
other member states which claimed that the provisions amounted to “a commitment by Ministers to carry out what is 
the legal obligation of each Contracting Party not to take or maintain protectionist steps in violation of GATT 
provisions.” See SUNS North – South Development Monitor, Uruguay Round, US Wants Toothless Surveillance, 11 
November 1986. Similarly, it has been argued that the fact that the deadline for negotiations on maritime 
transportation services within the framework of the WTO Doha Development Agenda could not be met should not 
affect the binding effect of the standstill provision in the 1996 Decision. See Newsletter No. 3/06, EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY SHIPOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS (ECSA), p. 4. 
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 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE TRADE BARRIERS REGULATION COMMITTEE, TBR PROCEEDINGS 
CONCERNING CHILEAN PRACTICES AFFECTING TRANSIT OF SWORDFISH IN CHILEAN PORTS, MARCH 1999, p. 46.  
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133 
A member states could argue that Paragraph 7 is binding on member states on the grounds that it 
creates reasonable expectations that all member states will pursue negotiations on maritime 
transportation services in good faith. The duty of states to negotiate in good faith is related to the 
customary rule of law of pacta sunt servanda and recognized as a general principle of law.692 The 
concept of the reasonable or legitimate expectations is related to good faith693 although it protects 
a wider range of interests.694 For example, the concept has been said to protect the security and 
predictability of reducing barriers to trade695 and the “validity of assumptions on which 
governments act.”696   
 
Although the concept of reasonable expectations is recognized in WTO law697 it generates 
controversy owing to the fact that it pits reliance on the agreed wording of the WTO texts against 
reliance on broad good faith-related concepts. For example, in the India – Patents dispute, the 
Appellate Body held that reasonable expectations could not be considered in isolation because 
they were already incorporated into the words of the agreements.698 Considering them separately 
would effectively impute “into a treaty of words that are not there or the importation into a treaty 
of concepts that were not intended.”699 In the EC – Computer Equipment dispute, the Appellate 
                                                  
692
 See MARION PANIZZON, GOOD FAITH IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WTO THE PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE 
EXPECTATIONS, GOOD FAITH INTERPRETATION AND FAIR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, Oxford 2006 pp. 27. However, its 
recognition in international instruments is variable. For example, Article 2:301 (3) of the Principles of European 
Contract Law (“Negotiations Contrary to Good Faith”) states that “It is contrary to good faith and fair dealing, in 
particular, for a party to enter into or continue negotiations with no real intention of reaching an agreement with the 
other party.” In UNCITRAL’s Convention on the International Sale of Goods, the principle is not expressly stated. 
However, the interpretative guidelines (Paragraph C “Interpretation of the Convention”) state that any questions on 
interpretation are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which the Convention is based. Arguably, 
Article 7(1) could offer a basis for a duty to negotiate in good faith to be implied. The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties does not make express reference to the duty to negotiate in good faith either. Article 18 simply states 
that “a State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.” 
693
 Zeitler, ‘Good Faith’ in the WTO Jurisprudence, Necessary Balancing Element or an Open Door to Judicial 
Activism? 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 721, p. 728.  
694
 Adrian T. L. Chua, Reasonable Expectations and Non-Violation Complaints in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence, JWT 
1988 p. 31, who presents reasonable expectations as an “umbrella principle” which protects a wide range of interests. 
695
 Report of the Panel, European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, 
WT/DS62,67,68/R, 5 February 1998 (adopted on 22 June 1998), para. 8.25. 
696
 Chua, at fn 3; World Trade Organization, Note by the Secretariat, Non-Violation Complaints under GATT Article 
XXIII:2 MTN.GNG/NG13/W/31, 14 July 1989, p. 10  
697
 Chua, p. 30 
698
 Report of the Appellate Body, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 
WT/DS50/AB/R, 19 December 1997 (adopted on 16 January 1998), para. 45. See also Zeitler, p. 728; cf. Maria-
Chiara Malaguti, Restrictive Business Practices in International Trade and the Role of the World Trade 
Organization, JWT Vol. 32, No. 3 1998, p. 134. 
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Body held that the common intentions of the parties “cannot be ascertained on the basis of the 
subjective and unilaterally determined “expectations” of one of the parties to a treaty.”700 On the 
other hand, the Panel in Korea – Procurement adopted a broader view of legitimate expectations: 
 
“Parties have an obligation to negotiate in good faith just as they must implement the treaty in 
good faith. It is clear to us […] that it is necessary that negotiations in the Agreement before us 
(the GPA) be conducted on a particularly open and forthcoming basis.”701 
 
Article XXIII:1 (b) GATT protects legitimate or reasonable expectations702 by providing a 
remedy for the nullification or impairment of benefits resulting from the Agreement owing to 
measures which do not contravene the wording of the agreement.703 Article 26 DSU provides that 
Article XXIII (1) (b) can also form the basis of a complaint for other WTO agreements as well,704 
although there have as yet been no complaints made in respect of the GATS.705 That said, Article 
XXIII:2 of the GATS expressly limits non-violation complaints to benefits arising from specific 
commitments made by WTO Members under Part III.706 Owing to the fact that the United States 
has not undertaken any agreement relating to maritime transportation services, there does not 
appear to be any possibility of using a non-violation complaint under the GATS in order to 
protect assurances made in respect of negotiations for maritime transportation services.  
 
                                                  
700
 Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, 
WT/DS62, 67, 68/AB/R, 5 June 1998 (adopted on 22 June 1998), para. 84. See also Zeitler, pp. 728 – 729.  
701
 Report of the Panel, Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, WT/DS163/R, 1 May 2000 (adopted 
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 According to Article XXIII GATT a contracting party may make written representations or proposals to another 
member state if it considers that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under the Agreement is being 
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703
 For an explanation of the remedy see Locknie Hsu, Non-Violation Complaints – World Trade Organization Issues 
and Recent Free Trade Agreements, JWT Vol. 39, No.2, 2005, pp. 205 – 208.  
704
 Article 26 of the DSU which states that a nullification or impairment complaint is available “where the provisions 
of paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 are applicable to a covered agreement.” See also Chua p. 37; Hsu, 
p. 212. 
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GATT: see Chua pp. 32 and 40; Malaguti, pp. 133 and 136; World Trade Organization, Note by the Secretariat 
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 See Hsu, p. 212, at fn. 24.  
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3.4. Result 
 
The United States has not undertaken any commitments in respect of maritime transport services. 
The lack of agreement among member states means that the disciplines of the GATS, including 
the MFN principle, do not apply to this market sector. It is not possible to protect the legitimate 
expectations of member states arising from paragraph 7 of the Decision on Maritime 
Transportation Services because Article XXIII:2 of the GATS limits violation complaints to 
specific commitments under Annex III. As the EC – Chile swordfish dispute shows there is a risk 
that member states could exploit the inapplicability of the GATS to restrict maritime transport 
services thereby frustrating the aims of the GATT relating to competitive equality and market 
access.  
 
4. Relationship between the GATS and the GATT 
 
The fact that the GATS and the GATT concern different trade markets raises the question 
whether they are mutually exclusive. This was considered by the Appellate Body in Canada – 
Periodicals, which concerned Canada’s excise tax on split-run editions of periodicals. Canada 
argued that the Panel had erred in law by characterizing Part V.1 of the Excise Tax Act as a 
measure regulating trade in goods subject to the GATT 1994.707 Instead, the provision of 
magazine advertising services fell within the GATS and Canada had not undertaken any 
commitments in respect of the provision of advertising services.708 The United States rejected this 
argument stating that the GATT 1994 was capable of applying to measures whose application 
affects both goods and services.709 The Appellate Body held that there was nothing in the GATS 
to suggest that a measure that came within the scope of the GATS could not be equally subject to 
the GATT.710 It agreed with the Panel’s statement that the two agreements were not mutually 
exclusive: 
 
                                                  
707
 Report of the Appellate Body, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, 30 June 
1997 (adopted on 30 July 1997), [hereinafter Appellate Body, Canada – Periodicals], p.3.  
708
 Id. p. 4. 
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 Id., p. 9. 
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“The ordinary meaning of the texts of GATT 1994 and GATS as well as Article II:2 of the WTO 
Agreement, taken together, indicates that obligations under GATT 1994 and GATS can co-exist 
and that one does not override the other.”711 
 
The Appellate Body held that the entry into force of the GATS did not diminish the scope of 
application of the GATT 1994.712 Although periodicals consisted of editorial content and 
advertising content they nevertheless constituted goods for the purposes of the GATT 1994.713 
The Appellate Body did not go on to examine overlaps between the GATS and the GATT but this 
issue was the subject of EC – Bananas III.714 In this dispute, the European Communities argued 
that the GATS did not apply to the EC import licensing procedures because they were not 
measures “affecting trade in services” pursuant to Article I:1 of the GATS.715 This argument was 
rejected by the Panel which held that the scope of the GATS encompassed any measure of a 
Member to the extent it affected the supply of a service.716 The Appellate Body upheld the 
Panel’s finding that there was no legal basis for an a priori exclusion of measures within the EC 
banana import licensing regime from the scope of the GATS owing to the broad scope of the 
GATS as evidenced by the use of the term “affecting” in Article I:1.717 The Appellate Body also 
reiterated its ruling in Canada – Periodicals, namely that there could be measures which fall 
under both agreements: 
 
“There is yet a third category of measures that could be found to fall within the scope of both the 
GATT 1994 and the GATS.  These are measures that involve a service relating to a particular 
good or a service supplied in conjunction with a particular good.  In all such cases in this third 
category, the measure in question could be scrutinized under both the GATT 1994 and the GATS.  
                                                  
711
 Id., p. 19 quoting Report of the Panel, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/R, 14 
March 1997, [hereinafter Panel, Canada – Periodicals], para. 5.17.  
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 Appellate Body, p. 18. 
713
 Id. p. 28. 
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 Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
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 Id., para. 218. 
716
 Report of the Panels, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
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However, while the same measure could be scrutinized under both agreements, the specific 
aspects of that measure examined under each agreement could be different.”718   
 
Despite the fact that the CSI primarily affects maritime transport and seaport services, member 
states which suffer adverse effects from the CSI could also argue that it constitutes a de facto or 
indirect discrimination against products and seek remedies under the provisions of the GATT. 
The “Swordfish Dispute” of 2003 between Chile and the European Union concerning port access 
for EC fisherman719 offers another example of a measure which falls under both the GATS and 
the GATT. The reason for the dispute was that the Chilean authorities wished to conserve the 
stocks of swordfish and prohibited the landing or transit of swordfish on the basis of Article 165 
of the Chilean Fishery Law.720 The EC alleged that prohibiting Community fishermen from 
accessing port facilities in Chile contravened WTO law and sought to challenge the measure as a 
violation of Articles V and XI of the GATT.721 Concerning the former provision, the EC claimed 
that, by being forced to land or transship their catches in the ports of third countries, Community 
vessels suffered a loss of competition. In addition, the Chilean measure prevented Community 
fishermen from accessing certain non-EU markets. In the event the parties reached a provisional 
agreement and a Panel was never convened.722  
 
5. Compliance with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade regulates trade in goods and its main aim is to 
eliminate discriminatory treatment in world trade.723 Since the signing of the original agreement 
in 1947, GATT has liberalized world trade by progressively reducing tariff barriers that 
traditionally represented the primary means of protecting the domestic economy against foreign 
                                                  
718
 Id. para. 221. 
719
 See European Commission, Decision 5 April 2000, (2000/296/EC), under the provisions of Council Regulation 
(EC)No 3286/94 concerning the Chilean prohibition on unloading of swordfish catches in Chilean ports, O.J. L 96/67 
(18.4.2000), paras. 15 – 20.  
720
 Id., paras. 5 – 6. 
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 Id., paras. 10 – 11. 
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 For an overview of this dispute see PARAMESWARAN, pp. 128 – 129.  
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 VAN DEN BOSSCHE, pp. 308 – 309.  
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competition.724 The agreement consists of five legal principles or pillars of which the 
unconditional most-favoured nation treatment, elimination of quantitative restrictions and 
transparency are particularly important in the following investigation.725 It also deals with non-
tariff barriers to trade. The basis of a claim under the GATT 1994 is Article XXIII, which 
provides that a member can refer to the dispute settlement bodies if it believes that any benefit 
accruing to it directly or indirectly under the GATT is being nullified or impaired or that the 
attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of the failure of 
another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this Agreement.726  
 
The following section examines whether the Container Security Initiative complies with the 
GATT on the basis of a violation complaint brought against the United States by another WTO 
Member. It provides a brief overview of the complainant’s burden and standard of proof together 
with general rules of interpretation applied by the Panel and Appellate Body. The main section 
examines a wide range of provisions which affect various aspects of the CSI. The provisions are 
categorized into two groups: the first deals with the general principles of the prohibition on 
discriminatory treatment (Article I:1) and quantitative restrictions (Article XI) and the second 
deals with the provisions relating to customs formalities and customs clearance, (Article V, VIII 
and X). Both groups concern the same issue, however, namely the practices that customs should 
or should not employ when issuing and administering customs formalities. The Container 
Security Initiative is a form of customs control and so the investigation will refer to the 
definitions and principles contained in international conventions (particularly the Revised Kyoto 
Convention and Framework of Standards).  
 
 
 
                                                  
724
 Id., p. 82 (pointing out that between 1947 and 1994, the average level of tariffs in developed countries was 
reduced from over 40 per cent to less than 4 per cent). 
725
 Kevin Kennedy, GATT 1994, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS, VOL. I (Patrick F. J. Macrory et al., eds.), Springer Verlag 2005, pp. 99 – 100.  
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 The chapeau of Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994 provides that a Panel can be requested “if any Member should 
consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that 
the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded.” 
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5.1.1. The Complainant  
 
Possible complainants against the CSI are likely to fall into two categories: countries which are 
not members of the CSI and those which are such as the European Community. The nature of the 
complaint is likely to vary considerably between them; whereas a country which is not a member 
of the CSI is likely to attack the measure as a whole, a complainant such as the European Union 
that already has CSI ports is likely to attack those aspects of the measure with which it disagrees.   
 
The first class of complainant are countries which are not members of the CSI, and in this respect 
developing countries are the most likely candidates. They are likely to complain about the 
measure as a whole because they are largely excluded from the measure, do not obtain any 
benefit from it and are seeing their opportunity to access markets in the United States restricted. 
Considering that many developing countries are landlocked and may not have access to major 
shipping routes, their complaints are also likely to deal with the side-effects of the CSI. For 
example, they may complain about the effects of the CSI on transshipment services as well as the 
imposition of port user fees by CSI participants in order to cover the costs of implementing the 
measure. International donor organizations (e.g. OECD, UNDP, IMF etc.) with their long 
experience of working in developing countries may be able to assist in detailing the effects of the 
CSI in this respect.  
 
The second category of complainant is already a member of the CSI initiative and likely to gain 
benefits from the initiative in the form of expedited clearance, and possibly, enhanced status as a 
political ally of the United States. As such, a potential complaint in this category is likely to be 
far more limited in scope. A prime candidate for initiating this complaint is the European Union, 
which is one of the most frequent users of dispute settlement as well as one of the few WTO 
Members which have sufficient trade power to impose retaliatory measures.727 However, the 
major motivation for bringing a complaint may be due to political reasons rather than trade 
effects under the Trade Barriers Regulation. 
 
                                                  
727
 Supra, n. 646. 
  
 
140 
Economic injury arising under the CSI is most likely to affect smaller economic participants with 
limited resources. Larger companies, on the other hand, are likely to have the necessary resources 
to comply with U.S. security requirements. As a result, the economic injury inflicted on European 
companies by the CSI may not be deemed significant for the Community as a whole, as required 
by Article 2(4) of the Trade Barriers Regulation. Smaller importers are also unlikely to have 
sufficient administrative resources to compile the necessary evidence of a case or be able to exert 
sufficient political pressure728 over industry representatives to commence an investigation of their 
complaint – especially considering the potentially explosive trade war that could result from a 
dispute about measures designed to protect national security.729  
 
A complaint may therefore represent a political decision taken by the European Commission in 
response to an aspect of the CSI that it particularly disagrees with, rather than as a response to 
significant economic injury. This sort of politically-motivated complaint by the European 
Community has been seen before – in relation to the so-called “Helms-Burton” Act of 1996. In 
that particular dispute, the EC was accused of abusing the DSB in order to thrash out a political 
dispute with the United States.730 Considering the highly sensitive nature of the CSI, it may well 
be prudent to ensure that a similar suspicion of a politically-motivated complaint be avoided in 
accordance with Article 3.10 DSU.731 The EU could accomplish this by concentrating its 
complaint onto a single aspect of the CSI which is unpopular with all stakeholders in the supply 
chain, namely Section 1701 of the IRCA 2007. In this way, the EC could use the dispute 
settlement procedure constructively: moreover, the fact that the current administration has also 
spoken out against the measure suggests that the United States would be willing to participate in 
consultations.732  
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 See Petersmann, p. 306 (pointing out that “several WTO complaints initiated by the United States[…] were linked 
to election campaign promises in exchange for financial campaign contributions in U.S. federal elections”). 
729
 See Schneider, pp. 636 – 637, pointing out that, unlike private actors, the government will be mindful of the 
effects that raising disputes will have not only on its trading and diplomatic relationships with other states as a whole 
but also on the dispute settlement system of the WTO; contra Bronckers and McNelis p. 67 and esp., p. 84 ( “It is not 
easy to conceive of political factors that would militate against an investigation of an injurious trade practice of a 
third country which is arguably illegal”). In addition, Article 3:7 of the DSU must also be considered. 
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 See generally, Spanogle, p. 1333. 
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 Article 3.10 DSU provides that “it is understood that requests for conciliation and the use of the dispute settlement 
procedures should not be intended or considered as contentious acts and that, if a dispute arises, all Members will 
engage in these procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute.” 
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 Statement of Administrative Policy, H.R.1 Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007, 9 
January 2007. 
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In any case, the European Community is unlikely to complain about the CSI as a whole, because 
this measure is based on concepts adopted by the EC in its own measures, such as the advanced 
submissions of cargo declarations, the risk assessment of maritime containers and simplified 
customs formalities for low risk cargo. Initial objections of the EU Commission to CBP’s 
conclusion of Declarations of Principle with individual member states were also settled through 
the conclusion of a pan-European agreement. Although the 10 + 2 data set exceeds the standards 
of the European Community and World Trade Organization there would be little point in basing a 
complaint on this measure (should it be implemented) because it simply responds to well-known 
inadequacies of using the cargo declaration as a source of information for risk assessment. On the 
other hand, the introduction of 100 per cent scanning by Congress as part of the CSI not only 
contradicts these concepts but also threatens to make redundant the security regime which has 
been painstakingly constructed by the European Community and the CBP over a four year period. 
This also appears to be the only maritime security measure in the world today that is not based on 
risk assessment and is universally opposed by those involved in maritime transportation. This 
element of the CSI may therefore motivate the EC Commission to launch a violation complaint. 
It should not be forgotten, however, that the fact that 100 per cent scanning forms part of the CSI 
will permit the Panel to make general observations about the measure as a whole.  
 
The following investigation takes the position that the complainant is not a member of the CSI 
and has launched a complaint against all four components of the CSI. This “scattergun” approach 
to a violation complaint not only permits a wide-ranging examination of the CSI under WTO law, 
but, in practice may ensure the best chances of success. The scope of the GATT is inherently 
uncertain in this dispute because, as stated above, the CSI is a measure which primarily affects 
maritime transportation services rather than the trade in goods. 
 
5.1.2. Burden of Proof for General Measures 
 
The burden of proof has been described as a mechanism by which an adjudicating body allocates 
the duty to prove facts and determines the outcome where evidence is evenly divided.733 Its 
allocation was dealt with by the Appellate Body in U.S. – Wool Shirts and Blouses. The DSU 
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itself does not allocate the burden of proof for making a complaint734  and so the Appellate Body 
referred to principles of general customary law for guidance. It noted that it was a general 
principle in all legal systems that the party making a complaint bore the burden of proving that 
complaint.735 Accordingly there was a presumption that states were meeting their obligations 
which the complainant had to rebut by adducing sufficient evidence.736 This would then establish 
a presumption that the measure in question was inconsistent with its obligations under the WTO 
agreements. It would then be incumbent on the Defendant state to adduce sufficient evidence to 
rebut the presumption.737 The benefit of the doubt is to be given to the defending party in cases of 
uncertainty,738 which accords with the presumption of good faith.739  
 
5.1.3. Standard of Proof  
 
According to one commentator, the standard of review “refers to the manner in which Panels are 
required to review member state measures in order to determine if such measures are in 
conformity with obligations under the various WTO agreements.”740  
 
                                                  
734
 Article 3.8 DSU only deals with the burden of proof once a violation is established and does not explain which 
party bears the burden of proving a violation of the WTO agreements in the first place. 
735
 Id. 
736
 See Zeitler, pp. 724 – 725; Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 647 
(1994), p. 657, who describes this principle (within the context of national law) as representing the principle of 
civility, “One ought to presume, until sufficient evidence is adduced to show otherwise, that any given person has 
acted in accordance with serious social obligations.” He explains this presumption in the following terms (p. 653), 
“[T]o presume that someone has breached his or her duty fails to accord that person the dignity associated with the 
status of membership in the community that is governed by the norms whose breach is at issue.” See also Report of 
the Appellate Body, Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, (WT/DS187/AB/R and WT/DS110/AB/R), 13 December 1999 
(adopted on 12 January 2000), para. 74 (“Members of the WTO should not be assumed, in any way, to have 
continued previous protection or discrimination through the adoption of a new measure. This would come close to a 
presumption of bad faith”). The Appellate has stated the presumption in good faith in a number of cases see Report 
of the Appellate Body, US – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line 
Pipe from Korea (WT/DS202/AB/R), 15 February 2002 (adopted on 8 March 2002), para. 110, “(As always, we 
must assume that WTO Members seek to carry out their WTO obligations in good faith.”). 
737
 See Appellate Body, U.S. Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 13; see also Panel, Argentina – Bovine Hides, paras. 11.11 
– 11.14 (stating that the complainant must provide evidence in support of each of its particular assertions). 
Concerning the burden of proof, see generally: VAN DEN BOSSCHE, pp. 210 – 211; WAINCYMER, pp. 536 ff. 
738
 See Report of the Panel, U.S. – Sections 301 – 310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R, 22 December 1999 
(adopted on 27 January 2000), [hereinafter, Panel US – Section 301] para. 714. 
739
 Zeitler, p. 724. 
740
 Ross Becroft, The Standard of Review Strikes Back: The US – Korea DRAMS Appeal, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 207, p. 
208. 
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The Dispute Settlement Understanding does not specify the standard of review to apply741 and so 
this question has been left to the Panels and Appellate Body. In U.S. – Wool Shirts and Blouses 
the Appellate Body held that, “in the context of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement, 
precisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be required to establish such a 
presumption will necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision to provision, and case to 
case.”742  In US – Gambling, the Appellate Body held that the complainant could not simply 
submit evidence and expect the Panel to determine a claim nor could it allege facts without 
relating them to the legal arguments. Rather, its claims had to be based on “sufficient” evidence 
and legal argument put forward in relation to each of the elements of the claim.743 
 
The standard of review extends to questions of law and fact and requires the Panel to review the 
factual situation (the “raw” facts), the conclusions which the government authority has drawn 
from them as well as the interpretation of the member state’s national law.744 In both branches of 
the review, the major question is always the degree of deference which the Panel should show 
member states. The standard of review ranges from absolute deference (amounting to little more 
than a review of whether the member states adopted the correct procedures when making the 
decision) to de novo review (i.e. “a new and independent fact-finding exercise”).745 In the latter 
case, the panel would have to “verify whether the determination by the national authority was 
‘correct’ both factually and procedurally.”746  
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 WAINCYMER, p. 563. It reflects the disagreement on this issue during the Uruguay Round; Oesch, pp. 645 – 646. 
The GATT and SPS Agreement are silent on the level of review. Only Article 17.6 (i) of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement has language on the standard of review to be employed by panels. See Report of the Appellate Body in 
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 Report of the Appellate Body, Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from 
the United States - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, WT/DS132/AB/RW, 22 October 2001, 
(adopted on 21 November 2001), para. 56. 
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The question concerning the standard of review in relation to facts arose in EC – Hormones. The 
EC argued that that WTO panels should adopt “a deferential “reasonableness” standard when 
reviewing a Member's decision to adopt a particular science policy or a Member’s determination 
that a particular inference from the available data is scientifically plausible.”747 This standard of 
review should apply in all “highly complex factual situations.”748 The Appellate Body rejected 
this argument and, referring to Article 11 of the DSU, stated that the appropriate level of review 
was neither de novo nor ‘total deference’ but an objective assessment of the facts.749  
 
As far as questions of law are concerned, the Panel adopts a de novo review which is dictated by 
the customary rules of interpretation contained in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT.750 On the 
other hand, the Panels have recognized the need to show deference to member states’ 
interpretation of their own laws.751 For example, the Panel in US – Stainless Steel held that 
Article X did not justify the review of the continuity of domestic decisions or judgments within 
the national legal system and practice. This was a task reserved for the member states and which 
the Panel was unsuited to carry out.752 
 
In establishing appropriate standards of review, Panels have looked to Article 11 DSU for 
guidance. Accordingly, in US – Cotton Underwear, the Panel held that a policy of “total 
deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as 
foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU.”753 On the other hand, it did not regard its review “as a 
substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities.”754 Instead, its 
function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating 
Authority. The Panel in US – Wool Shirts ruled that Article 11 required the Panel to “make an 
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 Id., para. 14. 
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 Id., para. 15. 
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objective assessment of the matter before it; including an objective assessment of the facts of the 
case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make 
such other findings as will assist the DSB […].”755 The Panel adopts an inquisitorial approach to 
the review of facts which can include substantial re-evaluation of the facts and logic developed 
by the competent authority. 
 
Concerning de facto measures, the standard of proof is particularly important because the 
complainant seeks to establish a violation of the agreement(s) based on the effects of the measure 
in question. In Argentina – Bovine Hides the Panel held that trade statistics alone would not be 
sufficient to establish the restrictive effect of a measure; rather, the complainant had to establish a 
causal link between the contested measure and the low level of exports. His arguments would 
also have to be buttressed by sufficient factual evidence.756 In the case of circumstantial 
evidence, the Panel held that it must “lead clearly and convincingly to the conclusion proposed 
by the complainant and no other.”757 The Panel reinforced the quasi-judicial nature of the dispute 
settlement body by holding that the burden of proof under WTO law “was comparable to that in a 
domestic trial.”758 
 
The standard of evidence depends on the wording of the provision and can therefore vary within 
an individual paragraph. For example, Article X:3 (a) obliges all member states to “administer in 
a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings.” 
Arguably, the standard of proof for “reasonable” is higher than that for “uniform” and “impartial” 
because an accusation of “unreasonableness” could also imply “bad faith.” According to the 
Appellate Body in United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures, an accusation of 
“bad faith” was a particularly serious allegation and imposed a particularly high standard of 
proof.759   
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5.1.4. Right of the Panel to Seek Information 
 
The Panel is a fact-finding organ760 and, according to Article 11 of the DSU is required to make 
an objective assessment of the matter before it, including the facts of the case. In order to do this, 
Article 13:1 gives it the right to seek information “from any individual or body which it deems 
appropriate.”  
 
This fact-finding function is unique to the Panel and, in principle, its findings cannot be reviewed 
by the Appellate Body.761 Article 13:2 allows the Panel to request an advisory report in writing 
from an expert review group concerning factual aspects of a scientific or technical nature raised 
by a party to a dispute. This provision grants the Panel discretionary authority (i.e. it is not duty-
bound to seek information in each and every case).762 The Appellate Body in US – Shrimp 
explained this authority of the Panel as follows: 
 
“We consider that a panel also has the authority to accept or reject any information or advice 
which it may have sought and received, or to make some other appropriate disposition thereof.  It 
is particularly within the province and the authority of a panel to determine the need for 
information and advice in a specific case, to ascertain the acceptability and relevancy of 
information or advice received, and to decide what weight to ascribe to that information or 
advice or to conclude that no weight at all should be given to what has been received.”763 
 
The Appellate Body believed that the Panel had “ample and extensive authority to undertake and 
to control the process by which it informs itself both of the relevant facts of the dispute and of the 
                                                  
760
 See Report of the Appellate Body in United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten 
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legal norms and principles applicable to such facts.”764 On the other hand, the Panel’s function as 
a fact-finding organ is limited by the burden and standard of proof on the parties as well as its 
terms of reference. The Appellate Body in Japan - Agricultural Products II observed that this 
authority “cannot be used by a Panel to rule in favour of a complaining party which has not 
established a prima facie case of inconsistency based on specific legal claims asserted by it.”765 
Rather, the Panel should seek information and advice from experts in order to understand and 
evaluate the evidence submitted and the arguments made by the parties.766 In addition, the Panel 
cannot act ultra petita and make a ruling on a claim which was not made by the complainant.767 
The effect of Article XXI(a) on the Panel’s fact-finding function is examined under Part D, 
Section 2.1. 
 
5.1.5. Rules of Interpretation for General Obligations 
 
According to the Appellate Body, the Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of the Law of 
Treaties represents the main mechanism for treaty interpretation used in the WTO.768 The rules 
impose certain common disciplines upon treaty interpreters, irrespective of the content of the 
treaty provision being examined and irrespective of the field of international law concerned.769 
Many provisions of the WTO are not ideally clear (e.g. Article XXI), and these rules of 
interpretation provide the basis for constructing an interpretative framework.  
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Article 31 VCLT consists of three elements, “the ordinary meaning of the words”, “in their 
context” and “in the light of its object and purpose.”770 According to the Panel in U.S. Section 
301, these elements are to be viewed as a holistic rule of interpretation.771 In practice, however, 
the Panels and Appellate Body attach the greatest importance to the ordinary meaning of words 
by reference to their dictionary meaning.772 In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body held that the 
object and purpose of the parties to the agreement must first be sought in the words constituting 
that provision.773 If the meaning is equivocal or inconclusive, the Panel may refer to the context 
as well as the object and purpose of the treaty.774 Article 31 (2) states that the “context” includes 
the preamble and annexes of a treaty. The preamble to the WTO Agreement states the 
overarching aims of the treaties and can also play an important role in the interpretation of the 
provision.775  
 
Article 31 (3) (b) VCLT allows reference to subsequent practice of the parties in the application 
of the treaty which establishes agreement regarding its interpretation. In Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages, it was held that the Panel reports adopted by the contracting parties constitute 
subsequent practice in a specific case. However, this decision was overruled by the Appellate 
Body which held that subsequent practice was a “concordant, common and consistent set of 
acts.”776 In this connection, the prior practice of only one party may be relevant to the 
examination but it may not represent the common intention of the parties.  
 
According to Panel in EC-Equipment, Article 31 is usually sufficient to establish the meaning of 
a term. Only if the meaning of the term in question remains ambiguous or obscure or leads to a 
result which is “manifestly absurd or unreasonable” can the treaty interpreter refer to Article 32 
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of the Vienna Convention. This Article allows the interpreter to have recourse to supplementary 
means of interpretation including the preparatory work of the treaty and the historical background 
against which the treaty was negotiated.  
 
5.1.6. Role of Previous Decisions 
 
The following investigation relies heavily on decisions of the Panel and Appellate Body relating 
to certain aspects of Article XX. Therefore, the role that previous decisions plays in the 
interpretation of the WTO agreements both in terms of stare decisis and obiter dicta is of 
particular importance.  
 
According to Article 32 of the VCLT, previous decisions only play a secondary role in the 
interpretation of the agreements and are not binding in later disputes. However, they have 
persuasive effect and, in practice, are often referred to by Panels and the Appellate Body.777 Like 
national courts, the dispute settlement organs of the WTO refer to obiter dicta as assistance for 
future decisions and developing the law.778 However, this practice has also been questioned by 
commentators who argue that the requirement of Article 3.2 limits Panels to examining issues 
within the context of a dispute.779 Although controversial, the Panels and the Appellate Body do 
refer to previous decisions when interpreting the covered agreements. 
 
5.2. Preamble to the Marrekech Agreement  
 
5.2.1. Introduction 
Before examining the individual provisions of the WTO agreements, it is important to remember 
that over two-thirds of the WTO members are developing countries. Therefore, it is important to 
                                                  
777
 See Ragosta et al p. 706 (accusing the Panels and Appellate Body of applying “de facto stare decisis”). See also 
WAINCYMER, p. 510 – 511.   
778
 Appellate Body, Canada – Periodicals, p. 33 (referring to a statement of the Panel as “obiter dicta”). See also 
WAINCYMER, p. 515. For an example of obiter dicta in relation to Article XXI see Report of the Panel, United – 
States – Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua 13 October 1986, (L/6053), [hereinafter, US – Nicaragua II], para. 
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excluded from its review; see also Ragosta et al, p. 731; Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking At The WTO: 
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 See Ragosta et al, p. 706. 
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consider the effects of the CSI on such countries when examining the provisions of the WTO 
agreements. In particular, the preamble to the Marrekech Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization 1994 stresses the importance of integrating developing countries into world 
trade. The principles contained in the preamble reflect the fact that developing and least 
developed countries have special needs that must be taken into account.780 A major aim of 
liberalization and capacity-building measures introduced by international organizations such as 
the WTO was to enable developing countries to participate in world trade.781 
 
5.2.2. Requirements 
 
The second paragraph to the Preamble of the Marrekech Agreement acknowledges the need that 
members make “positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the 
least-developed among them, secure a share in the growth of world trade commensurate with the 
needs of their economic development”. In order to achieve this, the next paragraph expresses the 
intention of member states to contribute to these objectives by “entering into reciprocal and 
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade 
relations”. Therefore, the preamble imposes dual obligation with regard to developing countries: 
positive efforts at integration and agreements to enhance market access.  
 
The dispute settlement bodies have recognized that the principles contained in the Preamble to 
the Marrekech Agreement are binding on member states. In the Shrimp – Turtle dispute, after 
stating that international agreements had to be carried out in good faith in accordance with the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda782, the Panel stated that, as a general rule, the Preamble of an 
agreement could be referred to in order to determine its object and scope. It held that: 
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 Van den Bossche, pp. 694 ff.  
781
 See e.g. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference, 4th Session, Doha 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 14 – 20 November 2001 (adopted on 14 November 2001) [hereinafter, Doha Declaration]. 
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“[T]he central focus of [the WTO Agreement] … remains the promotion of economic 
development through trade; and the provisions of GATT are essentially turned toward 
liberalization of access to markets on a non-discriminatory basis.”783 
 
The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s interpretation of the Preamble and stated that its 
principles formed an integral part of the WTO obligations:784 
 
“As this preambular language reflects the intentions of negotiators of the WTO Agreement, we 
believe it must add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the agreements annexed 
to the WTO Agreement, in this case, the GATT 1994. We have already observed that Article 
XX(g) of the GATT 1994 is appropriately read with the perspective embodied in the above 
preamble.”785 
 
Therefore, the Panel and Appellate Body will take the principles of the Preamble to the WTO 
Agreement into account when examining the individual provisions of the GATT, including the 
security exception of Article XXI786.  
 
5.2.3. Examination 
 
The Container Security Initiative is a measure that addresses a risk to a transnational asset, 
namely the international supply-chain. Like the environment, supply-chain security is a global 
concern and, in accordance with the Preamble to the WTO Agreement, the United States are 
bound to take positive measures to ensure that the CSI does not jeopardize the integration of  
developing and least developed countries into world trade.787 Evidence of such efforts can take 
the form of reciprocal agreements designed to eliminate trade barriers and discriminatory 
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 Id., Para. 7.2. 
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 See Report of the Appellate Body, paras. 129 and 131. 
785
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 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Minutes of Meeting, C/M/109, 31 October 1975, p. 9, (representatives 
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account pursuant to Part IV of the GATT). 
787
 The preamble to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization states, “seeking both to protect and 
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs 
and concerns at different levels of economic development, […].” Considering that the environment is a “pure public 
good”, this link would arguably also apply to other such goods, including security.  
  
 
152 
treatment by the CSI. The Panel has held that the objectives of the WTO Agreement would be 
undermined if a member were to jeopardize “the operation of the WTO Agreement in such a way 
that guaranteed market access and nondiscriminatory treatment within a multilateral framework 
would no longer be possible.”788 
 
Currently, the Container Security Initiative includes the seaports of few developing countries789 
despite the fact that they are important trading partners of the United States790 and are located in 
countries struggling with real terrorist threats.791 There is no evidence that that the United States 
has taken positive steps to ensure that developing and least developed countries will be able to 
participate in the measure. On the one hand, the initiative is only open to selected countries which 
CBP invites to participate in the measure.792 On the other hand, the entry requirements appear 
highly restrictive and it is unlikely that the seaports of any developing countries will be in a 
position to satisfy those relating to seaport infrastructure.793  
 
Considering the discriminatory treatment of containers subject to red-lane inspections, it is highly 
likely that the refusal of the United States to integrate developing countries into the CSI could 
cause them severe economic disadvantages. Research has shown that maritime transportation 
plays a crucial role in States’ economic development and the development of the global economy 
has ensured that shipping lanes are enormously important for the security and prosperity of states 
– including those which are landlocked.794 One writer points out the “close relationship between 
the existence of efficient shipping services and international development, especially in the case 
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 Report of the Panel, para. 7.44. 
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 See Florestal pp. 393 – 394.  
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 See UNCTAD REPORT, pp. 6-7 at para. 15. The report points out that “almost 90% of U.S. inbound maritime 
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 Supra pp. 78 – 80. 
793
 For the criteria see supra p. 79 
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 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, p. 1 and p. 20 (aiming to “support the accelerating growth of 
global commerce); see also NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, p. 17 (“A strong 
economy enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom to the rest of the world”).  
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of less developed countries.”795 This observation is particularly important with regard to the 
United States, which is the leading importer of goods from developing countries.796 Therefore, 
discrimination against non-CSI seaports has the potential to unravel the progress made in trade 
facilitation by complicating customs procedures.797 
 
In this respect, the Panel has held that the objectives of the WTO Agreement would be 
undermined if a member were to jeopardize “the operation of the WTO Agreement in such a way 
that guaranteed market access and nondiscriminatory treatment within a multilateral framework 
would no longer be possible.”798  
 
The refusal to involve developing countries in the CSI and the discriminatory treatment that this 
entails has wider ramifications. Trade plays a crucial role in the fight against terrorism because, 
as the preamble to the WTO Agreement states, it can lead to increasing the standard of living and 
full employment and real income.799 This, in turn provides the basis for political and social 
stability – pre-conditions for stamping out terrorist activities. The World Summit Outcome, for 
example, recognizes this by urging states to build national and regional capacity to combat 
terrorism.800 Accordingly, there is a risk that the negative economic effects of non-CSI 
participation could actually contribute to creating the conditions for terrorism by destabilizing 
weak states most at risk to terrorism.801 As one writer has observed: 
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 PARAMESWARAN, p. 23.  
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 Fact Sheet, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington DC, 14 September 2006.  
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 WORLD BANK RESEARCH REPORT DECEMBER 2003, p. 2 (“Inefficient procedures undermine the intended benefits 
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“If we derail the engine of economic growth and retreat from Wilsonian values, which are 
indispensable to sustaining the promise and reality of a better life around the globe, we will end 
up fuelling the threatening environment from which we are trying to protect ourselves. Security 
without openness is as self-defeating as openness without security.”802  
 
The United States itself has recognized that terrorism is more likely to flourish in impoverished 
and undemocratic states.803 According to the UN, economic and social development depends on 
governments creating “a conducive environment for vigorous private sector-led growth.”804 In 
this respect, it has been stated that the greatest disadvantage of non-CSI participation is likely to 
be felt by small and medium-sized companies in developing countries.805 These companies play a 
major role in small economies, being “a major instrument of employment creation and 
technology transfer.”806 This is also short-sighted, considering that the creation of a customs 
union (e.g. by the SADC) could enable its member states to team up more effectively to combat 
                                                  
802
 FLYNN, p. 13. 
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transnational organized crime by improving the exchange of information and provision of 
administrative assistance.807  
 
5.2.4. Result  
 
The Container Security Initiative contravenes the requirements of the Preamble to the Marrakech 
Agreement. The CBP has not made positive attempts to integrate developing countries into the 
Container Security Initiative and the measure’s selective, unilateral nature has the potential to 
restrict market access for goods from developing countries. The economic effects of non-
participation in the CSI could seriously affect the economic and political stability of developing 
and least developed countries. 
 
5.3. Article I:1 GATT: Most Favoured Nation Treatment  
 
5.3.1. Introduction 
 
Article I:1 GATT reflects the general principle of equality in the WTO Agreement, whose 
preamble states that the parties desire the “elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international trade relations.”808 It requires member states to grant all the benefits they grant to 
other states – whether members or non-members of the WTO – to all member states of the WTO. 
This so-called “most favoured nation principle” can be found in many provisions of the covered 
agreements809 and ensures that WTO members enjoy the same competitive conditions in relation 
to each other on the global market.810 This contributes to the multilateral system of world trade by 
eliminating protectionist measures and allowing the unrestricted flow of goods which may 
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Southern African states: Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia, Swaziland, Mazambique, Namibia and Mauritius in July 
2005. 
808
 The MFN principle aims to eliminate so-called ‘horizontal discrimination’, which refers to members states 
discriminating against same or similar products on the basis of their origin. See MEINHARD HILF/STEFAN OELER, 
WTO RECHT, BADEN-BADEN 2005, p. 178. 
809
 See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, p. 255 at § 11.3  
810
 According to the Appellate Body, the prohibition of discrimination in Article I:1 “serves as an incentive for 
concessions ... to be extended to all other members on an MFN basis.” Report of the Appellate Body, Canada – 
Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R; WT/DS142/AB/R, 4 October 2000 (adopted 
on 19 June 2000), [hereinafter, Canada – Autos], at para. 84. 
  
 
156 
otherwise lead to disputes and retaliatory actions.811 The MFN principle includes four areas of 
government activity, three of which take place at the border.812 
 
5.3.2. Requirements 
 
Article I:1 GATT applies to all “rules and formalities in connection with importation.” The term 
“customs formalities” is defined in the Revised Kyoto Convention as “all the operations which 
must be carried out by the persons concerned and by the Customs in order to comply with the 
Customs law.”813 Therefore, on the basis of international convention, Article I:1 GATT applies to 
all procedures required to ensure compliance with Customs law.  
 
Article I:1 prohibits discrimination between like products and relates to tariff (i.e. “customs 
duties”) and non-tariff measures (i.e. “other rules and formalities”). A measure can discriminate 
against like products expressly (de jure) or indirectly (de facto).814 Although the former measure 
will automatically violate Article I:1, there was uncertainty about the situation regarding de facto 
measures. In Canada – Autos, Canada argued that a measure which provided “a duty exemption 
for the importation of certain automobiles, buses and other specified commercial vehicles” could 
not be deemed discriminatory according to Article I:1 GATT because it did not impose 
limitations “with respect to the origin of products that may be imported.”815 In other words, the 
provision was origin-neutral and seemingly non-discriminatory. However, the Panel held that the 
measure was inconsistent with Article I:1 GATT because it had the effect of discriminating 
against imports from certain countries. On appeal, the Appellate Body upheld the ruling of the 
Panel stating that there was nothing in the wording of Article I:1 “which restricted its scope only 
to cases in which the failure to accord an “advantage” to like products of all other members 
appeared on the face of the measure, or can be demonstrated on the basis of the words of the 
measure.” One reason for this ruling is that limiting the scope of Article I:1 to origin-based 
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measures would mean that states could circumvent the provision by formulating their 
discriminatory measures in origin-neutral language.816 For example, in Belgian Family 
Allowances, the Belgian government adopted a measure which distinguished goods based on the 
characteristics of their country of origin. The Panel held that this violated Article I:1 and “was 
difficult to reconcile with the spirit of the General Agreement.” 817 
 
The requirements of Article I:1 relate to scope and obligation.818 In the dispute Indonesia-Autos, 
the Panel clarified the order of examination in relation to Article I:1 by referring to the report of 
the Appellate Body in EC-Bananas III819 and identified four requirements which the complainant 
must satisfy: 
 
• There must be an advantage of the type covered by Article I; 
• The measure must affect “like products”; 
• The disputed measure must be a type regulated by the MFN provision; 
• The advantage must be offered to all like products immediately and unconditionally.820  
 
The scope of Article I:1 is limited to benefits granted in relation to the importation and 
exportation of products. The meaning of benefits is not defined but in Canada – Autos, the 
Appellate Body formulated the language of the provision in the broadest possible sense to include 
“any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity.”821 Therefore, the wording clearly includes not 
only benefits in the form of an advantage (i.e. the grant of greenlane clearance) but also the 
avoidance of a disadvantage (such as a reduced risk of redlane clearance).822  
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The advantage can take a wide range of forms, including a procedural requirement or practice.823 
For example in U.S. – Non-Rubber Footwear, the Panel held that “the automatic backdating of 
the effect of revocation of a pre-existing countervailing duty order, without the necessity of the 
country subject to the order making a request for an injury review, is properly considered to be an 
advantage within the meaning of Article I:1.”824 Also, the MFN principle is not limited to 
benefits granted to member states. Therefore, if a member state grants a benefit to a state which is 
not a member of the WTO, it must do the same with regard to its fellow member states.825  
 
Member states must offer the benefit in question to a “like product.” This term frequently appears 
in the WTO agreements and refers to the equal treatment of foreign goods in relation to each 
other. It is different treatment of like products which distorts the competitive conditions between 
states. Products that are not alike can be treated differently.826 Despite its crucial importance, the 
GATT 1994 does not define this term. In Japan - Alcoholic Beverages the Panel and Appellate 
Body held that the interpretation of “like products” within the context of Article III applied 
equally to the same term in Article I:1.827 The Panel pointed out that previous cases had 
determined the question of likeness on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments 1970.828 
According to this report, the crucial question was whether the goods, owing to their 
characteristics and qualities, were considered to be in competition, were destined for the identical 
end-use or were at least substitutable, i.e. mutually interchangeable.829 The Appellate Body 
upheld this approach stating that the question whether products are “like” was “a discretionary 
decision that must be made in considering the various characteristics of products in individual 
cases.” However, it added that “no one approach to exercising judgement will be appropriate for 
all cases.”830  
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In Canada – Periodicals, the Panel held that hypothetical imports could be used to determine 
whether a measure violates Article III:2.831 According to the Panel, “an origin-based distinction is 
sufficient to violate Article III:2 without the complainant having to demonstrate the existence of 
actually-traded ‘like’ products.”832 The provision only applies to those “like products” which are 
“originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.” This limitation on 
the scope of the provision was a point at issue in EC-Bananas III where the European 
Community argued that it had set up two regimes for the importation of bananas but that these 
regimes did not contravene Article I:1 because this provision only applied within these 
regimes.833 The Panel held that these regimes had contravened Article I:1 and this ruling was 
upheld on appeal by the Appellate Body which stated that “the non-discrimination provisions 
apply to all imports of bananas, irrespective of whether and how a Member categorizes or 
subdivides these imports for administrative or other reasons.”834 To hold that the provisions 
applied only within regulatory regimes established by that Member would make it very easy for 
member states to circumvent the obligations imposed by Article I:1.835 
 
Article I:1 also obliges the member states to accord any benefit falling within its scope 
“immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories 
of all other contracting parties.” According to the Panel in Canada – Autos, the requirement of 
“immediate and unconditional” means that the advantages may not be subject to any delay or 
conditions.836 Awarding a benefit in stages, for example, results in unequal treatment because 
states given priority would enjoy a competitive advantage over other member states during a 
certain period. In addition, the Panel held that the requirement of “unconditionally” did not mean 
that the grant of an advantage could not be made dependent on the satisfaction of certain 
requirements. The Panel distinguished between, on the one hand, the issue of whether an 
advantage within the meaning of Article I:1 was subject to conditions, and, on the other, whether 
an advantage, once it had been granted to the product of any country, was accorded 
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“unconditionally” to the like product of all other Members.837  In other words, the Article I:1 
prohibits conditional most favoured nation treatment by requiring that a conditional benefit must 
be made available to all other member states unconditionally once the relevant conditions had 
been fulfilled.838  
 
5.3.3. Examination 
 
The CSI falls within the meaning of “rules and formalities in connection with importation and 
exportation” for the purposes of Article I:1 because it represents an administrative measure of the 
CBP, a government agency839 and consists of a statutory regulations which affect the importation 
of goods into the United States. There are three aspects which appear relevant to Article I: the 
risk assessment of containers, stationing of CSI teams and the post-incident resumption of 
trade.840  
 
In order to fall within the scope of Article I:1, these three measures must confer an advantage that 
applies to “any product originating in or destined for any other country”. Each of these measures 
can confer an advantage on the importation of products. First, the risk assessment process divides 
containers into low risk and high risk shipments. The designation of a container as “low risk” is 
advantageous because it reduces the risk that a container will be subject to inspection by the CBP. 
Secondly, the stationing of CSI teams at foreign seaports can also confer an advantage on 
products. The presence of such teams permits high-risk containers to be inspected while the 
container is waiting to be loaded on the vessel (so-called “dwell” or “down” time) thereby 
reducing delay in the transportation. The fact that a container is shipped from a CSI port also 
grants it preferential treatment. According to Section 202 (c) (1), “in determining the 
prioritization of the flow of cargo […] the Commissioner may give preference to cargo […] 
entering a port of entry directly from a foreign seaport designated under the Container Security 
                                                  
837
 Id., at para. 10.24. 
838
 See generally, VAN DEN BOSSCHE, pp. 317 – 318.  
839
 Id., pp. 312 – 313.  
840
 The 24 Hour Rule is contained in 19 CFR 4.7; parts of the CSI have been codified by the SAFE Port Act 2006.  
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Initiative.”841 The post-incident resumption of trade confers a similar benefit on products shipped 
from CSI ports. Section 205 (j) of the SAFE Port Act states: 
 
“Lesser Risk Port – The Secretary, acting through the Commissioner, may treat cargo loaded in 
a foreign seaport designated under the Container Security Initiative as presenting a lesser risk 
than similar cargo loaded in a foreign seaport that is not designated under the Container 
Security Initiative, for the purpose of clearing such cargo into the United States.” 
 
CBP itself has admitted that CSI status amounts to a competitive benefit for shippers using CSI 
ports842 and the promise of a competitive advantage has made states eager to sign up to the 
Container Security Initiative.843 States are also eager to avoid any disadvantages caused by 
increased inspections: any delay in customs clearance could increase the costs of transit 
considerably and make foreign products uncompetitive.844 
 
The CSI is of great significance to the importation of goods into the United States because risk 
assessment and “CSI port” status directly affect container transportation and customs procedures. 
The former is the most popular and, in some cases, the only viable means of transporting 
products. As stated earlier, it is estimated that 90 – 95 percent of the international trade in goods 
is transported by container.845 Customs procedures can also influence the importation of goods:846 
as explained in Section 2.2., any delay in customs clearance could increase the costs of transit 
considerably. 
 
These advantages conferred by the CSI are permissible provided that they do not discriminate 
against “like products.” Panels determine whether a product is “like” on a case-by-case basis, 
                                                  
841
 See  FLYNN, p. 103 who refers to “green lane” and “red lane” clearance. U.S. Customs Commissioner, Remarks of 
9 October 2002 (“[O]nce the screening is done “there” - at a CSI port - it will not, except in rare cases, need to be 
done again here in the U.S. You do not need to do the security screening twice. Nearly all CSI-screened cargo will 
speed right through on arrival in the U.S. It will get the fast lane into U.S. commerce”).  
842
 CSI FACT SHEET, p. 4 
843
 See Jau, p. 8 (“Overall, the competitive pressure to get onboard CSI appears to have generated a momentum of its 
own […]”). 
844
 Supra n. 631. 
845
 PARAMESWARAN, p 1. 
846
 Lewis E. Leibowitz et al, WTO Negotiations on Trade Facilitation: Prospects for Cutting Red Tape at the 
Borders and Opening Doors for Developing Countries, Int. T.L.R. 2007, 13(1), pp. 4 – 5. 
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taking into account a number of different factors including the product’s end-uses in a given 
market, consumers’ tastes and habits and the product’s properties, nature and quality.847 
Considering that containers transport almost half of all waterborne imports entering the United 
States, it would be easy to construct an example of hypothetical like products. The complainant 
could demonstrate this by comparing the customs treatment of two identical consignments 
exported to the United States via a CSI and non-CSI port and calculating differentials in the 
transit time and costs. The complainant could argue that each of the three aspects referred to: risk 
assessment, the stationing of CSI teams and the post-incident resumption of trade discriminates 
against “like products” and thereby creates a “substantively unequal, or unlevel, playing field”848 
with regard to the exportation of products to the United States. 
 
The European Communities has stated that “[t]he principle of non-discrimination should not of 
course interfere with Members’ rights to treat consignments differently according to objective 
risk assessment criteria.”849 However, the complainant could argue that the risk assessment of 
containers according to the 24 Hour Rule does not follow objective criteria because, according to 
the following statement by the WTO Secretariat, CBP distinguishes between the same products 
on the basis of their origin: 
 
“According to the authorities, under the current 24-hour system (see below), some products are 
more apt to be examined than others.  While CBP maintains a programme of random 
examination throughout its automated systems, enforcement and security concerns based on 
country of origin and identity of companies involved, may also result in examination.  In 
addition, goods considered to be trade-sensitive, such as textiles and clothing products, are 
subject to a higher percentage of examinations than other commodities.”850   
 
                                                  
847
 Appellate Body, Canada – Periodicals, pp. 20 – 21. 
848
 Cf. BHALA, p. 58 at para. 3-001.  
849
 See World Trade Organization, Communication from the European Communities, Improvements to GATT 
Article VIII on Formalities and Requirements Connected with Importation and Exportation and Related Proposals on 
Special and Differential Treatment and Technical Assistance, 9 June 2005 (TN/TF/W/46), p. 3, para. A. 1. However, 
this statement refers to two different issues. The question whether the criteria employed in risk assessment are non-
discriminatory is the subject of Article I. On the other hand, the administration of customs procedures is dealt with 
under Article X GATT.   
850
 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY REVIEW 2004, p. 34, para. 17.  
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A report by the OECD also states that origin is crucially important in assessing the risk-rating of 
containers.851 The complainant could therefore argue that singling out any products as high risk 
on the basis of their origin is discriminatory because it ensures that the container will be subject 
to inspection. Inspections are considered disadvantageous because they increase the risk of delay 
in customs clearance which, in turn, could increase transit costs.852 It is for this reason that 
customs conventions provide for simplified customs procedures and authorized consignee 
status.853 As a result, this treatment could place like products from countries deemed low risk at 
an unfair advantage.854  
 
The stationing of CSI teams and the post-incident resumption of trade could also discriminate 
against like products because the CSI makes a distinction between CSI and non-CSI ports. This 
could result in a situation similar to that considered by the Panel in Indonesia – Autos, where an 
imported product alike in all respects is subject to different clearance procedures simply because 
of the location of the seaport from which it departs.855 As far as the CSI is concerned, this 
distinction between seaports is discriminatory because it confers an advantage which is not 
offered to all like products “immediately and unconditionally.” 
 
The complainant could argue that the CSI violates Article I:1 because membership is not offered 
to the seaports of all countries “unconditionally.”  On the one hand, countries (i.e. their customs 
administrations) must be invited to join the CSI by the CBP. As a rule, CBP has limited 
membership to its major trading partners or strategic seaports. On the other hand, membership of 
                                                  
851
 According to the OECD certain countries of origin for either the goods or the shipment will automatically give the 
container a high risk rating or fail the goods outright. See OECD REPORT 2003, pp. 48-49, para. 140. See also Jon D. 
Haveman et al, The Container Security Initiative and Ocean Container Threats, JHESM: Vol. 4 [2007] No.1 Article 
1, p. 4. On the other hand, the origin of products may not necessarily prove decisive in the issue of a no-load order. 
See e.g. S. Hrg. 109 – 186, p. 23 (remarks of the U.S. Customs Commissioner regarding the sensitivity of no-load 
orders). 
852
 Supra n. 631. However, there is conflicting evidence on the effects of risk assessment, see infra n. 925.  
853
 See e.g. Revised Kyoto Convention, General Annex, Chapter 3, Part 7, which provides for special procedures for 
authorized persons. See also Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR 
Convention) 1975 as an example of simplified customs procedures to assist the efficient transportation of goods.  
854
 MATSUSHITA ET AL, p. 149. See also Panel, U.S. - User Fee, paras. 84 - 86, 107 – 108 which in effect held that an 
advantage may also be granted to a member state in the form of avoiding cumbersome formalities. There may be 
evidential problems with this Complaint because the rules used in risk assessment are confidential on grounds of 
national security. 
855
 Panel, Indonesia – Autos, para. 14.113 
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CSI is dependent on the satisfaction of certain criteria856 some of which are inherently 
discriminatory. For example, the first criteria for selection is that the “seaport must have regular, 
direct, and substantial container traffic to ports in the United States.”857 Not all seaports will be 
able to satisfy this requirement: figures show that a substantial number of countries ship less than 
30,000 containers to the United States each year.858 In addition, many countries (not only 
developing countries) may not be able to afford the inspection equipment required.859 The cost of 
acquiring, operating and maintaining equipment has been estimated to lie in the region of $1 – 5 
million.860 Upgrading security may also require major changes to harbour infrastructure and 
working practices.861 Such requirements could amount to hidden discrimination because they 
prevent certain countries (especially developing countries) from participating in the CSI, even if 
CBP allowed all states to participate. This is demonstrated by the fact that of the 54 CSI ports 
only 3 are found in developing countries.862 Moreover, the United States has not confirmed that it 
will expand the CSI to such countries or provide financial assistance for security measures.863  
 
The complainant could also claim that the advantage of CSI is not offered immediately to all 
states because its implementation has taken place in three phases with some seaports having to 
wait more than four years to join the programme.864 Such a “phased-in approach” is also likely to 
be held discriminatory865 because some states have enjoyed a competitive benefit for a 
considerably longer period of time.  
                                                  
856
 UNCTAD REPORT 2003, p. 6 at para. 15. See also Douglas Browning, Co-operation on Trade Security Must Be a 
Top Priority, EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, Summer/Fall 2003. Concerning the selection of CSI ports, Browning states: 
 “It must be noted, however, that the CSI sites were chosen based on existing maritime trade lanes and the volumes 
of U.S.-bound exports. The designated ports were already doing high volumes of business outbound to the United 
States and CSI simply acknowledged and capitalized on that reality.”  
857
 See supra p. 79. 
858
 Although, if this were the sole criterion for CSI membership, the condition of “substantial trade” would cast a 
wide net ranging from China (8.5 million containers) to Barbados, (1,184 containers). See Maritime Transportation 
Administration, U.S. Waterborne Container Import by Trading Partner, 2006.  
859
 For example, the United States provided the port of Piraeus in Greece with inspection equipment. See Declaration 
of Principles Governing the US Container Security Initiative at the Port of Piraeus, Greece between Directorate 
General of Customs and Excise of the Hellenic Republic and United States Customs and Border Protection, 22 June 
2004. See also Florestal, p. 402 – 403.  
860
 See OECD REPORT, p. 51. 
861
 See GAO-05-375, p. 24 
862
 South Africa, South America and the Caribbean represent developing countries of the medium income bracket. 
863
 Allen, p. 445. 
864
 See CBP Press Release, Container Security Initiative Port of Santos, Brazil Is Targeting and Pre-Screening 
Cargo Destined for U.S., 22 September 2005. See also Florestal, p. 394.  
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 Appellate Body, U.S. – Shrimp, paras. 173 – 175.  
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5.3.4. Result 
 
The CSI falls within the scope of Article I:1 as a collection of “rules or formalities” affecting the 
importation of products into the United States. It has been reported that CBP deliberately targets 
products based on their origin in assessing the risk of containers. This could place such goods at a 
competitive disadvantage by increasing the risk of delay caused by inspections. CSI status also 
grants products an “advantage” in the form of more opportune inspections and preferential post-
incident clearance. Owing to the fact that 49 percent of U.S. waterborne cargo is transported by 
container, it will be easy for the complainant to create hypothetical “like products.” In practice, 
the advantages in question have not been offered to all countries immediately or conditionally. In 
particular, the fact that some countries will not be able to satisfy the criteria to join the CSI 
suggests hidden discrimination. As a result, it is likely that the complainant could adduce 
sufficient evidence to prove that the CSI discriminates between ‘like products’ from different 
countries.  
 
5.4. Article XI GATT 
 
5.4.1. Introduction 
 
The success of the GATT in reducing tariffs has induced member states to employ non-tariff 
barriers in order to avoid their obligations under the GATT.866 Quantitative restrictions, in 
particular, have been described as representing “the single most debated non-tariff barrier to 
international trade.”867 Customs formalities and rules – like the CSI – can represent a 
considerable barrier to trade.868 Article XI confronts this practice with a broad prohibition on 
export and import prohibitions and restrictions other than by means of duties, taxes or charges 
                                                  
866
 If a state wishes to restrict trade it may only do so by means of tariff-measures, i.e. duties, taxes or other charges. 
Tariff measures are easier to deal with because they are more transparent than non-tariff measures and can be 
reduced through trade rounds. See Report of the Panel, Turkey – Restrictions on Import of Textiles and Clothing 
Products, WT/DS34/AB/R, 22 October 1999 (adopted on 19 November 1999), [hereinafter Turkey – Textiles], para. 
9.63 (“[q]uantitative restrictions impose absolute limits on exports, […] usually have a trade distorting effect and 
their administration may not be transparent”). 
867
 See JACKSON, p. 305 at §13.2. 
868
 Leibowitz et al supra n. 846. 
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and has been described as one of the cornerstones of the GATT system.869 Despite its broad 
wording Article XI does not represent a blanket prohibition on restrictions.870 Article XI:2 GATT 
contains a number of exceptions to this prohibition which are subject to the principle of non-
discrimination. Article XI represents the fourth pillar of the GATT and ensures that the price of 
goods is determined by the law of supply and demand, rather than by artificial restrictions on 
supply created by the government.871   
 
5.4.2. Requirements 
 
Article XI has a broad scope: according to the Panel in Japan – Semi-Conductors, it is not limited 
to specific types of “restrictions and prohibitions” such as quotas, import or export licenses but 
also includes a residual category of “other measures.”872 This term covers “virtually any 
requirement or regulation designed to inhibit imports or exports” and includes measures which do 
not refer to the quantity or value of the goods (e.g. security measures).873 It is also “inherently 
malleable” and allows GATT to catch new forms of non-tariff measures.874 The term 
“prohibition” means a total prohibition, whereas “restriction” refers to measures which limit but 
do not make import and export impossible.875  
 
                                                  
869
 Panel, Turkey – Textiles, paras. 9.63 – 9.65. However, the importance of the article has been reduced owing to the 
conclusion of specific agreements dealing with non-tariff trade barriers during the Uruguay Round (e.g. PSM, TBT, 
TRIPS and TRIMS agreements). 
870
 See WEISS who compares Article XI with Article 28 of the EC Treaty (itself based upon Article XI GATT); see 
also Panel, Argentina – Bovine Hides, at para. 11.20 (declaring that the aim of the provision was to protect 
competitive opportunities of imported products, not trade flows. 
871
 See Kennedy, p. 100. 
872
 Panel, Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors, paras. 104 – 109.  
873
 MATSUSHITA ET AL, p. 125. 
874
 See RAJ BHALA, MODERN GATT LAW: A TREATISE ON THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, p. 
358 at para 14.004. RICHARD SENTI, WTO SYSTEM, UND FUNKTIONSWEISE DER WELTHANDELSORDNUNG, p. 245 at 
para. 549 (“Other measures” can include provisions stipulating maximum and minimum prices, the requirement of 
import and export licenses, administrative measures and all other conditions affecting trade which a trade partner can 
apply to goods at the border crossing). 
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 Report of the Panel, India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, 
WT/DS90/R, 6 April 1999 (adopted on 22 September 1999), at para. 5.128, the term “restriction” is interpreted 
according to its ordinary meaning as a “limitation on action, a limiting condition or regulation.”  
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As the words “made effective” suggest, the measure in question does not have to expressly 
prohibit or restrict imports or exports.876 It is the effect of the restriction, prohibition or other 
measure and not its legal status or objective that is decisive.877 Therefore, both mandatory and 
voluntary measures can violate Article XI if they produce a de facto restrictive effect on trade. 
This is significant in relation to security measures whose implementation and maintenance entails 
a great deal of expense and training which some countries could find prohibitive. The provision 
has been held to apply to a wide range of measures including administrative guidelines and 
customs inspection procedures for goods destined for export.878 
 
In Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors, the Panel established a two-stage test to determine 
whether legally informal, non-mandatory measures contravened Article XI. First, the complainant 
had to prove reasonable grounds for believing that sufficient incentives or disincentives existed 
for non-mandatory measures to take effect. Second, the operation of the measure in question had 
to be essentially dependent on government action or intervention. Subject to these criteria, 
measures will be deemed to operate in a manner equivalent to mandatory requirements and 
therefore come within the scope of Article XI. The Panel held that the absence of formal legally-
binding obligations amounted to “a difference in form rather than substance because the measures 
were operated in a manner equivalent to mandatory requirements.”879  
 
The burden of proof varies according to whether the measure is de jure or de facto in nature.880 In 
the case of the former, there is a presumption that the measure prohibits or restricts trade. 
According to the Panel in EEC – Payments, a de jure restriction will breach Article XI if it 
distorts conditions of competition, “whether or not it actually impeded imports.”881 The 
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 Panel, Argentina – Bovine Hides, para. 11.17 (“There can be no doubt in our view, that the disciplines of Article 
XI:1 extend to restrictions of a de facto nature.”). 
877
 Panel, US – Shrimp, p. 283 at para 16: “In other words, the United States bans imports of shrimp or shrimp 
products from any country not meeting certain policy conditions.” 
878
 See e.g. Panel, Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors; Panel, Argentina – Bovine Hides. 
879
 Id. Panel, Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors, para. 117. 
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 See Panel, Argentina – Bovine Hides, paras. 11.11 – 11.14.  
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 Report of the Panel, European Economic Community – Payments and Subsidies to Processors and Producers of 
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complainant does not have to prove an actual trade restrictive effect.882 The mere existence of a 
quantitative restriction violates Article XXI because it adversely affects the equality of 
competitive conditions.883 However, in the case of de facto restriction, the complainant must 
prove an actual restrictive effect on trade884 by establishing a causal link between the contested 
measure and the trade effect.885 The Panel held that “a demonstration of causation must consist of 
a persuasive examination of precisely how the measure at issue causes or contributes to the low 
level of imports.”886 In Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, the Panel held that the effects 
of a measure are not limited to its effects on the volume of trade; other relevant effects of the 
measure could be increased transaction costs or uncertainties which could affect investment 
plans.887  
 
Article XI:2 contains exceptions to the general prohibition. However, these are not relevant to the 
investigation because they relate to agricultural and fisheries products which are necessary to 
enforce government measures designed to stabilize national markets for these products.888 
 
5.4.3. Examination 
 
The complainant could argue that the 24 Hour Rule and the CSI fall within the scope of “other 
measures” because they are government measures relating to the importation process which can 
potentially restrict and prohibit imports. On the other hand, it could be argued that Article XI 
does not extend to these measures because they primarily concern the transportation of goods 
whereas Article XI primarily applies to quantitative restrictions.  
 
                                                  
882
 Panel, Argentina – Bovine Hides, paras. 11.20 – 11.21 (holding that the complainant did not have to prove actual 
trade effects in order to establish that a particular measure infringes Article XI).  
883
 Kennedy, p. 127 (“[W]hether a quantitative restriction has actual trade effects is irrelevant”). 
884
 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. On the other hand, the defendant party does not have to prove that the measures are consistent with Article XI:1. 
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para. 55.  
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The argument against the application of Article XI to the CSI is contradicted by the case law 
which shows that the Panels and Appellate Body have interpreted the wording of the provision 
expansively. For example, in Japan – Semi-Conductors, the Panel pointed out that the provision 
used the term “measures” which was broader than e.g. “laws or regulations.” Although the Panel 
was more concerned with the legal status of the measure in question, it made clear that it was the 
intention to restrict imports rather than the means of doing so that was crucial: 
 
“The wording indicated that any measure instituted or maintained by a Contracting Party which 
restricted the exportation or sale for export of products was covered by this provision.”889 
 
An expansive interpretation of Article XI:1 is also supported by the fact that the provision 
complements Article I:1 which the Panel has also interpreted expansively (e.g. in the Belgium 
Family Allowances case it looked to the spirit of the agreement).890 Excluding measures from the 
scope of Article XI:1 because they are not directly linked to products would also weaken the 
effectiveness of the provision. Considering that maritime transport is “a pre-requisite for the 
expansion of trade”891 it would be easy for governments to restrict imports by imposing onerous 
requirements relating to maritime transportation. Alternatively, the complainant could argue that 
the fact that the CSI affects transportation is irrelevant because it falls within the scope of Article 
XI as a form of customs control which affects the importation of goods.  
 
The 24 Hour Rule could represent a de jure prohibition of certain cargo containers owing to the 
high regulatory burden it places on foreign exporters to the United States. CFR 4.7 is a 
mandatory measure which prohibits the importation of high-risk containers into the United States 
by means of a no-load order.892 Despite the fact that CSI teams have no legal authority to actually 
enforce such orders, the risk of sanctions at the US port of arrival persuades carriers not to load 
such containers.893 Considering that there is a presumption that de jure prohibitions contravene 
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 Panel Report, Japan-Semi-Conductors, para. 106. 
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Article XI:1, the complainant could argue that a no-load order contravenes Article XI:1 because it 
is designed to prevent certain containers entering U.S. seaports. In this case he would not be 
required to prove actual trade effects or provide empirical evidence of injury.894  
 
The complainant could also argue that the 24 Hour rule contravenes Article XI:1 because it 
restricts trade indirectly (i.e. de facto restriction on trade), although there are conflicting views on 
the effects of risk-assessment on trade flows. There is evidence that the 24 Hour Rule could 
operate to restrict trade in goods owing to the high costs of its implementation and the disruption 
it causes to traditional shipping practices. For example, the World Shipping Council has pointed 
out that the delay and cost caused by the measure may prove intolerable for small entities and 
major enterprises alike.895 The OECD has estimated the costs of the 24 Hour Rule to be in the 
region of $ 281.7 billion a year896 and this may be beyond the reach of seaports in poorer 
countries. Its restrictive effect on trade appears to be substantiated by a report issued by the 
Santiago Chamber of Commerce of Chile according to which Chilean exporters lost $3.75 
million between March and April of 2003.897 Although Standard 7.4 of the RKC states that 
national legislation is to provide for electronic commerce methods as an alternative to paper-
based documentary requirements, this is qualified by Standard 7.1 which states that IT can only 
be applied “where it is cost-effective and efficient for the Customs and for the trade.”898 On the 
other hand, the complainant must also be aware of the fact that risk assessment is considered an 
integral part of trade facilitation efforts – as shown by its incorporation into the WCO’s Revised 
Kyoto Convention and the Framework of Standards. Evidence has also shown that it actually 
                                                                                                                                                                
terminal for more than 48 hours after being delivered to the marine terminal operator is subject to search, seizure, 
and forfeiture”). 
894
 See BHALA, p. 367 at para. 14-017 (“The presence of or absence of actual trade effects is irrelevant. All that 
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 See WSC, Comments 9 September 2002, p. 5 (“The government may determine that this proposal is necessary for 
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increase carrier and shipper costs, and it will require trade processes to change significantly”).  
896
 OECD REPORT 2003, p. 49, para. 146; see also UNCTAD REPORT 2003, para. 66, pointing out that the figure 
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infrastructure necessary for the operation of the advance submission of cargo information. See also WSC, Comments 
9 September 2002, p.5 (“[The 24 Hour Rule] will delay commerce, it will significantly increase carrier and shipper 
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898
 Standard 7.1. of the RKC. 
  
 
171 
speeds up the importation process by obviating the need for 100 percent inspections which have 
been traditionally employed in Africa and South Asia.899 
 
Unlike the 24 Hour Rule, the Container Security Initiative is a voluntary measure which will only 
fall within the scope of Article XI if it satisfies the two stage test established by the Panel in 
Japan – Semi-conductors. The first stage of the test is satisfied because CBP divides cargo into 
greenlane and redlane clearance in order to exert maximum possible pressure900 on countries to 
participate in the CSI. Therefore, its effect is similar to that of a mandatory measure. Concerning 
the second stage of the test, the operation of the CSI is under the exclusive control of the U.S. 
government. The CSI was created by CBP, is regulated by statute and administered under the 
auspices of the Department of Homeland Security. The role of the foreign customs authority in 
the CSI is limited to examining high-risk containers referred to it by CSI teams using inspection 
equipment approved by CBP. Therefore, the CSI satisfies the two requirements established by the 
Panel.  
 
Despite the fact that the CSI attempts to balance trade facilitation and supply chain security, the 
complainant could argue that it restricts trade indirectly by adducing sufficient evidence showing 
that it increases costs, delay or causes competitive distortions.901 As in the swordfish dispute 
between the EC and Chile, the complainant would have to demonstrate how a measure which 
ostensibly relates to seaport services is also capable of indirectly affecting trade in products.902 
 
The CSI could constitute a non-tariff barrier to trade owing to the arbitrary way in which CSI 
ports are identified by the US. There is evidence that seaports are not admitted to the CSI despite 
satisfying the criteria for CSI membership. For example, For example, the port of Santos in 
Brazil only became a member of the CSI in June 2005. Despite the fact that this seaport exports a 
substantial number of containers to the United States there was a delay of three years before it 
                                                  
899
 Leibowitz et al, p. 14. See also WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2006: CREATING JOBS [hereinafter WB REPORT 
2006], p. 57. On the implementation of risk management in customs see RKC supra n. 540. 
900
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became CSI operational. By contrast, the port of Gothenburg became a member of the CSI in 
January 2003 despite the fact that it appears to have a far lesser commercial and strategic 
importance than its South American counterpart. South and Central America account for almost 
10% of maritime containers shipped to the United States. Moreover, Brazil is 14th in the list of 
top U.S. importers.903 
 
The CSI could restrict trade owing to the discriminatory treatment of goods from seaports or 
countries which do not participate in the CSI. It does this by dividing containers into greenlane 
and redlane clearance depending on whether the departure seaport is a member of the CSI or 
not.904 The discriminatory treatment which shippers can suffer as a consequence of this rule 
includes increased transit costs owing to no-load orders and increased inspections905 as well as 
increased fees for port services.906 In the event of a terrorist attack, non-CSI ports will not be 
eligible for “special continuity considerations” and their cargo will not receive “facilitated 
handling”, which could also lead to great financial loss owing to increased inspections.907 The 
result of these factors will be to restrict foreign trade with the United States.908  
 
The complainant could argue that, at the U.S. arrival port, containers from non-CSI seaports are 
more likely to be deemed high-risk and therefore scanned and physically inspected (“redlane 
clearance”).  Inspections at the arrival port will be carried out at a less convenient stage in the 
supply chain than those at CSI ports909 with the risk that products transported by non-CSI 
containers may experience delay.910 Such delay could be very damaging for perishable products 
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 See supra n. 892. 
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 Section 205 (j). SAFE Port Act 2006. 
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 See comments of Senator Levin, Hearing of 25 May 2005, p. 20.   
906
 For details on port fees see MARIA DEL PILAR LONDONO-KENT AND PAUL E. KENT, A TALE OF TWO PORTS, THE 
COST OF INEFFICIENCY, RESEARCH REPORT DECEMBER 2003 [hereinafter WORLD BANK RESEARCH REPORT 
DECEMBER 2003], pp. 3 – 5.  
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 CSI STRATEGIC PLAN, p. 9. 
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 See PARAMESWARAN, p. 50.  
909
 In the absence of a bilateral agreement with CBP there is no provision at non-CSI ports for the inspection of 
containers prior to their departure for United States, see supra pp. 160 – 161. 
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manifests or may refuse permission to unload certain containers. At the seaport customs officials may order the non-
intrusive and/or physical inspection of containers. Severe financial penalties can be imposed for infringement of the 
24 Hour Rule.  
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or fashion items such as clothing and children’s toys.911 The delays which followed increased 
inspection after 9/11 led to long delays at border crossings and caused many companies reliant on 
just-in-time delivery to shut down their plants.912 Transit delays owing to increased inspections 
can make a shipment of goods more expensive than a shipment within a domestic market.913 
These increased costs are likely to end up being incorporated in the retail price thereby making 
products less competitive. The restrictive effects that customs treatment can have on trade should 
not be underestimated,914 especially considering that nowadays importers operate under very 
competitive conditions, which allow “little or no excess capacity or redundancy.”915  
 
Overall, the costs incurred by the 24 Hour Rule and CSI have been reported as substantial and 
could adversely affect products from some countries more than others.916 Research has shown 
that transport costs are a greater barrier to US markets with regard to Sub-Saharan African 
countries than tariffs.917 For example one report states that landlocked states have to pay 
considerably more in transport costs than coastal states: according to one report, being landlocked 
is equivalent to being 10,000 km further away from markets.918 Such extra costs could affect 
optimal purchasing arrangements919 for the export of raw materials and semi-finished products,920 
which largely accounts for the trade of less developed countries.  
 
The complainant will not be able to discharge the burden of proof by adducing circumstantial 
evidence alone. Rather, he has to prove that the only explanation for the restriction of trade 
                                                  
911
 See S. Hrg. 108 – 55, p. 35 (“There is a window of about two weeks when you can sell a toy.”); WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, US TRADE POLICY REVIEW 2004, Add. 3, p. 31 (“Cumbersome inspection and approval procedures 
for goods entering the U.S. often lead to perishable goods being damaged with resulting commercial losses for 
exporters”). 
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 U.S. Customs Commissioner, Testimony of 26 January 2004. 
913
 See JACKSON, p. 439 at § 17.1.; Allen, p. 442 (referring to research showing that every day spent in customs adds 
almost 1 percent to the costs of goods).  
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 See PARAMESWARAN, p. 64. 
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 THE FREIGHT STORY, p. 7.  
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 See e.g. Nigel Brew, Ripples from 9/11: The U.S. Container Security Initiative and its Implications for Australia, 
CURRENT ISSUES BRIEF NO. 27 2002-03, p. 7; on the conditions facing traders in African and Southern Asian 
countries see WB REPORT 2006, pp. 53 – 59.  
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 PARAMESWARAN, p. 52. 
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 See WORLD BANK RESEARCH REPORT FEBRUARY 2002, pp. 4-5; see also UNCTAD ANNUAL REPORT 2006 
[hereinafter UNCTAD REPORT 2006], pp. 14 – 16 concerning the economic value of the Trans-Caprivi Corridor in 
Zambia. 
919
 Kumar and Hoffmann, p. 46. 
920
 PARAMESWARAN, p. 23. 
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complained of is the adverse economic effects of the 24 Hour Rule and CSI and no other.921 It is 
significant in this respect that the WTO Secretariat has stressed the need for more information on 
the costs of the security measures in order to assess their impact on trade.922  The EC – Chile 
swordfish dispute itself provides evidence of how restricting seaport services can also restrict 
access to national markets. However, direct evidence of the restrictive effect of the 24 Hour Rule 
and CSI is provided by the Market Access Database923 of the European Union, which states: 
 
“According to the European Engineering Industry, the CSI screening and related additional US 
customs routines are causing significant additional costs and delays to shipments of EU 
machinery and electrical equipment to the U.S. This burden is so severe that a number of small 
European engineering companies have decided not to export to the US any longer because of 
CSI. There is also competitive distortion in this fiercely competitive engineering market between 
EU and US engineering companies since up to now there is, de facto, no reciprocity between the 
EU and the US in this issue.”924 
 
On the other hand, it must also be recognized that there is conflicting evidence about the effect of 
customs inspections, with some commentators arguing that redlane clearance does not 
significantly delay cargo.925 However, the availability of NII equipment appears crucial in this 
respect.926 
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 Panel, Argentina - Bovine Hides, para. 11.41. 
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 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEW, REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT: UNITED STATES 
2006, WT/TPR/S/160, 15 February 2006, p. viii at para. 8 (“An assessment of the economic impact of the new 
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An additional aspect to be considered under Article XI is the recent amendment to the SAFE Port 
Act 2006 to scan 100 percent of containers prior to their importation into the United States.927 As 
with the CSI, the complainant could argue that this measure falls under Article XI GATT as 
constituting a form of customs control, regardless of the fact that it primarily concerns the 
transportation of products rather than the products themselves. In particular, he could argue that 
this measure would constitute both a de facto and de jure restriction on imports. Article 1701 of 
the IRCA 2007 makes the importation of cargo into the United States dependent on 100 per cent 
scanning. As a result, failure to scan would be met with a prohibition on importation. As with the 
no-load order, the presumption against de jure prohibitions means that the complainant would not 
have to show evidence of injury. The measure could also amount to a de facto restriction on 
imports owing to the problems of implementation. According to the World Shipping Council, the 
costs of delayed or non-delivery would be “enormous” and the “compliance and consequential 
costs of the bill would be staggering.”928 In fact, it considers the rule to be practically 
unworkable.929 Industry representatives have also voiced their concerns about the vague wording 
of the bill and have drawn attention to the potential delays that 100 percent scanning would 
entail. Moreover, it could lead to trade disputes as foreign countries impose reciprocal 
requirements on import shipments from the United States.930 
 
5.4.4. Result 
 
Provided that the scope of Article XI:1 is held to extend to measures primarily affecting 
transportation, then both the 24 Hour Rule and 100 per cent scanning could amount to a de jure 
prohibition on trade and de facto restriction on trade. On the other hand, the Container Security 
Initiative could amount to a de facto prohibition of trade. In the event that the scope does not 
extend to such measures, it may be possible for the complainant to raise a complaint against these 
measures under Article V, which specifically deals with transit.  
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 Supra pp. 39 – 40.  
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 See WSC, Comments of  30 July 2007, p.1.  
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5.5. Article X: Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations 
 
5.5.1. Introduction  
 
Transparency is especially important with regard to the maritime domain which is characterized 
by complexity and ambiguity.931 As a complex unilateral security measure which regulates 
foreign trade, it is important that CBP notifies foreign traders of its requirements and ensures 
transparency. Article X of the GATT sets out the principles and procedures governing the way in 
which member states publish and administer their trade regulations.932 It represents the fifth pillar 
of the GATT and serves as a guarantee of due process and a “partial shield against arbitrary 
government action.”933 
 
Article X consists of three paragraphs and three sub-paragraphs which relate to publication (X:1); 
disclosure (X:2) and principles derived from the rule of law (X:3). It ensures compliance with 
GATT principles and is also reflected in the Revised Kyoto Convention.934 At national level, 
transparency and availability of information to traders is important in the United States owing to 
the concept of informed compliance.935 Generally speaking, the secrecy of trader rules can 
constitute a trade barrier936 because a lack of knowledge about a country’s laws can discourage 
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 THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, p. 2 (“[M]uch of what occurs in the maritime domain with 
respect to vessel movements, activities, cargoes, intentions, or ownership is often difficult to discern”). See also pp. 3 
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 Their implementation is left to other instruments, however. See Council for Trade in Services, World Trade 
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n. 540 at p. 55. 
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 JACKSON, p. 462. 
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traders from competing on its markets and thereby give an unfair advantage to the importing 
nation’s government and established traders.937  
 
5.5.2. Requirements 
 
Article X:1 requires laws and regulations to be published in a way that allows governments and 
traders to become acquainted with them. It requires publication to be made in a prompt and 
accessible manner but does not state when the measure has to be published.938 The importance of 
publication is also reflected in the Kyoto Convention, which requires that all “interested parties” 
must be provided with all the “necessary information” connected to customs formalities.939 In 
Canada – Alcoholic Drinks, the Panel held that the member state did not have to publish trade 
regulations prior to their entry into force nor did it have to make the relevant information 
available to domestic and foreign suppliers at the same time.940 On the other hand, Article X:2 
expressly requires prior publication for all measures which impose a new or more burdensome 
requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports.941  
 
The reference to “publication and administration” means that the Panel cannot consider the 
regulation’s substance.942 Article X is applicable only to laws, regulations, judicial decisions and 
administrative rulings “of general application.”943 In U.S. – Cotton Underwear, the Panel held 
that the term “general application” excluded measures relating to individual companies or 
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shipments. In other words, the measure must affect an unidentified number of economic 
operators.944  Measures “of general application” can refer to a specific country, however,945 and 
include non-regulatory measures.946  
 
Article X limits publication where it would be contrary to the public interest or commercial 
interests of enterprises but it does not indicate how much information the member states are to 
publish or how it should be published.947 In EEC – Desert Apples, the Panel held that the 
publication of a Regulation in the Official Journal of the European Communities satisfied the 
publication requirement.948 With regard to Article X:2, the Appellate Body stated in U.S. – 
Underwear that the provision promoted “full disclosure of governmental acts affecting members 
and private persons and enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign nationality.”949 The policy 
principle underlying the provision was “the principle of transparency” and had “due process 
dimensions.”950 Moreover, publication should grant traders “a reasonable opportunity to acquire 
authentic information about such measures and, accordingly, to protect and adjust their activities 
or, alternatively, to seek modification of such measures.”951 However, some member states 
demand that publication should not only include all trade-related laws and regulations, 
procedures and administrative rules of border agencies952 but also the reasoned motivations for 
such a measure.953 This is contradicted by the Revised Kyoto Convention, which refers in its 
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preamble to “all necessary information regarding Customs laws, regulations, administrative 
guidelines, procedures and practices.”954 
 
Article X:3 contains three sub-paragraphs relating to the administration of Article X:1.955 In 
particular, sub-paragraph (a) requires contracting parties to administer their laws and regulations 
referred to in X:1 in a “uniform, impartial and reasonable manner.”956 These requirements are 
also reflected in the Revised Kyoto Convention, which requires customs procedures and practices 
to be applied “in a predictable, consistent and transparent manner.”957 The application of Customs 
laws and regulations must satisfy each of these criteria.958 Paragraph (b) requires the 
establishment of tribunals to deal with appeals against administrative decisions. Such tribunals 
must be independent of agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement.  
 
In Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, the 
Panel held that the ordinary meaning of the word ‘reasonable’, refers to notions such as ‘in 
accordance with reason’, ‘not irrational or absurd’, ‘proportionate’, ‘having sound judgement’, 
‘sensible’, ‘not asking for too much’, ‘within the limits of reason, not greatly less or more than 
might be thought likely or appropriate’, ‘articulate.’959 The administration of the measure was 
held to be unreasonable because the Dominican Republic had failed to base its decision on one of 
the bases provided by statute and ignored the end-price of the imported cigarettes.960 According 
to the Panel in Argentina – Bovine Hides: 
 
“[Article X:3(a)] requires an examination of the real effect that a  measure might have on 
traders operating in the commercial world. This, of course, does not require a showing of trade 
damage, as that is generally not a requirement with respect to violations of the GATT 1994. But it 
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can involve an examination of whether there is a possible impact on the competitiveness situation 
due to alleged partiality, unreasonableness or lack of uniformity in the application of customs 
rules, regulations, decisions, etc.”961  
 
The Panel in EC-Bananas III held that the scope of Article X:3 (a) is defined by Article X:1.962 
As a result, the provision appears to apply to the administration of laws, regulations, decisions or 
rulings.963 In U.S. – Hot-Rolled Steel, the Panel required the actions in question “to have a 
significant impact on the overall administration of the law, and not simply on the outcome in the 
single case in question.”964 The Appellate Body held that Article X:3 applied in relation to 
governments and members and focused on the day-to-day application of customs laws.965 Laws 
which are substantively discriminatory must be dealt with under the relevant provisions of the 
GATT.966 This would be the case with e.g. rules pertaining to the confidentiality of cargo 
information obtained by the CBP967 because they relate to the substance rather than 
administration of the CSI968 and are therefore outside the scope of Article X. 
 
In Argentina – Bovine Hides, the Panel noted that Article X:1 specifically referred to the 
importance of transparency to individual traders. Therefore, the requirement of a “uniform, 
impartial and reasonable manner” of administration related to the treatment accorded by 
government authorities to the traders in question.969 The Panel also held that the term 
“uniformity” did not constitute a “broad anti-discrimination provision.” Rather, the term “meant 
that Customs law should not vary, that every exporter and importer should be able to expect 
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differential treatment”). 
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treatment of the same kind, in the same manner both over time and in different places and with 
respect to other persons.”970 In U.S. – Stainless Steel, the Panel held that the requirement of 
uniform administration of laws and regulations had to be understood to mean uniformity of 
treatment in respect of persons similarly situated; it could not be understood to require identical 
results where relevant facts differed.971  
 
In Argentina – Hides and Leather, the Panel held that “impartiality” required the equality of 
parties in the customs process. This could be endangered if customs procedures or the 
administration of laws involved persons with contrary commercial interests.972 The mere 
presence of such persons is not decisive: rather, it depends on what they are allowed to do.973 In 
such cases, the Panel will consider whether adequate safeguards are in place to ensure 
impartiality.974 Concerning the requirement of “reasonableness”, the Panel Argentina – Hides and 
Leather held that a process aimed at assuring the proper classification of products, but which 
inherently contained the possibility of revealing confidential business information, would 
constitute an unreasonable manner of administering the laws, regulations and rules identified in 
Article X:1.975 As a result, the measure was held to be inconsistent with Article X:3(a). Unless 
the measure is objectively justified, it is likely to fail the test of reasonableness.976  
 
Article X:3(b) goes beyond the actual publication requirements and contributes to the principle of 
effective legal protection in world trade law977 insofar as it relates to the maintenance or 
institution of review procedures of administrative action relating to customs matters.978 This 
provision is also very important for transparency because it allows traders to obtain an 
explanation of the reasons for the decision and provides them with the right of appeal to a 
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competent authority.979 According to the WCO, the review procedures can also provide a suitable 
means of ensuring uniform application of laws and regulations.980 It also ensures protection of the 
individual against decisions of customs which are ultra vires or otherwise non-compliant with the 
law.981 
 
5.5.3. Examination 
 
The 24 Hour Rule and CSI represent “trade regulations”: the 24 Hour Rule is regulated by CFR 
4.7982 and the Container Security Initiative was introduced in February 2002 as a non-regulatory 
measure by the CBP but was recently codified by the SAFE Port Act of 2006. The 24 Hour Rule 
also satisfies the requirement of general application because CFR 4.7 is a mandatory provision 
which requires the advance declaration of all container cargo destined to the United States, 
regardless of the country or seaport from which it departs. By contrast, it is questionable whether 
the CSI can be described as a measure of general application. This is because it refers to specific 
seaports of a country rather than the country itself. The CSI also applies to an identified number 
of economic operators because it is limited to economic operators who are shipping goods to the 
United States.  
 
CBP has therefore satisfied the formal requirements for publishing the 24 Hour Rule by notifying 
those affected by the rule prior to its entry into force in an official publication. In accordance with 
5 U.S.C § 553(b),983 the U.S. Customs announced the introduction of the 24 Hour Rule by 
publication in the “Proposed Rules” section of the Federal Register on 31 October 2002984 and 26 
November 2002.985 The proposed rule-making was published in the Federal Register of 23 July 
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2002 together with comments from interested parties made during public meetings.986 The 
Department for Homeland Security published the final rule for the required advance electronic 
presentation of cargo information in the Federal Register on 5 December 2003. It entered into 
force on 5 January 2004987 but a 60-day non-enforcement period was granted in order to give 
industry sufficient time to adapt to the rule.988 This exceeded the 30 day period provided in 5 
U.S.C. §553(d). CBP has also published information for industry about the requirements and 
enforcement of the 24 Hour Rule in the form of a frequently asked questions document.989  
 
Assuming that the CSI is found to be of general application, the complainant could argue that 
CBP has not published this measure correctly because it failed to publish a strategic plan prior to 
the introduction of the measure detailing the objectives and components of the security measure 
until August 2006.990 This is a serious omission because such a plan is essential to the effective 
implementation of the CSI991 and was noted by the Government Accountability Office in a report 
of July 2003.992 The GAO recommended that customs develop a strategic plan that clearly lay out 
CSI goals, objectives and detailed implementation strategies.993 The publication of a strategic 
plan would provide a basis for communication and mutual understanding between stakeholders 
and contribute to programme accountability.994 The importance of such a plan is also recognized 
in international conventions.995 On the other hand, CBP could argue that the measure was non-
regulatory and that CBP’s website provided sufficient information in the form of a fact sheet and 
                                                  
986
 Comments on the proposed rule-making had to be submitted within a one-month period. During the consultation 
period 128 entities responded. 
987
 Fed. Reg., Vol. 68, No. 234, 5 December 2003, p. 68140. 
988
 According to Section 343(j) Trade Act 2002, the Secretary is to determine whether it is appropriate to provide 
transition periods between promulgation of the regulations and the effective date of the regulations and shall 
prescribe such transition periods in the regulations, as appropriate. 
989
 Supra n. 364  
990
 In the meantime, the SAFE Port Act 2006 was passed which clarified the substance of the CSI in a number of 
respects. 
991
 See GAO-03-770, p. 33 (“The effective implementation of CSI […] depends, in part, on rigorous strategic 
planning. Without strategic plans, Customs may discover that CSI cannot place CSI teams in strategic ports in a 
timely fashion, or that they place the teams but do not achieve any improvement in security”). The CSI STRATEGIC 
PLAN was issued in February 2004 in response to a recommendation by the GAO. See GAO-05-557, pp. 26 – 27.  
992
 See GAO-03-770, p. 32 (“Without the benefit of strategic planning, customs quickly rolled out CSI in France but 
failed to involve primary stakeholders in making key decisions”).  
993
 Id. p. 4. 
994
 Id. p. 31. 
995
 See e.g. the Columbus Ministerial Declaration on Trade Efficiency, Appendix, Section B, para. 1.  
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bulletins on CSI’s components and objectives.996 These electronic documents were updated 
regularly and supplemented by the U.S. customs journal and speeches of the U.S. Customs 
Commissioners which contained detailed information on the goals and aims of the CSI, also 
publicly available on the CBP website.  
 
The complainant could also argue that the administration of the 24 Hour Rule and CSI is 
unreasonable. Concerning the 24 Hour Rule, the failure of CBP to provide a definition of what 
would constitute an “incomplete manifest”997 results in uncertainty about precisely what 
information it considers acceptable.998 This is unreasonable – especially considering the severity 
of penalties for incorrect information. The fact that CBP imposes information requirements on a 
party (i.e. the carrier) which does not have direct knowledge of the information contained on the 
cargo manifest is also unreasonable999 because that party is unable to verify what is in the 
container. 
 
The complainant could argue that the administration of CSI is unreasonable because CBP does 
not pay sufficient regard for its effects on other member states. The urgent need for counter-
terrorist measures following 9/11 meant that U.S. Customs launched the CSI quickly during a 
period of national emergency using a so-called “implement and amend” approach.1000 The 
priority was to introduce the programme, solving any problems as they arose. However, as the 
GAO has pointed out, this approach runs the risk that fundamental weaknesses persist until they 
are discovered by which time it may prove extremely expensive or even impossible to correct 
them.1001 Performance measuring techniques were not adequately incorporated into the CSI from 
                                                  
996
 For an overview of CBP information on the CSI including standards, member ports and strategic plan see:  
< http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/ >   
997
 On the other hand, it has issued some guidelines on what information would not be acceptable. A “dummy” 
description is an accurate description of non-existent cargo and “generic” descriptions include “freight of all kinds” 
(“FAK”), “said to contain” (“STC”) etc. See Fed. Reg. Vol. 67, No. 211, 31 October 2002, p. 66324. 
998
 See of the World Shipping Council et al., Petition for the Reconsideration of the Final Rule before the 
Department of Homeland Security, 2 February 2004, pp. 19-20.  
999
 Section 343(a) of the Trade Act 2002 requires the information requirements to be imposed on the party most 
likely to have direct knowledge of the information. Another potential unreasonable aspect was the CBP’s 
interpretation of “shipper”, which did not reflect the legal or customary usage of the term as well as its treatment of 
confidential information. However, following complaints by the World Shipping Council, CBP suspended its 
interpretation of shipper in June 2004. 
1000
 See GAO-03-770, pp. 17 – 18; S. Hrg. p. 8.  
1001
 Id.; a major example of the weakness in this approach is provided by the 24 Hour Rule, which was only 
introduced when it became clear that the customs officers needed advance information about cargo shipments see pp. 
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the outset1002 and, as late as May 2005, the CBP was still developing three components of its 
strategic plan as required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.1003 The GAO 
has deemed these omissions to be serious because they make it difficult to assess progress in CBP 
operations over time and to compare CSI operations across ports.1004 The CBP also implemented 
the CSI using informal agreements which do not regulate any aspect of the measure in detail. In 
particular, there is no mention of cost sharing, appeals procedures or oversight by an independent 
body which indicates a lack of due process,1005 despite the fact that the U.S. government 
recognizes the importance of this principle.1006 The expansion of the CSI also appears illogical: 
the number of CSI ports varies considerably from country to country and do not appear to reflect 
the volume of exports to the United States or the geographic size of the country.1007  
 
The complainant could argue that Section 205 (j) of the SAFE Port Act fails the uniformity 
requirement of Article X:3(a). The import regime resembles that in EC – Bananas III insofar as 
the US operates an advantageous regime for CSI cargo and a disadvantageous regime for non-
CSI cargo.1008 However, in that case the Appellate Body held that different import procedures did 
not infringe WTO law. This was because Article X:3(a) only applies to the administration of laws 
and regulations and does not concern the substance of the laws themselves.1009 Therefore, Section 
205 (j) of the SAFE Port Act does not come within the scope of Article X:3(b) and should be 
considered under the anti-discrimination provisions of Article I:1.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                
21-22; Appendix II. p. 49, at para. 8. Cf. Robert C. Bonner, Remarks to the Customs World London Summit 2004 
London, England, 21 September 2004. 
1002
 See GAO-03-770, pp. 33 ff.  
1003
 See GAO REPORT, HOMELAND SECURITY: KEY CARGO SECURITY PROGRAMS CAN BE IMPROVED, 26 May 2005 
[hereinafter, GAO-05-466T], p. 22 
1004
 See GAO-05-557, p. 5. 
1005
 Appellate Body, U.S. – Shrimp, para. 182. 
1006
 DHS, THE INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND COORDINATION STRATEGY, p. 5.  
1007
 Cf. GAO-05-557, p. 12. According to CBP, Italy (5) has more CSI ports than China (4). Although Sweden has 2 
CSI ports, Russia has none, which is questionable from a strategic point of view considering that Russia is a 
suspected locus of nuclear smuggling. According to the: see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MAKING THE NATION 
SAFER: THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING TERRORISM, 2002, p. 40 (“Theft or diversion of 
excess Russian HEU for terrorist use represents a significant near-term threat to the United States”).  See Testimony 
of David Huizenga in Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, Hearing on Nuclear  and Radiological Threats, U.S. Senate, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, 28 March 
2006, S. Hrg. 109-548, p. 43.  
1008
 See Erskine, p. 446.  
1009
 Appellate Body, EC – Bananas, para. 200.  
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The complainant could also argue that the CSI fails to ensure the uniformity of security standards 
concerning inspections and non-intrusive inspection equipment.1010 As a result, some CSI 
seaports do not agree to inspect high-risk containers, an omission which undermines the 
effectiveness of the entire programme. Although the SAFE Port Act has attempted to address this 
problem,1011 it does not make the implementation of international standards mandatory.1012 CBP’s 
lack of regulatory authority at foreign seaports also means that there are no means of ensuring 
uniform security standards.1013  
 
Concerning Article X:3 (b), the CBP offers procedures for the review and correction of 
administrative action relating to customs matters. The fact that CSI teams do not have any powers 
at foreign seaports mean that complaints relating to inspections at CSI ports will be dealt with by 
the appeals procedures relating to the host customs authorities. Complaints against inspections 
carried out by CBP at seaports in the United States should be directed to the Office of Trade 
Relations which was created in January 2002 and deals with complaints against Customs policy 
and decisions as well as matters relating to enforcement.1014 According to the CBP, this office 
resolves problems objectively and independently. In addition, the Court of International Trade 
(formerly the Customs Court) is a judicial body with jurisdiction to hear appeals and protests 
against the agency’s acts.1015 The decisions of the court are published by the CBP on its website. 
Appeal is to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and from there to the Supreme Court. 
The Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol issues CBP Decisions which contain CBP rulings and 
court decisions.  
 
5.5.4. Result 
 
It is uncertain whether Article X applies to the CSI because the latter’s application is restricted to 
specific seaports and economic operators exporting to the United States using containers. In the 
                                                  
1010
 ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, pp. 8 – 9.  
1011
 Section 204 (a) (1) and (2) require the establishment of minimum standards and procedures for securing 
containers in transit to the United States. 
1012
 See Section 204 (c), which encourages national bodies to promote international standards with foreign 
governments and international organizations.  
1013
 See S. Hrg. 108–55, p. 20 
1014
 Thereby replacing the Office of Trade Ombudsman: see supra  n. 529. 
1015
 28 USC § 1581. 
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event that Article X is held to apply, the CSI may not comply with the publication requirement of 
Article X owing to the failure of CBP to publish the strategic plan prior to its introduction. 
Certain aspects of the 24 Hour Rule and CSI may also have “impacts on the competitiveness 
situation” due to unreasonableness or lack of uniformity in the application of the 24 Hour Rule 
and CSI1016 The 24 Hour Rule is unreasonable because it imposes information requirements on 
parties without direct knowledge of the cargo and the security standards at CSI ports are not 
uniform in contravention of Article X:3. However, on the available evidence, the publication of 
24 Hour Rule and CBP’s appeals procedures appear to satisfy the requirements of Article X. 
 
5.6. Article V: Freedom of Transit 
 
5.6.1. Introduction 
 
Articles V and VIII deal with other non-tariff barriers to trade. Article V deals with customs law 
in relation to transit cargo and aims to balance the sovereign concern of a country to police its 
borders with the need to facilitate trade.1017 The provision is particularly important for landlocked 
countries.1018 Article V prescribes two main obligations: on the one hand, member states must not 
hinder traffic in transit by imposing unnecessary delays or restrictions or by imposing 
unreasonable charges and, on the other, they must accord Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) 
treatment to transiting goods of all Members.1019 Article V must be regarded in conjunction with 
international agreements relating to customs transit.1020 Counter-terrorist measures which affect 
international trade can potentially infringe the freedom of transit.1021  
                                                  
1016
 Panel, Argentina –Bovine Hides para.11.77.  
1017
 BHALA, p. 470; see Standard 6.1. of the RKC.  
1018
 See Kennedy, p. 140. 
1019
 See World Trade Organization, WTO  Secretariat, Article V of the GATT, Scope and Application (TN/TF/W/2) 
12 January 2005, [hereinafter WTO Secretariat (TN/TF/W/2)] p. 4.; see also World Trade Organization, Council for 
Trade in Goods, Freedom of Transit: Obligations and Implications of Article V of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, Communication from UNCTAD, (G/C/W/427), 15 August 2002, p.1. 
1020
 E.g. the RKC, Specific Annex E, Chapter 1, Guidelines on Customs Transit. In particular, Recommended 
Practice 26 (p. 25 para. 10), encourages Contracting Parties to “give careful consideration to the possibility of 
acceding to international instruments relating to Customs transit.” E.g. the Convention on the International Transport 
of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention 1975) aims to facilitate the international carriage of goods 
by road vehicle. 
1021
 Jaemin Lee, Juggling Counter-Terrorism and Trade, The APEC Way: APEC’S Leadership in Devising Counter-
Terrorism Measures in Compliance with International Trade Norms, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L. L. & POLICY 257 at pp. 
270 – 271.  
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5.6.2. Requirements 
 
Article V has never been applied in dispute settlement proceedings of the GATT or the WTO, 
although there have been a number of disputes concerning this provision.1022  As a result, it 
“tends to be overlooked and thus is not well-known.”1023 On the other hand, the provisions of 
Article V are also reflected in international conventions, most notably the Revised Kyoto 
Convention, which also deals with transit and transshipment in Specific Annex E.1024 Article V 
may play an important role in relation to the CSI: according to one commentator it is “[t]he only 
international legal provision that may represent a significant impediment to the introduction of a 
new security regime.”1025 
 
Article V:1 contains three conditions: first, the provision applies only to goods, vessels and other 
means of transport.1026 Second, traffic must be “in transit”, which effectively means that the 
journey must represent one stage of the transportation process.1027 Finally, the goods must be in 
transit across the territory of contracting parties. One question of potential importance is whether 
transshipment falls within the scope of this provision.  
 
Article V:2 lays down the fundamental principle of the freedom of transit for traffic in transit. It 
subjects the freedom of transit to a further condition, namely that the route be the most 
convenient for international traffic. As a result, the freedom of transit does not apply to all 
routes.1028 The second sentence of paragraph 2 contains the MFN rule and outlaws discrimination 
based on wide range of factors, namely the flag of vessels, the place of origin, departure, entry, 
exit or destination, or on any circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, of vessels or of 
other means of transport. Thereby, Article V effectively prohibits all forms of discrimination. 
 
                                                  
1022
 See GATT Analytical Index, p. 215. 
1023
 See BHALA, p. 470. 
1024
 See RKC, Specific Annex E, Chapters 1 and 2.  
1025
 See Mellor, p. 394.  
1026
 See WTO Secretariat (TN/TF/W/2), para. 13. 
1027
 See RKC, Specific Annex E, Chapter 1, Guidelines on Customs Transit, p. 3, which defines “Customs transit” as 
the Customs procedure under which goods are transported from one Customs office to another. Para. 4.1 defines 
“International Customs transit” as “transit movements [which] … are part of a single Customs transit operation 
during which one or more frontiers are crossed in accordance with a bilateral or multilateral agreement.” 
1028
 Id., para. 17.  
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Paragraphs (3) – (5) regulate the charges and regulations which member states can legitimately 
impose1029 and subject them to the requirement of necessity, reasonableness and the most-
favoured nation principle. The former provision authorizes customs officials to require traffic in 
transit to be entered at a customs facility in its territory. However, such a measure must not cause 
unnecessary delays or restrictions, except in cases of failure to comply with applicable customs 
laws and regulations.1030 Therefore, the provision refers (indirectly) to a test of necessity. The 
lack of jurisprudence on Article V means that it is uncertain exactly how a Panel would interpret 
“necessary” within the context of Article V.1031 However, existing jurisprudence on this term 
suggests that its legal meaning is restrictive and has been interpreted by the Appellate Body as 
meaning “indispensable.”1032 However, this interpretation related to Article XX which, as an 
exception to the GATT, has traditionally been interpreted narrowly. The WTO Secretariat has 
also stressed that jurisprudence on one provision cannot automatically be transferred to another 
provision.1033 It could be argued that the context of Article V:3 suggests a lower standard of proof 
considering that the provision allows member states a certain amount of discretion in controlling 
their borders. Clarification is provided by the Revised Kyoto Convention which states that 
“[c]ustoms control shall be limited to that necessary to ensure compliance with the Customs law”, 
therefore indicating a rather narrow, objective “necessity” test.1034 This is supported by the fact 
                                                  
1029
 Id., para. 30; Article 3 RKC; see also the principle of customs control, General Annex, Chapter 6 Guidelines on 
Customs Control RKC, p. 9. TIR Convention Article 5 (2). 
1030
 See supra n. 1027, p. 4 which states that “[t]he basic principle of Customs transit is to permit goods to move 
from one Customs office to another […] without applying economic prohibitions or restrictions […].” See also 
Article 5 (1), TIR Convention which states that “goods carried under the TIR procedure […] shall not as a general 
rule be subjected to examination at Customs offices en route.” 
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 There have been requests for clarification of these terms: see supra 953. 
1032
 The meaning of “necessary” has been examined in the context of Article XX (b) and (d). See Report of the Panel, 
Thailand - Restrictions on the Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, adopted on 7 November 1990 
(DS10/R – 37S/200), para. 74 (holding the term to be synonymous with “unavoidable”). See also Report of the 
Panel, United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act 1930 (L/6439 - 36S/345), 16 January 1989 (adopted by the Panel 
on 7 November 1989), para. 5.26 (holding that a measure would be considered unnecessary if an alternative measure 
which it could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is 
available to it.).  See also Report of the Appellate Body, Korea – Measures affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and 
Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, 11 December 2000 (adopted on 10 January 2001), para. 160. 
1033
 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, NECESSITY TESTS IN THE 
WTO: NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT, (S/WPDR/W/27), 2 DECEMBER 2003, paras. 4, 7. 
1034
 Standard 6.2 of the RKC. 
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that customs administrations often grant transit goods simplified customs procedures in order to 
make transit more efficient.1035 
 
In addition, the measure in question may not subject the traffic in transit to a customs duty or any 
transit duties or other charges imposed in respect of transit. The only charges which contracting 
parties may levy are those for transportation or those commensurate with administrative expenses 
entailed by transit or with the cost of services rendered.1036  
 
Article V:4 subjects charges and regulations imposed by contracting parties to the requirement of 
reasonableness having regard to the conditions of the traffic. This term derives from the principle 
of good faith, and is similarly vague: member states have requested clarification on its 
meaning.1037 According to one writer, the term “usually refers to both substantive and procedural 
requirements including concepts such as ‘suitability’, ‘necessity’, ‘proportionality’, 
‘transparency’ and ‘participation’.”1038 The Panel has also considered the meaning of this term in 
relation to Article X.1039 Accordingly, there are potentially many ways in which the member 
states can breach the requirement of reasonableness. For example, in U.S. – Hot-Rolled Steel, the 
Appellate Body suggested that measures which imposed “unreasonable extra burden” or entailed 
“unreasonable additional cost and trouble” would contravene the principle of good faith.1040 A 
test of reasonableness implies an objective standard. For example, in EC – Hormones the 
European Communities argued that WTO panels should adopt a deferential “reasonableness” 
standard in all highly complex factual situations. However, these arguments were rejected by the 
Appellate Body which held that Article 11 DSU required an objective assessment of the facts.1041 
                                                  
1035
 See e.g. Recommended Practice, RKC, Specific Annex E, Chapter 1; see also TIR Convention, which reflects the 
desire amongst the contracting parties to simplify and harmonize administrative formalities in the field of 
international transport, in particular at frontiers. 
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 Cf. Standard 3 of the RKC, Specific Annex E, Chapter 1.  
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 See World Trade Organization, Council for Trade in Goods, WTO Trade Facilitation – Strengthening WTO 
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September 2002, p. 6. 
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 See Frederico Ortino, From Non-Discrimination to Reasonableness, A Paradigm Shift in International Economic 
Law? JEAN MONNET WORKING PAPER NO. 01/05, p. 7. 
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 Supra  pp. 179 – 180.  
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context, restrains investigating authorities from imposing on exporters burdens which, in the circumstances, are not 
reasonable”). 
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 Appellate Body, EC – Hormones, para. 15 (concerning arguments of the EC); para. 117 (objective assessment of 
Article 11 DSU) 
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Therefore, like the necessity test, the outcome of the reasonableness test is a question of 
evidence. In United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures, the Appellate Body 
stated that an allegation of unreasonableness had to be supported by solid evidence and reflect the 
gravity of the allegations.1042 When considering the objective of the measure, the Panel has 
deferred to the explanation given by the member state.1043 Overall, there are aspects of the CSI 
which may appear unreasonable, one example being the plans for introducing 100 percent 
scanning.1044 On the other hand, CBP maintains that it has not received any complaints of cargo 
having been delayed due to CSI implementation in any overseas port.1045  
 
Article V:6 requires member states to accord to products which have been in transit through the 
territory of any other contracting party treatment no less favourable than that which would have 
been accorded to such products had they been transported from their place of origin to their 
destination without going through the territory of such other contracting party. This provision 
therefore limits the MFN principle to member states of the WTO1046 which is particularly 
important with regard to transshipment services offered by seaports, although as stated above, it 
is uncertain whether transshipment forms part of the transit process. It would certainly be 
beneficial for member states if the Panel included transshipment services within the definition of 
“transit”, considering that transshipment hubs play an important role in the maritime 
transportation of goods.1047 On the other hand, such an interpretation would be difficult to 
reconcile with the Revised Kyoto Convention and European law which assign transshipment and 
transit different customs procedures.1048 This provision also has an interpretative note, which 
                                                  
1042
 Supra n. 759.  
1043
 Panel, Argentina – Bovine Hides, para. 11.90, p. 128 (“While a manifestly WTO-inconsistent measure cannot be 
justified by assertions of good intentions, we consider it reasonable in this instance to accept for purposes of analysis 
the preferred explanation in light of all the facts of the dispute”); see also Report of the Panel, European 
Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos – Containing Products, WT/DS135/R, 18 September 2000 
(adopted 5 April 2001), p. 439 (“The Panel therefore considers that the evidence before it tends to show that handling 
chrysotile cement products constitutes a risk to health rather than the opposite”).  
1044
 See infra pp. 332 – 333. 
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 TRADE POLICY REVIEW 2004, p. 33, para. 24. 
1046
 See Kennedy, p. 140. 
1047
 Port operators are investing heavily in this service industry see e.g. Hutchison Strategy Envisions Panama Ports 
as Container Transshipment Hubs, PAC. SHIPPER, 15 September 2005 (WLNR 25308954), reporting that Hutchison 
Port Holdings plans to invest $1 billion to quadruple container capacity at two key ports in Panama over the next 10 
years in a bid to establish them as key transshipment hubs. 
1048
 Under European customs law, transshipment goods are to be placed under the temporary importation procedure 
and then re-exportation procedure. See Lux, pp. 453 and 458.  
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states that "[w]ith regard to transportation charges, the principle laid down in paragraph 5 refers 
to like products being transported on the same route under like conditions.”1049 
 
5.6.3. Examination  
 
The CSI applies to transit cargo and therefore falls within the scope of Article V. Such cargo is 
termed “foreign freight remaining on board cargo” (“FROB”) and is defined by the CBP as 
“cargo that is loaded in a foreign port and is to be unloaded in another foreign port with an 
intervening vessel stop in one or more ports in the United States.”1050 Therefore, the cargo is not 
to be removed from the vessel at the US port. FROB cargo is deemed to be a security risk and is 
accordingly subject to the information and inspection requirements of CSI.1051  
 
The Container Security Initiative purports “to enhance cargo security and trade facilitation by 
strategically identifying the optimal trade lanes and ports for inclusion into CSI.”1052 However, 
the complainant could argue that the CSI contravenes the most favoured nation principle 
contained in Article V:2 with regard to freedom of transit because it makes a distinction between 
cargo containers (including those in transit) based on the port of departure. Thereby, CBP 
interrupts or otherwise disrupts the most efficient transit route available owing to the competitive 
distortion that expedited clearance creates between seaports. Shippers may be forced to transit 
their cargo through CSI ports in order to avoid redlane clearance at U.S. ports of arrival, thereby 
preventing them from using more efficient routes involving non-CSI (transshipment) seaports.1053 
The CSI therefore constitutes a de jure infringement of the second sentence of Article V:2 owing 
to the fact that it discriminates against transit cargo by inspections depending on its “place of 
                                                  
1049
 Annex I of the GATT, Ad Article V, para. 5. 
1050
 See CBP Frequently Asked Questions – Inbound Vessel Only – Trade Act of 2002 Final Rule [hereinafter CBP, 
Vessel FAQ], p. 5.  
1051
 Customs considers ‘‘FROB’’ cargo a security concern because although the cargo does not have a final 
destination in the U.S., the cargo is transiting the U.S. See Fed. Reg. Vol. 67, No. 211, 31 October 2002, p. 66328. 
See also CBP, Vessel FAQ, p. 4. It is also significant that a suspected Al Qaeda terrorist was hiding in a container 
which had been loaded at Port Said, transshipped at Gioia Tauro transported to Rotterdam and then further 
transshipped to Canada. See OECD REPORT, July 2003, pp. 8-9, para. 23.  
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 CSI STRATEGIC PLAN 2006, Objective 2.2. 
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 See Lee, 151 – 152, who claims that a CSI seaport will replace ports that were previously the best economical 
choice. This represents a trade barrier because it interferes with the transaction in question and restricts the 
movement of trade consumers: see PARAMESWARAN p. 45. 
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departure.” Discriminating against seaports restricts transit routes and thereby denies shippers 
access to efficient transportation networks.1054 
 
Article V:3 provides that traffic in transit shall not be subject to unnecessary delay, except in 
cases where there is an infringement of applicable customs laws. In the case of transit shipments 
from non-CSI ports, infringement of 19 CFR 4.7, could cause delay for a number of reasons.1055 
Such delay may not be considered unnecessary to the extent that it results from action taken in 
response to a breach of the 24 Hour Rule which specifically relates to national security. However, 
in the absence of a breach of customs infringements, the delay will be subject to a test of 
necessity.1056  
 
Article V reflects the fact that inspections are an important function of customs administrations in 
enforcing customs laws and securing a nation’s borders. This is also reflected in international 
conventions which attempt to simplify Customs transit procedures. For example, the Revised 
Kyoto Convention allows customs officers at the office of departure to identify the consignment 
and detect any unauthorized interference1057 and the TIR Convention also recognizes the 
importance of inspections.1058 Generally speaking, the enforcement of legislation relating to 
import of goods in order to protect the territory and citizens against potentially dangerous imports 
is reflected in the missions of all customs administrations.1059 Indeed, in the United States, border 
inspections by the customs authorities are considered so important that they justify exemption 
from the Fourth Amendment1060 with the result that U.S. customs officers are permitted to carry 
out border searches without reasonable cause. This suggests that a certain amount of delay 
resulting from border control measures (even when carried out in the absence of infringements) 
may be deemed necessary – especially where the measures in question relate to vital interests 
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 PARAMESWARAN, p. 47.  
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 For example, if the cargo is loaded without being scanned in contravention of the no-load order, CBP may delay 
the release of the cargo or deny the carrier’s preliminary entry-permit/special license to unlade at the U.S. port. It can 
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 Supra n. 1029. 
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such as public health or national security.1061  A random sampling of cargo, for example, is also 
used to measure the effectiveness of risk assessment system.1062 On the other hand, delay is likely 
to be considered unnecessary if caused by organizational failings such as the poor location of NII 
equipment,1063 a high rate of false alarms1064 or poor cargo handling facilities owing to inadequate 
infrastructure. Recent newspaper reports show that security at U.S. seaports is still ineffective.1065 
 
The complainant could argue that the 24 Hour Rule and Container Security Initiative are 
unreasonable pursuant to Article V:4 insofar as the inspections of high-risk containers at U.S. 
seaports cause delays in transit and increased transit costs which are so severe as to compromise 
market access. This aspect has already been dealt with under Article XI.1066 However, another 
potentially1067 important aspect of the CSI with regard to transit cargo concerns the introduction 
of security seals in order to improve the traditional means of ensuring the security of goods in 
transit.1068 It is particularly important that this element of the CSI be governed by “predictable, 
transparent and consistent rules” because ineffective rules could result in delay to goods in transit 
and competitive inequalities.1069 For example, the RKC recommends the mutual recognition of 
customs seals thereby “reducing any delays arising from customs intervention.”1070 In particular, 
it must take account of the fact that containers are often inspected during transit by customs 
officers carrying out controls. Any requirements concerning the sealing of containers must also 
                                                  
1061
 Appellate Body, EC - Asbestos, paras. 170 – 172, stating that measures are more readily accepted as “necessary” 
when they pursue important aims, such as protecting human life or health. 
1062
 For example, as part of its Compliance Measurement Programme, CBP randomly selected 30,000 shipments 
based on entry information submitted by the trade community. See Government Accountability Office, Statement for 
the Record to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, U.S. Senate, Cargo Container Inspections, Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the 
Automated Targeting System Statement for the Record by Richard M. Stana, Director Homeland Security and Justice 
Issues, 30 March 2006, [hereinafter GAO – 06 – 591 T], p. 6.  
1063
 See S-Hrg 109 – 186, p. 24  concerning the positioning of radiation portal monitors at U.S. seaports; GAO-04-
557T, p. 12. 
1064
 Concerning the cost of false alarms see id.; S. Hrg. 107 – 224, p. 81. 
1065
 See e.g. John Gillie, Port Security: Ring the Alarm, MORNING NEWS TRIB. (TACOMA WASH.), 10 March 2006 
(2006 WLNR 4066293); Alwyn Scott, Piercing Port Security Easy as Hitching a Ride, SEATTLE TIMES, 25 July 
2006 (2006 WLNR 12858462).  
1066
 Supra pp. 170– 174. However, if Article XI:1 does not extend to measures relating to transportation, Article V 
may be the only provision under which the indirect trade restrictive effects of the CSI can be examined. 
1067
 The use of container security seals is not yet a mandatory requirement under the CSI. However, see Section 
204 (c) of the SAFE Port Act 2006.  
1068
 WSC, In-Transit Container Security, p. 8 (“[T]he purpose of a security seal is to provide evidence regarding 
whether the seal has been interfered with in transit”). 
1069
 Id., p. 15. 
1070
 Id., pp. 17 – 18; Recommended Practice 17 of the RKC, Specific Annex E, Chapter 1. However, this does not 
prevent Customs from affixing their own customs seal if the foreign seals are found to be insufficient.  
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be agreed multilaterally within the framework of the Containers Convention 1972, to which the 
United States is a party. Currently, under the terms of this Convention, the United States must 
admit a container which is found to be compliant under the terms of that Convention.1071 
 
Finally, the CBP may breach the most favoured nation principle in V:6 if it increases the 
inspections of shipments which have passed through certain countries en route to its final 
destination.1072 This provision is particularly relevant for transshipment hubs that form an 
important part of seaport services.1073 The ability of seaports to compete in this important service 
industry could be prejudiced if shippers avoid using non-CSI transshipment ports owing to the 
risk of delays at US ports1074 – as the following statement suggests: 
 
“Moreover, U.S. bound cargo originating in foreign ports not blessed as CSI compliant likely 
will be more heavily scrutinized on this side of the pond. That means potential delays upon 
arrival, which should be a disincentive to shippers running their freight through ports not teamed 
up with us.”1075 
 
                                                  
1071
 See Departmental Advisory Committee on Commercial Operations of Customs & Border Protection (COAC), 
Maritime Transportation Security Act Subcommittee Recommendations to COAC and the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, p. 5  
1072
 Although the destination of traffic which transits through the United States territory is concentrated on the 
Pacific Coast, Hawaii and Alaska, which are not normally considered a terrorist threat. For information on the 
waterborne cargo of the United States see generally Institute for Water Resources, Waterborne Commerce of the 
United States Calendar Year 2005, Part 4. 
1073
 See RKC, Specific Annex E, Chapter 2, Guidelines on Transshipment, para. 2 (defining “transshipment” as “the 
Customs procedure under which goods are transferred under Customs control from the importing means of transport 
to the exporting means of transport […]”). Transshipment hubs are considered at risk to terrorist activities and this 
has led to the creation of the Transshipment Country Export Control Initiative (TECI), which aims to prevent the 
proliferation of WMD through global transshipment hubs. See also DHS, INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND 
COORDINATION STRATEGY, APPENDIX B. p. 2.  
1074
 Small ports or ports not located near main shipping lanes (e.g. St. Petersburg, Russia) are unable to ship directly 
to or from the United States. See Philip Damas, Transship or Direct? A Real Choice, American SHIPPER, JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS 2001, VOL. 43, NO. 6 (page unavailable online).  In addition, transshipment cargo 
services is a potentially lucrative market with ports in Egypt and the Caribbean handling significant volumes of 
transshipment cargo: see Peter T. Leach New Caribbean Tune: Transshipment, No Problem! Florida Shipper 
(WLNR 22874432, 2006), 11 September 2006 (page unavailable online). Of the big four transshipment hubs in the 
Caribbean only the Port of Freeport is currently a member of the CSI and this could give it an unfair advantage in a 
highly competitive market. Concerning the investment in hub ports see UNCTAD REPORT 2006, pp. 81 – 82. World 
Bank, Egypt – Port Sector Development Project Information Document, 6 April 2006 (AB1461), p. 2.   
1075
 Steven Block, The Container Security Initiative: Pushing out the Front Lines in the War on Terrorism, MONDAQ 
BUS. BRIEFING, 6 April 2004 (WLNR 12285330).  
  
 
196 
If the complainant can prove that CBP targets containers which have passed through or are 
destined for countries where there is a high terrorist threat, the CSI may violate Article V:6.1076 
According to the following statement there is evidence that discrimination against non-CSI 
transshipment ports is having repercussions on market access for certain countries: 
 
“At present, Indian cargo is first moved to Colombo, Dubai and Singapore for further 
transshipment to the United States or other CSI compliant ports. This results in delays as also 
raises transportation costs which impacts on both traders and India also loses revenue.”1077 
 
On the other hand, such an argument will fail if the Panel takes the view that transshipment 
services are not regarded as forming part of the transit process. It would also limit the remedies 
open to complainants: for example, if the Panel holds that Article XI does not extend to measures 
affecting transportation and interprets the term “transit” in accordance with the RKC and EU 
Customs Code, the complainant would be left with no remedies under the GATT with regard to 
reduced market access caused by the effect of the CSI on transshipment services. 
 
5.6.4. Result  
 
The complainant could argue that the Container Security Initiative infringes the freedom of 
transit of Article V:2 owing to the fact that it expressly discriminates against all container cargo 
from non-CSI seaports. By granting container shipments from CSI ports a competitive benefit, it 
also disrupts the most efficient route for transit cargo by pressuring producers to use CSI seaports 
in order to reduce the risk of delay from increased inspections. Delay caused by risk assessment 
or random inspections at US ports of call may not be regarded as “necessary” if caused by 
                                                  
1076
 CBP has attempted to obtain as much information as possible about the history of the container and its final 
destination For example, among the information that CBP requires is the foreign port of lading (19 CFR 
4.7a(c)(2)(ii)(B); 19 CFR 4.7a(c)(4)(xi)); the first foreign port where the carrier takes possession of the goods 
destined for the United States (19 CFR 4.7a(c)(4)(vi)); and the name and address of the consignee (19 CFR 
4.7a(c)(4)(ix)). However, this information is too limited for security purposes. See World Shipping Council, 
Testimony of Christopher Koch Regarding Maritime Transportation Security Act Oversight Before the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 17 May 2005, p. 5. The recent “10 +2” data elements 
recently proposed by CBP go further than the EU’s AEO and the WCO’s Framework of Standards in requiring data 
about the importer. 
1077
 Dr Vijay Sakhuja, Container Security Initiative: Is India Serious About Its Maritime Trade? World News 
Connection (Newswire), 6 January 2005. 
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unreliable inspection equipment or poor port layout. Finally, the CSI could contravene Article V: 
6 if it increases inspections of transit cargo which has passed through certain countries. 
 
5.7. Article VIII  
 
5.7.1. Introduction 
 
Article VIII also deals with aspects of customs law namely fees and charges at border crossings, 
the simplification of border formalities and sanctions for infringements imposed by member 
states. The provision works “hand-in-glove” with Article II:2 (c).1078  
 
5.7.2. Requirements 
 
Article VIII:1(a) complements Article III:1(b) and applies to a residual category of fees and 
charges imposed by a governmental authority which must be connected to trade.1079 The 
provision submits charges to three conditions: the charge must be limited in amount to the 
approximate cost of services rendered; it must not represent an indirect protection to domestic 
products or a taxation of imports for fiscal purposes.  
 
In order to fall within Article VIII:1(a), the body levying the charges must be a governmental or 
quasi-governmental entity. In Japan – Semi-Conductors, the Panel held that government 
involvement could take the form of informal government measures, applied “in a manner to 
directly influence the behaviour of private companies.”1080 In Japan - Measures Affecting 
Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, it held that the fact that a measure has been taken by a 
private party did not necessarily mean that it could not be linked to the government.1081 However, 
                                                  
1078
 See Kennedy, p. 143. 
1079
 See World Trade Organization, Council for Trade in Goods, Article VIII of the GATT, Scope and Application, 
Note by the Secretariat, T/N/TF/W3, 12 January 2005 (updating document G/C/W/391, 9 July 2002), p. 4 para. 9. 
1080
 Panel, Japan – Semi-Conductors, para. 117. 
1081
 Report of the Panel, Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper WT/DS44/R, 31 
March 1998, (adopted on 22 April 1998), para. 10.52 (“[P]rivate actions may nonetheless be attributable to a 
government because of some governmental connection to or endorsement of those actions”).   
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the Panel stated that there were no general guidelines in this regard and that the question had to 
be determined on an ad hoc basis.1082 
 
Concerning the meaning of “services”, the Panel in U.S. – Customs Services Fee held that the 
term referred to activities closely enough connected to the processes of customs entry that they 
might, with no more than the customary artistic license accorded to taxing authorities, be called 
“services” to the importer in question.1083 The Panel held that investigations of customs fraud and 
counterfeit goods were activities that formed part of general customs “services” applicable to all 
commercial importers because they directly affected the manner in which all entries were 
processed and were sufficiently general in character.1084 Accordingly, their cost could be 
allocated among all commercial importers and did not have to be charged solely to the specific 
importers who happened to be beneficiaries of their “services” at the time in question.1085  
 
The government entity may only charge for the approximate cost of services rendered. Although 
the terms “commensurate with” and “approximate” grant a certain degree of flexibility, the 
charge must be sufficiently linked to the services rendered to prevent a member state disguising a 
charge which serves to protect domestic producers.1086 This rule is also reflected in the Revised 
Kyoto Convention, which also limits expenses chargeable by customs to “the approximate cost of 
the services rendered.”1087 In U.S. – Customs Services Fees, the Panel held that the ordinary 
meaning of the term “cost of services rendered” would be the cost of those services rendered to 
the individual importer or exporter in question.1088 The Panel held that this requirement excluded 
levying fees on an ad valorem basis to the extent that it caused fees to be levied in excess of such 
                                                  
1082
 Id., para. 10.56. 
1083
 See Panel, U.S. – Customs Services Fee, para. 77.  
1084
 Id., para. 102. 
1085
 Id. para. 104. The same applied to the “clearance of carriers” item, which was an activity involving “the 
examination of manifests which was the first step in discharging commercial cargo, and thus was clearly a part of the 
normal process of customs clearance.” On the other hand, “international affairs” was not accepted as forming part of 
general customs “services” because it concerned activities of Customs officers stationed in other countries and only 
some appeared to be related to the process of customs clearance. 
1086
 Report of the Panel, Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, 
WT/DS56/R, 25 November 1997 (adopted on 22 April 1998), [hereinafter, Panel, Argentina – Footwear], paras. 6.77 
– 6.80 (holding that the link that was too loose). Panel, United States – Customs User Fee, para. 86 (holding that the 
fee was above the cost of services rendered by the United States Customs Service). 
1087
 Standard 3.2 of the RKC.  
1088
 Panel, United States – Customs User Fee, para. 86. 
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costs.1089 On the other hand, consular fees, customs fees and statistical fees have been held 
permissible for services rendered. The Panel in Argentina – Textiles and Apparel also rejected an 
ad valorem “statistic tax” on the basis that such a tax, according to its very nature, was not 
limited to the approximate costs of the service rendered.1090 
 
In United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the EC, the Panel held that Article 
VIII:1(a) was a dual requirement because the charge in question had to involve a “service 
rendered” and then the level of the charge could not exceed the approximate cost of that service. 
The government imposing the fee should have the initial burden of justifying any government 
activity being charged for. Once a prima facie satisfactory explanation had been given, it would 
be upon the complainant to present further information calling into question the adequacy of that 
explanation.1091  
 
Article VIII:1(c) contains only hortatory language and is therefore not legally binding on member 
states.1092 However, member states have implemented this provision through other instruments 
such as the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Agreement on Preshipment Inspection 
and Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade as well as instruments outside the WTO such as 
the Revised Kyoto Convention and TIR Convention.1093 Therefore, if a state infringes Article 
VIII:1(c) it is likely to infringe these agreements as well.1094 According to the Panel in EC – 
Bananas, the Panel noted that Article VIII:1(c) referred to import formalities and documentation 
requirements, not to the trade regulations which such formalities or requirements enforce.  
 
                                                  
1089
 Panel, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 86. Therefore, the Panel held that a charge calculated on an ad 
valorem basis would infringe Article VIII:1(a) because minor value transactions would pay less than major value 
transactions. See also MAVROIDIS, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: A COMMENTARY, OXFORD 
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2005, pp. 102 ff. 
1090
 Panel, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 6.80. 
1091
 See Report of the Panel, United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities, 
WT/DS165/R, 17 July 2000 (adopted 10 January 2001), para. 98. See also VAN DEN BOSSCHE, p. 440 
1092
 Article VIII:1 (c) simply states that members “recognize the need” to simplify import requirements. The 
provision was dealt with in Report of the Panel, EEC – Import Regime for Bananas, DS38/R, 11 February 1994, 
(unadopted), at para. 151. See also VAN DEN BOSSCHE, p. 475. 
1093
 See World Trade Organization, Council for Trade in Goods, Article VIII of the GATT, Scope and Application, 
Note by the Secretariat, T/N/TF/W3, 12 January 2005 (updating document G/C/W/391, 9 July 2002). 
1094
 E.g., Article 2, Appendix I of the RKC obliges each contracting party “to promote the simplification and 
harmonization of Customs procedures […].”   
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Article VIII:3 subjects the imposition of customs penalties to the principle of proportionality. 
Penalties are an important aspect of unilateral security measures because they ensure compliance 
by traders.1095 The provision prohibits “substantial penalties” being imposed for “minor 
breaches” of customs regulations or procedural requirements. It focuses on omission or mistakes 
in customs documentation which are “easily rectifiable and obviously made without fraudulent 
intent or gross negligence.” The use of the word “and” suggests that both requirements must be 
satisfied. Accordingly, it would be permissible to punish a minor breach which is easily 
rectifiable but which was made with fraudulent intent. Similarly, innocent mistakes which are not 
easily rectifiable may also give rise to substantial penalties. Provided that both requirements are 
satisfied, however, the penalty must only serve as a warning. This provision is also reflected in 
the Revised Kyoto Convention, which stipulates that customs must not impose substantial 
penalties for inadvertent errors. Penalties may be applied to discourage repetitions of errors but 
must be “no greater than is necessary for this purpose.”1096 
 
5.7.3. Examination 
 
Cost-sharing is one of the most controversial aspects of the CSI. As a rule, the U.S. government 
expects CSI participants to bear the costs of participation including outlays for inspection 
equipment, inspections and disposal of WMD materials.1097 As stated above, it reflects the quid 
pro quo approach adopted by seaports in attracting private sector investment in port infrastructure 
(e.g. concession contracts).1098 The argument is that the private stakeholders in the maritime 
domain including seaport authorities, carriers and shippers profit from increased security and 
should therefore contribute towards the costs of security measures.1099 It has been reported that 
the shipping industry as well as seaports in the United States and other countries are passing costs 
for security measures on to port users1100 in the form of container surcharges, scanning fees or 
                                                  
1095
 Mikuriya, p. 53.  
1096
 Standard 3.39 of the RKC.  
1097
 Supra n. 859 
1098
 Supra n. 557. 
1099
 See CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, 3 January 2007, pp. 11 – 12.  
1100
 In the United States, security surcharges have been imposed the South Carolina State Ports Authority, Virginia 
Port Authority and the North Carolina Ports Authority. In Mexico, a security fee for each full export or import 
container took effect on February 1, 2005. On 8 June 2005, the Florida Ports Conference adopted specific security 
fee criteria and rates which will take effect on or prior to 1 January 2006. On 25 October, the Gulf Seaports Marine 
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port duties.1101  Considering that new user fees have been opposed by the shipping and trade 
interests as well as constitutional obstacles1102 the question arises whether recovering costs 
specifically relating to the CSI from port users generally in the form of a security fee contravenes 
Article VIII. This section is unique in this investigation insofar as a complaint would not be 
directed against the United States itself but against its partners in the Container Security 
Initiative. This implies that the complainant will not be a member of the CSI itself, at least as far 
as Article VIII:1(a) is concerned.1103 
 
The costs of “pushing out the borders” are borne by the United States as well as private and 
public-sector stakeholders.1104 The U.S. government finances the CSI teams at the seaports and 
provides limited financial assistance for the implementation of security standards, depending on 
the country involved.1105 According to CBP, the private sector pays for all the costs associated 
with the non-intrusive inspections (NII) as well as the physical inspections1106 required by the 
CSI, which can be substantial.1107 According to CBP, “[t]he existence of CSI has shifted 
examination costs from the U.S. importer to the foreign shipper (exporter).”1108 One commentator 
                                                                                                                                                                
Terminal Conference announced its intention to impose a security fee for vessels and cargo utilizing U.S. Gulf of 
Mexico ports. See American Association of Port Authorities website: < http://www.aapa-
ports.org/industry/content.cfm?ItemNumber=1064 >; see also Frustration Mounts at Costs of Port Security, 29 May 
2004 (WLNR 7081132). 
1101
 See OECD REPORT 2003, p.52, para. 151. See also UNCTAD REPORT 2003 at p. 18, para. 45, (concerning 
additional charges levied by carriers); at p. 35 para. 91 (reporting that seaports are considering levying security fees 
of GBP 10.50 or EURO 10 per box). 
1102
 See Walters, 30 TUL. MAR. L.J. 311, pp. 326 – 328.  
1103
 As stated above, it may be the case that some WTO member states which are members of the CSI will complain 
against certain aspects of the measure that they object to, such as 100 per cent scanning. 
1104
 Papavizas and Kiern, pp. 452 – 454; Lee, p. 136; for an overview of the stakeholders who must bear the costs of 
the CSI see Allen, pp. 441 – 443.  
1105
 Florestal, p. 403. 
1106
 CSI STRATEGIC PLAN, p. 9.  
1107
 E.g. UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY REVIEW 2004, p. 35, para. 22 (“The CBP pays for personnel overseas to 
implement the CSI (e.g., travel, offices, and computers equipment), but ports that do not have the NII equipment 
must purchase it before CBP deploys to the port.  Although most large ports already have this equipment it for their 
own import and compliance processes, many commercial ports world-wide do not”). The potential costs are wide-
ranging and include the additional administrative burden in implementing the 24 Hour Rule, the acquisition, 
operation and maintenance of inspection equipment, the carrying out of inspections, disposal of WMD and the 
compensation of exporters for any loss caused by the inspections. 
1108
 CSI STRATEGIC PLAN, p. 9. In order to cover administrative costs associated with the additional reporting 
requirements under the 24-Hour Rule, most ocean carriers have begun to charge between US$ 25 and US$ 35 per bill 
of lading. See UNCTAD REPORT 2003, p. 18, para. 45.  
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states that “[t]here are fears by prospective CSI ports that they may be left in a situation where 
they take over all the burdens of U.S. controls in situ at their ports.”1109  
 
Security fees connected with the Container Security Initiative appear to fall within the scope of 
Article VIII:4(f) and (g) because they refer to costs connected with documents, documentation 
and certification as well as analysis and inspection.1110 Concerning the second requirement, the 
entity levying port fees is likely to be the seaport authority and so the question arises as to the 
degree of government involvement in the running of seaports. Although many seaports today are 
primarily owned by the private sector, there is also a significant degree of government control in 
certain areas.1111 There are numerous restrictions to free trade in maritime transportation services 
imposed by government legislation, including access to port facilities.1112 For example, in the 
United States the government controls access to and use of port facilities and is responsible for 
port safety, security and customs duties. In particular, it applies port access restrictions based on 
national security restrictions.1113  With regard to the CSI, the complainant could argue that the 
implementation of the CSI displays a degree of government involvement which justifies 
classifying the seaport as a quasi-governmental entity: the details of implementation, procedures 
for targeting and inspecting high-risk containers as well as the standards of security are agreed 
between the host government and the CBP. The role of the seaport authority is simply to facilitate 
the security standards agreed between the host government and the United States.1114 
Accordingly, it accommodates the CSI teams, provides inspection equipment, facilitates 
inspections and disposes of the WMD in co-operation with the national customs authority and 
CBP. The seaport authority recovers the costs arising from the implementation of the 
Declarations of Principles from port users. 
  
                                                  
1109
 Jau, p. 19 – 20 who states that Singapore spent $ 8.8 million on acquiring inspection equipment alone. See also 
WSC, Comments of  30 July 2007 (concerning 100 percent inspections).  
1110
 See U.S. – Customs User Fee, para. 76. 
1111
 See Trujillo and Nombela, pp. 16 – 18, concerning the participation of the private sector in seaports.  
1112
 See PARAMESWARAN, pp. 50 – 55; pp. 64 – 65.  
1113
 Jeffry Clay Clark, The United States Proposal for a General Agreement on Trade in Services and its Pre-emption 
of Inconsistent State Law, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 75, pp. 89 – 90. See also PARAMESWARAN, pp.64 - 68 
describing the government restrictions on maritime transportation services which exist in most states.  
1114
 The MTSA 2001 places the responsibility for security largely on private parties: see Papavizas and Kiern, p. 453. 
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If the Panel accepts that the seaport is acting as a quasi-governmental entity with regard to the 
implementation of the CSI, it would then have to consider whether the security fees represent 
“services rendered” to an importer or exporter. Although this term is not defined, Article VIII:4 
provides an illustrative list of relevant services. The complainant could argue that port user fees 
imposed in connection with the CSI fall within the scope of Article VIII:1,1115 being fees or 
charges relating to documentation and inspection. As a result, such services would appear to be 
“closely enough related to the processes of customs entry.”1116 Assuming that fees for 
participation in CSI fall within the scope of Article VIII:1(a), the complainant would then have to 
prove that the charge (i) does not involve a service rendered to all port users and that (ii) it 
indirectly protects a domestic producer or is a non-tariff device for raising revenue.  
 
Concerning the first requirement, the complainant could argue that the CSI inspection 
requirements only apply to container cargo for the United States. Therefore, the costs of scanning 
or physical inspections requested by CSI teams cannot be covered by a security fee levied on all 
port users because they do not represent a general service provided to all port users.1117 Unlike 
the inspections at issue in U.S. – Customs User Fees, CSI inspections do not represent an 
autonomous decision of the host customs authority either: the risk assessment of a container is 
carried out by CBP which can request the host customs administration to perform an 
inspection.1118 In other words, CSI inspections are exclusively designed to protect U.S. borders 
and do not benefit the containers of any other exporters: CSI inspections would not detect a bomb 
in a container destined for the United Kingdom, for example, because the 24 Hour Rule only 
carries out risk assessment to cargo containers destined for the United States. On the other hand, 
the host country could argue that the inspection equipment itself is there to benefit all port users: 
in particular, the security facilities at CSI ports serve to satisfy the requirements of the 
Framework of Standards, which is a multilateral agreement designed to discover illicit activities 
                                                  
1115
 Report of the Panel, United States – Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and Use of Tobacco, 
BISD 41S/I/131, 12 August 1994 (adopted 4 October 1994), para. 77. 
1116
 Supra n. 1083. However, the service provided by CSI harbours appears to contain some economic aspects. On 
the one hand, they improve security arrangements so that commerce can continue in the event of a terrorist attack. 
On the other hand, they confer expedited clearance on cargo containers. According to the OECD, CSI seaports “are 
simply investing in greater security, a premium which the United States is willing to “pay” for through expedited 
cargo processing.” See OECD REPORT 2003, p. 54, para. 157. 
1117
 Supra n. 1083. 
1118
 GAO-05-557, p. 15, fig. 3. 
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at seaports generally.1119 For example, it has been reported that customs authorities at the Port of 
Le Havre use inspection equipment acquired within the framework of the CSI to detect smuggled 
cigarettes.1120 Relevant points to consider would be whether the inspection equipment is 
positioned in such a way to inspect all containers or only U.S. containers. The complainant could 
also submit statistical information, comparing the number of inspections carried out containers 
destined for the U.S. and those destined for other countries.  
 
The second requirement (viz., whether the fees charged do not reflect the approximate cost of the 
service rendered and amount to a non-tariff device for raising revenue)1121 requires an 
examination of the method of calculating and levying the fee. This aspect is unlikely to give rise 
to evidential problems: at least one study has precisely quantified the costs of security measures 
at seaports.1122 At the same time, it is not possible to make any general statements in relation to 
this requirement because the costs of participation are likely to vary between ports.  According to 
one report, “[port] design is strongly conditioned by the physical characteristics of the coast 
where the port is located.”1123 The costs of installation may therefore be considerably higher in 
some seaports than in others.  
 
Both the 24 Hour Rule and administration of non-intrusive inspections involve complex 
documentation requirements and may be inconsistent with the principle contained in Article 
VIII:1(c). In particular, there is evidence that the extended information requirements contained in 
                                                  
1119
 Id., p. 23 (referrals by CBP for inspections have been refused by some administrations on the grounds that the 
illicit activities do not relate to terrorism). But see CSI STRATEGIC PLAN 2006, p. 13 (pointing out that equipment 
used for CSI may be used to uncover other illegal activities). 
1120
 ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, p. 19.  
1121
 Owing to the fact that security standards at CSI ports will be periodically reviewed under Section 204 (b) of the 
SAFE Port 2006 and that future updates or acquisitions are likely to be made on a regular basis, it is likely that 
security fees will be ongoing.  
1122
 See CSI STRATEGIC PLAN 2006, p. 34, which states that the estimated average cost per CSI port to achieve 
operational status is $395,000. However, these costs do not include the acquisition of X-Ray equipment to qualify for 
participation in the CSI. See Bjorkholm and Boeh, p. 147, who precisely quantify the costs of security equipment. 
See also WLNR 7081132 (supra 1100), South Carolina officials stated their intention to “press ahead unilaterally 
with a levy of $1 per foot for every vessel calling at the ports”; Port Klang, LLOYD’S LIST, 2 April 2004 (WLNR 
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charge “will be billed as ‘extra movement charges’ under the existing port tariff. 
1123
 The costs of installation of detection equipment and the inspection of containers depend on factors such as port 
size and layout, local labour rates and container yard technology. See UNCTAD REPORT, p. 52, para. 152; Trujillo 
and Nombela, p. 6. 
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CFR 4.7 have complicated import formalities for FROB cargo and interfered with contractual 
relationships.1124 In this respect, the complainant could argue that the pending “10 + 2” set of data 
elements required by CBP is far more onerous than that required by the WCO’s Framework of 
Standards and the European Union’s Authorized Economic Operator programme.1125 However, 
as the Panel in EEC – Bananas, stated, it is for the complainant to submit evidence that the 
import formalities and documents are more complex than necessary in order to implement the US 
security policy.1126 The United States could argue that the requirements are necessary because 
risk assessment is recognized by the Revised Kyoto Convention and the Framework of Standards 
as the most effective basis for carrying out inspections.1127 It is also justified in increasing the 
information requirements because it has been proved that existing data requirements are 
inadequate in identifying high-risk containers.1128 the more information it receives, allows the 
more precisely the NTC can carry out risk assessment.1129 In addition, the “10 + 2” data elements 
have been expressly supported by the World Shipping Council.1130  
 
Article VIII:3 applies to monetary and non-monetary penalties and prohibits member states from 
imposing substantial penalties for minor breaches of customs regulations or procedural 
requirements. This is an important dimension of the CSI because it is the means by which it 
ensures enforcement with its security requirements.1131 The Customs and Border Protection 
Bureau has inherited the traditional powers of U.S. Customs and can assess penalties and 
liquidated damages, seize merchandise, remit forfeitures, mitigate penalties, decide petitions and 
cancel claims.1132 It imposes penalties for breaches of the 24 Hour Rule as well as failure to 
comply with screening and scanning requirements at foreign seaports. Examples of infringements 
punished by CFR 4.7 include presenting the cargo information 10 hours before the cargo is laden 
aboard the vessel at the foreign port, or filing incomplete information.1133 Also, any master of a 
                                                  
1124
 See e.g. WSC, Statement of 22 August 2003, p.  11. 
1125
 Supra n. 284. 
1126
 Panel, EEC – Import Regime for Bananas, para 151.  
1127
 See RKC, Chapter 6, Customs Controls; Framework of Standards, Standard 4.2 ; see also Mikuriya, p. 55.  
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 See ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, pp. 26 – 27.  
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 WSC, Comments of  17 May 2005. 
1130
 World Shipping Council, Remarks of Christopher Koch Before the Maritime Security Expo 2006, New York 
City, 19 September 2006, pp. 4 – 5.  
1131
 See DHS, MARITIME SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS, p. 8.  
1132
 See Bishop, pp. 324 – 325. 
1133
 This violates 19 CFR 4.7(b)(2) and may result in the delay or the denial of the permit to unlade. 
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vessel can be punished for failing to provide a ‘precise narrative description’ of cargo container 
contents.1134 Certain factors can mitigate the penalties1135 and their imposition is also 
staggered.1136 Nevertheless, the pecuniary and non-pecuniary penalties are substantial and can be 
economically damaging to the parties affected.1137  
 
The complainant could argue that imposing penalties for errors in the cargo manifest is 
disproportionate because such errors are “easily” rectifiable and are likely to be made without 
fraudulent intent or gross negligence. It is generally accepted that the cargo manifest is a 
document which serves commercial rather than security purposes and that it is subject to errors 
and inaccurate information.1138 It is well-known that corrections often need to be made to the 
cargo manifest after the cargo has been loaded.1139 Despite these weaknesses, CBP has chosen to 
base the ATS almost exclusively on the cargo manifest information.1140 CBP requires a “precise 
narrative description of the cargo” and has made the importer responsible for obtaining this 
information.1141 However, a carrier does not have direct knowledge of the cargo and is unable to 
verify the information contained on the cargo manifest without carrying out a physical inspection 
of the container. Although CBP permits the carrier to submit information from third parties which 
it reasonably believes to be true, it nevertheless stresses that the party which provides the cargo 
                                                  
1134
 See CBP, Trade Act FAQ, pp. 15 – 16. See Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, CBP Decisions (CBP 
Dec. 05–23), CUSTOMS BULLETIN AND DECISIONS, VOL. 39, NO. 28, 6 July 2005, pp. 2 – 4. 
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 According to Section 343 (a) (3) (B) of the Trade Act, the CBP must require information from the party most 
likely to have direct knowledge. Therefore, where the presenting party is not reasonably able to verify such 
information, CBP will permit the party to electronically present such information on the basis of what the party 
reasonably believes to be true. Mitigating factors also include inexperience in transmitting electronic information, a 
general good performance and low error rate in the handling of cargo, C-TPAT membership and demonstrated 
remedial action has been taken to prevent future violations. 
1136
 For a first violation, the CBP will mitigate the penalty imposed on a master of a vessel or the assessment of 
liquidated damages to an amount between $1,000 and $3,500, if CBP determines that law enforcement goals were 
not compromised by the violation. Subsequent infringements incur a penalty payment of $3,500 – $5,000.  
1137
 According to 19 USC 1436(b), port directors are authorized to levy civil penalties of $5,000 against the master of 
the vessel and a $10,000 penalty against the same master for any subsequent violation. Port Directors may assess, in 
addition to any other applicable statutory penalty, a claim for liquidated damages in the amount of $5,000 under 19 
CFR 113.64(c) or 19 CFR 113.62(j)(2), against any NVOCC, slot charterer or other authorized electronic transmitter. 
A claim for liquidated damages in the amount of $5,000 may be assessed for any subsequent violation. These 
penalties apply in addition to penalties applicable under other provisions of law. In addition, an infringement may 
result in the delay of the release of the cargo or the denial of the carrier’s preliminary entry-permit/special license to 
unlade. 
1138
 See WSC, Comments 9 September 2002, p. 4; ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, p. 27. 
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 Id., p. 17. 
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 See ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, p. 27. 
1141
 For example, CBP has stated that “electronics” would not constitute a precise description, but that “CD players” 
or “computer monitors” would.  See CBP, Trade Act FAQ, p. 16 at para. 18. 
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declaration information to CBP is responsible for ensuring that the information is accurate.1142 
Considering that it is likely that carriers acting in good faith will nevertheless fail to provide 
sufficiently precise information the penalties imposed for infringements may be considered 
disproportionate. They impose a blanket penalty for errors per se and do not distinguish between 
errors made as a result of fraudulent handling or obvious negligence and errors made by entities 
acting in good faith. Clearly, the latter sort of error demands a lesser penalty than the former. For 
example, according to the Recommendation on Standard Practices for Consular Formalities of 
1952, no charge, other than the regular charge for replacement of a document, should be imposed 
for mistakes made in good faith. Moreover, corrections to the original documents should be 
allowed “within reasonable limits.” In this respect, evidential problems may arise because US 
authorities have stated that the number of fines assessed for violations of Section 343 of the 
Trade Act of 2002 is not public information.1143 
 
5.7.4. Result 
 
Seaports cannot pass the costs for participation in CSI onto all port users in the form of general 
port user fees because the CSI is a security measure which only applies to cargo shipments bound 
for the United States. The concept of “pushing out the U.S. borders” means that CSI inspections 
do not form part of the normal activities of the host customs administration. Host customs 
officials simply facilitate these inspections which are initiated at the request of CBP and reflect 
U.S. security standards. In this respect, seaports are acting as quasi-governmental entities in 
implementing the Declarations of Principles. The proposed “10 + 2” information requirements 
may not contravene Article VIII:3 because they are considered necessary by the United States 
and the World Shipping Council to assess risk accurately. On the other hand, the penalties 
imposed by CBP are disproportionate considering that errors in the cargo manifest are often made 
innocently and easily rectifiable.  
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 Id., p. 15.  
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 See US TRADE REVIEW 2006, p. 27 at para. 22. 
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6. TBT Agreement 1994 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The progressive reduction in tariff barriers to trade achieved by the GATT and WTO has been 
accompanied by an increase in non-tariff barriers. So-called “non-tariff measures” (NTMs) take a 
variety of forms and circumvent the prohibitions on trade restrictions in the GATT.1144 For 
example, despite the fact that they clearly restrict trade, many NTMs are difficult to challenge 
because they are disguised as or form part of legitimate measures. Technical barriers to trade are 
the major example of this form of disguised restriction.  
 
Technical barriers to trade refer to the technical regulations or standards which a modern society 
needs to protect the public interest such as health or the environment.1145 They often serve a dual 
purpose: on the one hand, they seek to protect legitimate interests and are imposed by the 
government as a result of pressure by powerful lobbyists and under the pretext that the market 
alone cannot guarantee the necessary standards. On the other hand, the measures operate to 
restrict trade either directly or indirectly, for example, by ensuring that the technical standards in 
question can only be complied with by certain producers or group of producers. This has the 
effect of forcing other economic participants from the market and excluding competition from 
developing countries, which may lack the technical capacity to comply with the regulations or 
standards.1146 A complainant may not be able to prove the underlying protectionist motive 
because the technical regulations at issue may not be expressly discriminatory. It can also be 
difficult to establish a prima facie case of de facto discrimination if the regulation pursues a 
legitimate non-trade purpose.  
 
                                                  
1144
 Arts. III, XI, XX GATT. 
1145
 SENTI, RICHARD, DIE NEUE WELTHANDELSORDNUNG NACH DER URUGUAY RUNDE, 2001 (3rd Edition), p. 72, 
paras. 4.5 et seq. 
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 GALLAGHER, PETER: GUIDE TO THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL (2000), 
pp. 152 et seq. 
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During the Tokyo Round it had become clear that many member states were employing technical 
measures for protectionist purposes1147 and that the GATT was ill-suited to deal with NTBs in the 
form of technical measures.1148 For example, owing to the fact that many technical measures 
serve the public interest, it is not possible to order their elimination pursuant to Article XI GATT. 
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade was signed during the Uruguay Round and 
combats the most prevalent non-tariff measures. The Appellate Body has described its obligations 
as “different and additional” to those in the GATT.1149 This agreement has been dealt with (as a 
whole) by two disputes: EC – Asbestos and EC-Sardines with only the latter report being 
adopted.  Therefore, there is little guidance on its interpretation. 
 
The TBT Agreement regulates trade related measures introduced to protect non-trade concerns 
such as human, animal or plant life or health, to protect the environment and to ensure the quality 
of goods. It applies in relation to goods and not services. The preamble to the agreement 
recognises the right of member states to introduce measures necessary to protect non-trade related 
concerns. However, they are only permissible to the extent that they are “necessary.” In this way, 
the TBT Agreement attempts to strike a balance between the need for technical provisions and 
standards and the need for trade facilitation. It also reflects the principles of GATT insofar as it 
subjects technical measures to the principles of most-favoured nation and national treatment. In a 
separate paragraph, the preamble recognizes that no country should be prevented from taking 
measures necessary for the protection of its essential security interest.  
 
6.2 Requirements 
 
In order to fall within the scope of the TBT Agreement, the CSI must constitute either a technical 
regulation or technical standard pursuant to Annex 1. In the EC-Asbestos case, the Appellate 
Body required a technical regulation or standard to be contained in a “document” laying down the 
                                                  
1147
 See DANIEL FISCHER, DIE BEHANDLUNG TECHNISCHER HANDELSHEMNISSE IM WELTHANDELSRECHT, 
HEIDELBERG 2004, pp.120ff. on how such measures can constitute trade restrictions.  
1148
 Tietje in PRIESS/BERRISCH, WTO HANDBUCH, Section B.I.5, paras. 3 – 4. 
1149
 See Appellate Body, EC  – Asbestos, at p. 31 para. 80 
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necessary requirements.1150 In EC – Sardines the Appellate Body, referring back to its Report in 
EC – Asbestos, formulated a three-part test for determining if a measure is a technical regulation: 
 
• the document must apply to an identifiable product or group of products; 
• the document must lay down one or more product characteristics; and 
• compliance with these characteristics must be mandatory.1151 
 
The scope of the TBT Agreement is contained in Annex 1 which defines “technical regulations” 
and “standards.”  
 
A “standard” takes the form of a document approved by a recognized body that provides, for 
common and repeated use, rules, guidelines and characteristics for products or related processes 
or production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. Standards may also include or 
deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements, as 
they apply to a product, process or production method. Although a standard is not strictly 
binding, it may nevertheless develop de facto binding effect as the standard becomes commonly 
used in trade. 
 
The term “technical regulations” was the subject of EC-Asbestos and EC-Sardines. In the former 
case, the Appellate Body held that “[t]he heart of the definition of a ‘technical regulation’ is that 
a ‘document’ must ‘lay down’ – that is, set forth, stipulate or provide – ‘product 
characteristics’.”1152 This statement suggests that the technical regulation must manifest itself in 
the actual product. This is supported by the AB’s definition of characteristics, which it held 
“might relate, inter alia, to a product’s composition, size, shape, colour, texture, hardness, tensile 
strength, flammability, conductivity, density, or viscosity.”1153 However, the examples provided 
                                                  
1150
 Id. 
1151
 Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, 26 
September 2002 (adopted 23 October 2002), p. 44 at para. 176. 
1152
 Appellate Body, EC - Asbestos. paras. 67 – 69. 
1153
 Id. para. 67. 
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in the TBT Agreement suggest that its scope might be wider than this ruling suggests.1154 The 
Panel held that these examples “indicate that ‘product characteristics’ include, not only features 
and qualities intrinsic to the product itself, but also related ‘characteristics’, such as the means of 
identification, the presentation and the appearance of a product.”1155 The Appellate Body also 
pointed out that, according to the definition in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, “a ‘technical 
regulation’ may set forth the ‘applicable administrative provisions’ for products which have 
certain ‘characteristics’.”1156 Concerning the requirement of “mandatory”, the Appellate Body 
held that, “with respect to products, a ‘technical regulation’ has the effect of prescribing or 
imposing one or more ‘characteristics’ – ‘features’, ‘qualities’, ‘attributes’, or other 
‘distinguishing mark’.”1157 
 
The question whether the regulation must be detectable in the final product is a controversial 
topic owing to the fact that Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement defining technical regulations and 
standards refers not only to “product characteristics” but also “related processes and production 
methods” (PPMs). This term refers to the way in which products are manufactured/produced or to 
the processes used in producing the product. In literature, a distinction is made between PPMs 
which are detectable in the final product (“product-related PPM” (PR-PPMs)) and PPMs which 
are not detectable in the final product (“non-product related PPM” (NPR-PPMs)). The reference 
to “related” PPMs in Annex 1 clearly indicates that the scope of the TBT Agreement does not 
extend to non-product-related PPMs.1158  
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 TBT Agreement, Annex I, defining a technical regulation as “a document which lays down product 
characteristics or their related processes and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, 
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 Id.  para. 68. 
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6.3. Examination 
 
Both the 24 Hour Rule and the CSI are contained in “documents” because they are regulated by 
statute and lay down regulations for the advance submission of cargo information and inspections 
at foreign seaports. In addition, both measures apply to an identifiable product group: i.e., 
products transported by containers to US seaports for sale in the United States.1159  
 
The second stage of the test laid down in EC – Sardines requires the regulation to be detectable in 
the final product – either positively or negatively. The jurisprudence clearly states that the terms 
“related processes and production methods” refer to the manufacture of the product itself. For 
this reason, the 24 Hour Rule and CSI do not fall within the scope of the agreement because their 
requirements relate solely to the transportation of cargo. Requirements such as the advance 
submission of the cargo information and inspection of high-risk containers do not contribute to 
the creation of the product characteristics, as required by the Appellate Body. By the same token, 
they are unlikely to constitute technical standards which also require a connection to a product or 
related process or production methods.  
 
6.4. Result 
 
The 24 Hour Rule and CSI relate solely to the security standards at different nodes of the supply 
chain in terms of advance information requirements and inspections of containers. These 
measures do not fall within the scope of the TBT Agreement because they do not determine the 
intrinsic or related physical characteristics of a product.  
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7. WTO Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspections 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
Pre-shipment inspection was introduced in 1965 and refers to a service provided to developing 
countries by private companies or quasi-governmental bodies (so-called “PSI entities”) to verify 
the information provided by the exporter relating to the goods. Many developing countries have 
opted for PSI because they lack the resources to effectively inspect imports at a rate which 
facilitates trade. There are 37 countries which use PSI services, 34 of which are WTO members. 
 
An increase in the use of PSI during the 1980s increased the profile of the system internationally 
and led to complaints by exporting nations that PSI represented a trade barrier owing to flaws in 
its design.1160 Industry, governments and international organizations issued studies critical of PSI 
and the WTO included the PSI issue on its GATT negotiating agenda in 1995. The WTO Pre-
shipment Inspection Agreement addresses the complaints of exporters in developed countries.  
 
7.2. Requirements 
 
The preamble to the PSI Agreement states that such programmes must be carried out without 
giving rise to unnecessary delays or unequal treatment. In addition, it recognizes that it is 
desirable to provide transparency of the operation of pre-shipment inspection entities and of laws 
and regulations relating to pre-shipment inspection. Last but not least, the Contracting Parties 
wish dispute to be resolved quickly, effectively and equitably. The most important provision is 
Article 2, which regulates the obligations of user members. The paragraphs of this article relate to 
prohibition of non-discrimination, use of international standards, guarantee of transparency, 
protection of confidential information, avoidance of delays and the provision of an appeals 
procedure.  
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Article 1:1 applies to all pre-shipment activities which are carried out on the territory of 
members, whether contracted or mandated by the government or any government body of a 
member. Paragraph 2 defines a user member as a country whose government contracts for or 
mandates the use of pre-shipment inspection activities. Paragraph 3 defines the term PSI as 
including all activities relating to the verification of product-related factors such as quality, the 
quantity and price. It then provides a list of activities which relate to purely commercial 
considerations.  
 
7.3. Examination  
 
The 24 Hour Rule and Container Security Initiative display considerable differences to pre-
shipment inspections.  Unlike the PSI, the CSI is administered by U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection in co-operation with the host customs authority and is limited to selected foreign 
seaports of departure. In addition, the examination is limited to ascertaining that the cargo in the 
container actually corresponds to its description on the cargo manifest. By contrast, PSI 
inspections take place in the country of origin at the site of the production or storage of the goods 
and do not involve in the customs authorities of the states in question. Moreover, it is not limited 
by a framework agreement with customs administrations which limits it to particular seaports. 
Finally, the information required relates to the inherent characteristics of products, namely the 
value, quantity and quality. 
 
The scope of the agreement on pre-shipment inspection as laid down in Article 1 of the PSI 
Agreement refers to activities relating to the commercial characteristics of the goods. Therefore 
the ordinary wording of Article 1:3 does not extend to security matters. This is supported by the 
history of pre-shipment inspection which started in 1965 and was a service offered by private 
contractors to developing countries whose customs authorities did not have the resources to 
inspect goods at the border themselves. The GATT/WTO Pre-Shipment Inspection Agreement 
was a response to the concerns of member states that such inspections could constitute barriers to 
trade and not global security concerns. 
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7.4. Result 
 
The Container Security Initiative does not fall within the scope of the GATT/WTO Agreement on 
Pre-shipment Inspection as defined by Article 1 of that agreement. The underlying purpose of the 
agreement is to prevent fraud in the form of capital flight (through the overvaluing of goods) and 
tax evasion (through the undervaluing of goods) and not terrorist activities. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
As the investigation has demonstrated, a dispute involving the CSI concerns such a range of 
weighty issues with regard to the interpretation of the GATT, that it may well be seen a 
representing a litmus test of the DSU’s approach to treaty interpretation as a whole in the new 
century. The following summarizes the major findings of the investigation. 
 
1. Container Security could be used as a disguised restriction on trade 
Since its appearance in 2002 container security has become an increasingly important non-trade 
related issue. For this reason, it is important that security-related measures comply with the WTO 
agreements as far as possible. While security measures like the Container Security Initiative may 
have a legitimate aim (i.e. to protect its citizens and critical infrastructure against a terrorist 
attack), they can also operate to restrict trade, either intentionally – by operating as a disguised 
protectionist measure – or unintentionally – by failing to strike the necessary balance between 
trade and security. Section 1701 of the IRCA 2007 and the Dubai Ports World controversy show 
that political pressure can lead to measures which are not only ill-suited to improve security but 
actively distort the competitive environment to the detriment of foreign economic participants 
with regard to trade in seaport services and goods.1161   
 
2. The Container Security Initiative can only be challenged under the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade  
The Container Security Initiative can only be challenged under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade. Despite its clear effects on maritime trade, the provisions of the General Agreement 
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on Trade in Services does not apply to maritime transportation services. The effects of the 
Container Security Initiative clearly place it outside the scope of the Agreement on Pre-Shipment 
Inspection as well as the Agreement on Technical Barrier to Trade.  
 
3 GATT does not expressly allow the Panel to examine the existence of protectionist 
measures 
Seen against the political importance of maritime security in the United States these caveats may 
lead one to conclude that the concept of supply chain security is secretly being used by policy-
makers in the United States to protect domestic the seaport services and manufacturing industries. 
That said, the GATT provisions do not appear to offer any possibility to take into account the 
political motivations of the United States in enacting security measures such as Section 1701 of 
the IRCA. Although Article VIII offers a textual basis for investigating “indirect protection to 
domestic products,” this provision does not refer to the substance of the CSI per se but to its 
implementation in foreign states. The prescriptions and proscriptions contained in the other 
provisions (Articles V, X and XI) do not allow an examination of protectionist motivation for 
adopting the CSI either. There may be an opportunity for the Panel to examine this theme of 
disguised protectionism within the context of Article XXI. Although this provision does not offer 
any textual basis for such an investigation, it may be possible to justify such an enquiry by 
introducing a test of good faith – similar to the one contained in the chapeau to Article XX. This 
would allow the Panel to examine whether the CSI constitutes arbitrary discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on trade.  
 
4. The Container Security Initiative is likely to infringe Articles I, XI, V, X and VIII. 
The foregoing investigation has suggested that the CSI could infringe all relevant articles of the 
GATT. However, much depends on how the Panel will interpret the scope of these provisions. In 
particular, it is significant that the CSI primarily affects the transportation of goods rather than 
the goods themselves.  
 
In this respect, the complainant will be confronted with two tasks: first, to convince the Panel that 
the CSI falls within the scope of the GATT provisions and second, to prove the causal connection 
between the CSI and trade restriction. Concerning the first task, the complainant is likely to 
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advocate a broad interpretation of the provisions in the sense of Article 3.3 DSU,1162 in order to 
prevent member states circumventing the principles of non-discrimination and market access. In 
this respect, the growing literature on the importance of transport for market access will enhance 
the complainant’s arguments. On the other hand, the broad interpretation of Articles V and XI is 
likely to lead to new accusations of judicial activism – in particular, of using the GATT as a 
means of regulating access to maritime transportation services indirectly. Concerning the 
complainant’s burden of evidence, there appears to be conflicting evidence on the effects of the 
CSI and so the complainant will not only have to present detailed evidence proving that the CSI 
gives rise to unlawful effects but must also be prepared to counter any evidence presented by the 
United States in response, indicating that the CSI actually supports trade facilitation. In this 
respect, it is important to note that, when interpreting Articles V, VIII and X, the Panel is likely 
to guided by the important international agreements on trade facilitation, most notably the 
Revised Kyoto Convention, TIR Convention as well as the Framework of Standards issued by the 
WCO.1163 All of these agreements recognize the importance of supply chain security. 
 
The evidential burden on the complainant will be considerable owing to the fact that the 
agreement most applicable to the CSI – the GATS – does not apply (owing to the lack of 
agreement on subjecting maritime transportation services to the disciplines of this agreement). 
The same is true of the TBT Agreement (because the CSI affects transportation of products and 
not their production) as well as the Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection (which was clearly 
not conceived to ensure container security). The GATT may apply to the CSI mainly because it 
also extends to de facto measures. The complainant’s case therefore depends on adducing 
sufficient evidence to prove a causal connection between the operation of the CSI and the effects 
prohibited by the relevant provisions of the GATT, as required by the Panel in Argentina – 
Bovine Hides.  
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5. Article XI is likely to be most successful in a complaint against the CSI  
The major provision in a violation complaint is likely to be Article XI of the GATT. However, as 
stated above, this provision cannot be considered automatically applicable to a measure which 
concerns a means of transportation rather than products. Although the case law demonstrates that 
the provision applies to de facto restrictions and prohibitions, the measures at issue in those cases 
were clearly akin to quantitative restrictions. Concerning the other provisions, it is unlikely that 
the Panel would hold Article V to apply to transshipment hubs owing to the fact that customs 
practice views transshipment and transit as considered two separate procedures – as demonstrated 
by the RKC and EU Customs Code. Moreover, it is unlikely that the United States will be the 
subject of complaints under Article VIII:1 (a) concerning the levying of charges or under Article 
X concerning the customs appeals procedures because these aspects are under the control of the 
participating seaports. Article VIII:1 (c) concerning the simplification of customs formalities is 
potentially of great significance but in its present form it is hortatory and legally non-binding. As 
far as Article I:1 is concerned, states do not generally make a complaint on the basis of this 
provision alone: it is questionable whether it is worth pursuing a complaint against a 
discriminatory measure which does not violate any other provision of the GATT.   
 
6. The United States is likely to justify the CSI on grounds of Article XXI directly 
There is a real likelihood that the United States will choose not to defend itself against a violation 
complaint but instead immediately seek to justify the measure on the basis of Article XXI, an 
approach it adopted in US – Shrimp.1164 However, considering the controversy caused by Article 
XXI as well as the potential weaknesses in the complainant’s case, the United States may well 
choose to defend the claim (especially if the complaint relates to 100 percent scanning).  
 
In contrast to the broad arguments of the European Communities, the United States is likely to 
concentrate on the wording and scope of the general obligations. Owing to the opposition of the 
United States to the liberalization of seaport services (especially in the wake of the Dubai Ports 
World controversy), it is likely to vehemently oppose the extension of Article XI to cover 
measures relating to maritime transportation. It could support this argument by referring to 
Article 3.2 which provides that the dispute settlement system “serves to preserve the rights and 
                                                  
1164
 Panel, US – Shrimp, para. 7.13.  
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obligations of Members under the covered agreements” and, in particular, that the 
“[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements.”  
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D. The National Security Exception 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The term “national security” refers to interests that are vital to a state’s survival and security1165 
and under international law, it is the right and obligation of states to protect these interests.1166 
For example, the right of states to defend themselves against armed attack is recognized by 
Article 51 of the United Nations’ Charter1167 and Resolution 1373 of the U.N. Security Council 
obliges states to take steps to prevent acts of terrorism.1168 In common with other international 
treaties,1169  the GATT provides an exception to its obligations when a member state considers its 
national security interests are being threatened. 1170  In the United States, national security 
interests include critical infrastructure such as seaports, which are crucial for transportation of 
goods.  
 
Article XXI of the GATT is known as the “national security exception” and consists of three 
paragraphs which each address different aspects of national security. Paragraph (a) protects the 
secrecy of classified information which is of crucial importance to national security. Accordingly, 
a member may refuse to provide information if disclosure contradicts its essential security 
interests. Paragraph (b) is divided into three sub-paragraphs which permit security measures to be 
taken in relation to “fissionable materials”, “traffic in arms” etc., as well as action “taken in time 
of war or other emergency in international relations.” Finally, paragraph (c) allows WTO 
                                                  
1165
 See Winston P. Nagan and Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 375, p. 382. 
1166
 See Hahn, pp. 565 – 569. The 1949 GATT Council discussions included a statement that “every country must be 
the judge in the last resort on questions relating to its own security.” See, however, Ryan Goodman, Norms And 
National Security: The WTO As A Catalyst For Inquiry, 1 Chi. J. Int’l. L., 101 (2001), who argues that the United 
States' position relating to the Helms-Burton dispute involves a wholly legitimate definition of “security interests” 
and that the US stance, rather than representing a retreat from international legal norms, reflects and contributes to 
them. Moreover, “consistency with and furtherance of robust international norms of security – should be taken into 
account in rendering any broad assessment of the relationship between the US actions and international norms.” 
1167
 On the other hand, Article 51 does not define the contents of this right. In fact, the right of self-defence forms 
part of international customary law and is “particularly contentious and difficult to analyse.” See Michael Byers, 
Terrorism, The Use of Force and International Law After 11 September, INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 401, p. 405.  
1168
 See S/RES/1373, para. 2 (b). Concerning potential state liability for failure to take these necessary steps, see 
supra, pp. 43 – 45. See also Akande and Williams, p. 366 at fn. 2.   
1169
 Akande and Williams, p. 367 
1170
 See Article XXI of the GATT, which is practically repeated ad verbatim in Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement 
and Article XIV bis of the GATS. 
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members to perform obligations arising under the Charter of the United Nations in order to 
protect international peace and security.1171 Neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body have given 
a ruling on the interpretation of Article XXI. 
 
The following sections examine first of all, whether the Panel has the necessary jurisdiction to 
review an invocation of Article XXI and whether the terms used in the provision are in fact 
justiciable.1172 It then proposes an interpretative framework for Article XXI partly based on the 
jurisprudence of Article XX (the general exception) considering that they perform a similar 
function (i.e. providing an exception to the GATT obligations) and protect similar interests. 
Accordingly, the following will also examine how the Panel and Appellate Body have interpreted 
the general exception and applies these principles to Article XXI to the extent permitted by the 
latter’s wording.1173 Considering that national security has proved a highly controversial issue in 
the GATT and WTO this section also examines arguments against bringing a violation complaint 
before the DSB and provides an overview of Article XXI in literature.  
 
The investigation takes the text of Articles XX and XXI as its starting point and interprets the 
relevant terms in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation laid down in Articles 31 
and 32 VCLT. Therefore, the interpretation of the Article XXI is primarily based on the ordinary 
meaning of the words in light of their context and the aims of the agreement.  
 
1.1. Relationship between Article XX and Article XXI 
 
Article XXI is one of two provisions in the GATT which grants an absolute exemption to the 
obligations contained therein. The other provision is Article XX, entitled the “general exception.” 
At least one writer has argued that the two provisions should be interpreted according to similar 
                                                  
1171
 This paragraph reflects Article 103 of the UN Charter which declares the priority of the Charter and the 
obligations arising therefrom in relation to all other international agreements. For this reason, the exception of 
international security also applies in relation to all other agreements of world trade law and not only in relation to 
GATT. Accordingly, Article XIV bis (c) GATS and Article 73 TRIPS contain a rule corresponding to Article XXI 
(c) GATT. 
1172
 Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 426.   
1173
 Admittedly, the drafting history of the provisions suggests fundamental differences in the provisions: see Note by 
the Secretariat, Article XXI MTN.GNG/NG7/W/16, para. 2. However, the statements by the drafters in the historical 
materials are not clear or unambiguous. 
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principles.1174 This common approach to the two exceptions is also supported by the statement of 
the Appellate Body in Korea – Dairy, that “a treaty should be interpreted as a whole and, in 
particular, its sections and parts should be read as a whole.”1175 In addition, Article 31 of the 
VCLT allows interpreters to adopt a contextual approach when interpreting international treaties. 
Using this approach it would be possible for the Panel to refer to decisions on Article XX as 
guidance in structuring an investigation of Article XXI and establishing the proper interpretation 
of objective elements.  
 
A comparison of the two provisions suggests that they are sufficiently related to be considered in 
tandem,1176 although it is crucial to acknowledge and respect the differences in wording. The 
preparatory work to Article XXI shows that the original drafts of the ITO combined what are now 
Article XX and XXI into a single provision with a chapeau which had the same wording as that 
of Article XX GATT.1177 Both provisions protect similar interests insofar as natural resources and 
the supply chain represent vulnerable, commonly held resources:  
 
“Our commons, our systems of production and government, the means of economic exchange, 
and our social organizations and institutions, while not a single physical asset, are nonetheless 
commonly held and valuable property without a proprietor, with the potential to be ruined by 
terrorist actions.” 1178  
 
In addition, supply chain security and maritime wildlife inhabit the same environment, namely 
the maritime domain. Measures to secure these interests are therefore confronted by the same 
legal considerations and technical challenges. The United States government has also pointed out 
                                                  
1174
 See Rene E. Browne Revisiting National Security in an Interdependent World: The GATT Article XXI Defense 
After Helms-Burton, 86 Geo. L.J. 405. 
1175
 Report of the Appellate Body, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, 
WT/DS98/AB/R, 14 December 1999 (adopted on 12 January 2000), paras. 74 and 81.  
1176
 Concerning the drafting history of the provision, see Negotiating Group on GATT Articles, Article XXI, Note by 
the Secretariat, MTN.GNG/NG7/W/16, 18 August 1987 [hereinafter MTN.GNG/NG7/W/16], para. 2. 
1177
 However, this was eventually divided into two provisions which dealt with Commercial Policy and General 
Exceptions Article 43 General Exceptions to Chapter IV (Commercial Policy) and Article 94 General Exceptions. 
See id. Cf. the TBT Agreement, which classifies measures relating to national security and environmental protection 
together. 
1178
 Stephen Gale and Lawrence Husick, From MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) to MUD (Multilateral 
Unconstrained Destruction): Dealing with the New Terrorism, February 2003, Vol. I, No. 1.  
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that oceans are vulnerable to intentional critical damage from terrorists1179 and an MSI is likely to 
cause catastrophic pollution to the maritime environment and lead to equally catastrophic law 
suits against stakeholders in the supply chain by survivors or relatives of those killed in such an 
incident.1180 Legislative provisions in the United States impose strict liability in the case of 
environmental pollution, which could lead to devastating civil liability.1181 The two provisions 
also lead to the same legal result, namely an absolute exception to GATT obligations. Exactly 
how far one can base the interpretation of Article XXI on the jurisprudence to Article XX is a 
matter of debate. However, the following argues that Article XX can provide assistance in 
interpreting Article XXI with regard to the structure of examination and the definition of 
certain terms.  
 
1.1. Does the Panel have Jurisdiction over Article XXI? 
 
Some member states, particularly the United States,1182 argue that the Panel cannot subject 
national security measures to review. The WTO lacks the necessary jurisdiction to do so because 
it is a trade body and therefore not qualified to examine national security issues,1183 In addition, 
the wording of the provision suggests that it is “self-justifying”, i.e. that the mere invocation of 
Art. XXI by a state excludes a review of its grounds for doing so because only member states are 
competent to make decisions relating to their national security interests.1184 These arguments 
have given rise to great controversy.1185  
                                                  
1179
 THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, p. 12.  
1180
 See infra pp. 313 – 314. 
1181
 In particular, the Oil Pollution Act 1990 imposes strict liability on any person owning, operating or demise 
chartering the vessel for environmental damage caused by oil spillage. Liability for the damage caused by the release 
of hazardous substances is governed by the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability 
Act (CERCLA). The Act imposes strict liability on owners and operators of facilities at which hazardous substances 
are released. See also Carey, pp. 306 ff. 
1182
 The United States has been involved in three disputes involving Article XXI. In each case, its arguments were 
that the Panel did not have jurisdiction to examine national security matters and that the provision was entirely 
subjective. For an overview of these cases see Hahn, pp. 569 – 577.                                                           
The creation of the WTO has not altered the U.S. position as shown by its reaction to the EU complaint concerning 
the Helms-Burton Act. The U.S. invoked Article XXI and declared its intention to boycott the Panel proceedings.  
1183
 See the statement of Stuart Eizenstat, United States Undersecretary of Commerce and Special Envoy for the 
Promotion of Democracy in Cuba. Cited in Finegan, p.15. 
1184
 See U.S. Will Boycott WTO Proceeding on Helms-Burton, 8 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 7. 
1185
 See Piczak, at p. 309 (“[T]he general approach to interpreting Article XXI has been to defer almost completely to 
the judgment of the party invoking the exception.”); see also Peter Lindsay, The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: 
Subtle Success or Rampant Failure, 52 Duke L.J. 1277, pp. 1285 – 1286. Contra Spanogle, who argues that there are 
  
 
224 
According to the rules of interpretation under customary international law, there is nothing in the 
ordinary wording or context of Article XXI or Article XXIII:2 (that provides for the competence 
of the contracting parties to investigate complaints of nullification of impairment of any benefits 
granted by the GATT) to suggest that the security exception should not be subjected to Panel 
review. This is also supported by the historical comments made in Geneva 1947 which show that 
the national security exception was never intended to grant an exception to the application of 
Article XXIII:2.1186 On the contrary, one could argue that the Panel must able to review the 
invocation of Article XXI in order to ensure that it is not being abused. The jurisdiction of the 
Panel over the security exception appeared to be confirmed by a decision issued on Article XXI 
GATT of 30 November 1982, which stated that the dispute resolution organs were competent to 
decide on the lawfulness of measures made in reliance on Article XXI.1187  
 
The competence of the Panel to review the invocation of Article XXI is also supported by 
reference to the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which, being the constitution of the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB), reflects a rules-based approach to dispute settlement. According to 
Article 3.2 DSU, Members States recognize that the DSB serves to preserve the rights and 
obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of 
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation. In addition, 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot (add to or) diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements. The disputes involving Article XXI clearly show that 
measures taken to protect essential security interests have the potential to impair benefits 
accruing to another member directly or indirectly under the covered agreements pursuant to 
Article 3.3.1188  
 
                                                                                                                                                                
few precedents supporting the U.S. position, see pp. 1329 – 1330. For an analysis of GATT and WTO practice see 
Hahn, supra n. 1182; Akande and Williams, supra note 43 at 373 – 378, especially p. 374: “[T]here is no subsequent 
practice on the issue which establishes the agreement of the parties within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.” 
1186
 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE VOL. I, GENEVA 
1995, p. 606 “[T]here is no exception from the application of Article 35 [Article XXIII] to this or any other Article” 
(ECPT/A/PV/33, p. 26-27); see also Hahn, pp. 567 – 568. 
1187
 Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement (BISD 29S/23), adopted on 30 November 1982. The 
decision was issued owing to a dispute between the EC and Argentina concerning the lawfulness of a two-month 
embargo on Argentinian imports owing to the Falklands war.  
1188
 Hahn supra n. 1182. 
  
 
225 
The DSU also contains a number of provisions which oblige the Panel to fully investigate 
disputes. Article 7.1 provides for standard terms of reference that require a Panel to examine a 
matter referred to it by parties to a dispute. Art. 7.2 DSU imposes a positive duty on Panels to 
“address the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to 
the dispute.” In addition, Article 17.12 DSU requires the Appellate Body to “address each of the 
issues raised on appeal.”1189 According to these provisions therefore, the Panel is clearly 
competent to review an invocation of Article XXI(b). 
 
There are some rulings by the dispute settlement organs which also support jurisdiction, although 
none can be said to be truly conclusive. The only dispute where Article XXI was directly 
examined was in United States – Czechoslovakia decided by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in 
1949.1190 In this case, the United States imposed a ban on the export of certain products to 
Czechoslovakia and sought to justify it on the basis of Article XXI. Although the contracting 
parties decided the dispute in favour of the United States, they nevertheless subjected its 
invocation of the provision to review.1191  
 
The two disputes between the United States and Nicaragua which arose during the 1980s also 
offer evidence that, technically, the Panel is legally competent to review the invocation of Article 
XXI. In United States – Nicaragua I, Nicaragua complained about the United States’ reduction in 
the share of sugar imports it was allocated and requested the establishment of a Panel.1192  
Although the United States did not oppose this request, it did not believe that the review and 
resolution of that broader dispute was within the scope of the GATT.1193 In order to prevent the 
Panel considering Article XXI it therefore stated that it would not invoke any exceptions nor 
                                                  
1189
 See Lorand Bartels, The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism, 53 ICLQ 861, at p. 
876 (quoting James Bacchus). 
1190
 CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, Third Session; GATT/CP.3/33 (30 May 1949); GATT/CP.3/38 (2 June 
1949); GATT/CP.3/39 (8 June 1949).  
1191
 Schloemann and Ohlhoff, pp. 432 – 433. 
1192
 Report of the Panel, United States - Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, 2 March 1984 (adopted 13 March 1984), 
L/5607 – 31S/67, para. 3.11. See also Piczak, p. 292 (asserting that since the 1930s, the United States had used sugar 
quotas to integrate the export-dependent Cuban economy into the U.S. system and foster economic dependence on 
the United States). 
1193
 Panel, id., para. 3.11. 
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defend its actions.1194 In United States – Nicaragua II, Nicaragua complained about a complete 
import and export embargo which the United States had imposed on grounds of national security 
and again requested the establishment of a Panel.1195 Although the United States eventually 
agreed to this request, it required the terms of reference to exclude Article XXI. Accordingly, the 
terms of reference announced by the Chairman of the GATT Council stated that the Panel 
“cannot examine or judge the validity of or motivation for the invocation of 
Article XXI:(b)(iii).”1196 However, the Panel did make some significant comments on Article 
XXI in the form of the following rhetorical question: 
 
“If it were accepted that the interpretation of Article XXI was reserved entirely to the contracting 
party invoking it, how could the CONTRACTING PARTIES ensure that this general exception to 
all obligations under the General Agreement is not invoked excessively or for purposes other 
than those set out in this provision? If the CONTRACTING PARTIES give a panel the task of 
examining a case involving an Article XXI invocation without authorizing it to examine the 
justification of that invocation, do they limit the adversely affected contracting party's right to 
have its complaint investigated in accordance with Article XXIII:2?”1197 
 
In other words, the very fact that the drafters qualified the scope of Article XXI (i.e. by using 
terms such as “necessary”, “essential” as well as reference to specific conditions under which the 
provision could be invoked) suggests that the Panel must be able to interpret the provision; 
otherwise it would not be able to ascertain whether the measure has exceeded these 
qualifications.1198 It is significant in the Nicaragua cases that the United States only succeeded in 
                                                  
1194
 Id., para. 3.10. Under the GATT system of dispute settlement, decisions concerning the convening of a panel, its 
proceedings and the acceptance of a report had to be made by consensus in the GATT Council. Therefore, the 
establishment of a panel also required the agreement of the state against which a complaint had been made. As a 
result, Contracting Parties were able to prevent the establishment of Panels, dictate the terms of review and block the 
adoption of Report of the Panels.  
1195
 Report of the Panel, United States – Trade Measures affecting Nicaragua, (adopted on 13 October 1986), 
[hereinafter, Panel, US – Nicaragua II], L/6514 - 36S/331, at para. 3.1. See also Exec. Order issued by the President 
of the United States on 1 May 1985 (“I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of America, find that 
the policies and actions of the Government of Nicaragua constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security and foreign policy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that 
threat”).  
1196
 Panel, id., at para. 1.4. 
1197
 Id., at para. 5.17 
1198
 The existence of limitations to the Article is also supported by writers, notably Hahn, p. 579; Schloemann and 
Ohlhoff, pp. 442 – 447 and Akande and Williams, pp. 381 – 384. 
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preventing the review of Article XXI by the Panel by virtue of the consensus requirement. 
However, since the creation of the DSU, this procedure has been replaced by the so-called 
negative consensus requirement1199 with the result that the establishment of a Panel is now 
automatic. According to the standard terms of review provided by Article 7.1 DSU, the Panels 
and the Appellate Body are obliged to review Art. XXI if it is relevant for the resolution of the 
complaint.1200  
 
The embargoes against Nicaragua were also the subject of litigation before the International 
Court of Justice. The United States declined to participate in main hearing, likewise claiming that 
the court did not have any jurisdiction to hear the case. The court made the following statement: 
 
“Having taken part in the proceedings to argue that the Court lacked jurisdiction, the United 
States thereby acknowledged that the Court had the power to make a finding on its own 
jurisdiction to rule upon the merits. It is not possible to argue that the Court had jurisdiction only 
to declare that it lacked jurisdiction.”1201  
 
This statement appears equally applicable to the dispute settlement proceedings of Nicaragua II, 
where the United States participated in proceedings in order to prevent the Panel examining 
Article XXI. 
 
In literature, the most substantial investigations of Article XXI also tend to reject the argument 
that the Panel is not competent to review a state’s invocation of Article XXI. On the other hand, 
they have questioned whether an action would be fruitful in accordance with Article 3.7 DSU,1202 
a point which is examined in more detail below. 
                                                  
1199
 The Ministerial Declaration of  20 September 1986 contained an express mandate to improve the dispute 
resolution procedure. See: WTO/GATT Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round (Declaration of 20 September 
1986), Section D., “Subjects for Negotiation.” The right to veto the establishment of a panel was abolished in 1989.  
1200
 See Schloemann and Ohlhoff, pp. 424 et seq.; Akande and Williams, at pp. 379 – 380. 
1201
 See International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua. v. 
United States of America), Merits, 1986 ICJ Rep. Judgement of the ICJ, para. 27. The reasons why the United States 
believed the court to lack jurisdiction are dealt with in para. 32.  
1202
 There may be good reasons for the Panel deciding not to exercise its jurisdiction, see Piczak, at pp. 320 – 327, 
who argues that there is merit in the arguments against jurisdiction submitted by the United States.  Lindsay, at pp. 
1310 – 1313, who argues that informal methods of addressing Article XXI are more effective than formal dispute 
resolution.  
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1.2. Is Article XXI Justiciable? 
 
The answer to this question depends on whether the terms used in the provision, according to 
their ordinary meaning, are capable of being reviewed by the Panel. This question gives rise to 
debate owing to the scope of the subjective wording of Article XXI (b): does the subjective 
wording contained in this provision (i.e. “it considers”) also relate to the terms “necessary” or 
“essential security interests”, and, if so, to what extent do these terms limit the discretion of the 
state in question to introduce security measures?1203 Does the absence of a chapeau equivalent to 
Article XX mean that the Panel cannot examine whether the application of the measure amounts 
to arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination? In this context, it is also important to consider that 
evidential problems are likely to arise during proceedings because Article XXI (a) grants states 
the right to withhold information which would compromise their national security.1204 This is an 
important aspect in relation to seaports, which are classed as critical infrastructure owing to their 
military and social significance. 
 
 Despite the subjective wording in Article XXI (b), commentators have argued that the terms 
“necessary” and “essential” should be interpreted as setting standards which the state seeking to 
rely on Article XXI must attain.1205 As explained below, the legal meaning of “necessary” is 
potentially very restrictive and imposes a high standard of proof. The reference to “essential 
security interests” (as opposed to simply “security interests”) indicates that the drafters intended 
to limit the scope of the provision to the most vital interests relating to national security. 
Commentators also argue that the scope of Article XXI is limited by the specific circumstances 
under which the provision can be invoked: each of the situations listed in sub-paragraphs (i) – 
(iii) refer to specific, concrete situations and must therefore be judged objectively.1206 In disputes 
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 This is particularly clear in paragraph (a) where the paragraph only makes sense if the member state defines its 
essential security interests. See Akande and Williams, p. 398.  
1204
 See infra pp. 251 – 252.  
1205
 See Schloemann and Ohloff, pp. 445 – 446. 
1206
 Finegan, p. 13 describing the provision as “broadly worded, unilateral and entirely subjective” and proposes a 
reasonableness test; Olivia Q. Swaak – Goldman, Who Defines Members’ Security Interest in the WTO? LEIDEN J. 
INTL L. 9: 361 – 371, 1996, p. 370, describing Article XXI (b) as “one of the most ambiguous, and seemingly 
unlimited, exceptions to the rules governing international trade”; Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 443 argue that even the 
term “it considers” is subject to objective restrictions and Akande and Williams, p. 399 who argue that the sub-
paragraphs (i) – (iii) are unconnected with the subjective wording of Article XXI (a) and (b) and are to be judged 
objectively.   
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involving Article XXI complainants have also based their arguments on the objective limitations 
to Article XXI. For example, in U.S. – Czechoslovakia, the complainant argued that the United 
States was unjustified in invoking the national security exception and presented detailed 
arguments relating to the interpretation of the provision.1207 In Nicaragua II, the complainant 
argued that the provision did not present a blanket exception but could only be invoked if the 
measure in question was necessary for the protection of essential security interests and taken in a 
time of war or other emergency in international relations.1208  
 
A contextual interpretation of the provision also suggests that it is justiciable. The introductory 
paragraph to Article XX states that the measures in question must not be used as a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or 
a disguised restriction on international trade. This introductory chapeau of Article XX raises the 
question whether it is possible to subject measures under Article XXI to a similar test. Despite the 
fact that this latter provision does not contain such an introduction, the use of restrictive terms in 
Article XXI clearly suggests that there is a risk that the security exception could be abused.1209 
For example, if states were permitted to define “essential security interests” without control, the 
provision could be used to justify security interests that are not “essential.”1210 Reference to the 
wider context of the WTO treaties also suggests that member states must exercise their discretion 
to introduce measures relating to national security within the framework of the WTO Agreement. 
For example, in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body stated that: 
 
“The WTO Agreement is a treaty – the international equivalent of a contract. It is self-evident 
that in an exercise of their sovereignty, and in pursuit of their own respective national interests, 
the Members of the WTO have made a bargain. In exchange for the benefits they expect to derive 
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 See generally, CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, Third Session; GATT/CP.3/33 (30 May 1949), esp. p. 8. 
1208
 Panel, US – Nicaragua II, para. 4.5. 
1209
 This is generally recognized by most commentators. See, in particular, JACKSON, p. 741 “Articles XX and XXI 
contain a series of exceptions that may be the most troublesome and most subject to abuse of all the GATT 
exceptions.” 
1210
 See Contracting Parties to the GATT, Third Session, Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting, GATT 
CP.3/S.R. 22, (8 June 1949), [hereinafter United States – Czechoslovakia], p. 4 (where the Czechoslovakian 
representative argued that such an approach would lead to “autarky”).   
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as Members of the WTO, they have agreed to exercise their sovereignty according to the 
commitments they have made in the WTO Agreement.”1211 
 
If member states were granted unfettered discretion to determine measures necessary to protect 
their essential security interests, the temptation to abuse the provision would overwhelming. The 
Swedish footwear dispute of 1975 provides an example of how easy it is to abuse Article XXI for 
reasons which have little or nothing to do with “essential security interests.” Sweden sought to 
justify its import quota on footwear by claiming that the decrease in domestic shoe production 
“had become a threat to the planning of its economic defence in situations of emergency and as 
an integral part of its security policy.”1212 On this basis, the Swedish government sought to justify 
its quota under Article XXI. The other Contracting Parties “expressed doubts as to the 
justification of these measures” and reserved their rights under the General Agreement. 
Developing countries also objected to the fact that Sweden had not taken their needs into account 
pursuant to Part IV of the GATT.1213 Despite being described as a temporary measure it was two 
years before the Swedish government lifted the restriction. This example shows that the only 
means of preventing abuse is for the Panel to examine whether the measure falls within the 
(limited) scope of Article XXI (b). This argument is supported by the trevaux preparatoires to 
Article XXI. According to one drafter: 
 
“We recognized that there was a great danger of having too wide an exception […] Therefore, 
we thought it well to draft provisions which would take care of real security interests and, at the 
same time, so far as we could, to limit the exception so as to prevent the adoption of protection 
for maintaining industries under every conceivable circumstance […] It is really a question of 
balance.”1214 
 
During discussions of the complaint brought by Czechoslovakia in 1949, it was stated that 
“[e]very country must be the judge in the last resort on questions relating to its own security”. On 
the other hand, it was also stated that “every Contracting Party should be cautious not to take any 
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 Appellate Body, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, p. 15. 
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 Minutes of Council Meeting, 31 October 1975 (C/M/109) p. 8. See also, GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, p. 603. 
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 C/M/109, id. 
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 GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, p. 600.  
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step which might have the effect of undermining the general agreement.”1215 The subjective 
wording of Article XXI (b) notwithstanding, the Swedish footwear dispute suggests that it may 
be unrealistic to expect member states to strike this balance between the interests protected by the 
exceptions and the obligations arising under the general agreement (i.e. the proportionality of the 
measures) themselves. For example, the jurisprudence to Article XX shows that this balance can 
only be achieved by “weighing and balancing a series of factors” within the framework of a 
necessity test, which is a complex task. It is unlikely that a member state would be able to 
observe the inherently objective limitations of Article XXI, some of which are crucial to 
achieving this balance, considering the overriding importance they habitually attach to their 
essential security interests. The question therefore arises whether there are any devices that a 
Panel could use (i.e. in the sense of interpretative techniques or legal principles) in order to 
minimize the risk that member states abuse Article XXI. The following considers the doctrine of 
the general rule – exception as well as the standard of review that a Panel should adopt when 
examining Article XXI. 
 
1.3. The General Rule – Exception Principle 
 
One means of preventing the abuse of Article XXI may be offered by the general – rule exception 
doctrine. During the GATT regime, jurisprudence shows that the Panels made a distinction 
between general obligations and exceptions by categorizing provisions in the main body of the 
agreement as “positive obligations” and the exceptions to these provisions as “affirmative 
defences.” Exceptions did not form part of the main scheme of the agreement but only 
established an exception to a rule.1216 Neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body have provided a 
detailed explanation for this distinction, often describing it as a “well-established” rule or 
practice,1217 justifying it “by implication”1218 or on the basis of reasonableness. Arguably, this 
distinction simply reflects the inherent tension which results from “the right of a Member to 
                                                  
1215
 Id., pp. 603 – 604.  
1216
 See Michelle T. Grando, Allocating the Burden of Proof in WTO Disputes: A Critical Analysis, 9 J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 615, p. 633. See also Report of the Panel, Panel on Norwegian Procurement of Toll Collection Equipment for the 
City of Trondheim, BISD/319, adopted 13 May 1992, para. 4.5 (where the Panel refers to “deviating from basic 
rules”). 
1217
 Panel, Turkey – Textiles, para. 9.57; Panel, US – Shrimp, para. 7.30  
1218
 Panel, EC – Hormones, para. 8.86.  
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invoke an exception under Article XX and the duty of that same Member to respect the treaty 
rights of the other Members.”1219 
 
The “general rule – exception” principle was realized by two techniques: on the one hand, the 
Panels placed the burden of proof on the party seeking to rely on the exception and, on the other, 
required the exception in question to be interpreted narrowly thereby imposing a higher standard 
of proof than that required in relation to general rules.1220 This approach proved controversial and 
was criticized as contradicting the ordinary meaning of the text contrary to the customary rules of 
interpretation contained in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT1221 as well as the doctrine of effet utile.1222 
The following examines the two instruments which were used to achieve the general rule – 
exception doctrine, namely the burden of proof and the “narrow” interpretation. 
 
1.3.1. Burden of Proof  
 
In US – Wool Shirts and Blouses the Appellate Body held that the burden of proof was to be 
borne by the party “who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence.”1223 In the case 
of the latter, it stated:  
 
“Articles XX and XI:(2)(c)(i) are limited exceptions from obligations under certain other 
provisions of the GATT 1994, not positive rules establishing obligations in themselves. They are 
in the nature of affirmative defences. It is only reasonable that the burden of establishing such a 
defence should rest on the party asserting it.”1224 
 
                                                  
1219
 Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, para. 156. 
1220
 PALMETER AND MAVROIDIS, pp. 83 – 84. In other words, the reversal of the burden of proof in relation to 
affirmative defences and their narrow interpretation form part and parcel of the same policy. See statement of the 
Panel in Report of the Panel, United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, BISD 39S/206, 
adopted 19 June 1992, para. 5.41 (“The Panel also noted the practice of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 
interpreting these Article XX exceptions narrowly, placing the burden on the party invoking an exception to justify 
its use”). 
1221
 See Neuling, The Shrimp – Turtle Case: Implications for Article XX of GATT and the Trade and Environment 
Debate, 22 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, p.18. 
1222
 Infra p. 237. 
1223
 Appellate Body, U.S. Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14.  
1224
 Id., p. 15.  
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The Appellate Body explained that this allocation of the burden reflected “a generally accepted 
canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions” and this view is also 
found in literature.1225 The Panel in Argentina – Footwear suggested that an additional reason for 
attributing the burden of proof to the party relying on the exceptions is the risk that the party will 
abuse the provision1226 thereby implying that the presumption that member states act in good 
faith in relation to their general obligations does not extend to exceptions.1227  
 
1.3.2. The Narrow Interpretation 
 
The distinction between general obligations and exceptions was also reflected in the deliberately 
“narrow” interpretation adopted by the GATT Panels in relation to Article XX. The term 
“narrow” appears to refer to restrictively defining the scope of Article XX thereby ensuring that it 
can be invoked only under very limited circumstances. For example, in Canada – Herring the 
Panel stated: 
 
“[T]he purpose of including Article XX(g) in the General Agreement was not to widen the scope 
for measures serving trade policy purposes but merely to ensure that the commitments under the 
General Agreement do not hinder the pursuit of policies aimed at the conservation of exhaustive 
natural resources.”1228 
 
                                                  
1225
 See Zeitler p. 725 (“The presumption does not imply in all cases that the complainant has the full and complete 
burden of proof. A defending party invoking, for example, the exception of Article XX GATT would still have to 
establish a prima facie case of justification, but not more, before the burden of proof shifts to the complainant”). For 
criticism of the allocation of burden of proof in relation to exceptions see generally Grando (supra n. 1216) and 
WAINCYMER, pp. 553 et seq. 
1226
 See Panel, Argentina – Footwear, para. 6.37 (“When, however, Argentina is claiming a specific affirmative 
defence, such that its national challenge procedure can be used to correct any alleged violation of GATT rules, it is 
for Argentina to raise first a presumption that such system operates in a way that there is, in effect, no infringement 
of GATT/WTO rules”). See also Whitt, p. 605, who describes Article XXI as a “broad GATT exception which 
threatens to undercut the overall stability and goodwill inherent in the GATT system.” 
1227
 However, this would arguably contradict the ruling of the Appellate Body that the fact that a member has 
violated a substantive treaty provision does not mean that it has not acted in good faith: see Report of the Appellate 
Body, United States – Continued Subsidy and Dumping Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/DS234/AB/R, 16 January 
2003 (adopted 27 January 2003), para. 298 (“In our view, it would be necessary to prove more than mere violation to 
support such a conclusion”). See also Report of the Appellate Body, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High 
Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Article 21.5 Recourse), WT/DS132/AB/RW, 22 October 2001 
(adopted on 21 November 2001), para. 74. 
1228
 Report of the Panel, Canada - Measures Affecting the Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, (adopted 22 
March 1988), 35S/98, 114, para. 4.6 
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This also reflected the tendency in international law to interpret exceptions narrowly.1229 
However, the approach led the Panel to interpret provisions in a way which did not reflect the 
ordinary meaning of the words. For example, in this dispute, the Panel interpreted the crucial 
term “relating to” in Article XX(g) in a restrictive way. This cannot be said to reflect the ordinary 
meaning of “relating to” because, unlike terms such as “necessary” and “essential”,  this term 
does not indicate a restrictive scope.1230 In later disputes Panels went further and subjected the 
exercise of Article XX to conditions unsupported by the text of the provision. The Panel Reports 
in the US - Tuna/Dolphin disputes are good illustrations of this particular approach to 
interpretation.  
 
In the Tuna/Dolphin I dispute, the Panel expressly recognized the general rule – exception 
doctrine, stating that “it had been the practice of panels to interpret Article XX narrowly, to place 
the burden on the party invoking Article XX to justify its invocation, and not to examine Article 
XX exceptions unless invoked.”1231 The Panel in Tuna/Dolphin II appeared to go further than the 
Panel in Canada – Herring in relation to the interpretation of Article XX, referring to “the long-
standing practice of Panels to interpret this provision narrowly, in a manner that preserves the 
basic objectives and principles of the General Agreement.”1232 Therefore, even if Article XX did 
apply, it was not to be interpreted as providing a complete exception to the General Agreement. 
Critics of the panel’s decision claimed that the “narrow interpretation” therefore had the effect of 
restricting (as opposed to narrowly defining) the scope of Article XX.1233 Restricting the scope of 
Article XX in this way arguably contravened the principle of effet utile and diminished the rights 
of members in contravention of Article 3.2 DSU.1234 Critics objected that, by prohibiting 
unilateral trade measures the Panel was restricting state sovereignty in contravention of 
international law.1235 Moreover, the Panel’s interpretation of Article XXI was unsupported by the 
text and therefore contravened Article 31 VCLT as well as Article 3.2 of the DSU.1236 In the 
event, neither report was adopted. 
                                                  
1229
 See Hahn, p. 579. 
1230
 See infra p. 268. 
1231
 Panel, US – Tuna  I, para. 5.22 
1232
 Panel, US – Tuna  II, para. 5.26. 
1233
 Neuling, pp. 19 – 20. 
1234
 Concerning effet utile and Article 3.2. DSU, see infra p. 237 and pp. 247 – 248 respectively. 
1235
 See Howse, p. 16, who refers to the Lotus case as authority for the assertion that state sovereignty is “plenary.”  
1236
 Id. 
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1.3.3. The Evolutionary Interpretation 
 
With the creation of the WTO as a rules-based organization, the “narrow” interpretation of 
exceptions was expressly abandoned in favour of a text-based interpretation in accordance with 
the customary rules of interpretation in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT.1237 In the EC – Hormones 
dispute, the Appellate Body declared that “merely characterizing a treaty provision as an 
‘exception’ does not by itself justify a ‘stricter’ or ‘narrower’ interpretation of that provision than 
would be warranted by […] applying the normal rules of treaty interpretation.”1238 At the same 
time, the rule that the party invoking the exception bears the burden of proof still applies.  
 
The principle of “evolutionary interpretation” can be seen as the antithesis of the narrow 
interpretation. This doctrine of interpretation was established by the Appellate Body in U.S. – 
Shrimp/Turtle which concerned the interpretation of “exhaustible natural resources” in Article 
XX(g).1239 The United States sought to justify its environmental measure which sought to reduce 
the mortality rate of turtles owing to fishing nets by arguing that turtles could be considered 
“exhaustible natural resources.”1240 The Panel rejected the United States’ argument on the basis 
that it constituted unjustifiable discrimination, contrary to the chapeau of Article XX.1241 
However, the Appellate Body overturned this ruling and approached the question using a novel 
and hitherto unprecedented interpretation in WTO law: 
 
“The words of Article XX(g), “exhaustible natural resources”, were actually crafted more than 
50 years ago.  They must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of 
the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the environment.”1242   
 
                                                  
1237
 This tendency is so pronounced, that it has led to the criticism that the Appellate follows the wording of the text 
to the exclusion of everything else: see Ragosta et al, p. 707, who illustrate this by the example of the Appellate 
Body’s reading Article XX in an “evolutionary” manner. The writers support the view that panels have completely 
disregarded such consensuses of Members’ views on what was interpreted to reach their own conclusions. 
1238
 Report of the Appellate Body, EC – Hormones, para. 104. 
1239
 Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, paras. 129 – 130. 
1240
 Id., para. 125.  
1241
 However, the Panel started its examination with the chapeau and therefore did not examine whether the measure 
fell within the scope of Article XX (b) or (g): see Panel, US – Shrimp, para. 7.63. 
1242
 Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, para. 129. 
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Using this approach, the Appellate Body interpreted the provision by referring to its use in 
international conventions and declarations. The importance of interpreting the WTO agreements 
in light of contemporary concerns was also recognized by the Appellate Body in Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages II: 
 
“[WTO rules are]… reliable, comprehensible and enforceable…. [and that they] are not so rigid 
or so inflexible as not to leave room from reasoned judgments in confronting the endless and ever 
changing ebb and flow of real facts in real cases in the real world. They will served the 
multilateral trading system best if they are interpreted with that in mind.”1243 
 
Considering that supply chain security is a comparatively recent phenomenon the evolutionary 
interpretation could therefore be of great importance to the interpretation of Article XXI which, 
as one of the original provisions of the GATT 1947, was conceived under circumstances very 
different from today.1244 The terms in Article XXI, such as “fissionable materials”, “war” and 
“other emergency in international relations,” are often defined in contemporary international 
instruments and could therefore be decisive in the interpretation of Article XXI. 
 
At the same time, it is important to note that the decision of the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp 
also subjected Article XX to a requirement which is not mentioned in the text, namely that 
unilateral measures should be linked to efforts to achieve multilateral agreement.1245 However, 
the Appellate Body linked this requirement to the chapeau, namely, that failure to have recourse 
to diplomacy could result in unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination.1246 It would be difficult to 
introduce such non-text based requirements into Article XXI, which does not contain such a 
chapeau. 
 
 
 
                                                  
1243
 Appellate Body. Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, p. 31. 
1244
 See Schloemann and Ohlhoff, pp. 432 ff.  
1245
 Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, paras. 166 – 168. 
1246
 Id., para. 166. 
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1.3.4. The Effet Utile Doctrine 
 
The evolutionary interpretation also corresponds to the doctrine of effet utile, which has been 
described by the Panel in Japan Alcoholic-Beverages as being a fundamental tenet of treaty 
interpretation which flows from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). This doctrine does not relate specifically 
to the exceptions as such but it is of particular importance in incorporating the exceptions within 
the framework of the treaty.  
 
According to the Panel, “all provisions of a treaty must be, to the fullest extent possible, given 
their full meaning so that parties to a treaty can enforce their rights and obligations effectively 
[...]” (so-called effet utile doctrine).1247 In US-Gasoline, the Appellate Body held that one of the 
corollaries of the general rule of interpretation in the Vienna Convention was that the 
interpretation had to give meaning and effect to all the terms in a treaty. An interpreter could not 
adopt a reading that reduced whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or 
inutility.1248 In Korea – Dairy, the Appellate Body stated that interpreters are under a duty to read 
all applicable provisions of a treaty in a way that gives meaning to all of them harmoniously. As a 
result, the treaty was to be interpreted as a whole and, in particular, sections and parts were to be 
read as a whole.1249 
 
1.3.5. Does the General-Rule Exception Still Apply? 
 
With the creation of the WTO, the general rule – exception principle was partly discarded. 
Although the allocation of the burden of proof remains unchanged, the intentionally narrow 
interpretation (based on policy reasons) was – as a general rule – discarded in favour of a textual 
interpretation according to Article 31 VCLT. However, the interpretation by the Panel must still 
take into account the character of an exception. According to Schloemann and Ohlhoff, for 
example:  
                                                  
1247
 Id., pp. 11 – 12. 
1248
 Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 650 at p. 19; see Article 3.2 of the DSU, which states that “the DSB 
cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.” 
1249
 See Report of the Appellate Body, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, 
14 December 1999 (WT/DS98/AB/R), p. 24 para. 81; see also Panel, Korea – Beef, para. 814 at fn. 423. 
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“[I]f a provision clearly constitutes an exception – as do Articles XX and XXI – the Appellate 
Body still believes that the purpose of the treaty would be jeopardized if that exception were 
interpreted and applied without taking into account the necessary balance between the GATT’s 
exceptions and substantive rights. The Appellate Body requires only that panels thoroughly 
examine the relationships among the various provisions they apply to a particular dispute.”1250  
 
One could draw two conclusions from this: first, it is not possible to adopt a “narrow” 
interpretation of Article XXI to the extent that it does not reflect the ordinary meaning of the 
words and, second, that a security measure must be proportionate if it is to be justified under 
Article XXI. Although the evolutionary interpretation also gives the Panel a significant degree of 
discretion in interpreting the GATT provisions, the lack of a chapeau may prevent it from 
introducing additional requirements (e.g. need to achieve multilateral agreement) to prevent 
abuse. This point is examined in more detail below.1251 
 
1.4. Standard of Review in Relation to Article XXI 
 
According to one writer, the standard of review expresses “a deliberate allocation of power 
between an authority taking a measure and a judicial organ reviewing it”1252 and thereby reflects 
the conflict between state sovereignty and the competence of multilateral organizations.1253 This 
conflict is particularly pronounced in Article XXI whose subjective but qualified wording 
attempts to balance the sensitivity of national security with the need to protect the rights of other 
member states. In other words, the standard of review in Article XXI must reflect the balance 
“between the jurisdictional competences conceded by the Members to the WTO and the 
jurisdictional competences retained by the Members for themselves.”1254  
 
The importance of a provision’s wording in establishing the standard of proof is shown by the 
Appellate Body’s decision in EC – Hormones. It stated that the wording of the SPS Agreement 
                                                  
1250
 See Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 439 at n. 84. 
1251
 See infra, pp. 275 – 284. 
1252
 Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution, 6 J. INTL ECON. L. 635, p. 636.  
1253
 See Steven P. Croley and John H. Jackson, WTO Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National 
Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 193, p. 194. 
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 Appellate Body, EC – Hormones, para. 115. 
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could not be interpreted to impose “the more onerous as opposed to the less burdensome” 
standards, adding that to do so would require “treaty language far more specific and compelling” 
than that found in the relevant provision.1255  
 
The standard of review should therefore reflect the mixture of subjective and objective elements 
in Article XXI. Accordingly, the Panel would be justified in adopting an objective standard of 
review in relation to Article XXI (b) (i) – (iii) whose terms can only be defined by reference to 
international law. On the other hand, the subjective wording (“it considers”) in the introductory 
paragraph of Article XXI(b) suggests that the Panel should defer to the decision of the member 
state to some extent. The significance that the dispute settlement bodies attribute to “self-
regulating” elements in the provisions of the WTO Agreements can also be seen from Appellate 
Body’s interpretation of Article 3.7 of the DSU in Mexico – HFCS: 
 
Given the “largely self-regulating” nature of the requirement in the first sentence of Article 3.7, 
panels and the Appellate Body must presume, whenever a Member submits a request for 
establishment of a panel, that such Member does so in good faith […]. Article 3.7 neither 
requires nor authorizes a panel to look behind that Member's decision and to question its 
exercise of judgement. Therefore, the Panel was not obliged to consider this issue on its own 
motion.1256 
 
It is submitted that the Panel cannot grant this degree of deference to Article XXI. 
Fundamentally, the right to take measures to protect national security interests is different in 
nature to the right to request the establishment of a Panel. The latter right serves to “preserve the 
rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing 
provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law.” By contrast, the right to exercise Article XXI will necessarily deprive other 
states of their rights under the agreement.  
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 Id., para 165 
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 Appellate Body, Mexico – HFCS, para. 110. 
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Another reason why the wording does not justify total deference is because the subjective 
elements in Article XXI (a) and (b) have been qualified using strikingly restrictive language, (i.e. 
“essential security interests” (paragraphs (a) and (b)) and “necessary to protect” (paragraph (b)). 
Total deference would offer the complainant no guarantee that the Defendant was applying the 
high standard of proof inherent in these terms. It would prevent the Panel from challenging any 
abuse of Article XXI and thereby leave the rights of other Members unprotected, thereby 
contravening the purpose of establishing a Panel in Article 3.2 DSU. 
 
The Panel should therefore interpret Article XXI (b) (i) – (iii) on the basis of an objective 
assessment of the facts in accordance with Article 11 DSU and an incursive and inquisitorial 
approach. It should then review the subjective elements of Article XXI (a) and (b) (i.e. 
“necessary to protect” and “its essential security interests”) by assessing the review conducted by 
the government authority using objective criteria1257 but deferring to the member state in cases of 
doubt. In this respect, the Panel could apply the principle of in dubio mitius which was 
recognized by the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones.1258 This principle states that if a term is 
ambiguous, that meaning should be preferred which is less onerous to the party assuming an 
obligation or which interferes less with the territorial and personal supremacy or involves less 
general restrictions upon the parties.1259 This standard of review would protect the rights of other 
member states against abuse whilst respecting the subjective wording together with its 
limitations.  
 
1.5. Arguments against a Violation Complaint 
 
The DSU requires member states to weigh up the pros and cons of initiating a violation 
complaint. As mentioned above, launching a violation complaint is essentially a political decision 
which could have serious ramifications for the future relationship between the two states 
concerned. This is particularly acute in relation to Article XXI owing to the sensitivity of national 
security. Previous complaints relating to the national security exception have generated intense 
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 Panel, US – Cotton Underwear, para. 7.12. 
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 Appellate Body, EC – Hormones, para. 154. 
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 Although the principle is controversial because it arguably conflicts with the Vienna Convention, see 
WAINCYMER, p. 476. 
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controversy and could have been damaging to the system of world trade. Generally speaking, 
there are three major arguments against a violation complaint: 1) that the measure would not be 
fruitful according to Article 3.7 DSU; 2) the political question doctrine and 3) the risk of judicial 
activism.  
 
1.5.1 Dispute Would Not Be “Fruitful” Pursuant to Article 3.7 DSU 
 
Both the wording of Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 and that of Article 3.7 of the DSU, require 
member states to decide whether it would be appropriate to bring a case against another 
Member.1260 In particular, Article 3.7 states that the aim of “the dispute settlement mechanism is 
to secure a positive solution to a dispute” and requires members to consider whether “action 
under these procedures would be fruitful.”1261 This provision reflects the fact that the 
effectiveness of dispute resolution largely depends on the willingness of member states to reach a 
solution. This is recognized in Article 3:10, which obliges all member states to participate in the 
dispute resolution procedure “in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute.”  
 
Disputes between member states often relate to national security, environmental protection and 
anti-dumping which can be highly controversial owing to their political nature. As a result, 
litigation does not always lead to a positive solution as required by Article 3.7 DSU. It is an 
adversarial system which can engender resentment, encourage non-compliance and the adoption 
of retaliatory measures.1262 The question therefore arises whether a complaint involving a 
measure introduced on the basis of national security is likely to lead to a positive outcome. The 
answer to this question will depend on the motivations of the complainant in bringing the dispute 
and the defendant’s interpretation of Article XXI.  
 
                                                  
1260
 Appellate Body, EC – Bananas, paras. 135 ff.  
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 This aspect is particularly important with regard to Article XXI, as shown by the dispute between the European 
Community and the United States concerning the Helms-Burton Act 1996. See supra p. 140. 
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Member states could use the dispute settlement procedure as a sword rather than a shield, by 
initiating a complaint in order to force a state to justify politically contentious trade measures.1263 
This risk is recognized in Article 3.10, which states that “[i]t is understood that requests for 
conciliation and the use of the dispute settlement procedures should not be intended or considered 
as contentious acts.” According to one commentator, the EU’s request for a Panel to examine its 
complaint about the Helms-Burton Act is one example of a politically-motivated complaint.1264 
On the other hand, it will be difficult to prevent such complaints because, following 
consultations, the dispute settlement runs automatically.1265  During proceedings the parties 
cannot prevent the Panel considering sensitive issues because the standard terms of reference 
under Article 7.2 allow the judicial bodies to examine any provision they deem is relevant to the 
dispute.  
 
As far as the defendant is concerned, states tend to equate the issue of national security with their 
sovereignty1266 and insist that the Panel should accord them total deference in matters of national 
security. For example, in US – Czechoslovakia it was argued that a country had the right to 
invoke Article XXI on the basis that national security was ultimately the sovereign right of the 
country concerned.1267 In U.S. – Nicaragua, the U.S. argued that Article XXI left the validity of 
the security justification to the exclusive judgment of the contracting party taking the action. As a 
result, it therefore could not be found to act in violation of Article XXI.1268 In the dispute which 
arose between the United States and the European Union concerning the Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, the United States declared its intention not to 
participate in the dispute settlement proceedings. This dispute was discussed at a sub-committee 
during the 105th Congress and the following comment illustrates the position taken by the United 
States towards issues of national security.   
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 Spanogle, supra n. 79. 
1264
 Id. 
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 Other examples are the EEC – Trade Measures Taken for Non-Economic Reasons, Recourse to Article XXIII:2 
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“With regard to the first issue, to involve the WTO in a dispute over foreign policy is merely a 
thinly veiled attempt to interfere and dictate the agenda of the United States. I am confident that I 
speak for most, if not all, of us here today when I say that no U.S. Government leader would, in 
good conscience, allow the WTO or any other outside entity to determine what the United States 
can or cannot do to protect our own interest. […]. International law has long recognized that 
each State has the sovereign right to dictate its foreign relations and to protect its citizens. 
Therefore, the U.S. Government's right to make decisions about our own foreign policy and our 
national security is absolute and cannot be abrogated or interfered with by any foreign 
entity.”1269  
 
These approaches to dispute resolution contravene the aforementioned principles of dispute 
settlement in the DSU. On the one hand, member states are obliged to participate in dispute 
settlement proceedings in good faith, with the aim of achieving a positive resolution to the 
dispute. On the other hand, the interpretation of the agreements is not the task of the member 
states themselves but the dispute settlement organs. Initiating disputes to pursue political 
complaints and insisting on a unilateral interpretation of the agreements contradicts the status of 
the WTO as a rules-based institution. On the other hand, Realpolitik may dictate that the sheer 
belligerence of a member state in pursuing its unilateral security measures may persuade a 
member state that launching a violation complaint would be a fruitless exercise, especially if that 
state is an important trading partner. 
 
1.5.2. Political Question Doctrine (Non Liquet) 
 
As a general rule in civil and common law legal systems, the court must decide questions of law. 
If it is unclear on the law, the court “cannot sit still and let the party making the claim lose.”1270 
An exception to this rule is the political question doctrine which forbids the courts from ruling on 
an issue which lies outside their competence. In this case the court should leave the question open 
                                                  
1269
 at Hearing Before the Sub-Committee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on 
International Relations “Interfering with U.S. National Security Interests: The World Trade Organization and 
European Union Challenge to the Helms-Burton Law”, House of Representatives, One-hundred-and-fifth Congress, 
1st Session, 19 March 1997 [hereinafter Sub-Committee Hearing 19 March 1997], (1998 48-877 CC), (Statement of 
Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen). 
1270
 See Pauwelyn, p. 230.  
  
 
244 
and refer it to the appropriate state organs.1271 According to one commentator, the reason for this 
doctrine is that “the resolution of a dispute in judicial proceedings would render useless the 
exercise of the powers of the political organs.”1272 Although the political question doctrine is a 
concept found in national legal systems some commentators have used it in relation to the WTO, 
in recognition of the fact that it has a quasi-legal dispute settlement body.1273 
 
The invocation of Article XXI has political dimensions. For example, in US – Nicaragua, the 
United States stated that were the Panel to examine the question of whether nullification or 
impairment could be caused through measures under Article XXI, it would be “drawn into a 
consideration of the political situation motivating the United States to invoke Article XXI.”1274 
Therefore, the security situation “fell outside the competence of the GATT in general and the 
Panel in particular.”1275 The United States also justified its refusal to participate in dispute 
resolution proceedings by arguing that the disputed Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 was of a political nature and therefore fell outside the jurisdiction of 
the WTO.1276 This argument of the United States is supported by statements made during the 
trevaux preparatoires of the GATT, which make clear that Article XXI was not intended to deal 
with political questions. According to one representative: 
 
“[T]he Charter ought to make provision for economic measures which are closely linked with 
political questions [...] in the sense of excluding them, because he believed that an economic 
                                                  
1271
 A related doctrine is “non liquet”, according to which the court does not rule on a question because the law is 
incomplete. However, this doctrine appears to be contradicted by the aim of the DSB to secure a positive resolution 
to a dispute under Article 3.7 as well as the requirement under Article 7.2 DSU to address the relevant provisions in 
any covered agreement(s) cited by the parties. Moreover, the wording of WTO agreements is necessarily ambiguous 
and the adoption of non liquet could undermine the authority of the texts. For further information see Lorand Bartels, 
The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism, 53 ICLQ 861, pp. 875 – 877 who argues (p. 
877), that “where the law is indeterminate, panels and the Appellate Body will be discharging their duties to 
‘address’ the relevant provisions of the covered agreements, and the relevant legal issues, by making a statement to 
this effect.” Concerning the position of non liquet in international law, see Alfredo Mordechai Rabello, Non Liquet: 
from Roman Law to Modern Law, 10 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, pp. 10 – 11; Steinberg, pp. 258 – 259.  
1272
 Bartels, p. 880. 
1273
 Piczak, pp. 320 – 321 (U.S. arguments in Nicaragua II were based upon the political question doctrine from U.S. 
constitutional jurisprudence). 
1274
 Panel, US – Nicaragua II, para. 4.9.  
1275
 Id., para. 4.6. 
1276
 Sub-Committee Hearing, 19 March 1997, “Unfortunately, the EU countries have been unable or, better yet, 
unwilling to understand two essential points. First, the LIBERTAD Act is one of a political nature. It is a foreign 
policy instrument of the United States and thus falls beyond the purview and the jurisdiction of the WTO.” 
  
 
245 
measure taken for political reasons was not properly speaking an economic measure but a 
political measure and as such was not within the competence of the Organization.”1277 
 
However, there are also persuasive arguments against adopting such a doctrine. First of all, the 
political question doctrine depends on the existence of a developed constitution which the WTO 
does not yet have.1278 In India – Quantitative Restrictions, India argued that the panel had only 
limited competence to examine trade measures for balance of payment purposes. It argued that 
jurisdiction over this matter has been explicitly assigned to the Balance of Payments Committee 
and the General Council.1279 However, the Appellate Body rejected this argument and did not 
express a principle along the lines of a separation of powers or a constitutional relationship 
between the political and judicial organs.1280 Also, the political organs of the WTO often find it 
difficult to reach consensus owing to the conflicting interests of its diverse membership as 
illustrated by the Seattle and Cancun Ministerial Conferences.1281 Members can request the 
General Council to provide an authoritative interpretation of a covered agreement under Article 
3.9 DSU but this procedure can be ineffective if there is a lack of consensus owing to the highly 
political nature of the subject. For example, a Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General 
Agreement which was issued by the General Council in 1982 did not provide any practical 
assistance in the interpretation of Art. XXI.1282 Finally, the WTO has a “quasi – judicial” dispute 
resolution system which does not compare in authority with courts in common law or civilian 
jurisdictions.  
 
                                                  
1277
 See SUMMARY RECORD OF THE SIXTH COMMITTEE on 10 March 1948, (C.6/SR.37, page 3). 
1278
 See Jeffrey L. Dunhoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’S ‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International 
Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 647. 
1279
 Report of the Appellate Body, India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial 
Products, WT/DS90/AB/R, 23 Aug. 1999 (adopted 22 September 1999), para. 98 (“In order to preserve a proper 
institutional balance between the judicial and the political organs of the WTO with regard to matters relating to 
balance-of payments restrictions, review of the justification of such measures must be left to the relevant political 
organs”).  
1280
 See id., paras.  100 – 105; see also para. 108 concerning judicial restraint. For an examination of this case see 
Dunhoff, pp. 657 – 658. 
1281
 Concerning the difference in priorities between developed and developing countries concerning the Seattle 
agenda see James L. Kenworthy, The Unraveling of the Seattle Conference and the Future of the WTO, 5 GEO. PUB. 
POL’Y REV. 103, pp. 109 – 110.  
1282
 See Schloemann and Ohlhoff, pp. 437 – 438, referring to the Decision concerning Article XXI of the General 
Agreement, (GATT Doc. L/5426 (1982)). 
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The political question doctrine also contradicts Article XXIII which grants member states the 
right to request the establishment of a Panel. Excluding areas from litigation would effectively 
deny member states the opportunity to protect their rights contrary to Article 3.2 DSU. In 
addition, Article 7.2 DSU requires Panels to address the relevant provisions in any covered 
agreement. In this context, it is also relevant to consider the comments of the Panel in US – 
Section 301 Trade Act in which the Panel stated that “providing security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be 
instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the preamble.”1283 Refusing to answer legal 
questions on the grounds that the question is political or the law is incomplete would undermine 
this objective.1284 
 
The political question doctrine may represent an important principle in national constitutional law 
but it cannot be automatically transferred to the WTO which does not have a constitution 
comparable to those of member states. This doctrine can only function properly if the political 
decision-making organs are effective and this is not the case with the WTO. Even if the dispute 
settlement organs do make a decision, there is little prospect of a corresponding legislative 
response.1285 Application of this doctrine is also likely to violate provisions of the GATT and 
DSU which do not make the initiation of dispute settlement dependent on the political nature of 
the case.  
 
1.5.3. Judicial Activism 
 
Like the political question doctrine, the concept of judicial activism derives from national legal 
discourse. The term was coined in the 1950s to describe two types of judges: “judicial activists” 
and “champions of self-restraint.”1286 The former group of judges regarded the court as an 
instrument to achieve desired social change whereas the latter preferred to leave political 
                                                  
1283
 Report of the Panel, WT/DS152/R of 22 December 1999. 
1284
 See also Appellate Body, U.S. – Gasoline, p. 23 (“One of the corollaries of the “general rule of interpretation” in 
the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty. An interpreter 
is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or 
inutility”). 
1285
 See WAINCYMER, p. 103.  
1286
 Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism”, 92 CAL. L. REV. 2004 1441, pp. 
1445-1447. 
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decisions to the elected legislature.1287 The term soon came to be used pejoratively to describe 
judges who were protagonists for change without regard for the unwritten rules regulating the 
exercise of judicial power.1288 Examples of judicial activism include usurping the role of 
parliament by legislating from the bench, failing to observe stare decisis or failing to use the tools 
of interpretation correctly.1289 
 
Article 3.2 DSU requires the dispute settlement organs to refer to customary rules of 
interpretation of international law.1290 The Panels have therefore based their interpretation on 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, which require courts to adopt a textual interpretation using the 
ordinary meaning of words.1291 Article 32 VCLT only permits reference to the drafting history in 
exceptional circumstances in order to ascertain what the contracting parties actually intended.1292 
Critics argue that these rules of interpretation in the VCLT reflect legal practice and are therefore 
ill-suited to the WTO texts, which were formulated by non-lawyers and reflect political 
compromise. Considering the ambiguity of the WTO agreements, a textual interpretation tends to 
encourage gap-filling and law-making.1293 This, in turn, contravenes the requirement – contained 
in Article 3.2 itself – that opinions should not add to or diminish the rights or obligations of 
member states.1294 For example, the “evolutionary” interpretation adopted by the Appellate Body 
in Shrimp-Turtle concerning the term “exhaustible natural resources” in Article XX(g) GATT has 
been denounced as a “remarkable” example of judicial activism on the grounds that it could lead 
to the terms of the agreements evolving into something that none of the original parties to the 
agreement ever imagined.1295 It has also been argued that that, by effectively allowing the 
                                                  
1287
 Id. 
1288
 Id. 1457-1458. 
1289
 Id. 1463 et seq.. 
1290
 Appellate Body, United States – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 45. 
1291
 Appellate Body, U.S. – Gasoline, p. 17. 
1292
 According to art. 32 of the VCLT, recourse may only be had to supplementary means of interpretation when the 
interpretation according to art. 31 “(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 
1293
 See Ragosta et al, p. 700: this ambiguity gives the Panels two choices: either to dismiss the case as beyond the 
purview of WTO norms or to create some obligation where none existed before. See also Steinberg, Judicial 
Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints”, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247, p. 261, 
(arguing that “failure to give weight to non-textual factors could lead to interpretations that contradict what the 
negotiators manifestly intended”). 
1294
 Ragosta et al, pp. 706 – 707. 
1295
 Ragosta et al, p. 707. See also Patrick Kelly, The Seduction of the Appellate Body: Shrimp/Sea Turtle I and II 
and the Proper Role of States in WTO Governance, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 459, p. 460. 
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unilateral regulation of production processes and methods, the Appellate Body has contravened 
Article 3.2 DSU by diminishing the right of other member states to claim free access to 
markets.1296 
 
On the other hand, there is no evidence that reference to extrinsic aids such as trevaux 
preparatoires would preserve the negotiators’ intention or lead to any more acceptable results.1297 
Such an approach would grant historical negotiations equal standing to the final statement of the 
member states’ intention in the WTO Agreements. There would also be evidential problems in 
ascertaining the Member’s intention from the background material.1298 The argument for judicial 
restraint also appears too restrictive: criticism of the “evolutionary interpretation” ignores the 
need to interpret terms of the GATT to reflect contemporary circumstances.1299 After all, global 
terrorism and global warming are two pressing concerns nowadays which were not contemplated 
by the drafters of the GATT in 1947. In any case, the need for restraint has been expressly 
recognized by the Appellate Body in U.S. – Wool Shirts, which noted that Panels must only 
address those questions that are necessary to resolve the claim and to the extent necessary for the 
reasoned consideration of the claims disputed.1300 
 
1.6. Literature on Article XXI 
 
The security exception tends to attract little attention from writers in general, at least in 
comparison with other provisions of the GATT. In available literature, only few writers 
concentrate on Article XXI as the sole subject of investigation.1301 Coverage of the provision in 
                                                  
1296
 E.g. Kelly, id., pp. 469 – 471.  
1297
 E.g. the Panel in US – Tuna I, which adopted a “narrow” interpretation of Article XX (d), has been accused of 
interpreting the provisions of Article XX GATT and the trevaux preparatoires in a way which did not reflect their 
ordinary meaning. See Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the 
Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491 p. 16. 
1298
 No official records are kept of GATT/WTO negotiations and the trevaux preparatoire of the GATT refers to the 
Havana Charter, which is technically a different charter: see WAINCYMER, p. 402. Moreover, the wealth of 
background material cited by Steinberg, (at p. 261) could lead to arguments about which documents are to be given 
priority.  
1299
 See Bernard H. Oxman and Louise de la Fayette, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 685, p. 692 (“[T]here is no 
doubt that WTO jurisprudence has taken a decisive turn in the right direction.”). 
1300
 See Report of the Appellate Body, U.S. Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 45. 
1301
 Hahn, Schloemann and Ohlhoff, Akande and Williams. Cf. however, Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, para 151 
which linked this description of the provisions to the chapeau of Article XX (“[…] that is to say, the ultimate 
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text books varies.1302 The provision is usually examined within the context of a particular dispute, 
one notable example being the Helms-Burton dispute. There is only one article which deals with 
the security exception in relation to the introduction of the Container Security Initiative.1303 
Nevertheless, the available literature presents many detailed and divergent views relating to the 
interpretation of the national security exception and suggests that Article XXI of GATT is in fact 
far more significant than the lack of jurisprudence and literature would suggest. The following 
examines the general view of literature on the justiciability of the provision, its wording, as well 
as the interpretation of subjective (Article XXI(b)) and objective elements (Article XXI(b)(i) – 
(iii)). 
 
Writers generally agree that Article XXI represents a conditional and limited exception to the 
GATT1304 and is therefore justiciable. The Panel has jurisdiction to examine the provision 
because Article XXI does not affect Article XXIII or the provisions of the DSU.1305 In addition, 
its wording not only contains objective elements but is obviously restrictive as shown by the 
reference to “essential security interests” and “necessary.” At the same time, there is agreement 
that the subjective wording cannot be overlooked owing to the application of Article 31 
VCLT.1306 On the other hand, Lindsay argues that Article 31 VCLT is “of minimal help in 
connection with GATT Article XXI”1307 owing to the ambiguous wording of the provision. There 
does not appear to be any “subsequent agreement between the parties” or “subsequent practice” 
in relation to Article XXI either.1308  
                                                                                                                                                                
availability of the exception is subject to the compliance by the invoking Member with the requirements of the 
chapeau”). Since Article XXI does not have a chapeau, the question arises whether it can be called a conditional and 
limited exception at all. 
1302
 Extensive coverage in BHALA, pp. 556 ff.; VAN DEN BOSSCHE, pp. 628 – 32; Alexandroff  and Sharma, pp. 1572 
– 1578.  
1303
 Florestal (supra n. 28). 
1304
 See Hahn, p. 568; Akande and Williams at p. 399 (“[I]t provides for specific exceptions to cover specific 
instances.”).  
1305
 Schloemann and Ohlhoff , p. 440; Peter Lindsay, The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or 
Rampant Failure?, 52 Duke L.J., 577 pp. 1281 et seq.  
1306
 Hahn, p. 589.  
1307
 Lindsay, p. 1282. 
1308
 Akande and Williams, p. 374 who do not perceive subsequent practice pursuant to Article 31 (3) (b) of the 
VCLT; Browne, p. 422. However, some writers perceive evidence of interpretative practice: cf. Hahn, pp. 594 et seq. 
who asserts that state practice “supports the notion that the security exception in article XXI(b)(iii) is subject to 
specific and objective limitations […]”; Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 431 and at fn. 38, who start their interpretative 
analysis by referring to the “pertinent case law” and “past Panel practice regarding Article XXI of GATT 1947”; cf. 
Piczak, pp. 309 and 320, referring to “past GATT practice in interpreting the security exception”; see also Gaugh, p. 
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Leading opinion regards Article XXI as a weakly worded provision which can be easily abused 
by states to pursue political aims. Gaugh, for example, argues that states have invoked Article 
XXI “without reference to trade or economic rationale; rather, a subjective, political 
determination is made that trade in the particular good threatens national security.”1309 It is 
argued that Article XXI offers a unacceptably broad exception to the General Agreement and it 
has been described as a unilateral provision:1310 “a virtually unlimited escape clause”;1311 “an all-
embracing exception”; as containing “vague terms”;1312 “ambiguous language”1313 and “broadly 
tailored exceptions.”1314 A more pragmatic view is taken by Schloemann and Ohlhoff, who argue 
that Article XXI “contains various open legal terms.”1315 Writers have also attacked the exception 
owing to its subjective wording. As a result, Article XXI has invited invectives such as 
“bogeyman” defence1316 or “a dangerous loophole.”1317 Its use has been described as “disturbing” 
and the questions its use raises as “troubling.”1318 Bhala describes the provision as “a weak 
restraint on the behaviour of members with regard to the enactment of national security 
sanctions.”1319 Jackson regards the language as being “so nebulous as to make exact definitions 
impossible.”1320 Whitt even suggests that the provision should be redrafted.1321 However, not all 
writers view the wording of Article XXI negatively. Lindsay argues that the ambiguity was 
intentional and has proved constructive.1322 The wording offers a flexibility without which the 
GATT could not operate. The following investigation adopts the view of the wording taken by 
                                                                                                                                                                
69, who asserts that “actions taken under Article XXI have always been subject to a certain level of review under 
GATT’s dispute resolution mechanism”. The only explicit Panel enquiry into the meaning of Article XXI is obiter in 
Panel, Nicaragua – United States II case (supra n. 1195).  
1309
 Michael Gaugh, GATT Article XXI and US Export Controls: The Invalidity of Non-Essential Non-Proliferation 
Controls, 8 N.Y. INT’L REV. 51, p. 68 
1310
 Richard Sutherland Whitt, The Politics of Procedure: An Examination of the GATT Dispute Settlement Panel and 
the Article XXI Defense in the Context of the U.S. Embargo of Nicaragua, 19 LAW AND POL’Y INT’L BUS. 603, p. 
616. 
1311
 David T. Shapiro, Be Careful What You Wish For: U.S. Politics and the Future of the National Security 
Exception to the GATT, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 97, p. 98. 
1312
 Id.; see also Piczak, p. 320, who considers the term “emergency in international relations” could be regarded as 
“so vague that it defies judicial determination.” 
1313
 Whitt, p. 605.  
1314
 Hahn, p. 559.  
1315
 Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 427.  
1316
 See Spanogle, p. 1316. 
1317
 See JACKSON, p. 748. 
1318
 Whitt, pp. 604, 619. 
1319
 Bhala, (supra n. 44), p. 265 
1320
 JACKSON, p. 744.  
1321
 Whitt, pp. 630 – 631.  
1322
 See Lindsay, p. 1312. 
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Schloemann and Ohlhoff (i.e. as “open legal terms”) and attempts to interpret Article XXI with 
reference to the jurisprudence on Article XX whilst taking differences between the two 
provisions into account. 
 
The way that writers assess the wording of the national security exception is of crucial 
importance for their investigation. Holding that the wording is ambiguous allows writers to break 
free from the confines of the text and refer to supplementary materials in support of their own 
interpretations.1323 In fact, the reference to supplementary materials is so frequent, that the 
question arises as to what extent the preparatory materials should be allowed to influence the 
interpretation of Article XXI, especially as they are relegated to secondary status in Article 32 
VCLT.1324  As commentators have pointed out, reference to such materials is highly controversial 
owing to the fact that they are simply records of negotiations and do not represent the final 
consensus.1325 It is also noticeable that writers tend to rely on the excerpts published in the GATT 
Analytical Index. Whereas these are informative, the context within which these comments were 
made is missing and, as isolated comments, do not form a coherent commentary to the drafting 
process.1326 Moreover, writers draw contradictory inferences from these preparatory materials.1327  
 
Concerning the subjective elements of the wording, most writers agree that member states have 
the right to decide whether a measure is necessary but that it does not have unlimited discretion 
within the decision-making process.1328 Some commentators regard the term “necessary” as 
                                                  
1323
 See Browne, p. 423 (“[A]s the meaning of the terms is still arguably ambiguous, it would be appropriate to 
examine the preparatory works of the treaty”). 
1324
 Modern WTO law clearly places emphasis on the ordinary textual meaning of the provision. See Steinberg, p. 
261. Appellate Body, U.S. – Shrimp, para. 114 (establishing a hierarchy of interpretation emphatically placing the 
ordinary meaning first, followed by object and purpose); contra Hahn, p. 564 (“[A]n analysis of a treaty provision 
may begin with an overview of the pertinent preparatory work and the history of its application.”); see also Browne, 
at p. 410, who starts analysis by referring to a statement by a drafter of the original charter.  
1325
 Id.; cf. supra n.1293.  
1326
 See e.g. Browne, p. 411, who links the comments made by a drafter with those made by the Chairman of the 
Committee by describing the latter as “the best solution.”  
1327
 E.g., Hahn pp. 568 – 569 who regards the preparatory works as evidence that Article XXI was to be a limited 
exception. On the other hand, Browne at pp. 412 – 413, sees the statements from the GATT’s preparatory works and 
negotiating history as suggesting that the security exception “should preclude review altogether.” See also 
Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 442.  
1328
 See Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 442 (on the meaning of “considering”); Browne, p. 426 (concerning security 
measures with extraterritorial effect); Akande and Williams, p. 398 (pointing out that Article XXI (a) allows a party 
to define its essential security interests free of review). 
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setting a standard which the member state must meet.1329 For that reason, the measure must be 
subject to examination in order to ensure that the exception is not abused. The term “essential 
security interests” potentially embraces a wide range of interests1330 but writers tend to limit its 
scope excluding, in particular, economic measures.1331 Some writers advocate an objective 
review of whether the measure amounts to an “essential security interest”1332 and, even, whether 
the measure is necessary.1333 They see different ways of achieving this, including the borrowing 
of interpretative methodology from Article XX panel decisions1334 or the adoption of a good faith 
test.1335 One example which is often cited as an abuse of the provision for protectionist purposes 
is the Swedish Footwear case.1336 This aspect is significant for the CSI which was primarily 
introduced to prevent the economic devastation that a terrorist attack at a seaport would cause.1337 
 
Many writers suggest adopting a test of reasonableness in order to prevent cases of abuse. Bhala 
suggests introducing a “reasonable state standard” which would assess the existence of a credible 
threat according to the situation of a state in a similar position.1338 Schloemann and Ohlhoff also 
suggest that the measure should be subject to a test of good faith but do not provide an 
accompanying conceptual framework.1339 Both suggestions are rejected by Akande and Williams 
who argue that neither approach is supported by the text of the provision and, in any case, such a 
test is unnecessary considering the objective threshold requirements of Article XX(b)(i) – (iii). 
However, they agree that there should be a limited review of good faith.1340 Incidentally, their 
                                                  
1329
 Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 445. 
1330
 Cf. Hahn at p. 580 (“The ‘essential security interests’ covered by Article XXI, however, […] address the 
immediate political-military conditions that a state deems important for its position in the world which are outside 
the regular scope of GATT”). See also Piczak, p. 324, arguing that threats to a nation’s “essential security interests” 
can come in forms other than an armed conflict. 
1331
 Cf. Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 444 (Article XXI  does not include economic interest); Hahn, p. 580 
(distinguishing between economic security and “essential security interests”); Whitt, p. 616. 
1332
 See Hahn, p. 582 (objective review of context in which the measure was taken): but see ASSESSMENT OF THE 
BRITISH GOVERNMENT (supra n. 85); Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 444 (objective review of whether the measure is 
an economic security measure); Akande and Williams, p. 398 – 399 (objective review of Article XXI (b) (i) – (iii)).  
1333
 Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 443; Browne, pp. 421 et seq.; contra Akande and Williams, p. 386. 
1334
 Browne, p. 432; Schloemann and Ohlhoff, pp. 438 – 439. 
1335
 Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 448; contra Akande and Williams, p. 392. 
1336
 E.g. Hahn, pp. 580 – 581. 
1337
 Introduction, CSI STRATEGIC PLAN (“Begun in January 2002, CSI is a multinational programme protecting the 
primary system of global trade—containerized shipping—from being exploited or disrupted by international 
terrorists”). 
1338
 Bhala (supra n. 44), p. 273.  
1339
 Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 448. 
1340
 Akande and Williams, p. 386. 
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view tends to overlook the fact that “fissionable materials” and “emergency in international 
relations” are potentially broad enough to be abused by member states (i.e., a trade-restrictive 
measure which is capable of preventing the proliferation of WMD).1341 Hahn rejects subjecting 
this provision to any test of necessity, arguing that the provision is subjectively worded which 
makes the necessity of a measure a question for the member state alone.1342 The following 
investigation adopts the same approach as Browne and Bhala, i.e. that the “necessary” should be 
based on the test of necessity established in relation to Article XX. It is based on the presumption 
that a balance between the subjective and limiting elements of Article XXI(b) GATT is best 
achieved by adopting an essentially objective standard of review which defers to the judgement 
of the member state with regard to a measure’s necessity in cases of doubt. 
 
Concerning the objective wording of the provision, writers tend to concentrate on Article 
XXI (b) (iii) regarding it as the most controversial provision. There is widespread agreement that 
Article XXI (b) (iii) should be narrowly interpreted according to objective criteria. For example, 
Shapiro argues that a situation of war or other emergency must exist before the state can rely on 
this provision.1343 This is expressly rejected by Bhala, who states that there is nothing in Article 
XXI that requires the danger or threat to have manifested itself,1344 (although the reference to “in 
time of” appears to contradict this statement). Schloemann and Ohlhoff, Akande and Williams and 
Hahn all argue that the term “war” cannot be interpreted unilaterally by the state concerned.1345 
Schloemann and Ohlhoff stress that the term “war” is potentially ambiguous and this argument 
appears supported by literature on this term since 9/11:1346 in particular, the “war against 
terrorism” arguably requires a reconsideration of the meaning of the term “war.”1347 There is 
general agreement that the term “other emergency” is susceptible to abuse owing to its ambiguity 
                                                  
1341
 See infra pp. 296 – 297.  
1342
 Id.; Hahn, p. 559. 
1343
 Shapiro, p. 113. 
1344
 BHALA p. 562; see also Ghana – Ban on Imports of Portuguese Goods (1961) L/1764, referred to in 
MTN.GNG/NG7/W/16, pp. 5 – 6.  
1345
 Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 445 (“[T]his determination is based on a long-established concept of international 
law and hence is prima facie a justiciable issue”); Akande and Williams, p. 400 (“If it is up to WTO members to 
unilaterally determine whether there is a war or other international emergency, then the scope for abuse of Article 
XXI is great indeed.”); Hahn, p. 586 (although cf. p. 587 “the definition of war must have recourse to the intentions 
of the parties involved”). 
1346
 See e.g. Louis Henkin, War and Terrorism: Law or Metaphor, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 817, p. 824. 
1347
 Infra pp. 298 – 300.  
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and writers advocate an objective interpretation of the provision.1348 Hahn argues that “other 
emergency in international relations” is not used “as a stand-alone term but as an annex to the 
term ‘war’.”1349 This would provide a means of reigning in the scope of this apparently broad and 
ambiguous term. On the other hand, Akande and Williams observe that other international 
tribunals have tended to accept the determination of the state with regard to the definition of this 
term.1350  
 
Significantly (for the purposes of the following investigation) Alexander points out that “national 
security is strongest not under Article XXI (b) (iii) but under Article XXI (b) (i) and (ii).1351 
These two articles receive relatively little attention from other writers, although Akande and 
Williams show that it can play an important role in the determination of the case as a whole and, 
more specifically, in the interpretation of Article XXI (b).1352 As argued below, the term “relating 
to fissionable materials” is potentially broad enough to justify CBP’s border-related counter-
terrorist measures, such as the PSI, CSI, MPI and SFI1353 and imposes a lower standard of proof 
than Article XXI (b) (iii).  
 
Another important piece of literature of relevance to the CSI is Stephen E. Flynn’s “America the 
Vulnerable.” This book provides an overview of the vulnerabilities in America’s national 
defences as it attempts to combat terrorism and has influenced the development of the CSI. In 
addition, considering that the subjective wording of Article XXI requires the Panel to consider 
national security from the point of view of the state invoking the measure, the various national 
security strategies of the United States will also be required reading for the Panel. The general 
opinion in available literature specifically relating to Article XXI GATT is that there is a need to 
control the invocation of Article XXI owing to the risk of abuse. Although the wording of the 
provision is widely regarded as unsatisfactory, it does offer the means to review the member 
                                                  
1348
 Schloemann and Ohlhoff, pp. 445 – 446 who assert that “This part of the provision has been used, and abused, in 
most actual Article XXI cases.” 
1349
 Hahn, p. 587 – 588.  
1350
 Akande and Williams, p. 40, referring to the practice of the European Commission and the European Court of 
Human Rights.  
1351
 See Klinton W. Alexander, The Helms-Burton Act and the WTO Challenge: Making a Case for the United States 
under the National Security Exception, 11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 559. 
1352
 Akande and Williams, p.394 and 398.  
1353
 See supra pp. 28 – 34. 
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state’s decision to adopt security measures. Views expressed in literature support the approach 
taken in this investigation, i.e. an objective-deferential review of Article XXI (b), an objective 
review of Article XXI (b) (i) – (iii) and a test of reasonableness. The following sections argue 
that the framework for implementing this approach can be constructed on the basis of the 
jurisprudence on Article XX as a basis.  
 
1.7. Intermediate Result 
 
The results of the investigation are: 
 
1. The Panel has jurisdiction to review Article XXI 
There is nothing in the GATT that suggests that the Panel does not have jurisdiction to 
investigate Article XXI. In addition, jurisdiction is supported by XXIII:1 and 2 of the GATT, a 
number of provisions in the DSU, a decision by the GATT Secretariat  as well as GATT 
jurisprudence (pp. 224 – 227).  
 
According to the remarks of the Panel in the Nicaragua II case, Panels must have jurisdiction to 
review an invocation of Article XXI in order to balance the interests between the Complainant 
and Defendant that this provision protects (p. 226). 
 
Only the DSB has jurisdiction to interpret Article XXI (p. 224). Once dispute settlement 
proceedings have been initiated, the standard terms of review under Article 7.1 DSU means that 
member states cannot prevent the Panel from considering Article XXI by manipulating the terms 
of reference (pp. 225, 227) If the WTO is to exist as a rules-based organization, member states 
cannot be allowed to determine the limits of WTO jurisdiction or the interpretation of provisions 
unilaterally.  
 
2. Article XXI is justiciable 
The statement “nothing in this agreement shall prevent a member state…” does not mean that the 
provision is self-justifying. This is because Article XXI contains clear qualifications to the 
subjective wording in Article XXI (a) and (b) as well as wholly objective criteria in sub-
paragraphs i) – iii). As a result, the Panel’s description of Article XX, as representing a “limited 
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and conditional exception to the general obligations”1354 equally applies to the security exception 
(pp- 228 – 229). 
 
Justiciability also appears to be supported by the historical materials (p. 230) and GATT 
jurisprudence (particularly in relation to the terms “necessary” and “essential” that lay down a 
high standard that states must attain) (p. 230). Considering that the terms “necessary” and 
“essential” have been included to protect the rights of other members against gratuitous use of the 
national security exception, the Panel must be able to verify the adequacy of the evidence 
submitted.  
 
A self-justifying provision would grant member states too much discretion and could lead to 
larger states using their economic power to deprive other members of their rights (p.231).  
 
3. The Complainant bears the burden of proof but a deliberately narrow interpretation of 
provisions (i.e. regardless of the ordinary meaning of the text) is no longer tenable 
The requirement that the complainant bears the burden of proof is expressly supported by 
jurisprudence of the Panel and Appellate Body (pp. 232 – 233).  
 
This is also supported by the rules of interpretation contained in the VCLT and rulings of the 
Appellate Body that support a textual interpretation of treaty provisions (p. 234 - 235). Moreover, 
the ruling of the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp advocates an evolutionary interpretation that 
directly contradicts a “narrow” interpretation of provisions (p. 235). A narrow interpretation is 
also opposed by the effet utile doctrine (p. 237) 
 
4. The standard of review should balance the subjective and objective elements of Article 
XXI whilst deferring to the member state invoking Article XXI in cases of doubt 
Like the general obligations of the GATT already examined,1355 Article XXI attempts to strike a 
balance between member states’ national interests and their obligations arising under the general 
agreement.1356 It does this by using a mixture of subjective and objective wording.1357  
                                                  
1354
 Panel, U.S. Tuna  I, para 5.22. 
1355
 Most notably, the customs-related provisions of Articles V, VIII and X. 
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In order to achieve this balance between subjective and objective elements, the Panel should 
interpret Article XXI (b) (i) – (iii) objectively in accordance with Article 11 DSU but defer to the 
judgement of the member states in relation to the subjectively worded necessity of measures and 
essentiality of security interests in Article XXI (b), provided that the member state in question 
submits sufficient scientific evidence substantiating its claims. A basis for such an approach is 
provided by the principle in dubio mitius that is recognized by WTO law (p.240). 
 
5. The Panel cannot be prevented from considering a complaint about national security  
Following consultations, the dispute settlement procedure runs automatically. Although members 
are admonished by the DSU to ensure that a dispute results in a positive solution and to consider 
whether actions would be fruitful, there is nothing that can prevent a member bringing a 
complaint concerning the national security measures of another state (p.242). 
 
The Helms-Burton dispute suggests that the sensitivity of national security could convince the 
United States to refuse to either participate in proceedings or comply with any adverse ruling 
from the Panel (p. 242). However, this is only relevant to the extent that it may persuade a 
member state not to initiate proceedings in the first place because such a complaint would not be 
fruitful (p.243).  
 
In this respect, the political question doctrine1358 and judicial activism1359 cannot regarded as 
plausible arguments against the jurisdiction of Panels or the Appellate Body to ensure member 
states’ compliance with treaty obligations or interpret texts in light of new circumstances.1360 On 
the one hand, they reflect national constitutional structures (p. 246) and, more particularly, the 
characteristics of the common law legal system (p. 247). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
1356
 See BHALA. p. 561, para. 20-009. 
1357
 See supra pp. 228 - 231.  
1358
 Concerning the application of this principle in relation to Article XXI see Piczak, pp. 318 – 319.   
1359
 See generally Ragosta et al. 
1360
 Although cf. Ragosta et al at p. 707, who correctly draw attention to the potential pitfall of the AB’s 
“evolutionary interpretation”: (“By this reading, the terms of the negotiated agreements could “evolve” into 
something that none of the original parties to the agreements ever anticipated”). However, this pitfall is not only due 
to “judicial activism” but also the ambiguous wording of the WTO Agreements.  
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6. Informal dispute settlement may play an important role in deciding sensitive issues 
In view of the controversy of Article XXI, informal dispute settlement could also play an 
important role in avoiding a potentially damaging trade dispute1361 and should be encouraged.1362  
 
The Helms-Burton dispute between the EU and US showed that even sensitive issues like 
national security can be decided through informal settlement. It also shows that member states 
may also sense when an action may not be fruitful – not only with regard to their own interests 
but also with regard to the interests of the WTO, from whose membership they ultimately 
profit.1363 On the other hand, it is questionable whether informal dispute settlement would be 
effective when the member states in dispute have unequal trade power.  
 
2. The Requirements of Article XXI 
 
This section examines the requirements contained in Article XXI (a) and (b) which relate to 
information and the conditions under which measures relating to national security can be taken. 
The investigation does not include Article XXI (c) because the CSI is a unilateral measure which 
aims to protect the seaports of the United States rather than international peace and security. This 
is made clear by the underlying strategy of the CBP, which is to “push the borders outwards.”  
 
The investigation interprets the national security exception according to the rules contained in 
Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. In particular, it uses the contextual interpretation as a basis for 
referring to decisions of the Panel and Appellate Body on Article XX in order to create a 
framework for the interpretation of Article XXI. The structure of the investigation reflects that 
                                                  
1361
 An example of the problems this cause was the dispute between the European Union and the United States 
concerning the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996. The escalation of this 
essentially political dispute could have had serious consequences for the then fledgling dispute settlement system. 
Although the EU initiated Panel proceedings, the parties eventually decided on an informal settlement. On the one 
hand, this example shows the strength of the new system in that both parties were prepared to use the DSU to its 
fullest extent. See JAMES CAMERON AND KAREN CAMPBELL, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE WTO (1998), p. 34.  
1362
 The need for member states to seek a negotiated settlement rather than automatically resorting to the WTO 
dispute settlement process was underlined by a joint statement of former directors-general of the GATT/WTO in 
2001: see WTO News Item: Joint Statement of Dunkel, Sutherland and Ruggiero, 2001. The authors state “Litigation 
in trade matters is not, and must not become, an automatic alternative to negotiation.” 
1363
 Lindsay, pp. 1299 – 1300.  
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developed by the Panel and Appellate Body in relation to Article XX (b).1364 The scope of Article 
XXI (a) is examined as a preliminary step to the main investigation because the right to withhold 
confidential information can be invoked by the defendant state during any stage of the 
proceedings. The first stage then examines whether the measure falls within the situations listed 
in Article XXI (b) (i) – (iii).1365 The second stage examines whether the interests protected by the 
provision can be considered “essential security interests” and is followed by a necessity test 
similar to that applied in Article XX. In this respect it is argued that the Panel should adopt an 
objective standard of review whilst respecting the subjective wording by means of the in dubio 
mitius principle. The final stage of investigation applies the abus des droit doctrine similar to that 
found in the chapeau to Article XX, which ensures that the application of the measure does not 
constitute an abuse of the national security exception. Such an examination is not supported by 
the express wording of the provision,1366 but the doctrine represents customary international law 
and its application within the context of Article XXI is supported by the context, aims and 
objectives of the provision as well as its drafting history.1367 
 
2.1. Article XXI(a) 
 
Article XXI (a) permits member states to maintain the confidentiality of information whose 
disclosure would threaten national security. Seaports are classified as critical infrastructure and 
information relating to maritime security is protected by statute.1368 In this connection, experience 
has shown that the special procedures that the Panel can offer for dealing with confidential 
information may not prove sufficient for the state to disclose such information.1369  
                                                  
1364
 Most notably, Schloemann and Ohlhoff, pp. 449 – 450; Akande and Williams, pp. 399 ff. 
1365
 Appellate Body, U.S. – Gasoline, pp. 30 – 31. 
1366
 Appellate Body, U.S. – Shrimp, para. 116 (“The purpose and object of the introductory clauses of Article XX is 
generally the prevention of  'abuse of the exceptions of [Article XX]'.”). 
1367
 See generally MTN.GNG/NG7/W/16. 
1368
 Section 214 of the Homeland Security Act 2002, protects the secrecy of information in relation to critical 
infrastructure which also includes seaports. 46 U.S.C. 70103(d) (as implemented by 49 CFR Part 1520) requires that 
maritime security information, especially security assessments and plans, be protected from unauthorized access or 
disclosure. On the protection of infrastructure information see TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS SECTOR SPECIFIC PLAN, p. 
38. 
1369
 Appellate Body, US – Wheat Gluten paras. 8.7 – 8.12 (where the Panel’s extensive “Procedures Governing 
Private Confidential Information” did not convince the United States to submit the confidential information); see also 
MAVROIDIS (supra  n. 1089 ), p. 173 
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The effect of Article XXI (a) in proceedings should not be underestimated: it could limit the 
Panel’s review of Article XXI by allowing the member state to withhold information crucial to 
resolving the dispute1370 and can also influence the interpretation of Article XXI (b).1371 One 
commentator claims that generally there has been an over-reliance on secrecy by bureaucrats in 
the United States, a tendency which has increased since 9/11: 
 
“Historically, secrecy has continued well beyond identifiable crises, becoming entrenched in 
even routine matters. The fact that government officials believe the country has subsisted in a 
constantly threatened state for much of the last 50 years due to the Cold War and terrorism […] 
suggests that executive officials will continue to invoke the national security rationale to justify 
even greater withholding of government information.”1372 
 
The decision to invoke Article XXI (a) is not wholly determined by the executive: as stated 
earlier, information relating to national security is highly classified and governments make 
related decisions on the advice of their intelligence services.1373 
 
Concerning the interpretation of Article XXI (a), a wholly subjective interpretation of the 
provision must be rejected for two reasons: first, if member state could invoke Article XXI (a) 
without justification, it could effectively choke the Panel’s review of Article XXI without 
suffering any prejudice to its case.1374 Second, the qualifications in the provision require the 
member state to prove to the Panel, on the one hand, that there is a sufficient connection between 
the information and its essential security interests and, on the other, that disclosure would 
prejudice those interests.1375 In this respect, the review of Article XXI (a) may require a 
consideration of U.S. legislation governing secrecy (i.e. the Freedom of Information Act 1966 (as 
amended)). As pointed out above, the Panel has authority to interpret domestic legislation during 
                                                  
1370
 See United States – Czechoslovakia, GATT/CP.3/38, p. 9. 
1371
 See Akande and Williams, p. 398 (with regard to the question of whether a state’s “essential security interests” 
are at issue). 
1372
 See Christina E. Wells, “National Security Information” and the Freedom of Information Act, 56 ADMIN. L. 
REV., 1195, p. 1197.  
1373
 See FLYNN, p. 160. 
1374
 See Akande and Williams, p. 394. 
1375
 For example, the United States would probably be justified in withholding the information about the rules used 
by the NTC to assess the risk of containers. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the Panel would accept it 
withholding information on the penalties assessed for infringements of the 24 Hour Rule.  
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the course of its review. However, such a review would have to consider the definition of 
“national security” according to national legislation and jurisprudence, the various classes of 
information (i.e. sensitive but not classified information), memoranda issued by the executive, the 
subjects which the classified information relates to, as well as the way the courts have interpreted 
the provision in the United States.  
 
Another observation to be made about Article XXI (a) is that it does not apply to the DSU.1376 
Accordingly, Article XXI (a) does not exempt member states from their obligation to co-operate 
with a complainant in order to uncover the truth by placing material evidence before the tribunal, 
as required by Article 3.10 DSU and elaborated by the Panel in Argentina – Footwear.1377 Article 
23 also requires members to “have recourse to and abide by, the rules and procedures of the 
DSU” when seeking redress for a violation complaint. 
 
Considering the fact-finding function of the Panel and the obligation of member states to 
collaborate in proceedings, the question arises as to how the Panel should react to an unjustified 
invocation of Article XXI (a). Assuming that the exercise of Article XXI (a) is subject to review 
in line with the other provisions of the security exception, there is a possibility that the Panel 
could draw negative inferences from the exercise of this right if it believes the defendant is 
refusing to collaborate or otherwise abusing the provision.1378 This issue was addressed by the 
Appellate Body in Canada – Aircraft: 
 
“[A] party's refusal to collaborate has the potential to undermine the functioning of the dispute 
settlement system. The continued viability of that system depends, in substantial measure, on the 
willingness of panels to take all steps open to them to induce the parties to the dispute to comply 
with their duty to provide information deemed necessary for dispute settlement. In particular, a 
panel should be willing expressly to remind parties – during the course of dispute settlement 
                                                  
1376
 Schloemann and Ohlhoff, pp. 439 – 440 (arguing that if the national security exception did apply to the DSU, 
member states would be able to block dispute settlement proceedings within the WTO). 
1377
 Panel, Argentina – Footwear, para.6.40; see also Pauwelyn, p. 233. 
1378
 See Mavroidis, Development of WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures Through Case-Law (We Will Fix It), in, 
THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995 – 2003, (Frederico Ortino and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, (eds.), 
Klwuer Law International, The Hague, 2004, pp. 172 ff.  
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proceedings – that a refusal to provide information requested by the panel may lead to inferences 
being drawn about the inculpatory character of the information withheld.”1379 
 
Accordingly, the Panel could draw a negative inference if it holds that the information in question 
contains evidence prejudicial to the party’s claim or denial.1380 
 
2.2. Situations Covered by Article XXI(b) (i) & (iii) 
 
The United States is most likely to base its defence on Article XXI (b) (i) and (iii) and so the 
following sections concentrate on examining the requirements of these provisions. Article XXI 
only allows states to invoke the security exception in relation to specific objects or in concrete 
situations.1381 Commentators have argued that these provisions should be examined first because 
they allow cases which do not fall within the scope of the provision to be excluded at the 
outset.1382 The first two sub-clauses deal with objects of protection whereas Article XXI(b)(iii) 
deals with actual situations pertaining at the time the measure is taken. As explained above, these 
provisions are to be interpreted objectively.1383 
 
2.2.1. “War” 
 
Situations of “war” and “peace” must be defined accurately considering the repercussions that the 
distinction has on society in general1384 and throughout history, jurists (e.g. Cicero, Thomas 
                                                  
1379
 See Report of the Appellate Body, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, 
WT/DS70/AB/R, 2 August 1999 (adopted on 20 August 1999), para. 204.   
1380
 Id., para. 205.  
1381
 In the disputes involving Article XXI the complainants also based their arguments on the objective limitations to 
Article XXI. In U.S. – Czechoslovakia, the complainant argued that the United States was unjustified in claiming the 
national security exception. In Nicargua II, the complainant argued that the provision did not present a blanket 
exception but could only be invoked  if the measure in question was necessary for the protection of essential security 
interests and taken in a time of war or other emergency in international relations. See infra nn. 1501 and 1195, 
respectively. See also supra nn. 1799 and 1800. 
1382
 See Akande and Williams, p. 399.  
1383
 Id., p. 398 attach greatest weight to this section, arguing that determining the meaning of these sub-paragraphs 
will effectively determine the meaning of “essential security interests”, owing to the close connection between them. 
Therefore, this section should be examined first. See also Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 445. 
1384
 See Mary Ellen O’Connell When is a War Not a War? The Myth of the Global War on Terror, 12 ILSA J. INTL. 
& COMP. L. 535, p. 535.  
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Acquinas and Hugo Grotius1385) have attempted to define and regulate these terms.1386  For 
example, one commentator defines “war” as follows: 
 
“War is a sustained struggle by armed force of certain intensity between groups of a certain size, 
consisting of individuals who are armed, who wear distinctive insignia and who are subjected to 
military discipline under responsible command.”1387 
 
In the post-war period, the use of force in international relations has been regulated by the 
Charter of the United Nations.1388 This instrument only uses the term “war” once, in the preamble 
in reference to the U.N.’s overarching aim of saving “succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”1389 The lack of reference 
to “war” reflects the aim of the Charter to outlaw the use of force in international relations 
according to Article 2 (4): 
 
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 
 
Although international law does not provide a universal definition of “war” commentators argue 
that the Panel should define the term “war” in Article XXI objectively in accordance with its 
accepted meaning in international law.1390 Both the WTO agreements1391 and jurisprudence1392 
                                                  
1385
 For an overview of the historical development of the law of war see < www.lawofwar.org > (website maintained 
by Prof. Evan J. Wallach). 
1386
 See Henkin, p. 818 who states that “their careless and metaphoric use […] threatens to confuse and dilute their 
significance in international law.” 
1387
 See INGRID DETTER, THE WAR OF LAW, CAMBRIDGE 2000, p. 27. 
1388
 See Allen S. Weiner, The Use of Force and Contemporary Security Threats: Old Medicine For New Ills? 59 
STAN. L. REV. 415, who states at p. 418, “The international law rules and institutional arrangements that today 
govern the international use of force are based on the norms and structures established in the U.N. Charter at the end 
of the Second World War.” See also Henkin, p. 824. 
1389
 By contrast with the UN Charter, the GATT retains the term “war.” This is a curious choice of words seeing as it 
refers to the Charter of the United Nations in Article XXI (c). Moreover, the choice of wording appears deliberate 
because the language of Article XIVbis of the GATS and Article 73 of the TRIPS simply repeat Article XXI of the 
GATT ad verbatim. The TBT Agreement on the other hand, makes no mention of the term “war” and simply refers 
to “national security.” The obvious question which arises is whether the two treaties are referring to the same thing. 
1390
 See Schloemann and Ohloff pp. 445 - 456; Hahn, pp. 586 – 587; Akande and Williams 400 – 402 (all of whom 
argue that the term is justiciable and a term of public international law, despite not being ideally clear). 
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make clear that when interpreting WTO law, reference must be made to international law and the 
United Nations Charter in particular.1393 Article 103 of the UN Charter also states that, in the 
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the 
Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, the latter are to prevail.1394  
 
The major provision dealing with what may be termed a “war” situation is Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, which forms one of two exceptions to the general principle contained in Article 2 (4). 
This states that:  
 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” 
 
The UN Charter continues the attempts of historical jurists to regulate and control the legality of 
war. By requiring an armed attack to have occurred, the provision outlaws pre-emptive strikes 
and effectively reduces a declaration of “war” to a counter-attack.1395 Article XXI also refers to 
“at a time of war”, thereby requiring a state of war to exist before the measure has been taken.   
 
The wording used in the UN Charter is ambiguous and capable of a broad interpretation. For 
example the wording permits states to act unilaterally and without prior approval from the UN 
Security Council. It also departs from traditional definitions of war because it does not require the 
armed attack to be carried out by state actors or by a regular army or militia. For this reason, the 
United States could argue that the Panel apply the “evolutionary interpretation” principle to adapt 
                                                                                                                                                                
1391
 Article 3.2. DSU orders that WTO law must be interpreted in accordance with customary rules used in the 
interpretation of international law. According to Article III. 5, Article V:1 empowers the General Council to take 
suitable steps in the interests of effective co-operation with other international organizations.  
1392
 Appellate Body, U.S. – Gasoline, p. 17 (stating that the WTO Agreement “cannot be read in clinical isolation 
from public international law”). See also, Panel, U.S. – Shrimp, para. 129 (terms must be interpreted in light of their 
contemporary meaning).  
1393
 See Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of 
International Law or its Fragmentation? 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 929, p. 937, quoting Judge Oda, who, in reference to the 
law of the sea, stated “If the development of the law of the sea were to be separated from the general rules of 
international law and placed under a separate judicial authority, this could lead to the destruction of the very 
foundation of international law.”  
1394
 See Weiner supra n. 1388. 
1395
 See O’Connell, p. 538. 
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the concept of war to modern-day circumstances.1396 However, this is to be rejected because the 
purpose of the UN Charter was not to broaden the definition of war and, thereby, the legitimacy 
of armed intervention. Under international law, the term “war” is to be interpreted restrictively.  
 
2.2.2. Emergency in International Relations 
 
The term “emergency in international relations” is more ambiguous than the term “war.” 
However, this is a situation which must also exist before the state can introduce the security 
measure in question. Whereas the Panel can refer to the leading definitions of international law to 
interpret the meaning of “war”, the meaning of “emergency in international relations” is less well 
documented.1397  
 
The ordinary dictionary meaning of “emergency” refers to “a situation demanding immediate 
action” or “a crisis.” According to some commentators, the context of Article XXI suggests a 
situation related to war which would exclude ordinary political tensions between states.1398 
Considering that the Container Security Initiative is a counter-terrorist measure,1399 the question 
therefore arises whether, in the post-9/11 world, international terrorism could be considered as 
constituting an emergency in international relations. Unlike “war”, there does not appear to be 
any practice under international law for interpreting this term restrictively and so the Panel could 
adopt the evolutionary interpretation of the Appellate Body in order to ascertain the status of 
international terrorism.   
 
The Security Council’s use of the term “terrorism” in its resolutions is controversial because it 
has failed to define the term1400 owing to the lack of consensus between member states. However, 
there does appear to be consensus about the destructive capabilities of terrorists, particularly 
since 9/11. Accordingly, reference to the various legal instruments of the United Nations clearly 
                                                  
1396
 See Frank A. Biggo, Neutralizing the Threat: Reconsidering Existing Doctrines in the Emerging War on 
Terrorism, 34 Case W. Res. J. Intl’L.1, pp. 17 – 18. 
1397
 Hahn, p. 587, Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 484; Akande and Williams, p. 399. 
1398
 Ohlhoff. p. 446; Hahn, p. 588, (describing the term as an “annex to the term war”). 
1399
 According to CBP, “CSI addresses the threat to border security and global trade that is posed by potential 
terrorist use of a maritime container to deliver a weapon.”  See CSI FACT SHEET, 30 September 2006, p. 1. 
1400
 See Ben Saul, Definition of ‘Terrorism’ in the UN Security Council: 1985 – 2004, 4 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 141, pp. 
157 – 161. 
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shows that international terrorism is capable of creating an emergency in international relations. 
Following 9/11, the Security Council issued Resolution 1368, which denounced the attack “like 
any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security.” According to 
Resolution 1456 (2003), terrorism “constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and 
security” and that “it has become easier, in an increasingly globalized world for terrorists to 
exploit sophisticated technology, communications and resources for their criminal objectives.” 
As a result, acts of international terrorism and their support by a state may constitute a threat to 
international peace and security pursuant to Article 39, Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
 
2.2.3. Fissionable Materials  
 
In line with the other terms used in Article XXI (b) (i) – (iii), commentators argue that 
“fissionable materials” should be defined objectively. The definition and accepted handling of 
such materials is quite well documented in international law owing to various international 
agreements.  
 
“Fissionable material” is often used as a synonym for “fissile material” which is defined “as 
material which can be fissioned by fast neutrons, including uranium 238.”1401 The provision does 
not limit the use of such material to situations of war or peace and so its scope could be quite 
broad. For example, it is conceivable that a state may invoke this provision in connection with the 
1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material which regulates the safe 
transportation of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes.1402  
 
Fissionable materials can also be used in the construction of nuclear weapons, which form part of 
a group of weapons known collectively as “Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Owing to their 
uniquely devastating effects, they are considered the most dangerous form of WMD and their use 
is tightly monitored and regulated.1403  For example, the 1968 Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
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 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Glossary: < http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-
ref/glossary.html >. 
1402
 Article 2(1) of the Convention applies to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international 
nuclear transportation. 
1403
 See International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
General List No. 95, 8 July 1996, “In […] order correctly to apply to the present case the Charter law on the use of 
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Nuclear Weapons seeks to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons which could increase the 
danger of nuclear war.1404 In Resolution 1540 (2004),1405 the United Nations’ Security Council 
stated that the “proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means 
of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.” Acting under its Chapter VII 
powers, the Security Council decided that all states were to “adopt and enforce appropriate 
effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, 
transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in 
particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, 
participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them.”1406  
 
Article XXI (b) (i) (unlike sub-paragraph (iii)) does not refer to an event that has already 
materialized and so does not prevent states from taking measures that pre-empt the use or traffic 
in fissionable materials. Recent events have shown that states take pre-emptive measures on the 
advice of their intelligence services based on their interpretation of raw data.1407  
 
Article XXI (b) (i) arguably imposes a lower burden of proof on the party invoking the security 
exception than sub-paragraph (iii) in that the state must only prove that the measure is “relating 
to” fissionable materials. On the other hand, reference to the jurisprudence on Article XX(g) 
shows that such terms can also facilitate a narrow interpretation. On the basis of a contextual 
interpretation, the Panel in Canada – Salmon and Herring restricted the scope of “relating to” by 
interpreting it to mean “primarily aimed at” the conservation of natural resources. This 
                                                                                                                                                                
force and the law applicable in armed conflict, in particular humanitarian law, it is imperative for the Court to take 
account of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in particular their destructive capacity, their capacity to 
cause untold human suffering, and their ability to cause damage to generations to come.” 
1404
 Article I of this Treaty states: “Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any 
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive 
devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons 
or explosive devices.” 
1405
 S/RES/1540 stresses the need for all member states to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and 
disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction. The resolution also 
recognized the threat that terrorists may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 
and their means of delivery. Last but not least, it recognizes the urgent need for all States to take additional effective 
measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. 
1406
 The need to prevent WMD falling into the hands of terrorists is also reflected in The United Nations Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy (adopted on 8 September 2006), Annex, Paragraph II (Measures to Prevent and Combat 
Terrorism) point 5 (international co-operation) point 13 (national efforts).  
1407
 See ASSESSMENT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, p. 3.  
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corresponded to the lower standard which the wording in Art.XX (g) implied whilst restricting 
the trade measures that fell within its scope.1408 One could argue that it is no longer possible to 
adopt such a narrow interpretation in respect of the exceptions following the ruling of the 
Appellate Body in EC - Hormones.1409 According to one commentator, “[t]his reading of the 
GATT is inconsistent with a plain reading of the words of the agreement and significantly 
reduces the coverage of Article XX(g) to regulations that are solely intended to conserve the 
resource.”1410 On the other hand, it could also be assumed that the function of “relating to” – like 
“necessary” – is to describe relationship between the measure and the protected interest and it is 
therefore capable of a range of meanings. In particular, considering that dispute settlement organs 
have interpreted “necessary” according to its legal meaning there appears no reason why a 
similarly legal interpretation could not be applied to “relating to.”  Indeed, this would appear to 
be the only option because interpreting “relating to” according to its ordinary meaning would 
widen the scope of Article XXI (b) (i) unacceptably insofar as member states could justify any 
counter-terrorist measure as “relating to” the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear WMD by 
terrorists.  
 
2.3. Is the Security Interest “Essential”? 
 
The question arises as to what extent the term “its essential security interests” in Article XXI (b) 
is capable of review by the Panel. Commentators have argued that the term “essential” is a 
limiting factor and, as such, justiciable.1411 Despite its subjective wording, the scope of the 
interests protected by the provision is limited:1412 the historical materials make clear that the 
drafters perceived the need for an exception but did not intend to create an unlimited exception. 
On the other hand, some commentators find such an interpretation difficult to reconcile with 
                                                  
1408
 See Report of the Panel, Canada – Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, adopted on 
22 March 1988 (L/S6268 – 35S/98), paras. 4.5 – 4.6 (The Panel observed that the Preamble to Article XX “was not 
to widen the scope for measures serving trade policy purposes but merely to ensure that the commitments under the 
General Agreement do not hinder the pursuit of policies aimed at the conservation of exhaustive natural resources”).  
1409
 Supra n. 1238. 
1410
 See Brandon L. Bowen, The World Trade Organization and its Interpretation of the Article XX Exceptions to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, In Light of Recent Developments, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 181, p. 185. 
1411
 See Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 444. 
1412
 HAHN, at p. 297, who describes threats to essential security interests as having an especially serious adverse 
effect on the situation of the state, e.g. threats to its political or military independence or its defining characteristics; 
contra Schloemann and Ohlhoff, id. who state that “[a] wide range of legitimate ‘essential security interests’ are 
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Article XXI (a) which grants member states the right to decide what information to withhold 
from Panel review.1413 However, as argued above, Article XXI (a) similarly requires member 
states to prove that the information concerned relates to their “essential security interests.”  
 
There is little case law which provides guidance on the interpretation of “essential.” However, in 
Article XXI (b), and other provisions of the GATT it serves to establish the relationship between 
the state and the particular interest to be protected.1414 The choice of “essential” is deliberate: for 
example, Article XX uses a number of terms to describe this relationship, including “essential” 
(in paragraph (j)), “relating to”, “involving”, “for the protection of” and “in pursuance of.” The 
distinction between the terms was recognized by the Appellate Body in US – Gasoline:  
 
“It does not seem reasonable to suppose that the WTO Members intended to require, in respect of 
each and every category, the same kind or degree of connection or relationship between the 
measure under appraisal and the state interest or policy sought to be promoted or realized.”1415 
 
The meaning of “essential” therefore implies a standard which is higher than “relating to” and 
closer to “necessary.”1416 In this respect, it is significant that Article XII:3(b) and Article 
XVIII:10 even refer to “more essential”, thereby indicating that there are degrees of essentiality. 
Accordingly, the Panel should only examine whether the member state in question considered its 
essential security interests to be threatened.1417  
 
2.4. Extraterritoriality (Extrajurisdictionality)  
 
Article XXI differs from Article XX by prefacing the “essential interests” capable of protection 
with “its.”1418 If the use of “essential” relates to the importance of the interests, the use of the 
                                                  
1413
 Akande and Williams, p. 398.  
1414
 See Bradly J. Condon, GATT Article XX and Proximity of Interest – Determining the Subject Matter of 
Paragraphs (b) and (g), 9 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 137, pp. 142 – 144. 
1415
 Appellate Body, US – Gasoline, p. 18. 
1416
 See e.g. Panel, Canada – Herring and Salmon, BISD 35S/98, para. 4.6, (a trade measure has to be primarily 
aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource and not necessary or essential). 
1417
 Akande and Williams, p. 399. 
1418
 C.f. sub-paragraphs (a) – (f) of Article XX simply refer to interests of protection in the abstract. The only 
protected interests referred to in Article XXI(b) are “its essential security interests.” 
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possessive pronoun could be interpreted as indicating a requirement of a jurisdictional nexus 
between the state and the interest it seeks to protect. The question as to whether a state can 
protect interests lying outside its territory has arisen in a number of disputes. For example, in 
Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina, member states imposed trade embargos against Argentina 
in response to its invasion of the Falkland Islands and sought to justify them on the basis of 
Article XXI.1419 Argentina and its allies complained that Article XXI did not justify such action 
because the states were foreign to the conflict and therefore not seeking to protect their essential 
security interests.1420 The question of the extraterritorial application of laws is also important in 
relation to the CSI, considering that the CBP is attempting to protect national security by 
“pushing the borders outwards.”  
 
As far as the United States is concerned, the extraterritorial application of its laws is justified on 
the basis of the “effects doctrine.” This provides that the United States has jurisdiction where the 
conduct of a party in a foreign country produces “an effect” within its territory. The doctrine was 
elaborated in U.S. v. Aluminium Co. of America, a case which concerned antitrust law. The court 
stated that “any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for 
conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its border which the state 
reprehends.”1421 In later cases, the doctrine was modified owing to the opposition of other 
states.1422 However, the United States has issued many laws with extraterritorial effects, for 
example, the extension of sanctions against Cuba on the basis of the Cuban (LIBERTAD) of 
March 1996.1423  
 
Under international law, it is settled that a state’s laws primarily apply only within its own 
territory, insofar as its jurisdiction is defined and limited by the sovereign rights of other 
                                                  
1419
 C/M/157 supra n. 1265,  
1420
 Id. pp. 2 and 5.  
1421
 148 F.2d 416 (1945), at p. 443. Quoted in SHAW, p. 612. 
1422
 SHAW, p. 612. 
1423
 This Act provided for the institution of legal proceedings before the US courts against foreign persons or 
companies deemed to be trafficking in property expropriated by Cuba from American nationals. In particular, the 
European Community objected to the latter, stating that the U.S. claims were “contrary to the principles of 
international law and can only lead to clashes of both a political and legal nature. These subsidiaries, goods and 
technologies must be subject to the law of the country where they are located”. See Letter of the European 
Commission to the Congressional Committee, quoted in SHAW, p. 618. 
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states.1424 However, the situation pertaining to the extraterritorial application of national laws is 
less clear. In the Lotus Case, the International Court of Justice held that, although international 
law defines jurisdiction by reference to territory, this did not amount to a general prohibition 
against the extraterritorial application of laws. According to the court, there was no rule of 
international law to prevent a State from exercising jurisdiction over aliens with regard to crimes 
committed abroad.1425 The court stated that “[t]he territoriality of criminal law is not an absolute 
principle of international law and by no means coincides with territorial sovereignty.”1426 This 
ruling has not been generally accepted. For example, according to a later judgement of the 
European Court of Human Rights, “[w]hile international law does not exclude a State’s exercise 
of jurisdiction extraterritorially, the suggested bases of such jurisdiction are, as a general rule, 
defined and limited by the sovereign territorial rights of the other relevant states.”1427 According 
to one writer, “[s]uch an understanding of sovereignty would be the very denial of the existence 
of a legal community.”1428 
 
The extraterritorial application of laws has also been examined in GATT and WTO 
jurisprudence, most notably in two unadopted Panel reports concerning U.S. trade embargoes 
against states which failed to comply with U.S. statutory requirements for the import of tuna. In 
U.S. – Tuna/Dolphin I, the Panel did not use the term “extraterritoriality” but 
“extrajurisdictionality” instead.1429 According to some commentators, it thereby drew a 
distinction between the regulation of objects outside a state’s borders (extraterritoriality) and the 
regulation of such objects by means of controls on transactions at the border 
(extrajurisdictionality).1430 The Panel rejected the extrajurisdictional application of measures 
                                                  
1424
 The concept of sovereignty refers to the “exclusive competence of a state in regard to its own territory: Island of 
Palmas Case: Netherlands v. U.S. (1928) Permanent Court of Arbitration. Sole Arbitrator: Huber. 2 R.I.A.A. 829. 
Quoted in HARRIS, pp. 187 et seq.  
1425
 See WAINCYMER, p. 475. 
1426
 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus”, PCIJ Ser. A, No. 10, 1927. 
< http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.09.07_lotus/  >  
1427
 Bankovic v. Belgium et al No. 52207/99 (2001) 11 B.H.R.C. 435, DA, para. 50. The court also stated at para. 60, 
“[A] State may not actually exercise jurisdiction on the territory of another without the latter’s consent, invitation or 
acquiescence, unless the former is an occupying State in which case it can be found to exercise jurisdiction in that 
territory, at least in certain respects.” 
1428
 Rao, p. 940. 
1429
 Panel Report, US – Tuna I, para. 5.28. 
1430
 See Daniel C. Esty, Unpacking the Trade and Environment Conflict, 25 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1259, p. 1262 at 
n. 11 (with further references). Owing to the fact that the Declarations of Principles do not give CBP officers any 
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under Article XX (b) and (g) on the basis that one member could not unilaterally determine the 
environmental policies of another state.1431 In other words, the Panel based its ruling on the 
notion that there were inherent territorial limits on the environmental exceptions.1432  
 
In U.S. – Tuna/Dolphin II, the Panel permitted a limited extrajurisdictional application of 
measures insofar as they regulated the external activities of nationals from the regulating state.1433 
It held that the General Agreement did not proscribe “in an absolute manner measures that related 
to things or actions outside the territorial jurisdiction of the party taking the measure.”1434 On the 
other hand, it held that the measures in question could not be justified under Article XX (b) and 
(g) because trade measures designed to force other countries to change their policies within their 
jurisdiction would “seriously impair the balance of rights and obligations among contracting 
parties.”1435 In Shrimp – Turtle, the dispute again centred on U.S. trade embargoes against states 
that did not comply with its environmental measures. The complainants argued that that Article 
XX (b) and (g) could not be invoked to justify a measure which applied to animals not within the 
jurisdiction of the Member enacting the measure. On the other hand, the United States responded 
that Article XX (b) and (g) contained no jurisdictional limitations, nor limitations on the location 
of the animals or natural resources to be protected and conserved.1436 The Panel did not directly 
address the jurisdictional aspect of the dispute, holding that the measure contravened Article XX 
owing to the discriminatory effects of the measure: 
 
“However, we note that we are not basing our finding on an extra-jurisdictional application of 
US law. Many domestic governmental measures can have an effect outside the jurisdiction of the 
government which takes them. What we found above was that a measure cannot be considered as 
falling within the scope of Article XX if it operates so as to affect other governments' policies in a 
way that threatens the multilateral trading system.”1437 
                                                                                                                                                                
powers of law enforcement at foreign seaport, the question therefore concerns the extrajurisdictional application of 
the CSI. 
1431
 Panel, US – Tuna I,  para. 5.32. 
1432
 See Howse, p. 6.  
1433
 Gerd Winter, The GATT and Environmental Protection: Problems of Construction, 15 J. ENVTL. L. 113, p. 131. 
1434
 Panel, US – Tuna  II,  p. 891. 
1435
 Id. p. 894. 
1436
 Panel, US – Shrimp, para. 7.24. 
1437
 Id., para. 7.51. 
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Although the Panel acknowledged that sea turtles could be a global resource, it held that the 
common interest of states in their conservation would be better addressed through the negotiation 
of international agreements than by unilateral measures determining market access.1438 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy, that, in a decision widely criticized as placing the interests of free 
trade above environmental protection, the Panel did not rule out the extrajurisdictional 
application of a state’s laws. Upon appeal, the Appellate Body also appeared to open the door to 
the possibility of extrajursidictionality, holding that requirements on exporting countries to 
comply with or adopt certain policies prescribed by the importing state did not rule out its 
justification under Article XX.1439 The issue of extrajurisdictionality itself was briefly referred to 
by the Appellate Body in the same dispute.  
 
“We do not pass upon the question of whether there is an implied jurisdictional limitation in 
Article XX (g), and if so, the nature or extent of that limitation.  We note only that in the specific 
circumstances of the case before us, there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and 
endangered marine populations involved and the United States for purposes of 
Article XX (g).”1440 
 
The Panel did not elaborate on the elements of the “sufficient nexus” requirement. However, its 
comments suggest that it does not require the party invoking Article XXI to have exclusive 
ownership of the interest protected nor does it require that interest being within the jurisdiction of 
the defendant state all the time. Presumably, this issue would be decided on the balance of 
scientific evidence supporting or refuting the member state’s interest in the object outside its 
territory.  
 
In conclusion, the CSI appears to be extrajurisdictional rather than extraterritorial in nature. This 
is because the Declarations of Principles do not give the CBP any powers of law enforcement at 
foreign harbours, with the result that CBP can only enforce the 24 Hour Rule and DoPs at U.S. 
seaports instead. Overall, the law on the extrajurisdictional application of laws remains unsettled 
in WTO jurisprudence. However, in Article XXI the reference to “its security interests” at least 
                                                  
1438
 Id., para. 7.53. 
1439
 Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, pp. 152-153. 
1440
 Id., para. 133. 
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offers a textual basis for imposing the nexus requirement on security measures adopted by 
member states.  
 
2.5. Is the Measure “Necessary”? 
 
Article XXI (b) subjects the measures introduced to a necessity test, similar to that in Article 
XX (b) insofar as the measure must be “necessary for the protection of” the interest concerned. 
However, whereas Article XX (b) is framed in objective terms, leaving the decision as to the 
necessity of the measure with the dispute bodies, Article XXI is framed subjectively, leaving the 
decision as to the necessity of the measure with the invoking state – to a certain extent.  
 
Article XXI clearly specifies the degree of deference that a Panel must accord to decisions of 
member states1441 as well as the individual framework conditions which must exist before the 
provision can be invoked. Contrary to statements by some member states, the wording of Article 
XXI does not grant a state unlimited discretion: the terms “necessary” and “essential” obviously 
impose limitations on the discretion of a state to take measures protecting its essential security 
interests. For example, writers have pointed out that the ordinary meaning of “considers” (i.e. to 
“reflect”, “deliberate” and “examine”) suggests that the state must follow a certain process when 
developing the measure in dispute, e.g. weighing up the evidence and developing measures which 
are necessary to protect.1442 The jurisprudence on Article XX also interprets the term “necessary” 
narrowly, equating it with “indispensable.” This suggests that, within the self-regulating scope of 
Article XXI (b), “necessary” and “essential” set standards which the state must attain.1443 In other 
words, the fact that Article XXI frames “necessary” in subjective terms (i.e. “it considers 
necessary”) does not affect the inherently objective legal meaning of the term as explained in 
Korea – Beef.1444  What this means is that the member state must adduce prima facie evidence 
that it considers the measure to be indispensable to protect the security interest in question.1445 As 
argued above, the Panel should be able to review this evidence.  
                                                  
1441
 See e.g. Jan Neumann and Elizabeth Türk, Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in World Trade Organization 
Law After Korea – Beef, EC – Asbestos and EC – Sardines, JWT, Vol. 37 No. 1 (Feb. 2003), pp. 207 – 208.  
1442
 Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 443. The term “considers” is also used in Article XXI (a). 
1443
 Id. 
1444
 Infra p. 278. 
1445
 Contra Akande and Williams at pp. 386 – 387. 
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The question then arises as to what test a Panel can apply to the member state’s decision-making 
process (i.e. “it considers”) to ensure that it has interpreted “necessary” in accordance with its 
narrow, legal meaning (i.e. “indispensable”). The most obvious comparison is the general 
exception, Article XX, which uses the term “necessary” in three provisions (sub-paragraphs (a), 
(b), (d) and (f)). The jurisprudence on Article XX could offer guidance on the relevant factors 
which the United States should consider in order to ensure the necessity of the Container Security 
Initiative.1446 Although the WTO Secretariat has stated that, as a rule, the tests of necessity 
adopted in relation to specific provisions are not automatically transferable1447 there are many 
arguments which support reference to Article XX jurisprudence. As mentioned above, the 
environment and national security are similar interests in a number of respects, not least the fact 
that they affect transboundary interests such as migratory species and the supply chain. There is 
also no evidence in the trevaux preparatoires that the drafters ever intended the meaning of 
“necessity” in Article XXI to impose a lower standard than “necessity” in Article XX.1448 Last 
but not least, the term “necessary” is capable of a range of meanings and it would contradict the 
effet utile principle if member states were permitted to choose the meaning at the lowest end of 
the scale, namely “convenient, useful, suitable, proper or conducive to the end sought.”1449 The 
following section examines the necessity test employed in relation to Article XX with a view to 
using it as a basis for examining the “necessity” of the Container Security Initiative under Article 
XXI. 
 
2.5.1. Is There a Risk to Essential Security Interests? 
 
The first stage of this investigation should be seen as representing the pre-condition to the 
necessity test.1450 According to the Panel in US – Section 337, its function is to filter out those 
measures which do not come within the scope of Article XX.1451 It does this by examining the 
                                                  
1446
 See Cann, pp. 454 – 455; Browne, supra n. 1334. 
1447
 See World Trade Organization, Working Party on Domestic Regulation, “Necessity Tests” in the WTO, Note By 
the Secretariat, S/WPDR/W/27, 2 December 2003, p. 3 at para. 11. 
1448
 See Cann supra n. 1446. 
1449
 Appellate Body, Korea – Beef, para. 160.  
1450
 See Deborah Akoth Osiro, GATT/WTO Necessity Analysis: Evolutionary Interpretation and its Impact on the 
Autonomy of Domestic Regulation in Legal Issues of Economic Integration Vol. 29 No.2, 123, p. 131 who describes 
this test as a “condition precedent” for conducting the necessity test. 
1451
 Panel, US – Section 337, para. 5.22. 
  
 
276 
existence of a risk which causes a state to introduce its measures in the first place.1452 This is 
supported by literature and jurisprudence. Commentators have argued that the existence of a 
threat to a state’s essential security interests is the principle pre-requisite for the application of 
Article XXI.1453  In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body held that the state invoking the provision 
had to show the existence of a risk to the interest deserving protection (in this case, human life or 
health) in order to show that the measure falls within the scope of Article XX: 
 
“… [T]he EC has made a prima facie case for the existence of a health risk in connection with 
the use of chrysotile, in particular as regards lung cancer and mesothelioma in the occupational 
sectors downstream of production and processing and for the public in general in relation to 
chrysotile-cement products. This prima facie case has not been rebutted by Canada. Moreover, 
the Panel considers that the comments by the experts confirm the health risk associated with 
exposure to chrysotile in its various uses. The Panel therefore considers that the EC have shown 
that the policy of prohibiting chrysotile asbestos implemented by the Decree falls within the 
range of policies designed to protect human life or health.”1454 
 
Examining the existence of a risk filters out unjustified measures: it is unlikely that the import 
quota in the Swedish footwear dispute or the Argentinean embargo imposed by Britain’s allies in 
the Falklands War would have passed such a test, for example.  
 
The standard of review employed in relation to Article XX suggests that this examination would 
not interfere with the sovereign right of the member state to respond to genuine threats to its 
essential national security interests. The Panel should show deference where particularly vital 
interests are concerned. Again, this is supported by literature and jurisprudence. Some 
commentators argue that the Panel should only enquire as to whether the member genuinely 
believed that the measure taken was necessary to protect its national security interests.1455 In EC 
– Asbestos, the Appellate Body held that the mere fact that asbestos presented a risk to human 
                                                  
1452
 See Osiro, p. 132 (arguing that the causal connection in relation to Article XX (b) requires an assessment of the 
risk involved and the end pursued). 
1453
 See Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 442.  
1454
 Appellate Body, EC – Asbestos, para. 157.  
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health ensured that the measure fell under Article XX (b).1456  Although the existence of a risk 
must be based on scientific evidence, the member state does not have to prove that it undertook 
risk analysis or that the evidence justifying the measure was based on conclusive evidence. 
According to the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones, (dealing with Article 5.1 of the SPS 
Agreement) divergent scientific opinion merely indicated a state of scientific uncertainty and did 
not mean that the measure was not necessary: 
 
“By itself, this does not necessarily signal the absence of a reasonable relationship between the 
SPS measure and the risk assessment especially where the risk involved is life-threatening in 
character and is perceived to constitute a clear and imminent threat to public health and 
safety.”1457 
 
In EC-Asbestos the Appellate Body referred to this decision, stating that “responsible and 
representative governments may act in good faith on the basis of what, at a given time, may be a 
divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected sources.”1458 Governments are not 
required to follow majority opinion and do not have to reach a decision under Article XX (b) 
GATT based on the preponderance of the evidence.1459 The existence of a risk to the interest 
deserving protection is crucial in determining whether the measure falls within the scope of the 
exception.  
 
2.5.2. The Necessity Test in Article XX 
 
The function of the necessity test is to establish whether the measure chosen by the state is the 
most GATT-compliant of the reasonably available alternatives open to the state. This requires an 
examination of a number of factors relating to measure, including the importance of the interests 
it seeks to protect and its effectiveness. 
 
                                                  
1456
 Id. paras. 162 – 163. 
1457
 Appellate Body, EC – Hormones, para. 194. 
1458
 Appellate Body, EC – Asbestos, para. 178. 
1459
 Id. 
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In Korea – Beef, the Appellate Body distinguished between the ordinary and legal meaning of the 
term “necessary.” It held that, from a legal standpoint, “necessary” was capable of various 
meanings insofar as it was “an adjective expressing degrees, and may express mere convenience 
or that which is indispensable or an absolute physical necessity.”1460 However, within the context 
of the general exception, the Appellate Body held that the meaning was closer to 
“indispensable.”1461 This is supported by the fact that other terms used in Article XX appear to 
cover the lower end of the range of meanings that “necessary” is capable of having. For example, 
“relating to” used in Article XX (g) is closer to “contributes to” than “indispensable” and thereby 
implies a lower standard of proof.1462  
 
The basis for the modern test of necessity under the GATT was laid down by the Panel in US – 
337. It held that “necessary” in Article XX (d) meant that that no alternative measure existed 
which the country could be reasonably expected to employ and which was not inconsistent with 
other GATT provisions or which entailed the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT 
provisions.1463 Although Panels adopted this test they tended to construe the meaning of necessity 
under Article XX ‘narrowly’.1464 Critics accused the Panels of eviscerating the function of the 
general exception by setting a standard of proof that member states found impossible to 
satisfy.1465 However, the creation of the WTO and introduction of a more text-based 
interpretation abolished the deliberately narrow interpretation of exceptions as a general rule.1466 
As a result, the test of necessity was broadened to pay greater attention to the regulatory aims of 
the member states. For example, in US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body stressed that the subject of 
the necessity test is the measure itself and not its policy goal.1467 The decisions in Korea – Beef 
and EC – Asbestos also relaxed the necessity test by taking account of other factors. Therefore, in 
                                                  
1460
 Appellate Body, Korea – Beef, para. 160. 
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 Id., paras. 160 – 161. 
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 For example, it is not immediately apparent why it should be harder to prove a measure which seeks to protect 
human life under Article XX(b) than a measure which seeks to preserve natural resources under Article XX(g).  
1463
 See Kennedy, p. 154, who describes “necessary” in Article XX as “shorthand for the minimum derogation 
principle, i.e. there must not be available any less trade restrictive alternative measure that would be equally 
effective.”  
1464
 According to the international practice regarding exceptions, see Hahn, p. 579. 
1465
 Arguably, the “narrow interpretation” would also violate the effect utile principle, according to which Panels and 
the Appellate Body are bound to give effect to all the provisions of a treaty. See Appellate Body, US – Gasoline, p. 
23.  
1466
 Supra pp. 231 – 232. 
1467
 Appellate Body, US – Gasoline, p. 28. 
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order to determine whether a measure was necessary, a state had to weigh and balance a series of 
factors which were both legal and factual.1468 As a result, the necessity test in its current form is a 
complex process of weighing up competing interests of the member states with the aims and 
objectives of the GATT.  
 
2.5.2.1. Necessity Test: Factors to be Considered 
 
In Korea – Beef, the Appellate Body summarized the main factors to be taken into consideration 
when ascertaining the necessity of the measure according to Article XX (d).1469 Such factors 
primarily included 1) the contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the 
law or regulation at issue; 2) the importance of the common interests or values protected by that 
law or regulation and 3) the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or 
exports.1470 The Appellate Body also referred to these criteria in EC – Asbestos when determining 
whether France could reasonably have been expected to employ alternative measures to a total 
ban on asbestos products in order to protect human life and health.1471  
 
In US – Section 337 the requirement of necessity was interpreted as meaning that there was no 
reasonably available alternative consistent with the invoking state’s obligations under the 
GATT.1472 At this stage, the necessity test was still undergoing development but the Panel’s 
decision is still referred to as containing the essence of the necessity test (i.e. the search for an 
alternative measure which is either GATT consistent or least GATT inconsistent).1473 This part of 
the necessity test also takes account of the proportionality of a measure1474 (although this 
principle has not been recognized as an independent principle of WTO law).1475 As stated above, 
                                                  
1468
 See S/WPDR/W/27 (supra n. 1447), para. 32 
1469
 See Neumann and Türk, p. 211. 
1470
 Appellate Body, EC – Hormones, para. 164. 
1471
 Appellate Body, EC - Asbestos, para. 34.  
1472
 Panel, US – Section 337, para. 5.26. 
1473
 Appellate Body, EC – Asbestos, para. 25 (describing this report as containing the “classic formulation” of the 
necessity test). 
1474
 Panel, Korea – Beef , para. 675 (holding that the measure could not be justified under Article XX (b) because it 
was disproportionate).   
1475
 See Meinhard Hilf and Sebastian Puth, The Principle of Proportionality on its Way into WTO/GATT Law in 
CLAUS DIETER EHLERMANN, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-ORDINATION 2002, pp. 119 – 218; 
Neumann and Türk, supra n. 1441. See also WAINCYMER, p. 501 at para. 7.25.7 (pointing out that WTO 
jurisprudence has never expressed “proportionality” as a principle). 
  
 
280 
the necessity test does not concern the policy motivating the measure nor the level of protection 
that the state wishes to achieve.1476  
 
The introductory paragraph to Article XXI (b) uses the term “it considers”, which, according to 
some commentators, grants member states “a right to be cautious” when deciding whether a 
measure is necessary.1477 This raises the question whether a state can act pre-emptively in order 
to head-off a risk which it believes to be imminent but which has not yet materialized.1478 This 
question requires consideration of the precautionary principle which derives from the 1897 
Ministerial Declaration on the Protection of the North Sea. Paragraph VII of this instrument 
states:  
 
“Accepting that, in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the most 
dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may require action to 
control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has been established by absolutely 
clear scientific evidence.”1479 
 
In other words, uncertain scientific information should not lead to inaction when confronted with 
possible damage to the environment. Its recognition in environmental conventions has led some 
writers to classify the principle as customary international law.1480  The application of the 
precautionary principle was considered in EC – Hormones, a case concerning the Article 5.7 of 
the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body held that, regardless of the status of the precautionary 
principle in international law, it would not override specific treaty provisions and could not be 
introduced without a clear textual directive to do so.1481  
                                                  
1476
 Panel, US - 337, para. 5.26; see also Appellate Body, US – Gasoline, pp. 29 – 30; US – Shrimp, para. 185; 
Appellate Body, EC – Asbestos, para. 168; cf. Korea – Beef, para. 178. 
1477
 See Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 443. 
1478
 See BHALA, p. 562. 
1479
 See SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE PROTECTION OF THE NORTH SEA, LONDON 24 – 25 
NOVEMBER 1987; this principle is also contained in principle 15 of the RIO DE JANEIRO DECLARATION: “In order to 
protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason 
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” See also 1998 WINGSPREAD 
STATEMENT ON THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: < http://www.sehn.org/wing.html >.  
1480
 See John M. Van Dyke, Applying the Precautionary Principle to Ocean Shipments of Radioactive Materials, 
Nuclear Control Institute < http://www.nci.org/i/ib3496a.htm >.  
1481
 See Report of the Appellate Body, EC – Hormones, paras. 123 – 124. 
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The complainant could argue that the words “it considers necessary” in Article XXI provide 
member states with a basis to take a precautionary or pre-emptive approach to national security 
by granting them “a right to be cautious.”1482 This is supported by a contextual interpretation 
because it is only possible to prevent the risk presented by nuclear WMD (i.e. “fissionable 
materials”) by using pre-emptive measures (such as “pushing the border outwards”). A 
precautionary approach in international law is also reflected in risk management which is 
recognized by the Revised Kyoto Convention and the Framework of Standards. In addition, 
although the Appellate Body has not recognized a “precautionary principle” there is evidence that 
it permits a precautionary approach.1483 As far as the CSI is concerned, the most important aspect 
of the precautionary approach relates to scientific evidence. In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate 
Body permitted states to evaluate a risk in qualitative rather than quantitative terms and did not 
oblige them to follow majority scientific opinion.1484 
 
The test of necessity can be divided into two stages: first, the measure is assessed according to 
the importance of the interests protected and the effectiveness of the measure. If the measure is 
found not to be indispensable using these two criteria, a further test is undertaken to ascertain 
whether the measure is the least trade restrictive alternative.1485 
 
2.5.2.2. First Stage: Importance of Interests and Effectiveness 
 
According to one writer, the jurisprudence on Article XX appears to divide measures into two 
classes: those which concern vital interests and those which do not.1486 The former category of 
measures is more likely to be held necessary than the latter, despite their restrictive trade 
                                                  
1482
 See Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 443 with further references. 
1483
 See Laurent A. Ruessmann, Putting The Precautionary Principle in its Place: Parameters for the Proper 
Application of a Precautionary Approach and the Implications for Developing Countries in Light of the Doha WTO 
Ministerial, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 905, p. 911 (suggesting a distinction between a precautionary principle and 
precautionary approach); pp. 925 – 926 concerning deference of the Appellate Body to a precautionary approach. 
1484
 See Appellate Body, EC – Asbestos, paras. 167 and 178. See also id., p. 925. 
1485
 For an examination of the stages of the necessity test under Article XX see Osiro supra n. 1450. However, the 
jurisprudence on Article XX shows that the necessity test may not follow this structure strictly, p. 135. 
1486
 Id. p. 136 
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effects.1487 Measures in the latter category will be subjected to the “least trade restrictive test” to 
find out whether they are nevertheless indispensable.  
 
a) Importance of the interests protected (level of protection): in Korea - Beef, the 
Appellate Body held that it would be useful to bear in mind the context of “necessary” in 
Article XX (d). In appropriate cases, the treaty interpreter may take into account the 
relative importance of the common interests or values that the law or regulation to be 
enforced is intended to protect.1488  This was confirmed by the Appellate Body in EC-
Asbestos, which held that the availability of alternative measures had to take into account 
the aim of the measure employed. Referring to its decision in Korea – Beef, the Appellate 
Body stated: 
 
“In addition, we observed, in that case, that '[t]he more vital or important [the] common 
interests or values’ pursued, the easier it would be to accept as ‘necessary’ measures 
designed to achieve those ends. In this case, the objective pursued by the measure is the 
preservation of human life and health through the elimination, or reduction, of the well-
known, and life-threatening, health risks posed by asbestos fibres. The value pursued is 
both vital and important in the highest degree.”1489 
 
The member state is free to set the level of protection it considers appropriate and they 
can even choose to impose a “zero risk” level of protection.1490 This consideration also 
applies to Article XX(b): the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos held that it was 
“undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine the level of protection of 
health that they consider appropriate in a given situation.”1491 However, if the measure is 
silent on the level of protection then it will be presumed that 100 percent protection was 
not intended.1492 
                                                  
1487
 Id. pp. 134 – 135. 
1488
 Report of the Appellate Body, Korea – Beef, para. 162. 
1489
 Id., paras. 170 – 172. 
1490
 Report of the Appellate Body, Australia – Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, 20 October 1998 (adopted 6 November 
1998), para. 125. 
1491
 Appellate Body, EC – Asbestos, para. 168. 
1492
 Appellate Body, Korea – Beef, para. 178. 
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b)  Contribution made by the compliance measure to the realization of the value 
pursued (effectiveness): some commentators argue that necessity also depends on the 
effectiveness of a measure.1493 Concerning Article XXI, they argue that the term “it 
considers” requires, by implication, that the measure must be “effective”, in order to have 
the necessary effect on protecting the interest.1494 This is supported by jurisprudence on 
Article XX. For example, in Korea – Beef, the Appellate Body held that the greater the 
contribution of the measure to the realization of the end pursued, the more easily a 
measure might be considered to be “necessary.”1495 In EC-Asbestos, it referred to 
“measures designed to achieve” the policy goal and in EC – GSP even suggested that 
there should be a nexus between the measure and the likelihood of attaining the goal.1496 
However, when examining the effectiveness of security measures, the Panel should also 
respect the deterrent value of the measure.  
 
2.5.2.3. Second Stage: Trade Restrictiveness  
 
In the U.S. - Section 337 case, the Panel stated that if all methods reasonably available are 
inconsistent with the GATT, the country should use the least inconsistent method.1497 This 
standard was increased by the Panel in Thailand – Cigarettes, which held that a measure was not 
to be regarded as “necessary” if “an alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to 
employ and which was less inconsistent with other GATT provisions was reasonably available to 
it.”1498 This decision imposed a very high burden of proof on the party seeking to justify the 
measures: if consistent or less consistent methods existed, the regulation would not be considered 
necessary.1499 However, it was argued that such alternatives would always exist and it therefore 
                                                  
1493
 See Tatanja Eres, Limits of Article XX: A Back Door for Human Rights? 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 2004, 597, p. 631 
(“It does not presume to judge the underlying domestic policy values, nor is it an empirical evaluation. However, it 
does involve an assessment of whether the policy implemented is reasonably suited to achieve the objective. 
Considering effectiveness in this way precludes the abuse of Article XX exceptions”). 
1494
 Schloemann and Ohlhoff p. 443. 
1495
 Appellate Body, Korea – Beef, para. 163. 
1496
 Report of the Appellate Body EC- Asbestos, para 173; Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities – 
Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R, 7 April 2004 (adopted 
on 20 April 2004), para. 164. 
1497
 Panel, United States – Section 337, para. 5.26. Confirmed by the Appellate Body, EC – Asbestos, para. 171. 
1498
 Panel, Thailand - Cigarettes, para. 74. 
1499
 Cynthia Maas, Should the WTO Expand GATT Article XX: An Analysis of United States – Standards for 
Reformulated and Convention Gasoline, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 415, p. 430. As a result, states preferred to rely 
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would not be possible to prove that they were unviable to the Panel’s satisfaction.1500 Concerning 
Article XXI, it is possible to detect the consideration of the “least trade restrictive” alternative in 
United States – Czechoslovakia, where the British delegate made the following statement: 
 
“The United Kingdom system of control was designed to reduce uncertainty to a minimum and to 
put both would-be importers in other countries and their own exporters on notice as fully as 
possible of the restrictions and requirements that his Government applied. In this way it was 
careful to reduce interference with normal trade to a minimum.”1501 
 
The necessity test also proved controversial in Tuna – Dolphin I (unadopted), where the Panel 
held that the United States had failed the “necessity requirement” of Art. XX (b) insofar as it had 
not demonstrated that it had exhausted all options reasonably available to pursue its objectives 
through measures consistent with the GATT, “in particular through the negotiation of 
international co-operative arrangements.”1502 In Tuna – Dolphin II (also unadopted), the Panel 
followed the standard of U.S. – Section 337 to the effect that, in the absence of reasonable 
alternatives, the contracting party is obliged to use the measure which “entails the least degree of 
inconsistency with the other GATT provisions.”1503 However, the Panel in United States – 
Gasoline confirmed the standard of U.S. – Section 337: that alternative methods should be used 
which were least inconsistent with the GATT provisions.1504 The Appellate Body in Korea – 
Beef, explained how this test was to be carried out:  
 
In sum, determination of whether a measure, which is not “indispensable”, may nevertheless be 
“necessary” within the contemplation of Article XX (d), involves in every case a process of 
                                                                                                                                                                
on Article XX(g) which did not require the measure to be “necessary.” See Report of the Panel, United States – 
Taxes on Automobiles DS31/R, 11 October 1994, (adopted on same date), para. 5.63 (holding that the availability of 
other less trade restrictive measures “did not imply that the measure could not be justified under Article XX(g).” 
1500
 See Report of the Panel, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Convention Gasoline, WT/DS2/R, 29 
January 1996, (adopted 20 May 1996), [hereinafter, Panel, US – Gasoline], para. 6.26 (“[W]hile the Panel agreed 
that it would be necessary under such a system to ascertain the origin of gasoline, the Panel could not conclude that 
the United States had shown that this could not be achieved by other measures reasonably available to it and 
consistent or less inconsistent with the General Agreement”). 
1501
 United States – Czechoslovakia, GATT/CP.3/SR. 20, p. 4 (emphasis added). 
1502
 Panel, US – Tuna I, para. 5.28. 
1503
 Panel, US – Tuna II, para. 5.35. 
1504
 Panel, US – Gasoline, para. 6.24. As a result, states preferred to base their defence on Article XX(g) which 
imposed a lower standard, see also Howse, p. 7. 
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weighing and balancing a series of factors which prominently include the contribution made by 
the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of 
the common interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying 
impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports.1505 
 
In other words, the measure must be proportional to the attainment of its aims. Although the test 
of proportionality is not as incursive as that employed in the EC, for example,1506 it nevertheless 
requires the Appellate Body to assess the options available to member states in achieving its 
aims. In Korea – Beef, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s decision that traditional 
enforcement measures to combat deceptive practices were less trade-restrictive than the measure 
in dispute and reasonably available to the Korean government.1507  
 
The assessment of whether a reasonable alternative exists requires the invoking state to consider 
the cost, technical difficulties and lack of expertise. In EC - Asbestos, the Appellate Body held 
that mere administrative difficulty would not prevent a measure from being considered a 
reasonably available alternative.1508 Concerning Article XXI, there is no reason why the Panel 
should not adopt a similarly incursive investigation into whether reasonable alternative means of 
counter-terrorism exist. Otherwise, it would not be able to ensure that the member state has 
introduced measures “it considers necessary.”  
 
2.5.3. Creating a Chapeau for Article XXI 
 
If a measure satisfies the necessity test, it is considered “provisionally justified.” The justification 
is only provisional because the measure must be subjected to a third examination under the 
chapeau to Article XX, i.e. whether a member is justified in exercising its right to apply a 
measure under the general exception. The following argues that the absence of a similar 
“chapeau” in the security exception should not exclude the application of the abus de droit 
                                                  
1505
 Appellate Body, Korea – Beef, para. 164. 
1506
 See Neumann and Türck, pp. 201 – 206.  
1507
 Appellate Body, Korea – Beef, para. 180. According to the Panel, the dual retail system was “a disproportionate 
measure not necessary to secure compliance with the Korean law against deceptive practices.” See Panel Report, 
Korea – Beef, para. 660 – 674.  
1508
 Appellate Body, EC – Asbestos, para. 169 (referring to the Panel, US – Gasoline, paras. 6.26 and 6.28).  
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doctrine owing to the fact that this doctrine stems from the principle of good faith – a pervasive 
principle of WTO law.  
 
2.5.3.1. The Principle of Good Faith in WTO Law  
 
“Good faith” is a general principle of international law and is recognized in some form by most 
national courts and international organizations, including the WTO.1509 It has been described by 
the Appellate Body as a general principle of law and a principle of general international law1510 
which is pervasive in nature.1511  
 
In fact, good faith has been expressly referred to in the WTO agreements and applied by the 
Panels and Appellate Body both in relation to application and interpretation, although its extent in 
WTO law appears restricted as far as estoppel and the protection of legitimate expectations are 
concerned.1512 On the other hand, “good faith” is a very vague principle and does not give rise to 
legal obligations independent of a violation of treaty.1513  Owing to the fact that good faith has 
moralistic connotations, it is not possible to construe the term in terms of what it is not (i.e. “bad 
faith”). According to the Panel, the possible imputation of bad faith to one of the parties would 
amount to a serious accusation on a member state’s integrity.1514 In fact, WTO law presumes the 
good faith of all member states, as the Appellate Body stated in EC – Sardines: 
 
“We must assume that Members of the WTO will abide by their treaty obligations in good faith, 
as required by the principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda articulated in Article 26 of the Vienna 
                                                  
1509
 E.g. Article 2(2) of the UN Charter, which requires all member states, to “fulfil in good faith the obligations 
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.” 
1510
 Appellate Body, U.S. – Hot-rolled Steel, para. 101.  
1511
 Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from 
Pakistan, WT/DS192/AB/R, 8 October 2001 (adopted on 5 November 2001), para. 81; see also Zeitler, p. 722 
(pointing out that good faith has been referred to in almost all cases decided by the Panels and Appellate Body). 
1512
 Laurent Ruessmann, The Place of Legitimate Expectations in the General Interpretation of the WTO Agreements, 
Institute for International Law, Working Paper No. 36, December 2002. See also supra pp. 133 – 134.  
1513
 Andrew D. Mitchell, Good Faith in Dispute Settlement, MELB. J. INTL. L., pp. 341 et seq.; Zeitler, pp. 745 – 746. 
Accordingly, a good faith review should not be understood as elevating good faith to an independent legal 
obligation: but cf. Akande and Williams, p. 389 and Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 441 who refer to a “test of good 
faith” and “good faith test” respectively.  
1514
 Panel, US – Section 301, para. 7.64. See also Zeitler, p. 727; Mitchell, p. 342. 
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Convention. And always in dispute settlement, every Member of the WTO must assume the good 
faith of every other Member.”1515  
 
This general principle of international law gives rise to further, more specific principles such as 
pacta sunt servanda, and abus de droit which have also found expression in the covered 
agreements and jurisprudence of the WTO. The former principle requires member states to 
perform their obligations under international treaties in good faith.1516 This requirement is not 
satisfied by performing contracts to the letter; rather, parties must also avoid acts which would 
affect their ability to perform the treaty.1517 The other offshoot of the good faith principle – the 
abus de droit doctrine – requires states to exercise their rights under treaties in good faith.1518 
This is particularly important in relation to the security exception and is dealt with in greater 
detail below.  
 
Zeitler divides good faith into good faith performance and good faith interpretation of WTO 
agreements.1519 On the one hand, the principle refers to the performance of treaty obligations (so-
called “good faith application”), pursuant to Article 26 of the VCLT which obliges states to apply 
the provisions of a treaty in good faith. In other words, member states must not apply the 
provision in a way which would frustrate or defeat the purposes or objectives of the covered 
agreement in question.1520 The doctrine of good faith can also be used as an interpretive tool: 
according to Article 31(1) of the VCLT, “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose.” The doctrine therefore forms part of the holistic interpretation to be 
adopted by the treaty interpreter.1521 The Appellate Body in US – Shrimp appeared to draw a 
                                                  
1515
 Report of the Appellate Body European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, 26 
September 2002 (adopted on 23 October 2002), at para. 278. 
1516
 Article 26 of the VCLT is entitled “pacta sunt servanda” and provides that every treaty in force is binding upon 
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.  
1517
 Mitchell, p, 347.  
1518
 Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, para. 158. 
1519
 Zeitler pp. 725 – 729 (interpretation) and pp. 729 – 743 (application).  
1520
 Panel US – Shrimp, paras. 740 – 741.  
1521
 Panel, EC – Asbestos, para. 8.46 (“to the extent that Article 31 of the Vienna Convention contains a single rule of 
interpretation and not a number of alternative rules, the various criteria in the article should be considered as forming 
part of a whole.”) 
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distinction between these two aspects of good faith,1522 although the precise dividing line is 
unclear.1523 
 
Article XXI does not offer any textual basis for adopting a test relating to good faith However, it 
could also be argued that the Appellate Body’s reference to a “pervasive” principle of WTO law, 
suggests that good faith – whether in the form of a test of reasonableness or the doctrine of abus 
de droit – does not need to be expressly stated in order to apply to Article XXI because it is an 
implied duty of WTO law.1524 After all, not all provisions of the WTO agreements refer to good 
faith and yet it is the glue that binds the member states to their obligations arising thereunder.1525 
Admittedly, both good faith and the related concept of reasonableness are vague terms and their 
application in the absence of an express textual basis could lead to accusations of judicial 
activism were the Panel and Appellate Body to use them in order to justify their rulings.1526 
However, in practice, the Appellate Body has respected Article 3.7 DSU and shown restraint in 
using these concepts. It uses the doctrine of good faith to reinforce (as opposed to justify) its 
decisions and has generally made sure that its reference to the doctrine is clearly rooted in the 
wording of the covered agreements (although there are exceptions to this rule).1527  
 
2.5.3.2  The Reasonable Exercise of a Right  
 
The introductory paragraph to Article XX (the chapeau)1528 prohibits the application of a measure 
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on international trade. This passage reflects the abus de droit doctrine which 
was described by the Appellate Body in the US – Shrimp/Turtle case as follows: 
 
                                                  
1522
 Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, para. 158. 
1523
 Id., para. 160 (after declaring that its task is to interpret the language of the chapeau, the Appellate Body then 
went on to examine the application of the measure). 
1524
 This is also supported by the fact that the VCLT refers to good faith concerning the application (Article 26) and 
interpretation of law (Article 31).  
1525
 Florestal, pp. 415 – 417.  
1526
 Zeitler, pp. 753 – 755. 
1527
 Id., p. 754 (arguing that the Appellate Body has shown judicial restraint with regard to good faith); see also 
Mitchell, pp. 361 – 362, whose findings suggest that this has limited the development of good faith in WTO law. 
1528
 The TBT Agreement contains a similar clause in its preamble, which states that the “technical regulations and 
standards […] do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade.”   
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“[The]… doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a state's rights and enjoins 
that whenever the assertion of a right impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it 
must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably.”1529 
 
There is a need to control the application of Article XXI by means of a test of reasonableness 
because the subjective wording of the provision increases the risk of abuse. In fact, the danger 
that the right to protect national security could be abused has also been recognized by the United 
States Court of Appeal, which ruled in one case that “[g]iven the difficulty of defining the 
domestic security interest, the danger of abuse in acting to protect that interest becomes 
apparent.”1530 Some writers advocate a test of reasonableness in order to prevent member states 
abusing the provision.1531 In this sense, therefore, the test of reasonableness is similar to the abus 
de droit doctrine insofar as it aims to prevent the unreasonable exercise of a right.1532 The test 
does not refer to the substance of a measure but its application: accordingly, the standards applied 
by the abus de droit test will also be different from those contained in the substantive rules.1533 
 
The major obstacle to subjecting measures under Article XXI to a test of reasonableness is the 
lack of an express textual basis in the provision.1534 The Appellate Body in India – Patents 
stressed that the principles of interpretation embodied in Article 31 VCLT neither required nor 
condoned the imputation into a treaty of words that were not there or the importation into a treaty 
of concepts that were not intended. Moreover, the Panel was not to add to or diminish rights and 
obligations provided in the WTO Agreement.1535 The imposition of a reasonableness test cannot 
be disguised as “gap-filling” either because there is no gap to fill: the wording and drafting 
history of Article XXI suggest that the drafters deliberately omitted a reference to the abus de 
                                                  
1529
 Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, para. 158. 
1530
 See United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan et al. (Plamondon et al, 
Real Parties in Interest) Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit No. 70 – 153, Argued 
24 February 1972, Decided 19 June, 1972.  
1531
 Schloemann and Ohlhoff pp. 447 – 448; Akande and Williams, p. 382 n. 80. Finegan, pp. 14 – 15. 
1532
 Although good faith review has been equated with reasonableness, commentators argue that this test is 
unsupported by the wording of Article XXI; Zeigler, p. 744; see also Report of the Appellate Body on India – Patent 
Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, 19 December 1997 (adopted 
16 January 1998), para. 45 (“[T]hese principles of interpretation neither require nor condone the imputation into a 
treaty of words that are not there, or the importation into a treaty of concepts that were not intended”).  
1533
 Appellate Body, United States – Gasoline, p. 23 
1534
 Cf. id., pp. 16 – 17. 
1535
 Appellate Body, India – Patents, para. 45.  
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droit doctrine.1536 There are also other arguments against a test of reasonableness: the term is 
very broad1537 and there is no jurisprudence of the WTO which deals with its precise meaning.1538 
Some writers also argue that, as a limited and conditional exception to the GATT obligations, 
Article XXI’s justiciable terms will ensure that the measure is reasonable in any case.1539  
 
On the other hand, a test of reasonableness could be justified by the requirement in Article 26 
VCLT that states exercise their rights in good faith (i.e. good faith in application).1540 The 
Appellate Body has also stated that the chapeau to Article XX is intended to prevent the abuse of 
exceptions.1541 As an exception, Article XXI would have to be subject to a similar test otherwise 
the limitations and restrictions in its wording could easily be frustrated by the manner in which 
the measure was applied. The following statement of the Appellate Body made in respect of 
Article XX appears equally applicable to Article XXI: 
 
“To permit one Member to abuse or misuse its right to invoke an exception would be effectively 
to allow that Member to degrade its own treaty obligations as well as to devalue the treaty rights 
of other Members. If the abuse or misuse is sufficiently grave or extensive, the Member, in effect, 
reduces its treaty obligation to a merely facultative one and dissolves its juridical character, and, 
in so doing, negates altogether the treaty rights of other Members.” 
 
The Panel in US – Shrimp considered this finding to be an application of the international law 
principle according to which international agreements must be applied in good faith, in light of 
                                                  
1536
 The drafting history to Article XXI reveals that both the general and security exceptions were originally 
contained in one provision prefaced by the chapeau. The fact that the chapeau was deliberately excluded from the 
security exception could be interpreted as a deliberate decision not to subject Article XXI to a test of reasonableness 
“Good faith” as a tool of interpretation imposes a standard of “reasonableness” (although the actual standard to be 
applied has never been explained by the DSB). See Zeitler, p. 727.  
1537
 Panel, US – Section 301, para. 7.64. The standard of review can be very high as in Article 17.6 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, which states that “[I]n its assessment of the facts of the matter, the Panel shall determine 
whether the authorities’ establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was 
unbiased and objective.” By contrast, the GATT does not expressly stipulate the standard of the good faith review to 
be applied in either Article XX or Article XXI. 
1538
 Appellate Body, U.S. – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 101 (suggesting that measures which imposed “unreasonable 
extra burden” or entailed “unreasonable additional cost and trouble” would contravene the principle of good faith). 
1539
 Cf. Akande and Williams, p. 392, (suggesting that the fact that Article XXI is not entirely self-judging means that 
there is no need to introduce a test of reasonableness).  
1540
 Article 26 VCLT (Pacta Sunt Servanda) states “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.” 
1541
 Appellate Body, US – Gasoline, p. 22. 
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the pacta sunt servanda principle.1542 More specifically, failure to prevent the abusive application 
of Article XXI would also infringe Article XXIII of the GATT as well as the Panel’s obligation 
under Article 3.2. DSU “to preserve the rights and obligations of the Parties under the covered 
agreements.”1543 It could also be argued that a ruling of the Panel which does not consider the 
reasonableness of the exercise of a right would not be achieving a satisfactory settlement 
pursuant to Article 3.4 DSU.  
 
The obligation on member states to exercise their rights reasonably also reflects a general 
concern by the dispute settlement organs that member states should not avoid their obligations by 
formulating measures in a way which circumvents the provision, regardless of the express 
wording of the text. The Panel and Appellate Body have taken a similar approach towards the 
anti-discrimination provisions of Article I and Article XI GATT. In Canada – Autos and 
Argentine – Hides and Leather the Panel held that these provisions applied to de jure and de facto 
discrimination in order to prevent the frustration of the provision, despite the lack of express 
wording to this effect.1544 The way that the Appellate Body interprets the chapeau also reflects 
this broad policy. For example, in US – Gasoline, it held that “[t]he fundamental theme is to be 
found in the purpose and object of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to 
substantive rules available in Article XX.”1545 The major aim of the investigation would be 
similar to that underlying the chapeau of Article XX, namely to strike a balance between 
protecting the duties and rights of the parties concerned:  
 
“The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence, essentially the delicate one of 
locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an 
exception under Article XX and the rights of the other Members under varying substantive 
provisions (e.g., Article XI) of the GATT 1994, so that neither of the competing rights will cancel 
                                                  
1542
 Panel, US – Shrimp, para. 7.41.  
1543
 Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, p. 22 (the application of a measure would be unreasonable if it deliberately leads 
to diminishing the rights of other states “without due regard both to the legal duties of the party claiming the 
exception and the legal rights of the other parties concerned”).  
1544
 Panel, Canada – Autos, para. 10.38; Panel, Argentina – Bovine Hides, pp. 11.17. 
1545
 Appellate Body, US  – Gasoline, p. 25. 
  
 
292 
out the other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and obligations 
constructed by the Members themselves in that Agreement.” 1546 
 
The exact form that the test of a reasonable exercise of a right could take is uncertain: after all, 
one of the main criticisms of “reasonableness” is its vagueness, which risks granting too much 
discretion to the Panel or Appellate Body.1547 It has also proved difficult to establish general rules 
in relation to the chapeau of Article XX because a finding of discrimination depends on the 
unique circumstances of each case.1548  Reliance on scientific evidence may provide the means of 
reaching an objective result but there is nevertheless a need to define the conceptual form that a 
reasonableness test should take. This could be achieved by limiting the abus de droit doctrine to 
specific situations, as Article XX does (i.e. discrimination and trade restriction), or by assessing 
the measure according to the standard of a “reasonable state.”1549 These two methods are 
examined below.  
 
A “reasonable state” test proposed by a leading authority on WTO law is an intriguing proposal 
because it appears to reflect the use of reasonableness in common law jurisdictions, i.e. as a 
means of judging the appropriateness of behaviour according to objective criteria.1550 It could be 
argued that this test would be unacceptable in relation to Article XXI because it would require the 
Panel to place itself in the position of the member state and assess whether it was justified in 
taking the measures it did.1551 Such an exercise would conflict with the subjective wording of 
                                                  
1546
 Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, para. 158 – 159. 
1547
 See Report of the Panel, EC – Anti-Dumping Duties on Inports of Cotton-Type Bedlinens from India, 
WT/DS141/R, 30 October 2000 (adopted 12 March 2001), para. 6.99 (“Thus, the use of actual data itself ensures that 
subjective judgments about the reasonability of the results do not affect the calculation of constructed normal value. 
We consider that no purpose would be served by testing the results obtained under the chapeau and subparagraphs (i) 
and (ii) against some arbitrary or subjective standard of reasonability”). 
1548
 See Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, paras. 158 – 159 (“The location of the line of equilibrium, as expressed in the 
chapeau, is not fixed and unchanging; the line moves as the kind and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as 
the facts making up specific cases differ”). 
1549
 See BHALA, p. 562 
1550
 See WILLIAM ROGERS ET AL, WINFIELD AND JOLOCWICZ ON TORT, 17th EDITION, LONDON 2002, pp. 64 – 65 at 
para. 3.5. The authors point out that the judge has to decide what this term means and that “it is inevitable that 
different judges may take variant views on the same question with respect to such an elastic term.”  
1551
 Neil MacCormick, Reasonableness and Objectivity, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1575, at p. 1579, who points to “a 
very general tendency in the law to rely upon the standard of reasonableness as a criterion of right decision-making, 
of right action, and of fair interpersonal relationships within the law of property, the law of obligations, and family 
law.”  
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Article XXI (b)1552 and could lead to complaints of judicial activism:1553 Panels may be accused 
of “second guessing” the decision taking by member states or of applying seemingly objective 
standards through a subjective perspective (a criticism levelled at common law judges).1554 The 
standards applied by this test would necessarily be multilateral in nature, with the “reasonable 
state” representing a universal best model for all 151 members of the WTO, whether least 
developed, developing or developed. It is difficult to reconcile this model with Article XXI 
which, as previously argued, specifically offers justification to measures protecting national 
security (i.e. unilateral measures). 
 
Within the context of Article XX, the abus de droit doctrine assumes a very specific form, 
restricting the investigation to a far narrower range of subjects than it theoretically permits.1555 
During the Uruguay Round, the Members agreed on a text which deliberately limited the 
constellations of abuse to the arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade. The wording of the 
provision is also restrictive: for example, in US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body held that a finding 
of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” depended on the satisfaction of three requirements: 
1) discrimination; 2) which is arbitrary or unjustifiable in character and 3) which must occur 
between countries where the same conditions prevail.1556 It also pointed out that failure to comply 
with the requirements of the chapeau meant that the protection of the exception would not apply 
to the measure.1557 Equally, however, it is possible that some cases of abuse will not fall within 
the scope of the provision even if these three conditions are met.1558 For example, the Appellate 
                                                  
1552
 E.g. Panel, U.S. – Gasoline, para. 6.26 the Panel did not accept the reasons put forward by the United States 
imported gasoline was relegated to the more exacting statutory baseline requirement because of these difficulties of 
verification and enforcement. It held that there was not any particular difficulty sufficient to warrant the demands of 
the baseline establishment methods applied by the United States. See discussion of the Panel’s decision in Appellate 
Body, U.S. – Gasoline, pp. 25 – 27.  
1553
 Ragosta et al, pp. 711 – 713. 
1554
 Attempts to find objective elements in Article XXI cannot disguise the fact that the wording does not permit any 
conclusive interpretation: see Piczak, pp. 319 – 320 (“[E]ven given a panel member that may not shrink from the task 
of defining the term, ultimately he or she would be making a subjective assessment of the term”). 
1555
 See Panizzon, p. 31, who identifies four ways in which a state can abuse its exercise of a right. 
1556
 Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, para. 150; Appellate Body, US – Gasoline, p. 25 (the three terms were to be “read 
side-by-side” and “they impart meaning to one another”). 
1557
 Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, para. 157. 
1558
 For example, if the restrictive effects of the measure are limited to small traders of a foreign country. Such 
traders are unlikely to have the political weight to persuade their government to initiate dispute settlement 
proceedings at the WTO. 
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Body held that discrimination has to be foreseeable and not merely an inadvertent or unavoidable 
consequence of the application of the measure.1559  
 
Of these two possible methods of carrying out a reasonableness test, the second is to be preferred 
because it respects the fact that Article XXI is designed to justify unilateral measures. Although a 
general test of reasonableness in relation to Article XXI would encompass a broader range of 
abuses than those covered by the chapeau of Article XX, the following investigation takes these 
two forms of abuse as its starting point. Existing jurisprudence on Article XX has examined the 
nature of “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination” and “disguised restrictions on international 
trade” in detail. 
 
2.6. Intermediate Result 
 
1. Article XXI (a) cannot be interpreted wholly subjectively  
Member states must satisfy the objective elements of Article XXI (a) regarding national security 
and disclosure. Otherwise, member states could obstruct the investigation by refusing to submit 
the necessary information (p. 260).  
 
Moreover, Articles 3.10 and 23 of the DSU requires states to co-operate with the Panel; failure to 
do so could lead it to draw negative inferences (p. 260). 
 
2. Terms such as “war” and “emergency in international relations” must be  interpreted in 
accordance with international law  
This is supported by the WTO agreements, jurisprudence and commentators. In addition, the 
Charter of the United Nations expressly states that its obligations are to prevail over those of any 
other agreement (pp. 263 – 264). 
 
The evolutionary interpretation should not be applied because the United Nations did not intend 
the definition of war to be given a broad interpretation (p. 265). 
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 Appellate Body, US – Gasoline, pp. 28.  
  
 
295 
The term “emergency in international relations” is ambiguous and can only be properly defined 
with reference to resolutions of the United Nations (pp. 265 – 266). 
 
The meaning of fissionable materials is well-documented in international law and can serve to 
limit the application of Article XXI (pp. 266 – 267). The term “relating to” must be narrowly 
interpreted, otherwise the scope of the provision would be too wide (pp. 267 – 268). 
 
3. The ordinary meaning of “essential” and “necessary” suggests a narrow scope of 
application 
This is supported by the fact that “essential” is clearly more restrictive than other adjectives used 
to describe the relationship between the state and the particular interest to be protected (pp. 268 – 
269).  
 
According to Korea – Beef, the term “necessary” – within the context of the general exceptions – 
is used in a legal sense and accordingly has a limited scope of application (p. 278) 
 
4. The extraterritorial application of laws may be acceptable provided there is a sufficient 
nexus between the object of regulation and the state issuing the regulation. 
This is supported by the ruling of the Panel in US – Shrimp (p. 272).  
 
The legality of extraterritoriality under international law is not a settled issue (pp. 270 – 271). 
 
5. There must be a necessity test along the lines of the that contained in Article XX, taking 
into account the degree of deference indicated by the wording of Article XXI (p. 274) 
Environmental and national security interests are similar and also interrelated. Also, there is 
nothing in the trevaux preparatoires indicates that “necessary” in Article XXI GATT imposes a 
lower standard than that in Article XX (p. 275). 
 
According to Korea – Beef, the effet utile principle dictates that states should not be able to 
choose the standard most convenient to them (p. 275).  
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3. Examination  
 
This section subjects the Container Security Initiative to the necessity test as described above. 
The first stage examines whether the measure falls within the scope of Article XXI and forms the 
precondition to the necessity test. The next stage examines whether the measure is necessary 
using the test employed in Article XX as a basis. The final stage of the test examines whether the 
application of the measure amounts to an abuse of the right to invoke the security exception.  
 
3.1. Does the CSI Fall Within the Scope of Article XXI (b) (i)?  
 
The United States must first prove that it has introduced the CSI under the circumstances listed in 
Article XXI (b) (i) – (iii) GATT.1560 As stated above, this question is to be judged according to 
objective criteria. The interpretation of many of the terms contained in this provision has been 
regulated by international instruments, particularly in resolutions issued by the Security Council 
of the United Nations.1561 In general, there are two alternatives open to the United States: it could 
claim that the CSI relates to “fissionable materials” (Article XXI (b) (i) or that it has been taken 
“at a time of war or other emergency in international relations” (Article XXI (b) (ii)).  
 
3.1.1. Does the CSI Relate to Fissionable Materials? 
 
According to the CBP, “CSI addresses the threat to border security and global trade that is posed 
by potential terrorist use of a maritime container to deliver a weapon.”1562 Therefore, the United 
States could seek to justify the CSI on the basis of Article XXI (b) (i), arguing that the primary 
aim of the CSI to detect WMD which use fissionable materials.1563  
 
The main purpose of the Container Security Initiative is to identify the presence of materials in 
containers which could be used to construct Weapons of Mass Destruction. The detection 
equipment used at CSI harbours primarily aims to detect and prevent WMD (including nuclear 
                                                  
1560
 See Finnegan, p. 15.  
1561
 Id. 
1562
 CSI FACT SHEET, p. 1.  
1563
 By contrast, there are no fixed or universally accepted criteria for existence of a war or other emergency in 
international relations.  
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weapons) from being smuggled into the United States. This was the justification for introducing 
the CSI given by the statement of the former U.S. Commissioner for Customs in 2002: 
 
“Of ever-greater concern are the possibilities that international terrorists such as Al Qaeda 
could smuggle a crude nuclear device in one of the more than fifty thousand containers that 
arrive in the U.S. each day. One can only imagine the devastation of a small nuclear explosion at 
one of our seaports.”1564  
 
Therefore, the United States could argue that the CSI falls within the scope of Article XXI(b)(i), 
by reference to its aim of preventing the proliferation of WMD generally.  
 
On the other hand, the complainant could argue that the CSI does not fall within the scope of 
Article XXI (b) (i) because it does not primarily relate to “fissionable materials.” The main aim 
of the CSI does not relate to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons per se which, in any case, 
is a task more suited to other government initiatives such as the PSI Department of Energy’s 
Megaport Initiative.1565 Rather, the CSI is designed to prevent the detonation of a “dirty bomb” at 
a US seaport. This term refers to a radiological bomb constructed e.g. with Cesium-1371566 and as 
such does not constitute a “material which can be fissioned” for the purposes of Article 
XXI (b) (i) being a “nuclear fragment of heavy-element fission” (i.e. a by-product of the fission 
process).1567 An “evolutionary interpretation” could not be used to expand the meaning of the 
term because this would risk contradicting the scientific definition of this term in international 
treaties. The complainant could also argue that even if the CSI was capable of detecting 
fissionable materials in containers it would still not fall within the scope of Article XXI because 
it is not “primarily aimed at” detecting fissionable materials in containers.1568  
 
                                                  
1564
 U.S. Customs Commissioner, Speech of 17 January 2002.  
1565
 GAO-05-375, p. 6. 
1566
 See Opening Statement of Senator Coleman, Hearing of 28 March 2006, S. Hrg. 109–548, pp. 1 – 2. According 
to the US Environmental Agency the largest single source of Cesium-137 in the environment came from fallout from 
atmospheric nuclear weapons tests in the 1950s and 1960s, which dispersed and deposited Cesium-137 world-wide: 
see < http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/cesium.htm >. 
1567
 See < http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Effects/wenw_chp2.shtml >; see also OECD REPORT 2005, which 
makes a clear distinction between nuclear and radiological weapons.  
1568
 Although the CSI STRATEGIC PLAN on p. 28 does refer to the detection of radiological and nuclear material, it 
states on p. 15 that the primary strategic goal is to “protect US borders against terrorists and terrorist weapons.”  
  
 
298 
3.1.2. Does the War Against Terrorism Amount to a State of War? 
 
The United States could argue that, since 2001, it has waged a war on terrorism and that maritime 
transportation security represents a major component of this offensive. Therefore, the CSI is 
justified by Article XXI (b) (iii) because it is a measure taken “in a time of war.”  
 
A declaration of war against the United States was made by Osama bin Laden and his followers 
on 23 August 1996.1569 This was followed by a fatwa issued by the leader of Al Qaeda in which 
he stated that that “[t]o kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual 
duty of every Muslim who is able, in any country where this is possible.”1570 9/11 clearly showed 
that the Al Qaeda terrorist network had the power to launch an attack which passed the threshold 
test of the ICJ in the Nicaragua v. United States insofar as the sheer scale of an attack amounted 
to more than a mere “isolated border incident”. Indeed, in terms of destruction and the death toll, 
9/11 was worse than the attack on Pearl Harbour.1571 Al Qaeda’s attack on the WTC in New York 
on 11 September 2001 amounted to an “armed attack” according to Article 51 of the UN Charter 
and, under this provision, the United States is entitled to take measures to protect itself.  
 
The United States Government has officially and consistently designated the terrorist atrocity of 
9/11 as an “act of war” and has taken defensive action by declaring a “war against terrorism.”1572 
Since 9/11 the United States has fought a war against “terrorists of global reach” which it has 
described as “a global enterprise of uncertain duration.”1573 Declaring severe acts of terrorism as 
“acts of war” and taking military action against terrorists reflected the precedent set by previous 
                                                  
1569
 Osama bin Laden, Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places 
(Expel the Infidels from the Arab Peninsula): A Message From Usama Bin Muhammad Bin In Laden To His Muslim 
Brethren All Over The World Generally And In The Arab Peninsula Specifically (August 1996); see also REPORT OF 
THE 9/11 COMMISSION, pp. 47 – 48.  
1570
 Osama bin Laden et al, Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, World Islamic Front, 23 February 1998.  
1571
 Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L. 
L. J. 41, p. 47 (“[T]o find U.S. deaths on the same scale in a single day requires going back to the U.S. Civil War”).  
1572
 See NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM, p. 1: “The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 […] 
were acts of war against the United States of America and its allies […].” See also 9-11 COMMISSION REPORT, pp. 
47ff. and 59ff. See also President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People 
Office of the Press Secretary, 20 September 2001 (“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end 
there.  It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated”).    
1573
 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Preamble by George Bush, p. 3. 
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administrations.1574 Moreover, the President was supported by the Congress which issued the 
“Authorization for Use of Military Force”1575 against “those responsible” for the attacks launched 
against the United States in accordance with Section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.1576 At 
international level, the reaction of the United States to 9/11 was supported by United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions and other nations.1577 Although the United States is not using the 
term “war” in a conventional sense there is growing recognition amongst commentators that the 
law on war should be re-evaluated following 9/11 in light of the threat presented by global 
terrorism. Nowadays, the static and quantifiable threat of nuclear annihilation (i.e. MAD) has 
been replaced by “shadowy networks of individuals.”1578 The response to this environment has 
been the so-called “Bush Doctrine” of pre-emptive self-defence, which is articulated in the 
National Security Strategy of the United States as follows: 
 
“As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the 
specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists 
acquired and used weapons of mass destruction.[…] The United States has long maintained the 
option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater 
the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking 
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains at to the time and place of the 
enemy’s attack.”1579 
 
Categorizing the “war against terrorism” as a state of war pursuant to Article XXI GATT would 
also correspond to the evolutionary interpretation of treaty provisions which demands that terms 
contained in the WTO agreements reflect current conditions (in this case the threats to global 
security and economic stability in the post-Cold War security situation).1580 Moreover, such an 
                                                  
1574
 Ronald Reagan also described terrorist attacks as an “act of war” in 1985. See REPORT OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION, 
p. 99. 
1575
 S.J. Res. 23, Section 2 (b) (1), 107th Congress, 1st Session, 3 January 2001 (“Joint Resolution to authorize the use 
of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States”). 
1576
 War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. 93 – 148, 93rd Congress, H.J. Res. 452, 7 November 1973 (USC Title 
50, Chapter 33, §§1541 et seq.). 
1577
 See Murphy, p. 48. 
1578
 Supra n. 1178.  
1579
 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, p. 15. 
1580
 See Eyal Benvenisti, The US and the Use of Force: Double-Edged Hegemony and the Management of Global 
Emergencies, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 677, pp. 681 – 685. 
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interpretation is not opposed by the wording of Article 51 of the UN Charter which is broadly 
worded and simply provides that states have a right to defend themselves when an armed attack 
occurs.
1581
 
 
The complainant could argue that while certain aspects of these arguments may appear 
persuasive, especially following 9/11, they are to be rejected taking into account applicable 
international law. The evolutionary interpretation of Article XXI established by the Appellate 
Body in United States – Shrimp/Turtle requires the dispute settlement bodies to ascertain the 
contemporary meaning of treaty provisions by referring to the relevant international 
conventions.1582 Its purpose is to ensure that the provisions of the WTO agreements reflect the 
contemporary usage of terms according to the applicable law rather than shape their possible or 
prospective interpretation. This is supported by customary rules of international law that the 
dispute settlement bodies are to apply when clarifying the meaning of the agreement. Article 
31 (2) (c) VCLT states that the agreements also comprise of “any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties.” In other words, WTO law cannot adopt an 
interpretation for which there is no authority in international law. As explained above,1583 the law 
on war is determined by Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the UN Charter. The latter provision does not 
refer to state actors or non-state actors. Nevertheless, it has been the practice of the International 
Court of Justice to interpret the provision narrowly and limit its scope to state actors.1584 An act 
by a non-state actor will only be considered an “armed attack” if it can be attributed to a state in 
accordance with control tests laid down by the ICJ in the Nicaragua and Tadic decisions.1585 
Despite the gravity of the attacks carried out by the 9/11 terrorists, the absence of a state 
connection means that they do not constitute “armed attacks” pursuant to Article 51 of the UN 
                                                  
1581
 Frank A. Biggio, Neutralizing the Threat: Reconsidering Existing Doctrines in the Emerging War on Terrorism, 
34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.1, p. 35. 
1582
 See Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, para. 130 stating that “it is pertinent to note” such agreements. However, the 
following paragraphs its interpretation is determined by UNCLOS and CITES which suggests that international 
agreements must form the basis for the evolutionary interpretation. Only by referring to such agreement could the 
AB ascertain “contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the 
environment”. Reference to international instruments is even more important when dealing with a term as crucial to 
peace and stability as “war.”  
1583
 Supra pp. 262 – 265. 
1584
 Mary Ellen O’Connell, When is a War not a War? The Myth of the Global War on Terror, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 535, pp. 537 and 539 (“[I]t is time to restate and strengthen a narrow definition of war”). 
1585
 See Jonathon Somer, Acts of Non-State Armed Groups and the Law Governing Armed Conflict, ASIL INSIGHT 
,24 August 2006, Vol. 10 Issue 21.  
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Charter.1586 This is the applicable law (in the sense of Article 51 VCLT), despite dissenting views 
in the ICJ judgements and literature.1587 Therefore, according to the evolutionary interpretation, 
the war against terrorism does not constitute a “war” pursuant to Article XXI (b) (iii). 
 
3.1.3. Does Maritime Terrorism Amount to an Emergency in International Relations? 
 
Alternatively, the United States could deem the maritime terrorist threat to be an emergency in 
international relations. The term “other emergency in international relations” may be more 
ambiguous than “war” but it is also to be interpreted according to objective criteria. The context 
of the term makes clear that the crisis is similar or related to a situation of war.1588 In addition, the 
event must precipitate an emergency in interstate relations.  
 
Although terrorist attacks have traditionally constituted small-scale, isolated incidents they have 
increased in intensity and range since the 1990s. Transportation has played a major role in such 
attacks: apart from 9/11, examples include the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 (“Lockerbie 
bombing”), the bombings of underground railways in Madrid and London as well as bus 
bombings in Northern Israel. All these incidents have provoked emergencies in international 
relations either relating to cross-border law enforcement proceedings or military reprisals.1589 
9/11 itself also led to an emergency in international relations in terms of law enforcement and 
military action against those held responsible in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2006 George W. Bush 
extended the national emergency with regard to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
which had been announced by President George Bush in 1994: 
 
“Because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them 
continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
                                                  
1586
 Jörg Kammerhofer, The Armed Activities Case and Non-state Actors in Self-Defence Law, LEIDEN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (2007), 89 – 113, pp. 106 – 112. 
1587
 See e.g. Markus Krajewski, Preventive Use of Force and Military Actions against Non-state Actors: Revisiting 
the Right of Self-Defence in Insecure Times, 5 BALTIC YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2005, pp. 19 ff.  
1588
 See Hahn, p. 558, who points out that the term “emergency” “is not used as a stand-alone term but as an annex to 
the term war.” 
1589
 The Lockerbie Bombing led to economic sanctions being imposed on Libya (see Security Council Resolution 
883 (1993)); bus bombings in Israel have led to military action by Israeli forces (see e.g. Stephan Farell et al, Israel 
urged to show restraint after bomb, TIMES ONLINE, 6 March 2003).  
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and economy of the United States, I have determined the national emergency previously declared 
must continue in effect beyond November 14, 2006”.1590 
 
Terrorist attacks on the international supply chain could also trigger an emergency in 
international relations. Oceans no longer act as barriers but connect nations by offering highways 
for commerce.1591 With specific regard to the CSI, international container traffic has been 
described as “the lubricant for the world’s economy”1592 and the economic consequences of an 
MSI on the scale of 9/11 is likely to prove intolerable for the United States and its trade 
partners.1593 The United States has produced substantial and detailed information explaining how 
a ‘maritime security incident’ could trigger an international economic crisis which could 
plausibly be described as an emergency in international relations.1594 As the following statement 
by the U.S. government makes clear, the maritime domain is of unparalleled strategy importance 
and offers a “broad array of potential targets”:1595  
  
“Maritime transportation […] is the primary mechanism […] for moving goods and commodities 
around the world quickly and cheaply. The ships that ply the Maritime Domain are the primary 
mode of transportation for world trade, carrying over 80 % of world trade by volume, making the 
security of the Maritime Domain critically important to the prosperity and liberty of billions of 
people […].”1596 
 
The importance of maritime transportation to the international community and its vulnerability to 
acts of terrorism is also recognized by international organizations such as the World Shipping 
Organization, the International Maritime Organization and the European Union.1597 The fact that 
                                                  
1590
 Communication from the President of the United States transmitting notification that the national emergency 
declared with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems declared by 
Executive Order 12938 on 14 November 1994, as amended, is to continue in effect beyond 14 November 2006, 
pursuant to 50 u.s.c. 1622(d), 9 November 2006, 105th Congress, 1st Session, (House Document 109 – 149).  
1591
 THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, p. 2. 
1592
 RAND EUROPE REPORT, p.1; see also Section 101, Findings (2), MTSA 2002. 
1593
 Loy and Ross, p. 3.   
1594
 See e.g. PORT SECURITY WARGAME; Binnendijk et al, p. 3. 
1595
 NATIONAL PLAN TO ACHIEVE MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, p. 2.  
1596
 MARITIME COMMERCE SECURITY PLAN, p. 2. 
1597
 WSC, Comments 9 September 2002 at p. 2 (referring to the fact that industry has recognized the importance of 
securing America’s trade and world trade from the threat of terrorist attack); European Commission, Communication 
from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament, The European Economic and Social Committee and 
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other countries have also started to take action to improve maritime security also proves that this 
issue is of global importance.1598 Considering that two-third’s of the world’s people live within 
240 miles of a seacoast, no population is immune from the threat of maritime terrorism.1599 
 
On the other hand, the complainant could argue that the threat presented by terrorists to maritime 
transportation does not amount to an emergency in international relations. The expression “in 
time of” proves that Article XXI (b) (iii) refers to an existing rather than a potential situation.1600 
The fear that terrorists will use a container to deliver and detonate a dirty bomb is based on 
assumption and not scientific evidence.1601 Reference to available evidence suggests that the 
assumed risk of container terrorism does not amount to an emergency in international relations. 
Maritime terrorists are reported to have targeted a range of vessels, including cruisers, freight 
ships, military vessels and ferries since 1992 but these attacks have not used containers.1602 
Incidents of maritime terrorism generally tend to be irregular small-scale attacks by a number of 
diverse terrorist groups1603 and those which have occurred since 9/11 do not indicate any increase 
in scale or sophistication.1604 This traditionally low threat level is reflected by the fact that the 
International Maritime Organization only introduced new legal measures to prevent maritime 
                                                                                                                                                                
the Committee of the Regions on Enhancing Maritime Transportation Security, Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Enhancing Ship and Port Facility, COM(2003) 229 final. 
1598
 THE INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND COORDINATION STRATEGY, p. 3.  
1599
 Id., pp. 2 – 3. 
1600
 This does not necessarily contradict the assertion that “it considers” allows pre-emptive measures. However, pre-
emptive measures can only be justified if they are taken at the time of war or other emergency in international 
relations.  
1601
 See OECD REPORT, pp. 36-37 (“[…] many government agencies in charge of overseeing the different parts of 
the container transport chain have not undertaken a thorough and comprehensive risk assessment according to 
internationally accepted risk management standards.”) and 40. 
1602
 Al Qaeda is also reported to own and operate 15 container vessels which could be used to commit or support a 
terrorist attack: see Aaron Lukas, Protection without Protectionism, Reconciling Trade and Homeland Security, 
Trade Policy Analysis No. 27, 8 April 2004, p. 2.   
1603
 For an overview of terrorist attacks prior and subsequent to 9/11, see Bryant, pp. 3-10; see also THE NATIONAL 
MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY, p. 4.  
1604
 For example, the most recent maritime terrorist plot was by a British Islamic terrorist cell which planned to 
attack the Mayport naval base in Jacksonville Florida. This too was an unsophisticated plot using conventional 
weapons and explosives. According to a newspaper report, messages exchanged by the plotters “referred to using six 
Chevrolet GT vehicles and three fishing boats and blowing up petrol tanks with rocket propelled grenades.” See John 
Steele, 45 Muslim Doctors Planned US Terror Raids, DAILY TELEGRAPH ONLINE, 5 July 2007. See also 
ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, p. 5 recognizing that an attack using conventional explosives continues to be the most 
probable scenario.  
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terrorism following 9/11.1605 There is also uncertainty as to the significance of containers in 
facilitating maritime terrorism. For example, there has not been any published judicial decision 
with regard to terrorism and the carriage of goods by sea1606 and since its introduction in 2002, 
the CSI has not resulted in any discovery of WMD.1607 It is also significant that container security 
does not feature in the measures taken by the IMO and WCO. The ISPS Code and related 
amendments to the SOLAS Convention introduced by the International Maritime Organization do 
not contain any provisions directly dealing with container security.1608 This is also the case with 
the WCO’s Framework of Standards which concentrates on security at the premises of importers 
and co-operation between customs authorities and does not refer to container security directly.  
 
Overall, despite a number of attacks on maritime transportation assets following 9/11 (e.g. the 
attack on the Limburg by a group affiliated with Al Qaeda), terrorist attacks on maritime 
transportation facilities remain sporadic and primitive. There is also no evidence that terrorists 
have used or are likely to use containers in carrying out their attacks. The risk of terrorist attacks 
on maritime transportation is largely based on an a priori assumption1609 and cannot be 
objectively classified as constituting an “emergency in international relations.” 
 
3.1.4. Is there a Threat to U.S. Maritime Container Transport? 
 
The first stage of this test also requires the Panel to establish the threat to the essential security 
interests of the United States within the context of maritime container transport.1610 In other 
words, the risk relates specifically to the threat of container terrorism in the United States rather 
than the threat of terrorism at internationally. Although the Panel should adopt a deferential 
                                                  
1605
 Prior to 9/11, the IMO preferred to deal with such acts under the existing laws combatting piracy: see Bryant, p. 
5 (“Until the horrific terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the IMO turned its attention to the more immediate 
problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea”).  
1606
 Clyne, p. 1187. 
1607
 ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, p. 12.  
1608
 Bryant, pp. 10 – 11.  
1609
 Binnendijk et al, p. 2. 
1610
 The CSI specifically targets containers and not, e.g. bulk shipments or the importation of other cargo which 
could be used to transport WMD, such as cars: see S. Hrg. 107 – 224, p. 88 (“Yet if a container can be used to 
transport a WMD, how about the 610,000 automobiles, trucks, buses, subways, cars, and huge crates that pass 
through our port every year?”) 
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standard of review,1611 the member state must nevertheless base its arguments on scientifically-
based threat assessment.1612 According to the GAO,  
 
“A threat analysis, the first step in determining risk, identifies and evaluates each threat on the 
basis of various factors, such as its capability and intent to attack an asset, the likelihood of a 
successful attack, and its lethality.”1613 
 
The United States could base its justification by drawing attention to the fact that it is not possible 
to define or quantify the terrorist threat precisely: the United States is facing “myriad non-
traditional, asymmetric, and unpredictable threats from […] terrorist organizations.”1614 Threats 
to maritime interests are difficult to identify owing to the lack of transparency in the maritime 
domain.1615  In addition, information on their activities is highly classified. Notwithstanding such 
inherent certainty, a leading maritime security expert has proved in detail that it would be 
technically possible for terrorists to ship a radiological bomb to the United States and detonate it 
at a seaport by remote control.1616 Considering the catastrophic devastation that would result from 
such an attack, the United States government could argue that it is justified in introducing the CSI 
to prevent such an attack on the basis of its inherent right to protect its national security interests, 
as provided for in the GATT. Moreover, the actual threat of terrorism is compounded by the 
almost complete absence of counter-terrorist measures in the maritime domain prior to 9/11. 
Taking into account the evidence for and against a terrorist threat to maritime containers, an 
expert report for Congress concluded that whilst maritime terrorist attacks are difficult to execute, 
                                                  
1611
 Akande and Williams, pp. 400 – 402.  
1612
 OECD REPORT 2005, pp. 36 – 44.  
1613
 GAO REPORT, COMBATING TERRORISM: THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENTS CAN HELP PRIORITIZE AND TARGET 
PROGRAM INVESTMENTS, April 1998 (GAO/NSIAD – 98 – 74), p.3. See also p. 4 (“If properly applied, threat and 
risk assessments can provide an analytically sound basis for building programmatic responses to various identified 
threats, including terrorism.”); ECSA ANNUAL REPORT 2003 – 2004, p.18. 
1614
 INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND COORDINATION STRATEGY, p. 2. Annex A of the strategy summarizes the major 
threats to the maritime domain. 
1615
 THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, p. 2.  
1616
 FLYNN, pp. 16 – 29. This scenario was used to justify the introduction of the CSI: see U.S. Customs 
Commissioner, Speech of January 17 2002. It has also been routinely cited in all the hearings on CSI and is related to 
the wider aim of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. See e.g. S. Hrg. 109 – 186 (statement of Senator 
Norm Coleman), p. 2. There is a potential overlap between the CSI and the NNSA’s Megaport Initiative in this 
respect, although the two agencies collaborate in achieving proliferation prevention. 
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“they nevertheless remain a significant possibility and warrant continued policy attention.”1617 It 
is true to say that, nowadays, this view is shared by international maritime organizations and the 
maritime industry generally.  
 
The Framework of Standards opens with the statement, “On 23 June 2005 safer world trade 
became a reality when […] the 166 Members of the WCO […] adopted the Framework of 
Standards […]”, thereby implying that world trade is nowadays a potentially unsafe activity.1618 It 
is true that container shipping is not an industry designed for security: its aim is to move goods 
through the international market place in the most expeditious manner.1619 Once a container has 
been loaded and sealed it is impossible for customs authorities to verify its contents without 
carrying out a physical inspection.1620 Prior to the 24 Hour Rule, the only source of information 
on the contents of a container was the cargo manifest which provided a minimal description of 
the cargo such as “said to contain” or acronyms such as “F.A.K.” (freight of all kinds). Criminals 
used the anonymity of containers to smuggle illegal goods such as narcotics, counterfeit goods 
and pornographic materials into a country and illegal immigrants used containers as a means of 
transportation to gain entry into the United States.1621 Containers are still secured by little more 
than a “fifty cent lead seal”1622 and criminals have become expert at opening containers 
unnoticed, in order to steal the contents or insert illegal merchandise.1623 It would be easy for 
terrorists to exploit this lack of security in order to smuggle WMD into the United States.1624 
 
Although the scale of crime at seaports became a source of concern for U.S. Customs long before 
2001, the rise in container shipments soon outstripped their available resources. It has been 
claimed that 21,000 containers enter United States’ seaports every day but prior to 9/11, only 3.7 
                                                  
1617
 PAUL W. PARFOMAK AND JOHN FRITTELLI, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, MARITIME SECURITY: POTENTIAL 
TERRORIST ATTACKS AND PROTECTION PRIORITIES, 9 January 2007, p. 24. 
1618
 See Statement of Michael Danet in WCO, Framework of Standards; FLYNN p. 13 (“A core obligation is to 
provide for the security and safety of its people. My concern has been that the imperative of openness has been 
trumping the public sector’s means to meet that responsibility”). Cf. THE INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND 
COORDINATION STRATEGY, p. 2 (“The openness that makes the maritime domain so important to international 
commerce also represents a great vulnerability”).  
1619
 Binnendijk et al. p. 2. 
1620
 Loy and Ross, p.3. 
1621
 OECD REPORT 2003, p. 25 at para. 26. 
1622
 S. Hrg. 108 – 55, p. 25. 
1623
 INTERAGENCY REPORT, 2000, pp. 29 ff.  
1624
 Section 101 (12) (A) and (14) MTSA 2002. For details on how terrorists could exploit the breaches in security 
see Flynn pp. 16 – 28. 
  
 
307 
percent of those container were inspected physically.1625 In 1992, it was reported that U.S. 
Customs “could not adequately ensure that it was meeting its responsibilities to combat unfair 
trade practices or protect the American public from unsafe goods.”1626 Two reports in 1999 
revealed that crime was a continuing problem at seaports.1627 For example, the numbers of 
stakeholders in the supply chain, each employing numerous workers at seaports, made it difficult 
to identify those involved with seaport crime and stamp out corruption.1628 The Interagency 
Commission of 1999 reported that serious crime at seaports was probably more extensive than 
available evidence suggested.1629 Regulatory intervention to ensure standards of security was 
therefore required because “industry, mostly for financial reasons has clearly failed to ensure 
satisfactory levels of ship safety and environmental protection by itself without government 
coercion.”1630  
 
The United States could also present evidence supporting the existence of a risk to maritime 
container cargo in the form of a detailed plan explaining how a single terrorist could acquire the 
materials for a radiological bomb and send it to terrorist cells in Europe and United States for 
construction.1631 Experts have confirmed that it is technically feasible to load a dirty bomb in a 
container and detonate it by remote control.1632 The trafficking in WMD or their components is 
also a risk recognized by numerous international initiatives and which the CSI complements.1633 
                                                  
1625
 S. Hrg. 108-55, p. 45.  
1626
 GAO REPORT, MANAGING THE CUSTOMS SERVICE (GAO/HR-93-114), December 1992, p. 6. 
1627
 U.S. Department of Transportation, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM: A 
REPORT TO CONGRESS, SEPTEMBER 1999 and the INTERAGENCY REPORT 2000. 
1628
 See also S. Hrg 109 – 877 (Testimony of James P. Hoffa), p. 44.  
1629
 INTERAGENCY REPORT 2000, Excutive Summary, iii; Even today, crime is still a large-scale problem in the 
maritime transportation industry, see JOHN F. FRITTELLI, PORT AND MARITIME SECURITY: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 
FOR CONGRESS, UPDATED 27 MAY 2005, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, (RL31733), pp. 8 – 9.  
1630
 PARAMESWARAN, p. 51.  
1631
 Concerning maritime vulnerability see FLYNN, pp 81 – 110; see also S. Hg. 109 – 548 (testimony of Stephen E. 
Flynn), pp. 17 – 18. Expert opinion based on scientific evidence will be taken into account by the Panel. However, 
there are also other opinions on the threat. See e.g. Is It Time To Get Off the Security Bandwagon? LLOYD’S LIST, 
WLNR 7367746, 20 July 2004 (quoting Wolfgang Elsner, head of the European Commission’s intermodal security 
unit as stating “Our representatives in government are legislating in an attempt to protect us from the unpredictable.” 
According to the report “The Antwerp consensus seemed to be that the transport chain and Europe's coastline was 
impossible to defend”). 
1632
 Cf. Binnendjik, p. 3 (“Using simple mechanical triggering devices […] a weapon-carrying container may be 
readily transformed into a precision-guided munition”).  
1633
 See e.g. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force in 1970; the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, which entered into force in 1997 and aims to eliminate this category of WMD; the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and 
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The United States could also argue that terrorists have the motive to launch an attack on an 
American seaport owing to their crucial economic importance. This was illustrated in 2002 when 
a leading consultancy firm in the United States simulated a “war game” in co-operation with over 
eighty leading stakeholders at U.S. seaports and thereby calculated the catastrophic damage that 
would result from the detonation of radiological device at a seaport.1634 These findings were 
confirmed by a serious strike by dock workers at West Coast ports in 2002. Finally, a widely-
publicized newspaper report of a suspected Egyptian Al Qaeda operative found hiding in 
container at a small Italian harbour1635 confirmed CBP’s suspicions that terrorists were using 
containers to carry out a future attack on U.S. seaports.  
 
On the other hand, the complainant could argue that this evidence amounts to nothing more than 
circumstantial evidence.1636 There is no evidence that terrorists have used containers to carry out 
their attacks and, in any case, the difficulties in constructing a WMD together with the necessary 
detonation device make such an attack technically unfeasible.1637 Moreover, the possible effects 
of such a detonation are irrelevant in determining the existence of a threat because they do not 
refer to the capability of terrorists to smuggle a WMD into the United States by means of 
containers primed for detonation on arrival.1638 Prior to 9/11, the Congressional Research Service 
stated: 
 
“Many believe that while terrorist WMD attacks are possible, they are by no means inevitable. 
While some experts believe that a terrorist large-scale WMD attack is a low – probability, high-
                                                                                                                                                                
on Their Destruction, which entered into force in 1975. See also S/RES/1540, whereby the Security Council affirmed 
that the “proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security.” In particular, the Security Council obliges all states (under its Chapter VII 
powers) to “adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, 
possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in 
particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as 
an accomplice, assist or finance them.” 
1634
 PORT SECURITY WARGAME, pp. 1 – 2. 
1635
 OECD REPORT July 2003, p. 8, para. 23. For an overview of the available evidence see ASSESSMENT OF U.S. 
EFFORTS, pp. 3 – 5. 
1636
 An overview of the available evidence is provided in ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, id. 
1637
 See OECD REPORT 2005, p. 40, Box 3.1. 
1638
 See Remarks of Christopher Koch before the Maritime Trades Department AFL-CIO 2005 Convention, Chicago 
22 July 2005, p.2 who states “The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has stated that there are no known 
credible threats that indicate terrorists are planning to infiltrate or attack the United States via maritime shipping 
containers.” 
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consequence scenario, most seem to agree that possible future attacks would take the form of 
hoaxes and small scale attacks with chemical and biological weapons or materials, using low-
tech dissemination methods, such as contamination of food sources.”1639 
 
The GAO has also stated that “to be considered a threat, a terrorist group must not only exist but 
also have the intention and capability to launch attacks.”1640 The United States has not proved 
either of these elements, a point which has also been recognized by the OECD.1641 The literature 
on WMDs makes clear that such weapons are complicated to construct and difficult to detonate 
reliably and accurately.1642 It is generally accepted that terrorist groups lack the technological 
ability to construct a dirty bomb capable of being detonated by remote control.1643 For example, 
research into smart containers has revealed the difficulties in tracking individual container 
movements1644 and the challenge of finding a nuclear bomb in a container has been compared to 
looking for a needle in a hay-stack.1645 Terrorists seeking to detonate a nuclear device hidden in a 
container would be confronted by the same problems. Even the latest satellite tracking equipment 
(needed to locate a container for detonation by remote control) is attached to the outside of a 
container and easily visible to customs officers.1646 Overall, the evidence put forward so far by in 
support of the threat of a radiological bomb does not prove, on the balance of probabilities, that 
terrorist groups have the required technical know-how to detonate a WMD or radiological bomb 
in container.1647 The improbability of a bomb transported by container also appears to be 
                                                  
1639
 CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, 8 December 1999, p. 5. 
1640
 See GAO-03-519T, p. 7.  
1641
 See OECD REPORT 2005, p. 77 (“However, very real questions remain as to terrorists’ readiness, motivation 
and/or capability to use a container as a delivery platform for a CBRN weapon”). 
1642
 See e.g., the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL), Part II, Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies 
(Section 1 – Means of Delivery Technology), September 1998. 
1643
 THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT, pp. 71ff., 108ff., 190ff.; see also Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism and Intelligence Collection Prior to 
9/11, Staff Statement No. 9. 
1644
 World Shipping Council et al, In-Transit Container Security Enhancement, 9 September 2003, p. 14.; GAO-03-
770. 
1645
 S. Hrg. 107 – 224, p.2.  
1646
 S. Hrg. 108–55, p. 48 (photograph of antenna visible on exterior of Operation Safe Commerce Phase One 
container). Pictures of the latest technology also show the GPS device clearly attached to the door hinges of 
containers (see e.g. < http://www.globaltrackingtech.com/container_tracking.html >). However, cf., FLYNN, p. 23 
who points out that most cargo movements are automated and therefore such an antenna would not be seen by 
customs officers. 
1647
 See OECD REPORT 2005, p. 40. 
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recognized by the Department of Homeland Security itself in its budget allocation for 2006 which 
did not include it in its list of plausible attack scenarios.1648  
 
Hitherto, the United States has tended to rely on the technical possibility of constructing a device 
as well as the catastrophic damage that an MSI could cause.1649 The lack of hard evidence is 
compounded by the fact that during the five years that the CSI has been in operation, neither the 
stationing of U.S. Customs officers at foreign seaports nor the advance submission of the cargo 
manifest has revealed any interference with cargo containers attributable to terrorist groups.1650 
Considering the comments of the Panel with regard to the burden of evidence in Argentine – 
Hides, it is unlikely to consider this evidence as substantiating the classification of maritime 
terrorism as an “emergency in international relations.”1651 Moreover, the lack of a scientific threat 
assessment may mean that the measures are not proportional to the actual risk and not take into 
account the needs of commerce as required by statute.1652 
 
3.2. Is the CSI Necessary to Protect US Essential Security Interests ?  
 
As explained above, the necessity test in relation to Article XXI should take two steps: first, the 
determination of whether the interests that the measure aims to protect are vital and, second, 
whether the measure is effective and proportional to achieve its societal goal (i.e. the protection 
of essential security interests). If this is not the case, then the second stage of the test examines 
whether the measure is the least trade-restrictive means available. This would involve an 
examination of whether the measure is proportional to the societal aims to be achieved.1653  
 
                                                  
1648
 See CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, MARITIME SECURITY: POTENTIAL TERRORIST ATTACK AND PROTECTION 
PRIORITIES, 9 January 2007, p. 13.  
1649
 S. Hrg. 109 – 548 (testimony of Stephen E. Flynn), pp. 17 ff. 
1650
 See ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, p. 12 (“To date, of the high-risk containers inspected overseas, no WMD 
have been discovered”). 
1651
 It is questionable whether this evidence can be considered “scientific evidence.” Although the views of experts 
are important, there conflicting evidence on whether containers actually present a threat to national security. See e.g. 
S. Hrg. 107 – 224, p. 88; S. Hrg 109 – 877, p. 38 (“But we believe that we are not concentrating all of our efforts in 
the right place. Weapons of mass destruction do not necessarily come in containers”). 
1652
 As required by Section 343 (a) (3) (H) of the Trade Act 2002 (impact of the 24 Hour Rule on trade flows) and (I) 
(redundancy of 24 Hour Rule).   
1653
 Appellate Body, EC – Asbestos (which decided this question simply on the basis of the importance of the values 
that the measure sought to protect).   
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3.2.1. Does the CSI Protect Essential Security Interests? 
 
The United States could argue that the objectives of the CSI protects two essential security 
interests of the United States: on the one hand, it seeks to prevent nuclear and radiological 
materials being smuggled into the United States and, on the other, it seeks to protect seaports, 
which represent critical infrastructure and are related to U.S. national security interests.1654 
 
The essential security interests of the United States have been articulated in its various national 
strategies1655 which were published in response to 9/11 in order to address different aspects of the 
counter-terrorist effort. Concerning the first argument, the National Strategy for Maritime 
Security1656 states that: 
 
“Defending against enemies is the first and most fundamental commitment of the United States 
Government. Pre-eminent among our national security priorities is to take all necessary steps to 
prevent WMD from entering the country and to avert an attack on the homeland.”1657 
 
Concerning the second argument, the national security strategies make clear that maritime 
transportation facilities are of crucial economic and social importance. For example, the National 
Security Strategy for Homeland Security highlights the need to assure the continuity of the 
security of international shipping containers in order to maintain vital commerce and defence 
readiness1658 and the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures 
and Key Assets (February 2003), aims to protect the most critical structures of American society 
                                                  
1654
 Section 101 (12) (A) and (B) of the MTSA 2002. See also THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, 
p, 10. 
1655
 Winston P. Nagan and Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22 
BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 375 at p. 382 (“[…] all national security doctrines contain at a minimum implicit claims that 
the doctrine is necessary for the survival of the state […]”). 
1656
 For details of its introduction and progress see Press Release: Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Port Security Legislation, 5 April 2006.  
1657
 Id. 
1658
 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, p. 23. Some seaports in the United States also have 
military importance: see S. Hrg 109 – 877, p. 5 (“[T]hey serve as the conduit for 90 percent of the war material 
destined for major theatre operations.”); see also ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 
1999, p. 3. 
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including the maritime shipping infrastructure.1659 The National Strategy for Maritime 
Security claims that terrorists are targeting telecommunications and international commercial 
logistics in order to damage global, political and economic security.1660  
 
The status of maritime transportation facilities as critical infrastructure is supported by the 
potential economic devastation which could result from the detonation of a radiological bomb in 
a container at an American seaport. A Transportation Security Incident of this magnitude would 
undoubtedly constitute an Incident of National Significance. This was dramatically illustrated in 
2002 when the consultants Booz, Allen and Hamilton conducted a Port Security War Game.1661 
The simulation predicted that the likely response of the U.S. Government would be to shut down 
the maritime transportation system at enormous cost to the US and its trade partners.1662 It 
estimated that it would take approximately three months to clear the container backlog resulting 
from closings of 12 days. In addition, the total cost of the strike to the U.S. economy was $ 58 
billion.1663 In view of the results, the report recommended that the process of detecting and 
capturing dangerous materials had to begin overseas where goods are loaded and shipped.1664 
Business and government had to work together to prevent tampering with cargo. Moreover, 
international standards were needed for preloading container inspections.1665 This simulation may 
be considered as representing scientific evidence: according to the report, the simulation involved 
“85 leaders from a range of government and industry organizations with a critical stake in port 
security.”1666 Practical evidence of the economic havoc that shutting down a port would have on a 
seaport was also provided by the West Coast U.S. dockworkers’ labour dispute of September 
                                                  
1659
 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND KEY ASSETS, pp. 
61ff.  
1660
 THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, p. 3.  
1661
 This was a strategic simulation of a terrorist attack, with the aim of assessing the economic impact that a terrorist 
attack would have on America's cargo transportation system and supply chains. The scenario commenced with the 
discovery of a "dirty bomb" in a container on a truck as it left the port of Los Angeles. A few weeks later another 
bomb was discovered in Minneapolis and a third exploded in Chicago. See PORT SECURITY WARGAME (supra n. 
302); see also Garry Fields, Disaster Waiting to Happen, WALL STREET JOURNAL, March 2003; OECD REPORT 
2003, pp. 19 – 23, paras. 61 – 64. The United States has also carried out simulations of terrorist attacks under its 
Assymetric Warfare Initiative since 2003. This has included “a nuclear device aboard an incoming vessel in a 55 
gallon drum”, see CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, 9 January 2007, p. 9. 
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 For a summary of the effects see OECD REPORT 2003, pp. 20 – 23.  
1663
 Id. at p.3 
1664
 Id.  
1665
 Id. 
1666
 Supra n. 302, p. 1. 
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2002.1667 This strike also affected countries neighbouring the United States: for example, the 
Asian economy is heavily dependent on West Coast ports and the people of Hawaii and Alaska 
depend on mainland shipments for survival.1668 
 
Considering that ports are situated close to crowded metropolitan areas,1669 the detonation of a 
radiological bomb at a US seaport would also have devastating consequence on human life and 
the environment.1670 It would also cause loss of human life to harbour workers and potentially 
severe injury to those residing in the vicinity of the harbour. For example, one report prepared for 
the U.S. Department of Transport states: 
 
“The economic impact of even a single nuclear terrorist attack on a major U.S. seaport would be 
very great. In the three plausible scenarios examined, a successful attack would create disruption 
of U.S. trade valued at $100-200 billion, property damage of $50-500 billion, and 50,000 to 
1,000,000 lives could be lost.”1671 
 
The loss of life and property also leads to liability issues which should not be underestimated. In 
the absence of a Victim’s Compensation Fund,1672 survivors and relatives of victims would seek 
                                                  
1667
 The lockout lasted for 10 days and led to 200 ships being stranded outside West Coast ports. The port shutdown 
was estimated to have cost $1-2 million a day. It left perishable goods rotting in ships and docks and retailers without 
merchandise to sell. Its repercussions were felt throughout the country was manufacturers were forced to close 
factories temporarily and lay off workers. The backlog of cargo from 200 ships affected by the shutdown was 
estimated to have taken six to seven weeks to clear. See S. Hrg. 108 – 55, p.35; see also OECD REPORT 2003, pp. 18 
– 19, paras. 56 – 58 (on estimates of loss) and 55 – 59; Calculating Cost of West Coast Dock Strike Is a Tough Act, 
LOS ANGELES TIMES, Tuesday, 26 November 2002; Sam Zuckerman, Shutdown not so bad after all, Friday, 18 
October 2002 SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE. Concerning other countries, a more recent 12-day industrial strike in 
Marseilles led to losses of $150 million and 1,750 workers being laid off: see UNCTAD REPORT 2006, p. 79. 
1668
 S. Hrg. 108 – 55, pp. 17-19. 
1669
 THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, p. 9.  
1670
 Id., p. 6. 
1671
 Clark C. Abt, The Economic Impact of Nuclear Terrorist Attacks on Freight Transport Systems in an Age of 
Seaport Vulnerability, Executive Summary, 30 April 2003, p. 3.  
1672
 Following 9/11, the U.S. government limited the liability of airline companies and set up the Victims’ 
Compensation Fund to meet any claims from survivors and relatives of victims. The federal government was 
concerned that liability claims would clog the courts and create further economic harm. It established the Victims 
Compensation Fund to make payments to families for the deaths and injuries of victims: see LLOYD DIXON AND 
RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATTACKS, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL 
JUSTICE, 2004. However, it is uncertain whether such a fund would be set up in the case of a maritime security 
incident. 
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compensation for their loss from private sector stakeholders in the supply chain.1673 Economic 
participants who fail to comply with the statutory requirements of the 24 Hour Rule SAFE Ports 
Act and CSI will expose themselves to potential civil liability for the injury caused by its acts or 
omissions.1674 As the Lockerbie bombing showed, companies not permitted to limit liability 
would not be able to survive a finding of negligence.1675 Public policy may now support the 
imposition of liability to provide incentives for tighter security and “to highlight culpable conduct 
facilitating terrorism.”1676 According to CBP, a TSI would have “collateral consequences to 
persons, property and the local environment which would be virtually impossible to 
calculate.”1677  
 
The United States could also seek to justify the extrajurisdictional character of the CSI by arguing 
that there is a nexus between foreign seaports and its essential security interests. The maritime 
domain is a global resource and cargo enters the United States from the ports of 165 countries 
around the globe.1678 The security of U.S. borders cannot be secured by the traditional single 
layer of security at US border crossings, with customs officers authorized to inspection cargo and 
passengers after the means of transportation had reached at the U.S. port of entry.1679 However, 
9/11 proved that a retroactive approach was inadequate to combat terrorism: a container often 
passes through numerous intermodal transfer points on the way to its final destination, each of 
                                                  
1673
 There are several classes of potential claimants including the crew, passengers, shore-based individuals injured 
or killed by the attack, cargo interests and private property owners. Possible tortfeasors include shippers, seaport 
authorities, security firms and shipping companies: see id., p. 9. 
1674
 See Antonio J. Rodriguez, When Your Ship Is in the Bull’s Eye: The Maritime Transportation Security Act and 
Potential Vessel Owner Liability to Third Parties Resulting from a Terrorist Attack, 17 U.S.F. MAR. L. J. 241, p. 255 
(the detonation of a dirty bomb aboard a commercial vessel could give rise to the civil liability of the vessel owner or 
charterer, even if that party had no knowledge of the device’s existence). 
1675
 In the Lockerbie bombing case, Pan American World Airways was held liable for the wrongful death of the 
passengers and was not allowed to limit its liability because it had failed to meet the applicable regulatory and 
industry standards. The airline subsequently went into bankruptcy and ceased operations. 
1676
 Rodriguez, p. 16 (“Civil liability for negligence resulting in terrorism could be a powerful tool in constructing a 
more secure nation”).  
1677
 Bryant, pp. 22 – 25; concerning civil liability for terrorist attacks see also Tarun Mehta, A Duty Breached? Can 
Aggrieved Citizens Sue the U.S. Government Under the Federal Tort Claims Act for 9/11? 6 HOW. SCROLL SOC. J. L. 
REV. 51; Joseph Dellapenna, International Terrorism: Prevention and Remedies, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 
13; Joe Wientge, Forseeable Change: The Need for Modification of the Foreseeability Standard in Cases Resulting 
from Terrorist Acts After September 11th, 74 UMKC L. REV. 165. 
1678
 CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, 9 January 2007, p. 4. 
1679
 See GAO/HR-93-114, p. 10. The traditional mission of U.S. Customs is explained in GAO REPORT, CUSTOMS 
SERVICE, TRADE ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES IMPAIRED BY MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS, September 1992 (GAO/GGD-
92-123), pp. 12 – 13. See also MARITIME COMMERCE SECURITY PLAN, p. 3. 
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which was a potential location of criminal activity.1680 Once a container, truck or aircraft carrying 
a WMD or armed terrorists passes the single layer of customs controls at U.S. ports of entry it 
will be free to travel to any destination in the United States without encountering any security 
obstacles.1681 Therefore, experts recommended the strategy of “pushing the borders outwards”, 
examining containers, trucks and aircraft passengers at the point of departure before their arrival 
at a U.S. port of entry.1682 This pre-emptive strategy has contributed to the creation of layered 
security system which offers greater protection against terrorist attacks planned from abroad.1683 
 
On the other hand, the complainant can argue that the CSI does not protect the “essential security 
interests” of the United States because it is motivated by commercial and political interests. 
Concerning the first point, the CSI seeks to protect seaports and containers which are purely 
economic assets.  Although CBP has stated that the CSI seeks to protect human life (which is 
considered a vital interest under WTO law) one report has stated that the detonation of a 
radiological bomb at a seaport “would likely entail very few actual casualties – even in the worst 
case […].”1684 The justifications that CBP has presented for the Container Security Initiative tend 
to emphasize the economic consequences of a terrorist attack rather than the threat of loss of life 
or environmental damage.1685 In this respect, it is also significant that the implementation of the 
CSI at foreign seaports has been largely due to trade incentives in the form of expedited 
clearance.1686 Therefore, the CSI cannot be considered as designed to protect human life. Writers 
                                                  
1680
 OECD REPORT 2003, p. 24, para. 67. 
1681
 See generally, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND KEY 
ASSETS, FEBRUARY 2003, pp. 68 ff; see also Loy and Ross, p. 3 (“Under these kinds of minimal security safeguards, 
a container could be used quite easily for WMD transport into the United States for an attack”). The Booz Allen 
Hamilton wargame was also based on a container with a WMD being found on a truck destined for Los Angeles, see 
PORT SECURITY WARGAME, p. 1.  
1682
 See PORT SECURITY WARGAME, p. 3 (“The process of detection and capture of dangerous materials must begin 
overseas where goods are loaded and shipped. Options are limited once a container has arrived”). See also NATIONAL 
STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY JULY 2002, p. 23  
1683
 Andrew P. Studdert, Statement before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
January 27, 2004. See also GAO REPORT, SUMMARY OF CHALLENGES FACED IN TARGETING OCEANGOING CARGO 
CONTAINERS FOR INSPECTION, 31 March 2004, pp. 4 – 5. 
1684
 See OECD REPORT 2005, p. 40.  
1685
 See e.g. CSI STRATEGIC PLAN, p. 11, which concentrates only on the economic effects of a terrorist attack. The 
“primary aim of the CSI” as described in the official Fact Sheet refers exclusively to trade. The economic character 
is also reflected in speeches by Robert C. Bonner, the former U.S. Commissioner for Customs, in which the 
prevention of economic devastation is clearly the major justification of the CSI. See e.g. Customs Commissioner, 
Speech of 17 January 2002 (announcing the CSI); see also Customs Commissioner, Speech of 26 August 2002.   
1686
 See Jau, p. 12;  S. Hrg. 109 – 186, p. 31 
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have argued that the term “essential security interests” is to be interpreted narrowly1687 to exclude 
interests which are primarily economic or commercial in nature.1688 Holding otherwise would 
give member states the right to use protect their industries and gain competitive advantages on 
the basis of national security.1689  
 
The complainant could also attack the extraterritorial nature of the CSI by arguing that there is, in 
reality, no nexus between foreign CSI ports and the essential security interests of the United 
States.1690  The CSI seeks to regulate the supply chain, which, as a transborder economic asset, 
may affect the essential security interests of the United States. However, the object of the CSI’s 
regulations are foreign seaports and the United States has not produced any objective evidence 
proving that these facilities adversely affect the essential security interests of the United States 
itself (e.g. that the security standards at foreign seaports are lower than the seaports maintained in 
the United States).1691  Article XXI arguably reflects the traditional principle of state sovereignty 
insofar as it refers to “its essential security interests.” The use of “its” implies that member states 
can only seek to regulate essential security interests within their territorial jurisdiction.1692 This 
would accord with international law as reflected in other international instruments on security.1693 
The complainant could argue that the concept of “pushing out the borders” is simply a means to 
shift the cost and administrative inconvenience of security measures to foreign seaports.1694 The 
                                                  
1687
 See Schloemann and Ohlhoff, pp. 444 – 445; see also Cann, pp. 415 – 416; Akande and Williams, p. 391; Hahn, 
pp. 588 - 589. 
1688
 See Schloemann and Ohlhoff, p. 444. 
1689
 See e.g. Swedish footwear dispute, supra n. 1212. 
1690
 Further aspects of the extraterritorial nature of the CSI, in particular its voluntary nature and transfer of risk are 
discussed below as part of the “reasonable application test.” 
1691
 Section 108 (a) (1) of the MTSA 2002, which provides for security inspections of foreign ports from which 
vessels depart for the United States or which the Secretary believes poses a security risk to international maritime 
commerce. Cf. Flynn, p. 102. 
1692
 According to Article 2 of the UNCLOS, which states that the sovereignty of a coastal State extends beyond its 
land territory and internal waters to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. According to Article 3, 
every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles.  
1693
 For example, whereas S/RES/1373 and the Framework of Standards stress the need for bilateral agreement in 
combating terrorism, neither instrument expressly condones extraterritorial or extrajurisdictional law enforcement. 
However, S/RES/1373 does recognize that the territory of one state could be used to plan atrocities in the territory of 
another (para. 2 (b)).  
1694
 See e.g. S. Hrg 109 – 877, pp. 23 – 24; see also WSC, Statement of 30 July 2007 (“As a practical matter, this 
legislation requires the rest of the world to do what cannot be done today in U.S. ports”). This statement can also 
apply to other aspects of the CSI as well. See e.g. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TESTIMONY  BEFORE THE 
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, UNITED STATES SENATE, MARITIME SECURITY: 
ENHANCEMENTS MADE, BUT IMPLEMENTATION AND SUSTAINABILITY REMAIN KEY CHALLENGES (STATEMENT OF 
MARGARET T. WRIGHTSON), GAO-05-448T, 17 May 2005, p. 14; but see GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
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customs administrations of CSI partners are forced to sign the DoPs owing to the threat of 
economic reprisals by the U.S. in the form of redlane clearance.  
 
3.2.2. Is the CSI Effective in Protecting US Essential Security Interests? 
 
This aspect represents Achilles’ heel of the CSI: investigations by Congress and the GAO have 
revealed substantial weaknesses in the CSI1695 which cast doubt on its effectiveness in securing 
U.S. seaports against terrorist attack.1696 The following provides an overview of the weaknesses 
in the CSI as well as the steps taken in to improve the measure in the SAFE Port Act 2006.  
 
3.2.2.1. The 24 Hour Rule is Seriously Flawed 
 
The 24 Hour Rule is seriously flawed in a number of respects.1697 A fundamental weakness is its 
use of the cargo manifest as a source of advance information on container shipments entering the 
United States. This document is generally regarded by industry and security experts as being the 
least reliable source of information on incoming containers.1698 It is a commercial instrument not 
designed for security purposes1699 and not issued by the parties who have direct knowledge of the 
cargo.1700 Therefore, it is impossible for CBP to ensure the contents of a container without a 
physical inspection.1701 The unreliability of the cargo manifest could adversely affect the 
                                                                                                                                                                
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS U.S. SENATE, 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRESS REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF MISSION AND MANAGEMENT 
FUNCTIONS (STATEMENT OF DAVID M. WALKER), GAO-07-1081T, 6 September 2007, p. 4 (noting substantial 
progress in maritime security). 
1695
 See, in particular, ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS; see also US Security System Has 'Crippling Flaws', LLOYD’S 
LIST, WLNR 8349665, 27 May 2005. 
1696
 See GAO-05-557, p. 2 “The program is promising but our previous work has raised concerns about its 
management and its ability to achieve its ultimate goal of improved cargo security.” See also S. Hrg. 109 – 186. p. 
10, “[…] I am afraid that the report card is one that will not make anyone particularly proud. The Administration has 
failed on port security.”  
1697
 See OECD REPORT 2003, p. 48 at para. 138 (describing the rule as “probably the most contentious of all of the 
security measures announced to date.”); see also WSC, Comments of 9 September 2002, p.8 expressing doubt as to 
whether the rule would enable overseas customs personnel to identify high-risk containers. 
1698
 See ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, pp. 26 – 27.   
1699
 WSC, Comments of 9 September 2002, p. 4 (“It was not designed for this purpose and has some limitations in 
this regard”). 
1700
 See GAO-05-557, p. 21. 
1701
 Under the CSI, such examinations are only to be carried out in the last resort owing to the disruption they cause 
to supply chain. See S. Hrg. 109 – 186, p. 23 (comments of Robert C. Bonner (“I have no-load authority, and we 
have used that sparingly […] because we don’t want to […] sour the relationship with the host nations […]”)). 
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effectiveness of the ATS system by feeding it with inaccurate information.1702  According to one 
expert:  
 
“In fact, of the 65 percent of the containers that were classified as high-risk and were reviewed 
by the staff overseas, our detailed work at the ports suggested that even within that 65 per cent, 
there is no guarantee that all those were high-risk or not high-risk.”1703 
 
A terrorist group intent on shipping a dirty bomb to a U.S. harbour could circumvent U.S. 
security controls by filling out cargo manifests in the required manner.1704 In addition, the fact 
that bulk cargo is wholly exempt from the requirements of the 24 Hour Rule suggests that 
terrorists could conceal a weapon in bulk cargo shipments without risk of detection.1705  
 
3.2.2.2. The CSI Offers Inadequate Security Coverage  
 
Under the CSI, the inspection of high-risk cargo is carried out at the seaport of departure (i.e. the 
last seaport where cargo is loaded on a vessel for export to the United States). However, the port 
of departure represents only one point in the entire supply chain and a container may make 
several stops and change hands several times during its transport to the CSI harbour.1706 
Accordingly, containers could be interfered with by terrorists at non-CSI ports earlier in the 
supply chain and packed with WMD before reaching the CSI port.1707 At the host port itself, CSI 
teams only target a specific threat, i.e. the transport of WMD. It has been reported that host 
customs authorities have refused inspections for narcotics or other contraband on the basis that 
                                                  
1702
 The strategic importance of precise information is undisputed: as far back as 1999, it was recognized that without 
a way to ensure that the data supplied by the business community are accurate, the entire trade system is at risk. See, 
REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY COMMISSION, p. 90. See also ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, p. 28. 
1703
 S. Hrg. 109 – 186, p. 46. 
1704
 Id., at p. 51 (“I am not comfortable in saying that a container can move from a high-risk designation to a low-risk 
designation simply because the author filled out the paperwork correctly”). See Letter by the Japan Machinery 
Centre for Trade and Investment to the U.S. Customs Service, 9 September 2002 (“It is difficult to imagine a terrorist 
honestly describing terrorist weapons as such”).  
1705
 For example, a report by the OECD suggests that terrorists could conceal a weapon inside a bulk shipment of 
ammonium nitrate or use a vessel in a suicide operation by making use of cargo containing modified fertilizer, of the 
type used in the Oklahoma City Bombing on 19 April 1995. See OECD REPORT 2003, pp. 9 – 11  
1706
 Id., pp. 24 ff.  
1707
 Id. 
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such inspections do not relate to anti-terrorism efforts.1708 Therefore, the CSI fails to prevent 
terrorists from financing their activities by smuggling narcotics or other contraband.1709 
 
The CSI also offers a very limited zone of security, with only 50 CSI ports concentrated on 
industrialized countries.1710 As a result “a substantial majority of […] ports worldwide are not 
part of the CSI program.”1711 For example, there are no CSI ports in countries which pose a 
terrorist threat to the United States.1712 This is an obvious shortcoming that was noted in the early 
stages of the CSI.1713 Even if the containers from “high-risk” countries pass through CSI seaports, 
the absence of CBP officers offers no deterrence to terrorists at the non-CSI high-risk seaport and 
no information-sharing with the customs administrations of such countries.1714 Moreover, staffing 
and budgetary constraints mean that it is unlikely that the CSI will extend to high-risk seaports1715 
or be maintained indefinitely at current member ports.1716  
 
3.2.2.3. Bilateral Agreements are Ineffective 
 
The Declarations of Principles do not require inspections to be carried out according to a uniform 
set of criteria or using standard equipment1717 and they do not grant CBP any powers to enforce 
                                                  
1708
 GAO-05-466T, p. 21; see also GAO-05-557, p. 23 (“Some of these denials were for inspection requests based on 
factors not related to security threats. […] They told us that their rationale in denying these requests was that […] 
identifying customs violations was not the purpose of CSI.”); cf. THE NATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY, p. 
5, which points out that “[m]aritime drug trafficking generates vast amounts of money for […] terrorist 
organizations.”  
1709
 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM, p. 8, (“Terrorists are increasingly using criminal activities to 
support and fund their terror”). U.N. Resolution 1456 also recognizes that “terrorists must also be prevented from 
making use of other criminal activities such as transnational organized crime, illicit drugs and drug trafficking, 
money-laundering and illicit arms trafficking.” 
1710
 Cf. THE INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND COORDINATION STRATEGY, p. 4 (stressing the need for a “coordinated 
and consistent approach to building international support”).  
1711
 S. Hrg. 109 - 186, p. 8. 
1712
 Id., at p. 27, where the U.S. Commissioner states that most of the cargo from high-risk ports moves through CSI 
ports.  
1713
 See S. Hrg. 108-55, pp. 8 and 10. 
1714
 Cf. GAO-05-557, p. 17. 
1715
 The U.S. Commissioner for Customs has stated “Although CSI will be expanded to a few more foreign seaports, 
we already have built a security network that can recover rapidly from a terrorist attack exploiting the supply chain.” 
See Robert C. Bonner, Remarks to the CBP Trade Symposium Ronald Reagan Building, Washington, D.C., 11 March 
2005. According to its official website, “CBP’s goal is to have 50 operational CSI ports by the end of fiscal year 
2006.” < http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/csi_in_brief.xml >. 
1716
 Concerning the limitations on the CSI see GAO-05-557, pp. 4 and 19. See also S. Hrg. 109 – 186, p. 6 
(comments of Senator Levin).  
1717
 S. Hrg. 109 – 186, pp. 28 – 30; see also S. Hrg. 108 – 55, p. 30.  
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inspections or security standards; CBP is also prohibited from recommending branded 
equipment.1718 The Declarations of Principles do not require the host customs administration to 
conduct inspections of cargo deemed high-risk1719 either and the actual level of co-operation with 
regard to requests to inspect containers is variable.1720 According to the GAO, of the containers 
designated high-risk and referred to the host customs administration for inspection, 28 percent 
were not inspected.1721 Financial and technical burdens involved in dealing with high-risk 
containers may test the foreign customs administration’s readiness to co-operate.1722 For example, 
the Port of Le Havre in France must pay compensation to shippers whose containers are inspected 
and which do not contain any WMD.1723 The costs aspect may dissuade foreign customs 
administrations from agreeing to inspect high-risk containers.1724 
 
In addition, political and practical considerations have limited the number of staff stationed at 
seaports1725 and compromise the effectiveness of inspections. For example, there are problems 
involved in accommodating CSI teams at seaports1726 and integrating their tasks into the working 
practices of the foreign seaport. Co-operation with the foreign customs administration depends on 
effective communication.1727 However, linguistic barriers, foreign working practices and practical 
limitations may be difficult to avoid.1728 These difficulties are likely to increase in so-called 
                                                  
1718
 ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, p. 9. 
1719
 Id., p. 8 
1720
 See S. Hrg. 109 – 186, p. 3 (“[S]ome CSI reports [sic] […] routinely “waive” the inspection of high risk 
containers, despite requests by CSI personnel for an inspection. As a result, numerous high risk containers are not 
subjected to an examination overseas, thereby undermining the primary objective and purpose of CSI.”); see also  
GAO-05-557, p. 4 (indicating that the Port of Le Havre appears to be the worst offender in this regard).  
1721
 S. Hrg. 109 – 186, p. 21 (in cases where high-risk containers are not inspected at the CSI seaport, they are 
inspected at the U.S. seaport of arrival. Although CBP has claimed that 93 percent of non-inspected containers were 
inspected, there are no records which can verify this); ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, pp. 11 ff.  
1722
 Concerning the costs of incurred by identifying high-risk containers, see S. Hrg. 107 – 224, pp. 87 – 88 (“Every 
container that is considered to be a “high interest” container […] requires a co-operative emergency response effort 
on the part of numerous federal, state and local agencies. Each incident is different, some taking hours or even days 
to render safe, most utilizing 20 – 50 people who are primarily in stand-by mode in the event that something does 
happen”).  
1723
 AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, p. 18. 
1724
 Concerning the Megaports Initiative, the major obstacle to co-operation has been the operation costs, which must 
be borne by the foreign port. Concerning the costs, see GAO-05-375, p. 5.  
1725
 GAO-05-557, p.4  
1726
 Id., p. 19; S. Hg. 109 – 186, p.11 (“In some cases, DHS personnel in the CSI program are stationed an hour away 
from where the actual loading takes place”). 
1727
 See GAO-03-770, p. 32. 
1728
 See Stephen E., Flynn, The Ongoing Neglect of Maritime Transportation Security, Council on Foreign Relations, 
25 August 2004, p. 4 (“Inspectors are receiving no formal language or other training to prepare them for these 
overseas postings”).  
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“hardship posts”, i.e. seaports in countries where there is a high-risk of terrorism.1729 The high 
turnover of staff has also proved an additional concern in this respect because it adversely affects 
the liaison of CBP officers with foreign customs administrations.1730  
 
3.2.2.4. Inspection Equipment at Seaports is Ineffective 
 
The costs for acquiring, operating and maintaining security equipment, carrying out inspections, 
and disposing of the WMD must be borne by the host state.1731 The reliance on the largesse of 
foreign states limits CBP’s ability to stipulate security standards.1732 However, the absence of 
minimum requirements for inspection equipment means there is no guarantee that the equipment 
will be state of the art or effective in identifying fissionable materials. Indeed, one group of 
reporters even succeeded in smuggling low grade radioactive material hidden in a container 
through a CSI port to the United States.1733 
 
Doubt has been cast on the effectiveness of inspection equipment generally. It has been reported 
that radiation detectors cannot distinguish between the natural radiation emitted by normal 
products and that emitted by fissionable materials.1734 In the U.S. most anti-terrorism equipment 
acquired since 9/11 has had to be replaced because it is ineffective, unreliable or too expensive to 
operate.1735 Non-intrusive equipment has also proved unable to identify the contents of trash 
containers.1736 Seaports are notoriously short of space and this can limit the locations for large-
scale x-ray machines.1737 In addition, some foreign governments are reluctant to hire the 
additional customs officials needed to operate the radiation detection equipment.1738 
 
                                                  
1729
 GAO-03-770, p. 28. 
1730
 Id., p. 12; see also Flynn, supra n. 1728, at p. 4 (“Given that the teams are so small—only eight inspectors in 
Hong Kong which is the world largest port, they are able to inspect only the tiniest of percentages of containers”). 
1731
 See GAO-05-557, p. 17. 
1732
 S. Hrg. 109 – 186, p. 28.  
1733
 See ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, p. 27. 
1734
 Id., pp. 30 ff. 
1735
 See Eric Lipton, U.S. to Spend Millions More to Alter Security Systems, NEW YORK TIMES, 7 May 2005.  
1736
 ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, p. 41. 
1737
 S. Hrg. 109 – 186, pp. 24 – 25. 
1738
 See GAO-05-375, p. 4.  
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3.2.2.5. Improvements to the CSI by the SAFE Port Act 2006 
 
The United States could counter these criticisms by referring to the steps it has taken to improve 
the effectiveness of the CSI, primarily in the SAFE Port Act 2006. This piece of legislation was 
passed by Congress in response to the aforementioned concerns about its effectiveness. Sections 
203 – 205 address the infrastructural weaknesses in the CSI, which was heavily criticised by the 
PSI. Section 205 (k) requires the Secretary to submit a report on the effectiveness of the CSI no 
later than 30 September 2007 to the appropriate congressional committees. 
 
Section 203 responds to criticisms of the 24 Hour Rule1739 by mandating improvements to the 
ATS including the expansion of the date elements required by the 24 Hour Rule (Section 203(b)). 
Enhancing the quality of information will improve the accuracy of targeting high-risk containers. 
It also provides for various system improvements to the ATS such as the inclusion of smart 
features and the capability to electronically compare and other available data for cargo entered 
into or bound for the United States.  
 
Sections 204 and 205 address criticisms of the CSI, in particular the lack of uniform standards for 
inspections1740 and inadequate security equipment. Section 204(a) of the SAFE Port Act requires 
the DHS to issue regulations establishing minimum standards and verification procedures for 
securing containers in transit to a US importer within 90 days of its enactment. Section 
204 (a) (4), requires all containers bound for the US port of entry to comply with these standards 
within 2 years after their promulgation. According to Section 204 (b), the standards must be 
regularly reviewed and enhanced based on tests of commercial technology as it becomes 
available, to detect cargo intrusion and highest consequence threats, especially WMD. Section 
204 (c) encourages the DHS to promote international standards of container security, work with 
foreign governments and international organizations. 
 
Section 205 regulates the Container Security Initiative and seeks to strengthen US control over 
the security standards employed at CSI ports. Section 205 (b) provides that, before DHS can 
                                                  
1739
 ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, pp. 26 – 29. 
1740
 Id., p. 19 (“Overall, the CSI team in Felixstowe demonstrated that a lack of knowledge, resources and inspections 
may in fact be adding to the cargo security challenge”). 
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designate a foreign port as a CSI port, the DHS must carry out an assessment of that port 
considering factors listed in the Act. For example, Section 205 (b) (4) refers to the commitment 
of the government of the country in which the foreign seaport is located to co-operating with the 
Department in sharing critical data and risk management information and to maintain 
programmes to ensure employee integrity. Section 205 (c) requires the Department to submit its 
assessment of the foreign port to the appropriate congressional committees before it can officially 
declare the foreign port as being a member of the CSI. There must also be annual discussions 
between the Secretary and the foreign governments of countries with CSI ports concerning 
standards and procedures at CSI ports (Section 205 (i)). Concerning overseas inspections, Section 
205 (e) lays down requirements and procedures in sub-paragraphs (A) – (D) and Section 205(g) 
requires DHS and other federal agencies to identify foreign assistance programmes that could 
help implement programmes at CSI and non-CSI ports.  
 
Section 232 concerns the level of screening and scanning carried out on cargo which enters the 
United States harbours. This provision resulted from an amendment tabled by Senator Norm 
Coleman, who was the Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations regarding the 
Container Security Initiative.1741 It reflects the findings of the PSI report, which found that Hong 
Kong harbour had developed a system which could screen 100 per cent of containers without 
impeding the flow of commerce.1742 Section 232 (a) of the SAFE Port Act provides for the 
screening of all containers which enter the United States from foreign seaports. In addition, any 
containers which are deemed high-risk must be scanned before leaving the seaport facility in the 
United States. In order to implement this, Section 232 (b) requires the Secretary, in coordination 
with the Secretary of Energy and foreign partners, as appropriate, to ensure that integrated 
scanning systems are fully deployed to scan, using non-intrusive imaging equipment and 
radiation detection equipment, all containers entering the United States before such containers 
arrive in the United States as soon as possible. However, the Secretary must first determine that 
the integrated scanning equipment is fit for purpose according to criteria laid down in Section 
232 (b) (1) – (6). 
                                                  
1741
 S. Amdt. 4982, To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to ensure that all cargo containers are screened 
before arriving at a United States seaport, that all high-risk containers are scanned before leaving a United States 
seaport, and that integrated scanning systems are fully deployed to scan all cargo containers entering the United 
States before they arrive in the United States, proposed and accepted on 13 September 2006.  
1742
 ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS, p. 35. 
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A recent amendment to the SAFE Port Act 2006 also improves security by providing for 100 
percent scanning of containers destined for the United States at all foreign seaports by 2012.1743 
The measure will effectively abolish the risk assessment strategy upon which the CSI has been 
based and imposes a blanket requirement on all cargo containers, regardless of the seaport of 
origin.1744 This is a response to the concerns of senators that high-risk cargo is still entering the 
United States without being inspected.  
 
3.3. Is the CSI the Least Trade Restrictive Measure Available? 
 
If the Panel decides that the interests which the CSI seeks to protect are not “essential security 
interests” or that the CSI is ineffective, it will proceed to the second stage of the necessity test, 
which examines the availability of reasonable alternatives. This test ascertains whether the 
disputed measure is proportional to the attainment of the relevant societal aims by weighing and 
balancing a range of factors.1745 The following examines whether multilateral agreement or 100 
percent scanning are less GATT inconsistent than the CSI and whether they are reasonably 
available to the United States.1746 It should be noted that the SAFE Port Act 2006 also seeks to 
ensure the GATT compliance of the CSI.1747 In addition, the National Security for Maritime 
Security states: 
 
“First, preserving the freedom of the seas is a top national priority. The right of vessels to travel 
freely in international waters, engage in innocent and transit passage, and have access to ports is 
an essential element of national security.”1748 
 
Supply chain security represents a public resource which all states of the world have the right to 
use.1749 The supply chain and international peace and security are also “pure public goods” which 
                                                  
1743
 Supra pp. 39 – 40.  
1744
 Id. 
1745
 Osiro, pp. 134 – 135. 
1746
 Panel, US – Section 337, para. 5.26. 
1747
 Section 204 (d) seeks to ensure that minimum standards and procedures for securing containers in transit to the 
United States do not violate its international trade obligations or other international obligations.  
1748
 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, p. 7. 
1749
 Id., pp. 1 – 2.  
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means that they benefit all states (“non-exclusivity”).1750 In relation to the environment – another 
“pure public good” – the jurisprudence of the GATT/WTO has made clear that protective 
measures should be based on multilateral agreement.1751 However, the security standards of the 
CSI are inward looking, determined by the United States alone with the primary aim of protecting 
its own seaports against terrorist attack.1752 It has also been heavily influenced by domestic 
political interests rather than the needs of the international trading community.1753 The 
complainant could argue that the Container Security Initiative in its current form is more GATT 
restrictive than necessary because it based on unilateral standards because it does not provide for 
mutual recognition of security standards. Although Section 201 of the SAFE Port Act 2006 
contains provisions requiring the establishment of a strategic plan to enhance the security of the 
international supply chain, the United States nevertheless takes a unilateral approach towards 
supply chain security insofar as the CSI is under the control of the Secretary for Homeland 
Security and does not directly involve international organizations.1754 The SAFE Port Act also 
                                                  
1750
 See Benvenisti, p. 681; Philippe Dulbecco and Bertrand Laporte, How can the Security of International Trade be 
Financed in Developing Countries? A Global Public Good Approach, WORLD DEVELOPMENT VOL. 33 NO. 8, pp. pp. 
1202 – 1203.  
1751
 See Panel, US – Tuna I, para. 5.28, arguing that the requirement of necessity meant that member states were 
under an obligation to undertake multilateral negotiations in respect of transboundary objects of protection. This 
aspect of the report has been upheld in other reports: see Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, para. 166. 
1752
 This becomes clear from several hearings on the CSI. Senators consider and debate the measure purely from the 
viewpoint of the United States. See generally, S. Hrg. 107 – 224; S. Hrg. 108–55; S. Hrg. 109 - 186; S. Hrg. 109 - 
877. There is practically no reference in these hearings to the adverse effects of the measure on foreign companies. 
To the author’s knowledge there is no recorded statement of senators or CBP representatives considering the 
economic effect of the CSI on the economies of foreign states. But see, S. Hrg. 107 – 224, 2002, p. 56 (comments of 
Mark E. Souder (referring to the possible burden on small companies)) and p. 95 (concerning the negative effects of 
security measures on foreign exporters (“If we put the pressure, might they look to go to another port of entry and 
never come to New York?”)). See also Appellate Body, US – Gasoline, p. 28 (“At the same time we are bound to 
note that, while the United States counted the costs for its domestic refiners of statutory baselines, there is nothing in 
the record to indicate that it did other than disregard that kind of consideration when it came to foreign refiners”). 
See also S. Hrg. 109 – 186, (comment by Senator Lautenberg) p. 27.    
1753
 Many of the senators involved in the CSI represent coastal states and have vested interests in port security. For 
example, Senator Patty Murray (Washington State): see S. Hrg. 109 – 877, p. 10 (“My home State of Washington is 
the most trade-dependent State in the Nation. We know what is at stake if there were any incident at any of our 
ports.”); Senator Susan Collins (Maine); Senator Frank Lautenberg (New Jersey); Senator Robert Menendez (New 
Jersey); Senator Joseph Lieberman (Connecticut); Congressman Jerrold Nadler (New York 8th Congressional 
District); Senator Earnest Hollings (former Senator of South Carolina); Congressman Bennie Thompson (Missisipi). 
1754
 Section 201 (a) of the SAFE Port Act only requires the Secretary to consult with national bodies in the creation 
of this plan. Paragraph (f), as well as Section 204 (c) merely encourage the Secretary to consider the standards of 
international organizations. In other words, the standards of e.g. the WCO are not mandatory. This represents a 
unilateral approach to security an international resource.  
  
 
326 
refuses to recognize the maritime security measures of its trading partners or international 
organizations as equivalent to its own.1755 
 
The complainant could argue that United States should take into account the various international 
instruments relating to security.1756 Although such instruments permit states to take their own 
counter-terrorist measures, they nevertheless underline the need for co-operation in combating 
terrorism.1757  For example, with regard to international terrorism generally, paragraph 3 (c) of 
UN Resolution 1373 obliges all states to “co-operate, particularly through bilateral and 
multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take 
action against perpetrators of such acts.”1758 In addition, international conventions which regulate 
important aspects of the fight against international terrorism also recognize that the financing of 
terrorist organizations as well as the trafficking in conventional arms and WMD can only be 
effectively prevented by states co-ordinating their national counter-terrorist measures and co-
operating to enforce them.1759 States must also ensure that any measures taken to combat 
terrorism comply with their obligations under international law.1760  
                                                  
1755
 According to Section 205 (j) of the SAFE Port Act cargo loaded in a foreign seaport designated under the 
Container Security Initiative is treated as presenting a lesser risk than similar cargo loaded in a foreign seaport that is 
not designated under the Container Security Initiative, for the purpose of clearing such cargo into the United States. 
Cf. Framework of Standards, para. 1.1. (“Customs administrations should not burden the international trade 
community with different sets of requirements to secure and facilitate commerce, and there should be recognition of 
other international standards”). See also THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, p. 14 (“New initiatives 
will be pursued diplomatically through international organizations”). 
1756
 See e.g., US – Shrimp, para. 132 the Appellate Body sought guidance on how to approach the protection of 
transboundary interests from international agreements. 
1757
 In particular, the United Nations views international terrorism as one of a number of threats to the security of all 
nations: A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, p. 23.  
1758
 This instrument obliged members to take action at national level to combat terrorism. However, this unilateral 
response should form part of a multilateral response as shown by Article 4, which “emphasizes the need to enhance 
coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global 
response to this serious challenge and threat to international security.”  
1759
 See e.g., The Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition, which entered into force on 3 July 2005 and obliges states to take action at national 
level but which, in Article 13 (1), also requires signatory states to “co-operate at the bilateral, regional and 
international levels to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their 
parts and components and ammunition”; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 54/109 of 9 December 1999. Article 12 
requires states to “afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or 
criminal or extradition proceedings”; S/Res/1450 underlines the need for international co-operation by calling on 
states to strengthen multilateral anti-proliferation treaties, (para. 6 (a)), “to renew and fulfil their commitment to 
multilateral co-operation”, (para. 6 (c)) as well as “to promote dialogue and co-operation on non-proliferation” (para. 
7). 
1760
 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the World Summit Outcome [hereinafter A/Res/60/1], para. 85. 
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Taking these Resolutions of the United Nations’ Security Council into account, the complainant 
could argue that the SAFE Port Act 2006 should be amended to recognize and incorporate 
international standards and best practices.1761 For example, the United States could increase the 
GATT – compliance of the CSI by offering a single agreement to all of its trading partners based 
on the international standards of e.g. the Revised Kyoto Convention and Framework of 
Standards.1762 This latter instrument aims to strike a balance between trade facilitation and 
security controls using risk management techniques.1763 However, unlike the CSI, it leaves the 
implementation of security standards to states themselves. The security standards of such an 
agreement would be based on the WCO’s Model Bilateral Agreement.1764 The CBP could 
monitor the implementation of the Framework of Standards by dispatching inspection teams to 
foreign seaports on a periodic basis.1765 Seaports which fail to maintain adequate security 
standards will be subject to increased inspections at U.S. seaports or trade embargoes. 
 
Considering that the supply chain is a global asset and that the United States is the world’s largest 
importer, the complainant could argue that membership of the CSI should be opened to all states 
who comply with the security standards of this agreement.1766 This appears to be a reasonably 
available alternative because the United States has already adopted this approach in the 
Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on intensifying 
and broadening the Agreement of 28 May 1997 on customs co-operation and mutual assistance in 
                                                  
1761
 E.g. the Preamble to Annex I, RKC, aims at co-operation with “other national authorities, other customs 
administrations and the trading communities” as well as the “implementation of relevant international standards”. 
See also Standard 6.7. This would reflect the approach advocated in para. 3 (c) S/RES/1373, which obliges states to 
“co-operate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and suppress 
terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts.” 
1762
 Accordingly, the United States would implement the standards agreed by international organizations. Cf. Section 
204 (c) of the SAFE Port Act which does not make international standards mandatory. 
1763
 Framework of Standards, p. 3. Each country that joins the Framework commits to employing a consistent risk 
management approach to address security threats (c.f. 24 Hour Rule/NTC & ATS). Risk management forms the 
subject of Standard 4, which recommends that customs establish a risk-management system to identify potentially 
high-risk containers and automate that system. The system should include a mechanism for validating threat 
assessments and targeting decisions and identifying best practices. 
1764
 Standard 7.5, p. 28.  
1765
 U.S. Customs Commissioner, Remarks of 23 June 2005 (“But as others have noted […] approval of this 
Framework by this council itself will mean very little unless it is in fact implemented”). See also Historic Agreement 
Brings World Together to Protect Global Trade, US Customs and Border Protection Today, July/August 2005.  
1766
 E.g. ECSA ANNUAL REPORT 2003 – 2004, p. 19 (“Measures should not be solely inward looking. They should 
take into account the global character of trade and services”). 
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customs matters to include co-operation on Container Security and related matters.1767 This 
agreement implements the Container Security Initiative in all EU member states by means of a 
single multilateral agreement under the auspices of the European Commission and United 
States.1768  Paragraph 3 of the Agreement extends the CSI to all ports within the European Union 
where the exchange of sea-container traffic is more than de minimis.1769 Opening membership of 
the CSI to all states with an interest in trading with the United States would encourage the 
implementation of the Framework of Standards, thereby broadening the security coverage of the 
CSI and minimizing discriminatory effects.1770 That mutual recognition of security standards is 
possible has also been shown by the European Community’s AEO programme, which 
specifically provides for the recognition of security and safety certificates granted by other 
governments.1771 
 
The complainant could therefore argue that there are reasonable alternatives to the CSI which are 
more GATT compliant.  
 
3.4. Has the United States Exercised its Right Reasonably? 
 
This section examines whether the United States has abused its right to invoke Article XXI by 
implementing the measure in a way which constitutes unjustifiable discrimination and a disguised 
restriction on trade. Before starting this investigation it is worth bearing in mind the following 
statement of the United States government: 
 
                                                  
1767
 COUNCIL DECISION on the signature and conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and 
the United States of America on intensifying and broadening the Agreement of 28 May 1997 on customs co-
operation and mutual assistance in customs matters to include co-operation on Container Security and related matters 
Brussels, 22 January 2004 COM(2004) 36 final. The Agreement was formulated on November 2003 and accepted by 
the Council on 30 March 2004. The agreement was signed on 22 April 2004 by the State Secretary Tom Ridge and 
the Irish Minster of Finance, Charlie McCreevy.  
1768
 However, the issue still remains controversial: see e.g. “Warning on risk posed by Container Security Initiative”, 
WLNR 7192695, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, 21 April 2004  
1769
 The provision also refers to “certain minimum requirements” and “adequate inspection technology”, thereby 
lessening the criteria for seaports to satisfy before joining the CSI group of seaports. 
1770
 Multilateral agreement is the appropriate method of regulating global resources, see Panel, U.S. – Tuna I, para. 
5.28. 
1771
 Supra n. 281. 
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“Overly restrictive, unnecessarily costly, or reactionary security measures to reduce 
vulnerabilities can result in long-term harm to the United States and global economies, 
undermine positive countermeasures, and unintentionally foster and environment conducive to 
terrorism.”1772 
 
The complainant could argue that the United States is unreasonable in invoking Article XXI 
because the CSI unjustifiably discriminates against non-member seaports. The measure 
effectively creates “bilateral security corridors” between the United States and CSI member states 
which grant preferential trading conditions.1773 According to one report this runs the risk of 
creating a two-tier system of trade with nations divided into “favoured and less-favoured trading 
partners.”1774 The following statement by the former U.S. Customs Commissioner suggests that 
this is CBP’s intention.1775  
 
“In the not-too-distant future, I see two types of shipments entering the United States - those that 
are low risk, and that will speed through the “green lane” into the U.S. economy, and everybody 
else.”1776 
 
Such an approach could have severe economic consequences for states whose seaports are not 
invited to participate in the measure. Developing countries are at particular risk in this regard and 
the failure of CBP to take their needs into account constitutes a clear breach of the Preamble to 
the Marrekech Agreement.1777 
 
                                                  
1772
 The NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, p. 19.  
1773
 See John Arnold, Best Practices in Management of International Trade Corridors, The World Bank Group, 
Transport Papers, (TP-13), December 2006, p.5 ff..  Like a bilateral trade corridor, this security corridor is based on 
bilateral agreement (only it pertains to security not trade), is governed by legislation (24 Hour Rule and SAFE Port 
Act) and involves a wide range of stakeholders. Security also plays a role in trade corridors (pp. 9 – 10). 
1774
 See OECD REPORT 2005, p. 54 at  para. 157.  
1775
 See Appellate Body, US – Gasoline, p. 28, stating that discrimination resulting from the method of 
implementation “must have been foreseen, and not merely inadvertent or unavoidable.” This issue is relevant to the 
question of reasonableness because if the member state has chosen a method of implementation knowing that it 
would lead to serious economic harm to other states, it would not be fulfilling its obligations under the multilateral 
trade system in good faith and would therefore be acting unreasonably.  
1776
 See U.S. Customs Commissioner, Remarks of 30 October 2003. 
1777
 Supra pp. 150 - 155 
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The Complainant could argue that the CSI has exercised its right unreasonably because it has 
taken no steps to ensure that the CSI does not unduly restrict trade owing to discriminatory and 
arbitrary administration. In particular, the statutory provisions that seek to regulate the CSI do not 
contain any appeal procedures for importers affected by the measure and do not reflect any 
principles of international law or best practices.1778 In addition, the measure remains non-
reciprocal insofar as it does not recognize the security standards of other countries or 
organizations.1779  
 
The United States is unreasonable in invoking Article XXI to justify 100 percent scanning. The 
effects of this measure suggest that it is a hidden restriction on trade. 100 percent scanning 
dispenses with risk assessment and imposes a blanket scanning requirement on all containers 
entering the United States. It therefore makes no attempt to balance the needs of trade facilitation 
with security controls. The measure is also inherently discriminatory because the technology 
required to carry out 100 percent scanning is likely to be out of reach of developing countries. 
The potential repercussions of this policy would be felt both within and outside the United 
States1780 and it has been strongly opposed by the White House (as being “neither executable nor 
feasible”)1781 as well as international organizations, including the World Shipping Council.1782 It 
also appears to contradict the United States’ own assertion that “[t]here need not be an inherent 
conflict between the demand for security and the need for facilitating travel and trade essential to 
continued economic growth”1783 and that “[s]ecurity must be a team effort.”1784 The introduction 
of this measure is imminent owing to the recent approval of H.R. 1 by the Senate and is set to 
enter into force no later than 2012. Senators supporting the bill have argued that the scanning of 
all containers entering the United States is “reasonably available” insofar as there are two ports in 
China and Russia which operate such a strategy.1785  
 
                                                  
1778
 Supra pp. 39 - 42 
1779
 Supra pp. 326 - 328 
1780
 See NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, p. 8 ([A] disruption or slowing of the flow of almost any 
item can have widespread implications for the overall market, as well as upon the national economy”).  
1781
 Supra n. 730.  
1782
 WSC, Statement of 30 July 2007.  
1783
 THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, p. 8. 
1784
 THE INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND COORDINATION STRATEGY, p. 4. 
1785
 However, the technical feasibility of this strategy has been rejected by international organizations: see e.g. WSC, 
Statement of 30 July 2007. 
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As stated above, the abus de droit doctrine per se is not only limited to cases of discrimination 
and trade restrictions and if it is accepted that it represents an implied condition of the exceptions 
other constellations of abuse could be possible. In particular, the complainant could argue that the 
CSI breaches the equality of nations under international law and is nothing more than a political 
measure which responds to domestic political pressure to take security measures. The following 
deals with these two points in turn. 
 
The complainant could argue that the CSI violates the principle of the sovereign equality of states 
as enshrined in Article 2 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations1786 and recognized by the 
WTO.1787 Through its strategy of “pushing the borders outwards”, the United States makes the 
territory of other states its first line of defence and thereby shifts the risk of a terrorist explosion 
to foreign territories. As stated above, it is doubtful whether the bilateral agreements which 
implement the CSI at foreign seaports can be viewed as voluntary agreements per se because the 
United States has used the threat of trade sanction to pressurize states into giving their 
consent.1788 This arguably violates Resolution 36/103 of the United Nations which prohibits a 
state from interfering “in any form or for any reason whatsoever in the internal and external 
affairs of other States.”1789 Invoking Article XXI in order to justify acts which are illegal under 
international law would constitute an unreasonable application of the security exception.1790 In 
the event that a bomb did explode in a CSI harbour, the United States may be liable for a 
wrongful act in accordance with the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International 
Wrongful Acts in 1996.1791 This general rule that a state is liable for the damage arising from its 
                                                  
1786
 Article 2 (1) states “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” 
1787
 Pascal Lamy, The Place of the WTO and Its Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EURJIL 969, pp. 972 – 
973. 
1788
 Ravi Agarwal, Shifting Environmental Risks, India Together, “Environmental improvement is considered by 
many to be a simple question of using the right technology to clean-up and reduce pollution. It is not instantly 
obvious that such a clean-up could be the cause of a problem somewhere else.” 
< http://www.indiatogether.org/environment/opinions/raviag02-1.htm >. 
1789
 Paragraph 1, United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and 
Interference in the Internal Affairs of States (A/RES/36/103), 9 December 1981. Paragraph 2 (b) prohibits “coercion 
or threat in any form whatsoever.” 
1790
 Panizzon supra n. 1555. Alternatively, if the acts are not considered illegal under international law, The  Draft 
Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities may apply (cf. esp. Articles 9 & 10). 
1791
 They generally provide that where a state is in breach of its international obligations, it is responsible for the 
damage arising from that breach. See Commentary to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International 
Wrongful Acts, pp. 59-60. The International Law Commission selected state responsibility as suitable for 
codification in 1949 at its first session. It commenced the study of state responsibility at its seventh session in 1955. 
The Commission adopted the text of the draft articles on state responsibility at its 2459th meeting on 12 July 1996. 
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wrongful acts is subject to exceptions, including consent, necessity and self-defence.1792 
Assuming that the bilateral agreements are not considered valid, the only defence open to the 
United States would be Article 24 (1), which states that a situation of distress may preclude the 
wrongfulness of an act, provided there is no alternative. However, as discussed above, there is a 
reasonably available alternative to the United States in the form of multilateral agreement and it 
is unlikely to be acting in a situation of distress considering that the threat of maritime terrorism 
does not amount to an emergency in international relations. 
 
Finally, the complainant could argue that the United States is invoking Article XXI unreasonably 
because it is attempting to justify a measure which is primarily serves political aims before 
establishing its true costs and consequences.1793 Evidence of this is provided by the Dubai Ports 
controversy and 100 percent scanning as well as Phase III of the CSI.1794 Although senators 
complained that this transaction represented an unacceptable security risk,1795 it had been 
approved by the Committee on Foreign Investment1796 and simply reflected the involvement of 
                                                                                                                                                                
The Commission has now completed its second reading of the Draft Articles and adopted the final text of the Articles 
and accompanying commentaries in August 2001 at the end of its 53rd session. See 
< http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf >.  
1792
 Chapter V, Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness.  
1793
 FLYNN, p. 10. 
1794
 Florestal, p. 403 (“And certainly Pakistan is a poster-child for the tangible benefits that accrue to co-operative 
partners in the War on Terror”). 
1795
 S. Hrg. 109 – 877, (comment of Patty Murray), p. 12 (“Two months ago, the American people woke up and 
spoke out when they heard that a foreign-government-owned company could be running our ports”); (testimony of 
James P. Hoffa), p. 43 (“We believe that American ports should be run by Americans. We believe that port security 
should be managed by Americans”). 
1796
 The Exon-Florio Amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Amending Section 721 of 
the Defense Production Act 1950 and codified at US Code 50 App. 50a § 2170, available under 
< http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/search/display.html?terms=2170&url=/uscode/html/uscode50a/usc_sec_50a_0
0002170----000-.html >) by providing the President with a mechanism to review and restrict foreign direct 
investment that presents a risk to national security.1796 The President delegated this authority to the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) by Section 3-201 of Executive Order 12661 (Amending 
Executive Order 11858 of 7 May 1975, Chapter 31 available under < http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/12661.html >). This Committee is an interagency body, composed of the 
representatives of twelve U.S. government agencies and departments. It has primary responsibility within the 
Executive Branch for monitoring the impact of foreign investment in the United States and for coordinating the 
implementation of United States policy on such investment (EO 11858, Section 1 (a)(b)). According to Section 7(1) 
EO 1158, the Committee is designated to receive notices and other information, to determine whether investigations 
should be undertaken, and to make investigations, pursuant to Section 721(a) of the Defense Production Act. Upon 
completion or termination of any investigation, the Committee shall report to the President and present a 
recommendation. National security is not defined in the regulations and this reflects the intention that the term is to 
be defined “interpreted broadly and without limitation to particular industries.” See 30 CFR 800, p. 1006 
(“Ultimately, under Section 721 and the Constitution the judgment as to whether a transaction threatens national  
security rests within the President's discretion”). In 1992 Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act 
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foreign companies in the operation of port facilities.1797 Following its termination, senators used 
the failed transaction as illustrating the need for tighter port controls.1798 This desire to make 
political capital out of maritime security is can also be seen in the recent Sail Only if Scanned 
Act. Despite the opposition to this bill by CBP, the U.S. administration as well as international 
organizations owing to the disruption it is likely to cause, the bill has recently been passed into 
law. The United States1799 has not been alone in using Article XXI to justify such measures in the 
past.1800 However, the limitations and conditions of the national security exception suggest that it 
cannot be used to justify measures predominantly motivated by political concerns.1801 Invoking a 
provision for a different purpose than that for which it is intended constitutes a clear case of 
abuse.1802 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
for Fiscal Year 1993 (the so-called “Byrd Amendment”) which amended the Exon-Florio statute. Section 837(a) of 
this Act authorizes the CFIUS to undertake an investigation in any instance in which an entity controlled by or acting 
on behalf of a foreign government seeks to engage in any merger, acquisition, or takeover which could result in 
control of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States that could affect the national security of the 
United States (USC50 App. 50a §2170(b)). 
1797
 See Trujillo and Nombela, pp. 5, 16 ff.. 
1798
 See Jill Caiazzo and Cyndee Todgham et al, pp. 192 – 193;  contra comment of Daniel E. Lungren Hearing of 5 
April 2006, p. 13 (“I think it is important to note that neither this effort in the Senate nor the companion effort in the 
House with the SAFE Ports Act is an afterthought to the recent Dubai Ports World controversy.”) However, it is 
worth noting that all senators regard the transaction as a security risk, see pp. 3, 12, 31.  
1799
 In 1949 against Czechoslovakia, in 1984 against Nicaragua and  in 1996 against Cuba. The WTO Secretariat has 
noted that “U.S. trade policies are connected to its broader policy aims.” US TRADE POLICY REVIEW 2004, para. 18; 
see also US TRADE POLICY REVIEW 2006, p. 14, para. 9, “The United States continues to pursue a policy of 
advancing open markets and the rule of law as part of a broader global security objective.”  
1800
 The United States is not alone in regarding Article XXI as linked to its foreign policy aims. See e.g. trade 
sanctions applied by the European Union against Argentina for non-economic reasons in 1982 (supra n. 1265). The 
trade embargoes in this case were adopted in a display of solidarity with another member state. However, the states 
in question were not confronted by any threat to their essential security interests. In addition, none of the situations 
covered by Article XXI (b) (i) – (iii) appear to have existed. See C/M/157, p. 2. The Argentinian representative 
complained that “the measures were based on reasons of a political nature and were meant to exert political pressure 
on the sovereign decisions of Argentina in order to intervene in a conflict in which only one of the countries 
concerned was involved.” Clearly, the economic sanctions applied by members who were not involved in the conflict 
are objectively difficult to justify under Article XXI. 
1801
 See Spanogle, p. 1338 “[Article XXI]… may not be available for trade-related measures, but it does seem 
available for politically motivated measures.” 
1802
 Panizzon supra n. 1555. 
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4. Final Result: Does the CSI Comply with WTO Law?  
 
On the balance of probabilities, the Panel is likely to hold that the Container Security 
Initiative is not justified by Article XXI and therefore contravenes WTO law. 
 
In order to comply with Article XXI, the United States must satisfy three requirements. In this, 
the burden of proof is on United States to justify its claims by establishing a prima facie case. If 
succeeds in doing so, the complainant would then have to adduce its own evidence to refute the 
presumption of justification. As stated earlier, the standard of review is basically objective but 
defers to the member states invoking the provision in cases of doubt (pp. 239 – 240). The 
findings of the dissertation with regard to the three requirements are summarized below: 
 
 Likely Uncertain Unlikely  
1) Does the CSI fall within the Scope of Article XXI? 
 Does the CSI relate to fissionable materials? 
 X  
 Is the war on terror “a state of war”? 
  X 
 Is maritime terrorism “an emergency”? 
  X 
 Is there a threat to maritime transport? 
 X  
2) Is the CSI “necessary”? 
 Does the CSI protect “essential security interests”? 
 X  
 Is the CSI effective? 
 X  
 Is the CSI the least trade-restrictive measure available? 
  X 
3) Has the CBP used its right under Article XXI “reasonably”? 
 Is the CSI unjustifiably and arbitrarily discriminatory? X   
 Is the CSI a disguised restriction on trade? X   
 
 
1. It is uncertain or unlikely that the CSI will be deemed to fall within the scope of Article 
XXI 
It is uncertain whether the Panel would hold that the CSI falls under Article XXI (b) (i) as a 
security measure which relates to fissionable materials (pp. 296 – 297). On the one hand, CBP 
has expressly stated that the reason for its introduction was to prevent a “dirty bomb” from 
entering the United States (p. 297) and, on the other, jurisprudence suggests that the Panel may 
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well decide to interpret the term “relating to” in a narrow sense (i.e. “primarily aimed at”) (pp. 
267 – 268). If the Panel were to hold otherwise, the standard imposed by this provision would 
arguably be too low. The Panel is unlikely to hold that the “war on terror” constitutes a “time of 
war” under Article XXI (b) (iii) because this understanding of war does not correspond to the 
applicable international law (p. 300). In addition, maritime terrorism is unlikely to be deemed an 
“emergency in international relations” because evidence suggests that terrorist attacks on vessels 
and maritime facilities are too small-scale and sporadic (pp. 301 ff.). As far as the threat to U.S. 
maritime container transport is concerned, the Panel is likely to adopt a deferential standard to the 
arguments of the United States (pp. 304 – 305). That said, it is unlikely that the United States will 
be able to present enough evidence to substantiate a level of threat justifying the severity of the 
security measures introduced (particularly 100 percent scanning) (pp. 308 – 310).  
 
2. It is unlikely or uncertain that the CSI will be deemed “necessary” 
The Panel is likely to hold that the CSI seeks to protect the “essential security interests” of the 
United States owing to the economic importance of seaports for societies generally (pp. 311 – 
314). Although the effectiveness of the measure has been doubted, the improvements mandated 
by the SAFE Port Act 2006 may satisfy the Panel that action has been taken to remedy this 
situation (pp. 322 – 324). On the other hand, the CSI is clearly not the least trade-restrictive 
measure reasonably available because it would be possible for CBP to offer an agreement based 
on the WCO’s Framework of Standards to all states and to mutually recognize the security 
standards of other states without jeopardizing its own security standards (pp. 327 – 328). 
Amending the measure in this way would not require a large scale overhaul of the CSI either 
because the Framework of Standards is largely modelled on the CSI and C-TPAT (pp. 49 – 51). 
 
3. It is unlikely or uncertain that the CBP will be deemed to have exercised its right under 
Article XXI “reasonably”  
Should the examination move to the final stage of the test, the Panel is likely to hold that the 
United States has failed to reasonably exercise its right to take security measures under Article 
XXI. This is because the CSI, in its present form, is unjustifiably discriminatory (pp. 329) and a 
disguised restriction on trade (p. 330). The investigation has also suggested that it may be 
possible for the complainant to prove other forms of abuse as well.  
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